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This study makes use of reports, resolutions, analyses, and other internal 
documents as well as oral history interviews in order to detail the construction, 
functioning, and output of foreign policy expertise n the GDR. Subordination to the 
practical needs and political-ideological requirements of the leadership of the ruling 
Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) represented the defining feature of East German 
foreign policy expertise. Yet its full politicization, which was essentially complete by the 
late 1960s as the SED succeeded in establishing a comprehensive system of foreign 
policy expertise tailored to meet its particular vision, entailed the maintenance of a degree 
of professional and intellectual autonomy—the GDR’s Außenpolitiker, or foreign policy 
professionals, were expected not only to comply with the political and ideological 
postulates espoused by the party leadership but also o deliver sound, specialist analysis 
of international relations. The persistent tension between these contrasting objectives was 
directly reflected in the output of East German experts, who in the conditions of 
diplomatic isolation prevailing until the early 1970s formulated a GDR-specific 
conception of international relations that fused clear identification of East Germany’s 
realpolitical interests with the Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as a form of class 
struggle. Following foreign policy normalization in the first half of the 1970s, however, 
increasing specialization and professionalization matched with a dramatic increase in 
East German experts’ exposure to the capitalist West, including integration into a 
transnational network of foreign policy specialists, allowed the specialist element of 
expertise to gain preponderance over the dogmatic-ideological element. The great 
challenge to the international position of the Soviet Bloc and the GDR represented by the 
“second Cold War” in the first half of the 1980s then prompted East German experts to 
abandon simplistic adherence to Marxist-Leninist foreign policy dogma in favor of 
prioritization of the concrete realpolitical interests of the GDR. In the process, the GDR’s 
experts formulated a body of non-dogmatic foreign policy thought that mirrored the 
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In August 1989, the Institute for International Politics and Economics, East Germany’s 
leading research institution on the capitalist West, completed an internal study that 
ascertained how “altered external and internal conditions have led to changes not only in 
the appearance but also in the character of [capitalism’s] development.” The report’s 
authors described how its continued economic dynamism matched with increasing 
interdependence in the international arena meant tht in erited assumptions about the 
nature of capitalism had to be re-thought: “The determination of our prospects and 
strategic goals cannot—as has become apparent—be based upon expectation of the 
ineluctable demise of capitalism in the sense of absolute bounds of its development.” 
Capitalism, in sharp contrast to the traditional Marxist-Leninist view that claimed 
“imperialism” was inherently bellicose and bound to wind up in the dustbin of history, 
was described in the report as “capable of peace and compatible with civilization,” which 
in turn required that East Germany and the Soviet Bloc abandon the notion of the 
fundamental incompatibility of capitalism and socialism and work for substantive and 
permanent rapprochement between the two opposed blocs.1 
 The present dissertation makes use of reports, memoranda, resolutions, analyses, 
and other internal documents as well as oral history interviews conducted with figures 
formerly active within the East German foreign policy apparatus in order to examine the 
development of East German foreign policy expertise during the Cold War and, starting 
in the late 1970s, the emergence among East German experts of a non-dogmatic current 
                                                 
1 Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen d r DDR im Bundesarchiv (hereafter SAMPO-
BArch) DY 30/IV 2/2.035/6. All translations, unless otherwise noted, are the author’s own. 
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of foreign policy thought that expressed ideas likethose sketched above as part of a 
larger break with inherited Marxist-Leninist, class-based assumptions about international 
relations. The seeming incongruity of formulation of a body of reformist-oriented foreign 
policy thought under a party leadership considered—rightly so in many ways—to be the 
most obstinately ideological of all Soviet satellit states in Eastern and Central Europe 
stemmed from the specific configuration of foreign policy expertise in the German 
Democratic Republic (GDR). East German Außenpolitiker, or foreign policy 
professionals, were expected both to comply with the political and ideological 
requirements of the leadership of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and 
to produce sound, specialist-based analysis of interna ional relations. Their rather 
paradoxical task thus consisted in providing reliable expertise in order to understand and 
fight East Germany’s Cold War “class enemy,” the capitalist West. The presence of these 
contrasting objectives resulted in a persistent tension, captured nicely by the evocative 
German term Spannungsverhältnis, between intellectual subordination and autonomy that 
lent foreign policy expertise in the GDR its own distinct developmental dynamic and 
decisively shaped its functioning and output. 
 The critical tendency within East German foreign policy expertise that would 
culminate in the type of reformist thought described above was kept in bounds for the 
first two decades of the state’s existence by the diplomatic isolation outside of the Soviet 
Bloc to which the GDR was subjected by West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine. Owing to 
the peculiar foreign policy conditions facing East Germany into the first half of the 
1970s—national division, diplomatic isolation, acute dependency on the Soviet Union, 
pronounced reliance on the Soviet Bloc—the GDR’s concrete foreign policy interests 
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were uniquely compatible with the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
international relations, to a degree unmatched in other Soviet satellite states, and East 
German experts correspondingly formulated a GDR-specific conception of international 
relations that fused identification of East Germany’s geo-strategic interests with 
ideological precepts drawn from the Marxist-Leninist canon. Within this framework, 
international relations were understood essentially n ideological terms—to a significant 
degree, ideology became reality for East German foreign policy experts. 
 However, foreign policy normalization in the first half of the 1970s, which saw 
the GDR establish diplomatic relations with the world outside the Soviet Bloc, appeared 
to change all of this and unleashed the critical potential resident within East German 
foreign policy expertise. Following integration into the international order, the GDR no 
longer appeared as an artificial construct of the Cold War but rather as a “status quo” 
actor on the international stage theoretically equal to ny other sovereign state.2 The GDR 
was rid, for good or ill, of its previous insularity and became fully exposed to the vagaries 
of international relations—East German experts now had to analyze and illuminate the 
GDR’s increasingly complex foreign relations without being able to retreat to the type of 
ideological dogmatism that had served as the natural def ult under the conditions of 
imposed isolation. Concurrent with foreign policy normalization, experts from the 
Institute for International Relations and the Institute for International Politics and 
Economics, the GDR’s two leading foreign policy research institutes, became integrated 
into a transnational network of foreign policy specialists by taking up and maintaining 
contact with their counterparts in the capitalist West. As East German experts engaged in 
                                                 
2 The concept is drawn from Adam Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973, 
2nd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974). 
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a dialog with their numerous and diverse Western patners, the bonds of the rigid, 
dogmatic understanding of international relations as the unfolding of the class struggle on 
the international stage that had been inherited from the pre-normalization era perforce 
slackened. East German experts recognized that the complexities of contemporary 
international relations, of which they were now gaining first-hand knowledge, were a 
poor fit for that same understanding. The discrepancy between the reality of the foreign 
relations East German experts were charged with analyzi g and the Marxist-Leninist 
postulates they were expected to apply began to grow steadily. 
 East German experts’ central, paradoxical task of complying with the party line 
while simultaneously producing accurate, specialist-based analysis of international 
relations remained unchanged, but the importance of the expert over the ideological 
element in experts’ work steadily mounted until the former’s preponderance over the 
latter became overwhelming in the 1980s. The stage was set for East German experts’ 
break with the prevailing Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations. 
Domestic stagnation paired with the capitalist West’s frontal challenge to the 
international position of the Soviet Bloc in the form of the “second Cold War” created a 
situation where the results of expert studies on the most central questions facing the 
GDR—arms control and East-West relations, the streng h and strategy of the capitalist 
West, economic development and political cohesion in the Soviet Bloc, relations with the 
developing world—repeatedly and unambiguously pointed to the incongruence of the 
existing interpretive framework with the existing state of international relations and the 
GDR’s place therein. As Marxism-Leninism proved sorely lacking as an analytical tool, 
East German experts working at the foreign ministry, in Günter Sieber’s International 
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Relations Division, at Max Schmidt’s Institute for International Politics and Economics, 
and at Gerhard Hahn’s Institue for International Relations prioritized pragmatic 
realpolitical considerations over adherence to rigid deological postulates, which 
appeared woefully out-of-step with the reality of the international situation East German 
experts were charged with analyzing. In the process, the GDR’s experts, sometimes 
tacitly, sometimes openly, rejected the central principles of the dogmatic class-based 
understanding of international relations that had long functioned as the standard template 
for understanding the world, producing views like those outlined in the opening 
paragraph above. The result was a body of non-dogmatic foreign policy thought that bore 
remarkable resemblance to the Soviet “New Thinking.” 
 The case of East German experts and their striking break with a class-based 
understanding of international relations in the conditions of the ideologically rigid East 
German dictatorship addresses a set of broader questions involving ideology, professional 
expertise, internationalization, and dictatorship. To wit: In what way does ideology shape 
how dictatorial regimes perceive the outside world an in what way does it influence how 
such regimes formulate foreign policy? How can the place and function of ideology 
within dictatorial regimes change over time in response to both internal and external 
stimuli? How do a state’s level of integration into the international political order and 
involvement in transnational processes influence such changes? What, finally, is the 
nature of the relationship between ideology and professional expertise in dictatorial 
regimes, how are the often contrasting requirements a d aims of the two dealt with by 
authorities, and how can the resulting tension potentially produce changes within 
dictatorial regimes? East Germany provides a rich hstorical case study to illuminate this 
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set of questions as the transition from diplomatic isolation to wide-ranging foreign policy 
engagement was particularly pronounced in the GDR, a state whose self-understanding 
and self-presentation were highly ideological from start to finish. East German Foreign 
policy expertise in particular, furthermore, represent  a uniquely appropriate field for 
investigation of the complexities surrounding the issues of ideology, professional 
expertise, internationalization, and dictatorship since the potential for tension between the 
ideological and the expert was great in the work of East German specialists, who had to 
comply with the dictates of a party leadership fixated on maintenance of a “firm Marxist-
Leninist perspective” yet also in need of sound analysis of international relations that 
could be of value in the process of foreign policy formulation. 
 The highly ideological orientation prevalent in East Germany has been well 
established. The GDR was a creation of that forty-five year span of time in the twentieth 
century known as the Cold War and typified by the “clash of systems” between socialist 
East, led by the Soviet Union, and capitalist West, l d by the United States. The GDR 
arose from the condition of systemic East-West rivalry nd exited the historical stage as 
soon as the chronic Cold War antagonism between the two rival systems of social 
organization had come to an end. As Hermann Wentker has put it, the Cold War was the 
decisive precondition for the genesis (Entstehungsbedingung) of both East and West 
Germany following the total defeat of Nazi Germany in the Second World War, but only 
for East Germany was the Cold War also the decisive precondition of its existence 
(Existenzbedingung): “In its entire forty-year history, [the GDR] remained an artifact 
existentially dependent upon maintenance of the East-West conflict.”3 The character of 
                                                 
3 Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 8. 
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East Germany as an exclusive creation of the Cold War in turn points to the fact that the 
GDR, for all the features it had in common with theother Soviet satellite states in Central 
and Eastern Europe in terms of political structure, repressive apparatus, economic 
organization, and social policy, also represented a case apart. 
 The primary reason for the GDR’s uniqueness within e Soviet Bloc lay in 
division of the German nation, both cause and effect of the Cold War, into two separate, 
antagonistic, and ideologically antithetical states of contrasting socio-economic 
organization and political order. East Germany’s resulting inability to establish its 
legitimacy on a national basis, as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the other states 
of the Soviet Bloc could, as well as the necessity to distinguish itself from its West 
German rival meant that the GDR was compelled to ground its legitimacy purely in non-
national ideological terms—on the basis of Marxism-Leninism—and to structure its self-
understanding around membership in the Soviet Bloc, which after all served as ultimate 
guarantor of its continued existence. Sigrid Meuschel has highlighted how this 
constellation of issues raised Marxist-Leninist ideology to a position of importance in 
East Germany unparalleled in other Soviet Bloc state : “Due to the division of Germany, 
the SED did not possess a self-evident, incontestable national basis…. The ruling 
ideology gained the character of a raison d’etat in greater measure than in other socialist 
states… In light of its precarious national basis, [The SED] had a vital interest in keeping 
the GDR in harmony with the elementary structures and ways of functioning of the 
socialist bloc. Only bloc cohesion could guarantee the existence of the GDR, and it had to 
rest upon normative definitions that allowed the SED to make clear the distinct antithesis 
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between the constitution of its state and that of is western adversary.”4 As numerous 
specialized studies have shown, Marxism-Leninism in the GDR did not merely fulfill the 
ideological function of justifying and veiling dictatorship5—although that is one function 
it certainly did fulfill—but also as a template for SED authorities’ understanding of 
politics and their formulation of concrete policy decisions. Ideological motives, for 
instance, exercised a significant, at times decisive, influence on SED policy in areas as 
diverse as education,6 religion,7 industrial relations,8 memory,9 sport,10 film,11 consumer 
                                                 
4 Sigrid Meuschel, Legitimation und Parteiherrschaft in der DDR. Zum Paradox von Stabilität und 
Revolution in der DDR 1945-1989 (Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 20 
5 Hermann Weber, “Marxismus-Leninismus und die soziale Umgestaltung der SBZ/DDR. Die 
Instrumentalisierung des Marxismus-Leninismus,” in Materialien der Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung 
von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland” vol. 3: Rolle und Bedeutung der Ideologie, 
integrativer Faktoren und disziplinierender Praktiken in Staat und Gesellschaft der DDR (Baden Baden: 
Nomos, 1995), pt. 3, p. 18. 
6 Birgit Werner, Sonderpädagogik im Spannungsfeld zwischen Ideologie und Tradition. Zur Geschichte der 
Sonderpädagogik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Hilfsschulpädagogik in der SBZ und der DDR 
zwischen 1945 und 1952 (Hamburg: Kovac, 1999), Bernd John, Ideologie und Pädagogik. Zur Geschichte 
der Vergleichenden Pädagogik in der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998); John Rodden, Textbook Reds: 
Schoolbooks, Ideology, and Eastern German Identity (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2006); Ralph Jessen, Akademische Elite und kommunistische Diktatur. Die ostdeutsche 
Hochschullehrerschaft in der Ulbricht-Ära (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999). 
7 Alfred Hoffmann, “Mit Gott einfach fertig.” Untersuchungen zu Theorie und Praxis des Atheismus im 
Marxismus-Leninismus der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Leipzig: Benno, 2000); Bernd Schaefer, 
Staat und Katholische Kirche in der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998); Josef Schmid, Kirchen, Staat und 
Politik in Dresden zwischen 1975 und 1989 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998). 
8 Wolfgang Zimmermann, Die industrielle Arbeitswelt der DDR unter dem Primat der sozialistischen 
Ideologie, exemplarisch untersucht am Schrifttum über Nacht- und Schichtarbeit (Münster: Lit, 2000). 
9 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997); Josie McLellan, Antifascism and Memory in East Germany: Remembering the 
International Brigades, 1945-1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Christina Morina, 
“Vernichtungskrieg, Kalter Krieg und politisches Gedächtnis: Zum Umgang mit dem Krieg gegen die 
Sowjetunion im geteilten Deutschland,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 34 (2008): 252-291. 
10 Uta Balbier, Kalter Krieg auf der Aschenbahn. Deutsch-deutscher Sport 1950-72, eine politische 
Geschichte (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2007); Hans Joachim Teichler, “H rrschaft und Eigensinn im DDR-
Sport,” in Transformationen des deutschen Sports seit 1939, ed. Michael Krüger (Hamburg: Czwalina, 
2001), 233-249; Hansjörg Geiger, “Das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit und der Leistungssport,” in 
Körper, Kultur und Ideologie. Sport und Zeitgeist im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, eds. Irene Diekmann and 
Hans Joachim Teichler (Bodenheim: Philo, 1997), 217- 4 . 
11 Dorothea Becker, Zwischen Ideologie und Autonomie. Der DDR-Blick auf die deutsche Filmgeschichte 
(Münster: Lit, 1999). 
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culture,12 and journalism.13 In the realm of international relations, the ideologically 
inspired concepts “peaceful coexistence,” “proletarian internationalism,” and “anti-
imperialist solidarity” similarly represented key elements in the SED’s basic 
understanding of the field and exercised a correspondingly significant, though variable, 
influence on the formulation of actual foreign policy.14 Parallel to Meuschel’s stress on 
the importance of ideological legitimation for domestic politics, Ulrich Pfeil has 
demonstrated how the same set of concerns infused East German foreign policy with a 
particularly sharp ideological edge: “Only by demonstrating the superiority of socialism 
would [the GDR] have been in a position to buttress its right to exist and to legitimize its 
existence alongside the ‘bourgeois’ Federal Republic.”15 
 Yet ideology does not exist in a vacuum. Even in a highly ideological state like 
the GDR and with an ideology whose claim to validity was as comprehensive as that of 
Marxism-Leninism, any given body of ideological precepts is transformed in the course 
of its implementation in societal practice. Not just in East Germany, but in all the 
communist dictatorships of the Soviet Bloc, professional expertise was a main area where 
                                                 
12 Eli Rubin, Synthetic Socialism: Plastics and Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Jonathan R. Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: Money and 
Political Culture in East Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
13 Gunter Holzweißig, Die schärfste Waffe der Partei. Eine Mediegeschichte der DDR (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2002); Gunter Holzweißig, Klassenfeinde und “Entspannungsfeinde.” West-Medien im Fadenkreuz von 
SED und MfS (Berlin, 1995, Schriftenreihe des Berliner Landesbeauftragten für die Unterlagen des 
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR). 
14 Wentker, Außenpolitik; Ingrid Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, 
Mechanismen (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2000); Benno-Eide Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1976-1989. 
Strategien und Grenzen (Paderborn: Schönigh, 1999); Ulrich Pfeil, ed., Die DDR und der Westen, 
Transnationale Beziehungen 1949-1989 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001); Heike Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED 
1948/49-1961. “Arbeit nach Westdeutschland” durch die Nationale Front, das Ministerium für Auswärtige 
Angelegenheiten und das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (Berlin: Akademie, 1999); Michael Lemke, 
Einheit oder Sozialismus? Die Deutschlandpolitik der SED 1949-1961 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2001); Daniel 
Küchenmeister et al., eds., …abgegrenzte Weltoffenheit…Zur Außen- und Deutschlandpolitik der DDR 
(Schkeuditz: GNN, 1999). 
15 Ulrich Pfeil, “Die DDR und der Westen 1949-1989. Eine Einführung,” in Die DDR und der Westen, ed. 
Pfeil, 13. 
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the rigid tenets of Marxism-Leninism often had to be attenuated and reconciled with the 
specialized knowledge and idiosyncratic practices of expert communities. In certain 
fields of expertise, particularly those belonging to the humanities and social sciences 
closely connected in some way with the core tenets of Marxism-Leninism, nearly all 
traces of professional and intellectual autonomy were eliminated as their full 
subordination to the party’s political and ideological requirements was successfully 
effected. Thus, disciplines like history,16 philosophy,17 and sociology,18 were fully 
“synchronized” and became little more than purveyors and enforcers of the party line in 
their respective field. In other fields, however, while their political subordination was 
essentially total, a degree of professional and intellectual autonomy was maintained, 
mainly because complete ideologization proved impractic ble, counterproductive or both. 
Technical expertise and the natural sciences represnt in this case the signal example, 
where ideological considerations and criteria played an unmistakable role in individual 
fields of expertise, but where expert considerations a d criteria specific to a given 
discipline simultaneously maintained importance.19 Thus, in a complicated process of 
negotiation with party authorities, technical specialists and scientists in the Soviet Union, 
                                                 
16 Martin Sabrow, Das Diktat des Konsenses. Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR 1949-1969 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2001); Stefan Ebenfeld, Geschichte nach Plan? Die Instrumentalisierung der 
Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR am Beispiel des Museums für Deutsche Gescichte in Berlin (1950-
1955) (Marburg: Tectum, 2001); Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk, Legitimation eines neuen Staates. Parteiarbeiter 
an der historischen Front. Geschichtswissenschaft in der SBZ/DDR 1945 bis 1961 (Berlin: Ch. Links, 
1997). 
17 Volker Gerhardt and Hans Christoph Rau, eds., Anfänge der DDR-Philosophie. Ansprüche, Ohnmacht, 
Scheitern (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001); Guntolf Herzberg, Aufbruch und Abwicklung. Neue Studien zur 
Philosophie in der DDR (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2000); Hans-Jürgen Mende and Reinhard Mocek, eds., 
Gestörte Vernunft? Gedanken zu einer Standortbestimmung der DDR-Philosophie (Berlin: Luisenstadt, 
1996). 
18 Bernhard Schäfers, ed., Soziologie in Deutschland. Entwicklung, Institutionalisierung und Berufsfelder, 
Theoretische Kontroversen (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1995). 
19 For a useful overview on questions surrounding the relationship between science, modern dictatorship, 
and ideology, see Mark Walker, ed., Science and Ideology: A Comparative History (New York: Routledge, 
2003). 
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East Germany, and other Soviet Bloc states in fields such as physics,20 nuclear energy,21 
space research,22 engineering,23 cybernetics,24 medicine,25 micro-electronics,26 and 
mathematics,27 were able to carve out for themselves a certain amount of professional and 
intellectual autonomy.28 But also in areas like law and administration29 and the 
economy,30 a degree of professional expertise comparatively fr e of excessive 
ideologization had to be maintained in order to ensure disciplinary cohesion and practical 
efficacy, where each field of specialist activity was informed by the political and 
ideological requirements placed upon it by party leadership, but in turn also re-shaped 
political practice and ideology in accord with its own particular disciplinary needs. 
                                                 
20 Alexei Kojevnikov, Stalin’s Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists (London: 
Imperial College Press, 2004). 
21 Thomas Stange, Institut X. Die Anfänge der Kern- und Hochenergiephysik in der DDR (Stuttgart: 
Teubner, 2001); Paul Josephson, Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Program from Stalin to Today (New York: 
W. H. Freeman and Company, 2000); David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic 
Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994). 
22 Katharina Hein-Weingarten, Das Institut für Kosmosforschung der Akademie der Wissenschaften der 
DDR. Ein Beitrag zur Erfassung der Wissenschaftspolitik der DDR am Beispiel der Weltraumforschung 
von 1957 bis 1991 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2000); Asif Siddiqi, Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet 
Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
2000). 
23 Dolores L. Augustine, Red Prometheus: Engineering and Dictatorship in East Germany, 1945-1990 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), Loren R. Graham, The Ghost of the Executed Engineer: Technology 
and the Fall of the Soviet Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
24 Slava Gerovitch, From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2002), 
25 Anna-Sabine Ernst, “Die beste Prophylaxe ist der Sozialismus”: Ärzte und medizinische 
Hochschullehrer in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1961 (Münster: Waxmann, 1997). 
26 Gerhard Barkleit, Mikroelektronik in der DDR (Dresden: Hannah-Arendt-Institut für 
Totalitarismusforschung, 2000). 
27 Loren R. Graham, What Have We Learned About Science and Technology fr m the Russian Experience? 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
28 For useful overviews of the topic of scientific and technical expertise in East Germany and the Soviet 
Union, see, respectively, Kristie Macrakis and Dieter Hoffmann, eds., Science under Socialism: East 
Germany in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) and Loren R. 
Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
29 Ulrich Bernhardt, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft “Walter Ulbricht” 1948-
1971 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1997). 
30 André Steiner, Die DDR-Wirtschaftsreform der sechziger Jahre. Konflikt zwischen Effizienz und 
Machtkalkül (Berlin: Akademie, 1999). 
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 Foreign policy expertise was one such field of professional activity that for both 
reasons of practicability and expediency maintained a certain level of intellectual 
autonomy in the midst of complete political subordinat on. Throughout the Soviet Bloc, 
the object of analysis of foreign policy expertise—international relations—served as a 
constant check against excessive ideologization and required a degree of intellectual 
autonomy since international relations themselves could not be made subordinate to 
Marxist-Leninist precepts. A handful of scholars have provided valuable studies on 
foreign policy expertise in the Soviet Union that reveal the tensions between intellectual 
subordination and autonomy that were intrinsic to it.31 Robert English in particular has 
delivered an important account that details how Soviet “mezhdunarodniki,” or foreign 
policy professionals, played a key role in the articulation and promotion of New 
Thinking.32 Other scholars have tangentially addressed the issu n the Soviet context 
within a broader focus on the events of the Gorbachev era.33 Research that takes foreign 
                                                 
31 Gerhard Duda, Jenö Varga und die Geschichte des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik in 
Moskau, 1921-1970. Zu den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Auslandsanalyse in der 
Sowjetunion (Berlin: Akademie, 1994); Oded Aran, The Mezhdunarodniki: An Assessment of Professional 
Expertise in Soviet Foreign Policy (Tel Aviv: Turtledove Publishing, 1979); Jeffrey T. Checkel, Ideas and 
International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1997). 
32 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold 
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). In a 2005 article, English takes his argument further 
still, asserting that the New Thinking took root noonly among a farily narrow stratum of experts but 
among “a large section of the critical intelligentsia” and that it “did not merely signal a reconsideration of 
policy efficacy or recalculation of ends and means, but reflected instead a long-term and wholesale revision 
of beliefs, values, and identity.” Robert D. English, “The Sociology of New Thinking: Elites, Identity 
Change, and the End of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 2 (2005): 43-80. 
33 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Stephen Kotkin, 
Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Ofira 
Seliktar, Politics, Paradigms, and Intelligence Failures: Why So Few Predicted the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); Coit D. Blacker, Hostage to Revolution: Gorbachev and Soviet 
Security Policy, 1985-1991 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993); Sarah Mendelson, 
Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1998); Stephen Kull, Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign 
Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1992); Douglas Blum, “The Soviet Foreign Policy Belief System: Beliefs, 
Politics, and Foreign Policy Outcomes,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 4 (December 1993): 373-
394. 
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policy expertise as its focus, investigating how foreign policy experts fitted into the 
broader foreign policy apparatus and how they may have contributed to the development 
of new foreign policy paradigms, remains, however, rather scant for other Soviet Bloc 
states, including the GDR. 
 In literature dealing specifically with East German foreign policy, which has 
come into its own in recent years after issues of domestic politics had dominated 
historians’ research agenda,34 the topic of foreign policy expertise is rarely treated as a 
topic of importance in and of itself, but rather is typically only considered in relation to 
high politics in order to determine its influence on the formulation of actual foreign 
policy.35 Alternatively, a number of studies on individual exp rt institutions with diverse 
analytical foci and of varying chronological scope exist, but none places East German 
foreign policy expertise as a cohesive whole at the center of its analysis or devotes 
sufficient attention to the place of expertise within the broader East German foreign 
policy apparatus, of which it was a key component and which decisively shaped its 
functioning and output.36 Numerous memoirs and accounts written by “Zeitzeugen” who 
worked within the East German foreign policy apparatus, in addition to being colored by 
each author’s personal experiences and concerns, similarly provide in most cases only a 
snapshot of individual issues, personalities, and fcets of a much larger system without 
                                                 
34 For a detailed overview of the state of research on the GDR that, however, is no longer completely up-to-
date given the large number of studies that have come ut in the interim, see Rainer Eppelmann et al., eds., 
Bilanz und Perspektiven der DDR-Forschung (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schönigh, 2003). Less comprehensive 
but more streamlined and manageable is Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems and 
Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London: Arnold, 2002). 
35 Wentker, Außenpolitik; Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik; Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR; Pfeil, ed., Die 
DDR und der Westen; Amos, Die Westpolitik der SED; Lemke, Einheit oder Sozialismus?; Küchenmeister 
et al., eds., …abgegrenzte Weltoffenheit… 
36 Bernhardt, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft; Michael B. Klein, Das Institut 
für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft der DDR in seiner Gründungsphase 1971 bis 1974 (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1999); Erhard Crome, ed., Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für 
Internationale Beziehungen der DDR (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009). 
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addressing the discrete topic of foreign policy expertise in a thoroughgoing and 
consistently analytical manner.37 
 The result of the current state of research is a deficient understanding of East 
German foreign policy expertise as a whole and its position and role within the broader 
East German foreign policy apparatus. How was East German foreign policy expertise 
structured and how did it function? Which factors had the greatest influence on experts’ 
output and what was expertise on the myriad and changing foreign policy issues facing 
the GDR like? Did East German foreign policy experts, similar to their Soviet 
counterparts, enunciate a type of “East German New Thinking”? The present study seeks 
to close this research lacuna by investigating how the tension, the Spannungsverhältnis, 
between intellectual subordination and autonomy inherent to foreign policy expertise in 
the Soviet Bloc played out in the specific conditions prevailing in the GDR, where a 
particular set of domestic and foreign policy concer s lent Marxist-Leninist ideology a 
centrality unparalleled in other Soviet satellite states, yet where the transition from 
diplomatic isolation to foreign policy normalization, an experience in the Soviet Bloc 
unique to the GDR, had the potential to mitigate ideology’s centrality and to challenge 
the Marxist-Leninist paradigm in foreign policy thought. 
                                                 
37 Hermann Axen, Ich war ein Diener der Partei. Autobiographische Gepsräche mit Harald Neubert 
(Berlin: Edition Ost, 1996); Manfred Uschner, Die zweite Etage. Funktionsweise eines Machtapparates 
(Berlin: Dietz, 1993); Horst Grunert, Für Honecker auf glattem Parket. Erinnerungen eines DDR-
Diplomaten (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1995); Egon Winkelmann, Moskau, das war’s. Erinnerungen des DDR-
Botschafters in der Sowjetunion, 1981 bis 1987 (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1997); Karl Seidel, Berlin-Bonner 
Balance. 20 Jahre deutsch-deutsche Beziehungen: Erinerungen und Erkenntnisse eines Beteiligten 
(Berlin: Edition Ost, 2002); Joachim Mitdank, Berlin zwischen Ost und West. Erinnerungen eines 
Diplomaten (Berlin: Kai Homilius, 2004); Siegfried Bock et al., eds., Die DDR-Außenpolitik im 
Rückspiegel. Diplomaten im Gespräch (Münster: Lit, 2004) and Alternative deutsche Außenpolitik? DDR-
Außenpolitik im Rückspiegel (II) (Münster: Lit, 2006); Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, Deutsch-deutsche 
Erinnerungen (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 2000); Gerhard Kegel, In den Stürmen unseres Jahrhunderts. Ein 
deutscher Kommunist über sein ungewöhnliches Leben (B rlin: Dietz, 1983); Birgit Malchow, ed., Der 
Letzte macht das Licht aus. Wie DDR-Diplomaten das Jahr 1990 im Ausland erlebten (Berlin: Edition Ost, 
1999). 
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 Even if one were to accept Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s dismissive characterization of 
the GDR as little more than a footnote to history,38 a position which the author of the 
current study views as the result of adherence to an utmoded, overly narrow concern 
with social history located exclusively in the framework of the traditional nation-state, 
the case of East German foreign policy expertise would still possess considerable 
significance since it has important implications for one’s understanding of the 
relationship between professional expertise, ideology, internationalization, and modern 
dictatorship that extend well beyond the East German experience proper. Although the 
political subordination of East German foreign policy expertise was complete, there 
nevertheless existed a clear tension between intellec ual autonomy and intellectual 
subordination which stemmed from the very raison d’être of foreign policy expertise in 
the GDR. This tension allowed for the emergence of a critical tendency within expertise 
that was increasingly at odds with adherence to an unsophisticated, reductionist, class-
based approach to international relations. Under the conditions of diplomatic isolation, 
this critical tendency was largely kept in check, but the internationalization of foreign 
policy and the transnationalization of foreign policy expertise brought about in the early 
1970s by normalization facilitated its continued an steady growth until the 
preponderance of the expert over the ideological elem nt in East German foreign policy 
expertise became overwhelming by the 1980s. In this context, Marxism-Leninism 
continued to serve as the basic framework in which international relations were generally 
understood, but it was increasingly relegated to this position alone, i.e. of intellectual 
framing device, while the essential focus of expertis  shifted emphatically toward expert 
                                                 
38 Wehler essentially views the GDR as a temporary detour on Germany’s otherwise inexorable forward 
march along a trajectory of Western Weberian modernity. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte, vol. 5: Bundesrepublik und DDR 1949-1990 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008). 
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analysis of individual issues on the basis of specialist knowledge. After engagement with 
the world outside the Soviet Bloc had fulfilled the n cessary prerequisites for East 
German experts to bring their full knowledge to bear on the most pressing international 
relations issues facing the GDR, the West’s frontal ch llenge to the Soviet Bloc in the 
1980s provided the concrete catalyst for them to unleash their accrued critical potential. 
In a situation where the reality of international relations diverged sharply from how 
Marxism-Leninism claimed that reality should look, East German experts engaged in a 
critical re-assessment of the prevailing class-based understanding of international 
relations and developed a body of non-dogmatic foreign policy thought that bore striking 
resemblance to the Soviet New Thinking. 
 The GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise encompassed a network of 
institutions responsible for a variety of tasks, ranging from operative foreign policy such 
as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee’s International Relations 
Division to research and education such as the Institute for International Relations and 
the Institute for International Politics and Economics. While each institution within the 
system possessed its own specific institutional profile and objectives, all shared in 
common in one capacity or another the task of analyzing the foreign relations of the 
GDR. Furthermore, the functional differentiation existing between the diverse institutions 
of the GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise was subsumed under the unity of 
purpose provided by unambiguous subordination toward fulfilling the GDR’s foreign 
policy objectives as determined by the changing needs and priorities of the SED 
leadership. Operative and research foreign policy institutions were thus supposed to stand 
in a symbiotic relationship with one another where th  so-called “joining of theory with 
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practice” (i.e. their full political and ideological subordination to the requirements of the 
SED leadership) would be complete. The full political and ideological subordination of 
the GDR’s expert institutions—and the resulting Spannungsverhältnis—however, was 
not brought about over night. The history of East German foreign policy expertise is in 
large part the story of, first, the erection of an institutional framework in which this 
tension was established as the defining characteristic of foreign policy expertise and, 
then, the gradual increase in the importance of the expert over the ideological element 
until the former’s preponderance over the latter became overpowering in the 1980s. In the 
process, it was not simply a question of how foreign policy expertise was supposed to 
function according to “communist visions and theoris” but also how “the contested and 
messy attempts to implement them within new institutions” played out.39 And it is only 
within the framework in which it was formulated—the changing institutional 
configuration of East German foreign policy expertise—that changes in expert output can 
be understood. 
 The institutional development of East German foreign policy expertise proceeded 
in the 1950s not according to a regular, long-term plan or a cohesive vision, but rather 
haphazardly in response to the shifting needs and priorities of the SED leadership, which 
at the time accorded secondary importance to foreign policy. The result was a hastily 
created patchwork of institutions arbitrarily reacting to momentary exigencies and 
lacking thoroughgoing coordination that hardly warranted the designation “expert.” The 
quality of expertise produced in the course of the 1950s was consistent with this state of 
institutional underdevelopment, typically possessing l ttle analytical value and generally 
                                                 
39 Michael David-Fox, Revolution of the Mind: Higher Learning Among the Bolsheviks (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 2. 
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being characterized by a combination of shrill ideological overstatement, unfounded 
wishful thinking, and a shortage of information that went much beyond basic facts. Most 
significant was the absence among experts of a comprehensive conception of the place of 
the GDR in the international arena that clearly delineated the GDR’s specific foreign 
policy interests. 
 By the end of the 1960s, however, East German foreign policy expertise had been 
subjected to a concentrated process of rationalization in the service of synchronization. 
The “joining of theory with practice” was achieved in a manner where synchronization 
and rationalization proceeded hand in hand. A final push for the “systematization” of East 
German foreign policy expertise in the late 1960s and early 1970s capped the process, 
creating a well-organized, highly professional, andefficiently functioning system of 
foreign policy expertise where complete subordination o the practical needs and 
political-ideological requirements of the leadership of the SED as well as the attendant 
Spannungsverhältnis between intellectual subordination and autonomy were established 
as the central characteristics of East German foreign policy expertise. The basic 
institutional configuration and fundamental features of East German foreign policy 
expertise would remain essentially unchanged for the remainder of the GDR’s existence. 
 In tandem with the institutional development of a comprehensive system of 
foreign policy expertise, East German experts enunciated a comprehensive, GDR-specific 
conception of international relations that fused identification of the GDR’s concrete geo-
strategic interests with ideological precepts drawn from the Marxist-Leninist canon. 
Thus, the “clash of systems” (Systemauseinandersetzung) between socialism and 
capitalism represented the defining characteristic of nternational relations, foreign policy 
 19
was a direct reflection of social system and accordingly a form of the class struggle 
(Außenpolitik als Klassenpolitik), all international relations developments possessed 
significance only insofar as they related to and impacted the so-called international 
constellation of forces (das internationale Kräfteverhältnis), which moved inexorably in 
favor of socialism, and the character of the developing world was correspondingly 
believed to be “objectively anti-imperialist.” Further, the foreign policy interests of the 
GDR were understood as one and the same with the interests of an abstractly understood 
“international socialism,” which was embodied in con rete form by the Soviet Bloc. The 
critical tendency inherent in the Spannungsverhältnis between intellectual subordination 
and autonomy was stifled as a result of the GDR’s diplomatic isolation, which ensured a 
strong correlation, to a degree unmatched in other Soviet satellite states, between the 
actual conditions in which the GDR had to conduct foreign policy and the dichotomous 
Marxist-Leninist conception of international relations, effectively precluding any 
alternative understanding of international relations. 
 East German experts’ fusion in the pre-normalization era of the GDR’s 
realpolitical interests with Marxist-Leninist tenets to form a comprehensive conception of 
international relations speaks to an important, unsettled question in studies on East 
German foreign policy, namely, the degree to which ideological motivations versus 
geopolitical interests shaped the foreign policy of the GDR.40 The case of East German 
experts in the 1950s and 1960s reveals that the two elements, while not fully compatible, 
were also not fully contradictory, especially in the conditions of diplomatic isolation 
                                                 
40 See footnote 14. 
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prevailing at the time.41 This finding echoes Vladislav Zubok and Constantine 
Plehsakov’s identification of a “revolutionary-imperial paradigm” in Soviet foreign 
policy, where ideologically inspired revolutionary ambitions and pragmatic geopolitical 
interests were amalgamated and provided the basic template for Soviet foreign policy, 
within which the center of gravity tacked back and forth between the two contrasting, but 
not contradictory, poles.42 Such an approach that views ideology and realpolitik not as 
antithetical and fully distinct from one another but as overlapping and capable of cross-
fertilization43 is ideally suited to tracing change both within and to a given foreign policy 
paradigm, whether on the level of policy-analysts—the focus of the current study—or on 
the level of policy-makers—the focus of Zubok and Pleshakov’s study—since it 
construes the process of interaction between the two elements as dynamic and open-
ended, not as fixed, neither in development nor in utcome. The application of such an 
approach to East German foreign policy expertise further recommends itself since the 
GDR and the USSR, despite all their obvious differences, were twins insofar as Marxism-
Leninism was absolutely central to each state’s self-understanding, to a degree 
unmatched in other Soviet Bloc states, and was thoroughly incorporated into the very 
categories in which international relations were understood. And just as Marxism-
Leninism occupied a similar position in the GDR and the USSR, the integration of each 
                                                 
41 The fusion of ideology and realpolitik was not limited to GDR foreign policy in its entirety; it also 
occurred in discrete sub-fields, such as in relations with the Middle East. Angelika Timm, Hammer, Zirkel, 
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42 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev 
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43 Adam Ulam was an early proponent of such a view that by no means saw ideology and realpolitik as 
mutually exclusive, as the very name of his magnum opus suggests. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence. 
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state into the international order would set in motion parallel structural processes that 
fostered new modes of analyzing foreign policy: foreign policy normalization in the early 
1970s promoted the same type of non-dogmatic understanding of international relations 
among East German Außenpolitiker as the USSR’s post-Stalin opening to the West did 
among Soviet mezhdunarodniki. 
 When, in the wake of foreign policy normalization, East German experts 
established wide-ranging contact with their counterparts in the capitalist West, they 
became, to use Peter Haas’s definition of the term, members of a distinct epistemic 
community, “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue-area.”44 Scholarly contact with the capitalist West was intended to serve 
the dual goal of gaining valuable information in order to produce a more accurate, refined 
picture of the complexities of contemporary international relations, of which the SED 
leadership could make use in its formulation of foreign policy, and offensively 
representing and substantiating the East German position on outstanding international 
relations issues in order to facilitate the successful implementation of GDR foreign policy 
by increasing acceptance for it abroad. The attemptd union of contrasting, if not 
contradictory, scholarly and political objectives in East German experts’ contacts with the 
capitalist West thus became another element in the broader Spannungsverhältnis between 
the expert and the ideological in East German foreign policy expertise. While in the view 
of the SED leadership such contacts were supposed t function exclusively as a one-way 
conduit of influence from East to West, the essential politicization, to which these 
                                                 
44 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” in 
Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordinat on, ed. Peter M. Haas (Columbia, SC: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1997). 
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contacts were unmistakably subjected, was ultimately incapable of producing this 
outcome since the very purpose of such contacts entail d learning from and about the 
West, where an accurate assessment of the situation clashed with a strict ideological 
approach. The simple act of engaging in a dialog with Western partners, with whom East 
German experts increasingly viewed themselves as linked as members of a supranational 
expert community on the basis of shared specialized knowledge and a discrete set of 
professional standards, perforce led to a broadening of perspective, a convergence with 
the views of their counterparts, that otherwise could not have taken place. 
 The outcome of East German experts’ integration into a transnational community 
of experts notably accords with Patricia Clavin’s approach to transnationalism, where the 
nation-state and transnational phenomena are not cosidered antithetical—a view which 
has often predominated in transnational studies completed by cultural historians45—but 
rather where they interact with and reciprocally shape one another. Clavin, whose 
approach to transnationalism centers around an attemp  to bring the state “back in,” 
advises that “[i]t is better to think of a transnational community not as an enmeshed or 
bound network, but rather as a honeycomb, a structure which sustains and gives shape to 
the identities of nation-states, institutions and particular social and geographic space.”46 
On this basis, Clavin urges historians to consider not only how transnational phenomena 
have transcended the boundaries of the traditional nation-state but also how national 
phenomena can be understood in new ways through the prism of transnationalism. 
                                                 
45 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der 
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Following Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane’s early, influe tial definition of transnational 
relations as “contracts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not 
controlled by the central foreign policy organs of g vernment,”47 dictatorial states have 
occupied a minor position in transnational studies. Yet applying a definition such as 
Clavin’s allows one to overcome this methodological conundrum in order to trace the 
reciprocal influenced exercised by transnational processes and dictatorial states on one 
another since representatives of the latter became incr asingly involved in transnational 
networks devoted to diverse topics—economics, military affairs, health, sport—as 
globalization proceeded apace in the second half of the twentieth century. The case of 
foreign policy experts can be taken as more broadly valid: politicization involved a 
degree of subordination, but also entailed professional zation and the promotion of 
autonomous expertise, which allowed experts from dictatorial states like the GDR to 
become members of transnational epistemic communities on the basis of shared expertise 
and in turn allowed them to be influenced by their pa ticipation in such networks. 
Matthew Evangelista’s account of the impact of the transnational peace movement on 
Soviet policy decisions does exactly this, revealing how the influx of ideas and 
information from outside the Soviet Bloc fostered moderation and pragmatism over 
ideological intransigence among Soviet decision-makers.48 The explosive growth of East 
German experts’ scholarly contacts with the West following foreign policy normalization 
proved tremendously significant as it similarly provided a check against ideological 
                                                 
47 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), ix. 
48 Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1999). 
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dogmatism and insularity and in doing so fostered the growing preponderance of the 
expert over the ideological in East German foreign policy expertise. 
 The twin processes of internationalization and transnationalization occurred at a 
time when the system of international relations into which the GDR was being integrated 
itself was being transformed. The emergence of new dimensions, new forms, and new 
institutions of international relations meant that the sovereignty of the nation-state as 
international actor was being impinged upon as never before. The rise of supranational 
institutions, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations and the 
intensification of cross-border phenomena such as migration and cultural transfer 
considerably broadened the meaning and content of “international relations” beyond the 
traditional focus on interstate relations. In light of the rapid growth of the linked 
processes of internationalization, transnationalization, and globalization in the second 
half of the twentieth century, Eckart Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper, and Guido Müller have 
called for historians to respond accordingly, to expand the traditional focus on interstate 
relations to include close attention to the “forces profondes”49 like “space and geography, 
demography, economic and financial developments, social change or systems of ideas 
and ideologies” that shaped the states enmeshed in the changing system of international 
relations as the system itself changed.50 With the traditional nation-state’s monopoly on 
international relations in precipitous decline,51 the internal development of states was 
                                                 
49 Conze, Lappenküper, and Müller borrow the term from Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 
Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationals (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1964). 
50 Eckart Conze et al., “Einführung,” in Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und 
Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin, eds. Eckart Conze et al. (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 3. 
51 Conze, like Clavin, emphasizes that the traditional nation-state and transnational phenomena should not 
be understood as antithetical, but rather as interactive and complementary: “Transnational relations or 
transnational politics are not counter-concepts to approaches that now as before examine the role of the 
state in international politics. Both approaches complement one another and together make allowance for 
an expanded understanding of politics that identifies other political actors alongside the state and state 
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shaped that much more by the processes and phenomena occurring in the now 
dramatically broadened system of international relations. Internationalization and 
transnationalization in the GDR must be understood namely in this context, as occurring 
in a world that itself was caught in the throes of change. 
 With the twin processes of internationalization and transnationalization 
proceeding apace in the wake of foreign policy normalization, the previously robust 
correlation between the objective conditions in which the GDR had to conduct foreign 
policy and the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist conception of international relations began 
to break down. The international relations challenges facing the new “status quo” GDR, 
incomparably more varied and complex than those accompanying the single-minded 
focus on diplomatic recognition of the pre-normaliztion era, demanded the specialized 
skills and knowledge possessed only by foreign policy experts, who now had to analyze 
the GDR’s newly normalized foreign relations without the insulation previously afforded 
by imposed diplomatic isolation. On this backdrop, the GDR-specific conception of 
international relations that fused identification of East Germany’s geo-strategic interests 
with ideological precepts drawn from the Marxist-Leninist canon actually experienced 
the highpoint of its development in the immediate wake of foreign policy normalization. 
For the manner in which foreign policy normalization was achieved—as part and parcel 
of the broader gains made by “international socialism” (i.e. the Soviet Bloc) in the 
détente era, from the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw to the Helsinki Accords—
perpetuated the notion that the GDR’s interests were one and the same with the abstract 
cause of international socialism and reinforced experts’ ideologized understanding of 
                                                                                                                                      
institutions and analyses their actions.” Eckart Conze, “Abschied von Staat und Politik? Überlegungen zur 
Geschichte der internationalen Politik,” in Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen. Erneuerung und 
Erweiterung einer historischen Disziplin, eds. Eckart Conze et al. (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004), 42. 
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international relations since the entire process appe red to play out in conformity with the 
defining feature of that same understanding, namely, the fusion of the GDR’s realpolitical 
interests with the Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as a form of the international 
class struggle. 
 But with the foreign policy fortunes of the GDR now subject to the vacillations of 
international relations as never before, just as highly favorable foreign policy 
developments reinforced the prevailing foreign policy paradigm among experts in the 
1970s, adverse developments could and almost necessarily had to elicit critical re-
consideration of that same understanding, which claimed to explain not only individual 
international relations events but also the unfolding of international relations in their 
entirety. 
 It was at this time that domestic stagnation paired with the capitalist West’s 
frontal challenge to the international position of the Soviet Bloc in the form of the 
“second Cold War” elicited East German experts’ critical re-assessment of the prevailing 
foreign policy paradigm. Experts often dispensed with Marxist-Leninist analysis, which 
seemed less and less applicable to the complex problems facing the GDR and the Soviet 
Bloc, and instead adopted a pragmatic approach focused on the concrete realpolitical 
interests of the GDR. The hallowed principles propping up the GDR-specific conception 
of foreign policy that fused the clearly delineated r alpolitical interests of East Germany 
with a class-based understanding of international rel tions were overturned one by one—
the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism no longer represented the 
defining characteristic of international relations; the “international constellation of 
forces,” which no longer moved continuously and inexorably in favor of socialism, was 
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drained of its ideological content to refer simply to the complex constellation of forces, 
actors, and interests shaping the system of contemporary international relations; the 
concept of a monolithic “international socialism” proceeding steadily toward certain 
victory lost all currency as the severity of the Soviet Bloc’s domestic and international 
problems was acknowledged; recognition of the strength, dynamism, and ultimate 
sustainability of capitalism correspondingly led to abandonment of the notion of a 
“general crisis” that would in due course result in capitalism’s final exit from the 
historical stage; finally, the developing world was no longer viewed as “objectively anti-
imperialist” and its interests and problems were acknowledged as important in their own 
right, not only insofar as they related to and impacted the international constellation of 
forces. Mikhail Gorbachev’s enunciation in 1986 of the New Thinking in Soviet foreign 
policy, both by the specific example it offered and by promoting innovation in foreign 
policy thought in general, exercised a catalyzing effect on East German experts’ ongoing 
critical re-assessment of the conceptual underpinnings of the prevailing understanding of 
international relations, but this effect in turn was significantly dampened by the SED 
leadership’s firm opposition to the New Thinking. East German experts’ break with 
Marxist-Leninist axioms, a process which had already begun at the start of the 1980s, 
derived from specific East German concerns, dynamics, and conditions. 
 While East German experts’ development of a body of non-dogmatic foreign 
policy thought and their break with a strict class-based approach to international relations 
by and large realized the essential thrust of the Soviet New Thinking—the rejection of 
ideological dogmatism in foreign policy thought in favor of prioritization of realpolitical 
considerations—it largely lacked the comprehensive, cohesive character and the 
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conscious rejection of inherited foreign policy postulates characteristic of the Soviet 
original. Conceptually, the GDR’s subordinate positi n within the Soviet Bloc 
represented a significant barrier to the development of a full-fledged “East German New 
Thinking.” In contrast to the Soviet Union, which as bloc leader was confronted with a 
hugely diverse set of foreign policy challenges andupon which the onus of finding 
innovate solutions lay, the GDR was a subordinate bloc member and the range of its 
foreign policy concerns was correspondingly much narrower. The formulation of bold 
new approaches to bloc-wide or cross-system problems was therefore much likelier to 
come from the superpower Soviet Union than the dependent GDR, which was in fact 
exactly what occurred in the 1980s. The fact that te GDR comprised one half of the 
divided German nation and was located at the very forefront of the clash between 
socialist East and capitalist West only amplified the endency to resort to unsophisticated 
ideological positions. East German experts’ development of a body of non-dogmatic 
foreign policy thought in the 1980s was that much more remarkable given these 
conditions. 
 The main barrier to formulation of a full-fledged “East German New Thinking,” 
however, lay in the internal constitution of East German foreign policy expertise itself. 
The dual mission of maintaining a “firm Marxist-Leninist perspective” and producing 
sound, specialist analysis of international relations—itself the result of the complete 
subordination of expertise to the practical needs and political-ideological requirements of 
the SED leadership—led to the eventual preponderanc of the expert over the ideological 
element in East German foreign policy expertise, which in turn propelled experts’ 
rejection of a strict class-based approach to international relations in the 1980s. Yet the 
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basic fact of subordination ultimately proved decisive in keeping this critical tendency 
within bounds. In the East German dictatorship, the sin  qua non of employment in the 
foreign policy apparatus of the GDR was adherence to the given party line and 
submission to its will in practice. East German experts were compelled to regulate their 
actions and views so as not to come into conflict wth the prevailing party line or to 
challenge the party’s authority. In contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union, where 
similar conditions existed but where Gorbachev enthusiastically tapped the critical 
potential accumulated within the Soviet system of foreign policy expertise and actively 
promoted its implementation in foreign policy practice, an East German version of 
Gorbachev was sorely lacking. Erich Honecker and the top leadership of the SED viewed 
maintenance of the ideologically inspired fundamental antagonism between East and 
West as imperative and resolutely opposed dilution of the strict Abgrenzung 
(demarcation) separating the two blocs from one another and East Germany from West 
Germany. It thus should not have come as a surprise when, soon after Gorbachev had 
promulgated the New Thinking, which aimed at doing exactly this, Honecker and the top 
SED leadership placed themselves in strict opposition to it. Given the dictatorial 
character of the SED and the concentration of decision-making authority on foreign 
policy matters in the hands of an exceedingly small number of individuals, the absence of 
a party leadership that was willing to countenance formulation of a new paradigm in East 
German foreign policy thought, let alone to carry out serious reforms, meant that the far-
reaching, if incomplete, re-conceptualization of East German foreign policy carried out 
by experts in the 1980s found limited implementation in broader foreign policy practice. 
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 Finally, these empirical conclusions are based upon an effort to take ideas, in this 
case ideology, seriously,52 yet to do so while locating them in the specific historical 
context in which they took shape and in light of the multifarious influences that molded 
them. Here, ideology, even while it rests upon a more-or-less fixed set of basic principles, 
is viewed not as monolithic but as dynamic and open to change and as but one historical 
phenomenon alongside others, where it both acted upon and was acted upon by other 
factors. The current study consequently approaches ideology within East German foreign 
policy expertise “not [as] the unfolding of ideational imperatives” but rather seeks “to 
understand the ideological in its deeper contexts.”53 Such an approach allows one not 
only to better grasp the multivalent, variable content of “the ideological” and the 
complex, changing function(s) it fulfilled within a given historical matrix, but also to 
identify the essential interconnectedness and interdependency of ideology with other 
historical phenomena—an indispensable condition for understanding the development 
and fully comprehending the significance of East German foreign policy expertise. 
 
                                                   *                   *  
                                                             * 
 
The current study proceeds chronologically and is divided into four parts, each of which 
contains two chapters. In each part, the first chapter is dedicated to the multifaceted 
institutional development of East German foreign policy expertise in the span of time 
                                                 
52 On the model provided by Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda during World War II nd 
the Holocaust, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006). 
53 Michael David-Fox, “On the Primacy of Ideology: Soviet Revisionists and Holocaust Deniers (In 
Response to Martin Malia),” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 5, no. 1 (Winter 2004), 
105. 
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under consideration and the second chapter is dedicat  to examination of the output of 
East German experts in the same period of time. Part four, however, departs from this 
formula as institutional development and output are treated side by side in chapters seven 
and eight, which respectively cover the first and second half of the 1980s, as the study’s 
analytical focus is then squarely directed at elucidation of the critical re-assessment of the 
prevailing understanding of international relations u dertaken by East German experts in 
the period. Placing expert output in the immediate historical context which gave rise to it 
and shaped it acknowledges its interconnectedness and interaction with other 
contemporaneous events and processes and affords a more refined understanding of the 
formation, development, and transformation of East German experts’ conception of 
international relation in dialogic relation to both internal and external stimuli. 
 The chronological breakdown of the study largely accords with the periodization 
of East German foreign policy applied in the most important works on the subject,54 but 
also diverges with it at certain points since the development and configuration of East 
German foreign policy expertise was shaped as much by processes internal to the GDR as 
by the GDR’s changing fortunes in the international arena.55 With that said, one must 
note that the most important benchmarks in East German domestic and foreign policy 
GDR largely coincide since the GDR was a state whose internal development was 
heavily shaped by broader Cold War developments. Nevertheless, the distinction is worth 
making, and the fact that internal developments possessed larger relative importance for 
East German foreign policy expertise in the pre-normalization era and external 
                                                 
54 See footnote 14. 
55 The differences in periodization also accord with Clavin’s remark how attention to transnational 
phenomena frequently affords “the opportunity to address a different, and frequently larger, chronological 
range.” Clavin, “Defining Transnationalism,” 9. 
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developments larger relative importance in the post-n rmalization era—especially in 
terms of output—evinces the crucial role played by normalization in the broader story of 
foreign policy expertise in the GDR. 
 The current study is based primarily upon archival sources—the reports, 
memoranda, resolutions, analyses, and other internal documents which reveal how the 
GDR’s system of foreign expertise was constructed and how it functioned and how East 
German experts fulfilled their central charge of analyzing the foreign relations of the 
GDR. These archival sources are supplemented by the results of oral history interviews 
conducted with figures—ambassadors, career diplomats, scholars—formerly active 
within the East German foreign policy apparatus. Making use of these two different 
source-types helps to avoid the pitfalls encountered when dealing with either type of 
source on its own: the testimony of contemporary actors helps to get at those elements of 
the story that are not captured in the written histor cal record while written documents 
provide a means of double-checking the veracity of statements made in oral history 
interviews, which, for a host of reasons, may not be completely accurate. While the 
results of the oral history interviews were approached with a particularly critical eye and 
have been used more as supplemental rather than primary sources of evidence, immense 
care has been taken with both source-types, which are understood in the current study as 
partial reflections of a larger historical reality, not as unblemished representations of 
absolute historical truth. 
 Finally, this study raises no claims to comprehensiveness. It instead accentuates 
those central developments and features that appeared to the author as characteristic for 
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The Early Development of East German Foreign Policy Expertise: Incomplete 
Rationalization, Incomplete Synchronization 
 
Introduction 
The decisive fact shaping East German foreign policy expertise throughout its existence 
was its position as a subordinate element within the larger East German dictatorship, 
within which it was molded according to the changing goals and priorities of the 
leadership of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). The basic objectives of 
East German foreign policy expertise were set by the SED and the demands placed upon 
it by the party guided its functioning. In the earliest phase of its development, extending 
from the establishment of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ) in 1945 through the 
founding of East Germany in 1949 to the consolidation of ultimate authority in the hands 
of SED leader Walter Ulbricht in 1958, East German foreign policy expertise, like most 
other aspects of state and party life in the SOZ and the young GDR, had to be built up 
essentially from scratch in the effort to establish a radically different political and social 
order on the ruins left behind by Nazi Germany’s total defeat. In this period, the primary 
attention of the SED was directed toward the tasks of transforming itself into a Stalinist 
cadre party “of the new type” and establishing and cementing its dictatorial control over a 
communist East Germany, which meant that the initial institutional development of 
foreign policy expertise took place in a context of relative neglect. 
 The context of relative neglect would prove decisive, as it entailed the 
construction of a foreign policy apparatus and attendant expert institutions not according 
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to a uniform, long-term plan or coherent vision buthaphazardly in response to the 
shifting needs and priorities of the SED. The state and party organs created in the period 
were oriented toward satisfying immediate party demands and wants in the realm of 
international relations, consisting principally in supplying essential information to 
provide basic foreign policy orientation, production f propaganda for domestic and 
foreign consumption, the creation of “socialist foreign policy cadres” to staff the nascent 
foreign policy apparatus, and managing the still-limited foreign relations of party and 
state. While an array of institutions was created to carry out these tasks, a state of marked 
institutional underdevelopment prevailed in the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus well into 
the 1950s, the main features of which were ineffectual leadership and deficient 
coordination between different bodies, unclear delineation of responsibilities and 
overlapping competencies, a shortage of material resources, and an acute lack of qualified 
personnel. The end result of the initial period of East German foreign policy apparatus’s 
institutional underdevelopment was a hastily created patchwork of institutions arbitrarily 
reacting to momentary exigencies and lacking thoroughgoing coordination. The 
designation “expert” was hardly warranted. 
 Crucially, the deficient institutional development of East German foreign policy 
expertise in the SOZ and the young GDR meant that, although the ultimate authority of 
the SED was never questioned, the “leading role of the party” could only be partially 
realized—the absence of a fully rationalized institutional framework prevented the full 
political and ideological synchronization of expertise. The SED provided the driving 
force behind East German foreign policy expertise in th s initial phase of its development, 
but complete synchronization with the goals and priorities of the party would only come 
 36
later, in tandem with a thoroughgoing process of ration lization that would rectify the 
deficiencies stemming from institutional underdevelopment. 
 
The SED and its Initial Priorities 
After the conclusion of the Second World War, the rapid replacement of the wartime 
alliance between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom against 
Nazi Germany by the Cold War confrontation between socialist East and capitalist West 
created the conditions in which a separate East German state under the dictatorial control 
of the SED was established. Within the framework of the newly proclaimed “anti-fascist 
democratic order” of the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ), the SED under the leadership of 
Walter Ulbricht steadily increased its political power and involvement in the 
administration of the zone. Despite the nominal democratic orientation of the SOZ, in 
which multiple political parties were active, and the SED’s avowed fealty to the 
development of a pluralistic political system, the party in fact aspired from the outset to 
gain absolute power in East Germany. Wolfgang Leonhard arrived in the SOZ from 
Moscow on 30 April 1945 as a member of the “Ulbricht Group,”1 whose mission was to 
take the first steps in reorganizing public life and administration, and, after fleeing the 
SOZ for Yugoslavia in 1949 due to dissatisfaction with the dictatorial course 
developments were taking, described how Ulbricht por rayed the desired “anti-fascist 
                                                 
1 The main task of the Ulbricht group consisted in the staffing of the new city and county administration 
with dependable cadres in step with goals of the Soviets and the soon-to-be-reestablished Communist Party
of Germany in June 1945, whose preparation represent d the second main task of the group; Gerhard 
Keiderling, ed., “Gruppe Ulbricht” in Berlin April bis Juni 1945. Von den Vorbereitungen im Sommer 
1944 bis zur Wiedergründung der KPD im Juni 1945. Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: A. Spitz, 1993), 102. 
 37
democratic” transformation of the SOZ: “It’s as clear as day: things have to look 
democratic, but we have to keep everything under our c ntrol.”2 
 The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAG), which possessed 
complete authority in its occupation zone in accordance with the stipulations of the 
Potsdam Agreement of August 1945, played the key enabling role that allowed the SED 
to fulfill its goal of gaining absolute power in anEast Germany with communist 
orientation. The SMAG drove the socio-economic, political, and cultural transformation 
of the SOZ in a Stalinist direction3 and privileged the SED over the other political parties 
active in the SOZ, thereby creating the necessary preconditions for the establishment of 
the SED’s one-party rule and the incorporation of East Germany into the Soviet Bloc. 
First, local Zentralverwaltungen (central administrations), designed to aid SMAG in its 
administration of the SOZ, were established in July1945 and, then, the Deutsche 
Wirtschaftskommission (DWK, German Economic Commission), responsible for the 
coordination of the individual Zentralverwaltungen as well as economic planning for the 
entire SOZ, was founded in June 1947.4 The establishment of the central administrations 
and the German Economic Commission represented not only he first steps on the path to 
a separate East German state but also provided the SED with a vehicle for the 
establishment of its political power, since the party’s members were appointed by SMAG 
authorities to leading positions in these organizations over members of other parties 
nearly without exception. Following the formal establishment of the German Democratic 
                                                 
2 Wolfgang Leonhard, Die Revolution entläßt ihre Kinder (Leipzig: Reclam, 1990), 406. 
3 Norman Naimark in his study on the history of SMAG comes to the conclusion that “there was no overall 
plan for the political development of the [Soviet Occupation Z]one, certainly nothing like JCS 1067, the 
American policy statement on how to conduct the occupation [….] Soviet officers bolshevized the zone not 
because there was a plan to do so, but because that was the only way they knew how to organize society.” 
Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1995), 467. 
4 Hermann Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 2nd ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999) 53. 
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Republic on 07 October 1949, which saw the transformation of the German Economic 
Commission into the provisional administration of the GDR, the SED’s dominance of the 
East German political landscape was not yet total, but given the continued support of the 
Soviets, who still maintained final authority in the newly established GDR, the SED’s 
dominance of the newly formed East German polity was simply a matter of time. 
 Both before and after the Staatsgründung (the founding of the GDR), the SED 
devoted comparatively little attention to the construction of a functional foreign policy 
apparatus, instead focusing on two interconnected issues whose resolution was 
indispensable for realization of the central goal of establishing a communist state in East 
Germany under its dictatorial control: transformation of the party into a Stalinist cadre 
party “of the new type” and political and economic administration of the SOZ and the 
young GDR.5 After the total defeat of Nazi Germany, the basic elements of a functioning 
administrative system and economy had to be re-established. The establishment and 
maintenance of political control was in turn predicated upon returning the East German 
economy to a normal level of performance and achieving a degree of social stabilization. 
The SED wanted to ensure not only that this goal was achieved, but also that SED 
members held the key administrative positions in the process. After this was achieved, 
economic concerns continued to hold priority for the SED insofar as the party, after the 
“construction of socialism” had been declared the main objective for the GDR at the II 
Party Conference of the SED in 1952, undertook to create a socialist socio-economic 
order in the GDR. 
 The success of the SED’s efforts to create a communist East Germany under its 
exclusive control was dependent upon the other key issue at the center of the party’s 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 35. 
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attention: transformation of the party into one “of the new type,” i.e. a Stalinist cadre 
party following the example of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
Starting with the creation of the SED in April 1946 through the forced unification of the 
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) 
of the SOZ, the leadership of the former KPD, centered around Walter Ulbricht, Franz 
Dahlem, Wilhelm Pieck, and Anton Ackermann and distinguished by slavish loyalty to 
the person of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, continually expanded its influence within the 
party at the expense of the former SPD and successfully implemented the Leninist 
organizational principle of “democratic centralism,” which in practice amounted to an 
authoritarian chain of command within the party.6 The year 1948 saw the accelerated 
Stalinist transformation of the party,7 so that by the time of the formal creation of the 
GDR in 1949, the SED in its structure and decision-making process was well on its way 
to becoming a carbon copy of the Soviet exemplar.8 With the convening of the III Party 
Congress of the SED in July 1950, the development of the SED into a party of the new 
type was formalized and pursued with renewed vigor. At the congress, the party 
leadership expressed the belief that the SED could by virtue of its adherence to Marxism-
Leninism discern the laws of history, in agreement with which the SED would guide the 
                                                 
6 Heike Amos, Politik und Organisation der SED-Zentrale 1949-1963. Struktur und Arbeitsweise von 
Politbüro, Sekretariat und ZK-Apparat (Münster; Lit, 2003), 21-22. 
7 Andreas Malycha, Die SED. Geschichte ihrer Stalinisierung 1946-1953 (Paderborn: Ferdinand 
Schoningh, 2000), 300. Malycha views the summer months of 1948, which coincided with a spike in the 
early Cold War conflict as well as the introduction f a planned economy in the SOZ, as the temporary 
culmination of a process of “schleichende Staliniserung” (creeping Stalinization) that hat begun with the 
very creation of the party in April 1946. 
8 Malycha enumerates the main features: “A leader cult, restricted or non-existent opportunity for members 
to influence the party’s fundamental decisions, disciplinary action or expulsion of irksome members, 
intraparty power struggles, abuse of power, cliquism, bureaucratic and centralistic structures as wellas 
disrespect of the will of members were from 1946 on deep-rooted traits that justified the label “Stalinist” 
and that dominated the party until fall 1989.” Ibid., 514. 
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process of societal transformation.9 In accord with this sentiment as well as its aspirations 
for total control, the SED sought to transform the East German party system into a 
compliant tool completely subordinate to its wishes. The four non-SED parties active in 
the SOZ/GDR—the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Liberal Democratic Party of 
Germany (LDPD), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD), and the 
Democratic Farmers’ Party of Germany (DBD)— did notshare the fate of oppositional 
parties in the Soviet Union (i.e. criminalization ad dissolution), but were stripped of all 
real power and made to fulfill several indispensable functions that sustained the 
hegemony of the SED in East Germany: an “alibi functio ” by maintaining the fiction 
that the East German political system was actually a pluralistic democracy; an “all-
German” function by maintaining contact with parties and organizations in West 
Germany (the CDU and LDPD, for instance, were the “East versions” of the CDU and 
LDP active in West Germany); and a “transmission function” by diffusing the views of 
the SED among groups of the population that would otherwise be unreachable or 
unreceptive to the party’s overtures.10 The non-SED parties were bullied and co-opted in 
what was an unfair fight from the start as a result of SMAG’s preferential treatment of the 
SED until they lost every semblance of independence a d became a tractable instrument 
of SED rule within the GDR—a process that was already relatively advanced at the 
founding of the state and then essentially complete by the middle of the 1950s.11 The 
establishment and cementing of the SED’s dictatorial control over East Germany 
advanced in tandem with the SED’s transformation into a Stalinist cadre party. 
                                                 
9 Weber, Geschichte der DDR, 133. 
10 Ibid., 140. 
11 Jürgen Winkler, “Zum Verhältnis von Partei und Staat in der DDR,” in Die SED. Geschichte 
Organisation Politik. Ein Handbuch, eds. Andreas Herbst et al. (Berlin: Dietz, 1997), 159-176, esp. 162-
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 While the SED’s attention was directed primarily at the interrelated tasks of 
political and economic administration and creation of a strict party hierarchy capable of 
imposing its will both within its own ranks and upon East German politics and society, 
one other crucial element shaped the context in which East German foreign policy 
expertise began to take shape: the GDR’s near total dependency on the Soviet Union in 
the realm of foreign policy. Both before and after the formal founding of the GDR, 
essentially all significant foreign policy decisions that emanated from East Germany in 
the period were either made in Moscow or at the behest of the Soviets and were 
subordinated to the broader goals of Soviet D utschlandpolitik (policy on Germany) in 
the framework of the nascent Cold War.12 East German leaders not only possessed 
negligible latitude in the formulation of the GDR’s foreign relations but also exercised 
minimal influence on the decisions of Soviet leaders pertaining to Germany. In this 
opening phase of the Cold War, when the continued existence of the GDR itself was 
anything but certain, the SED leadership had no option but to accede to Soviet foreign 
policy decisions whether they appeared beneficial to the SED leadership’s vision of a 
separate communist East German state or not. The most outstanding example of the SED 
leadership’s powerlessness to influence Soviet decision-making on the German question 
was provided in 1952, when the notorious “Stalin note” sent from the USSR to the 
Western powers seemed to signal the Soviet leader’s readiness to assent to a peace treaty 
that would bring about the reunification of Germany s a neutral state and thereby fatally 
                                                 
12 Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 27. Wentker describes the situation in the following manner: “Soviet 
supremacy in the foreign policy of the GDR was unmistakable in the first years after its founding. If East 
Berlin wanted to engage in international politics at all, at the time it could only do so as an appendage of 
Moscow. In these years, the GDR served the eastern uperpower above all as the base and instrument of its 
policy on Germany. The leadership of the GDR in tur bound itself to the Soviet hegemon because they 
knew they had no chance to survive without its support.” 
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undermine the SED’s rule in East Germany. While asss ments on the seriousness and 
ultimate purpose of the note diverge, 13 it is clear that Ulbricht was extremely displeased 
with the entire process and, what is more telling, wielded no influence on the formulation 
of the note itself, which was rejected by the Western powers. 
 As a result of the SED’s focus on domestic issues and its acute dependency on the 
Soviet Union in all matters relating to foreign policy, international relations in their 
concrete, day-to-day sense were of secondary importance for the SED during the SOZ 
period and in the young GDR. Despite this situation, however, international relations 
developments in themselves nevertheless possessed immense significance for the SED 
leadership—the fate of socialism in Germany, or, more concretely, the SOZ/GDR, was 
after all to be decided by how the “German question”, i.e. the final settlement among the 
four powers on the postwar status of Germany, would be resolved in the context of the 
conflict between East and West that had flared up after the Second World War and had 
since only gained in intensity. The SED’s self-understanding and its vision for East 
Germany starting from the state’s very inception were in fact intrinsically connected with 
consideration of the German question and the place of both East and West Germany in 
the broader international system. It could not have be n otherwise considering that the 
creation in 1949 of separate German states with opposing social and political systems 
was the direct result of the broader clash between socialist East and capitalist West that 
                                                 
13 The numerous works written on the topic do not come to a unanimous conclusion on how seriously the 
Stalin note ought to be taken; some dismiss the notas pure propaganda intended solely to hinder the 
FRG’s integration into the West, some argue in favor of Soviet earnestness, while still others claim the 
Soviets themselves were unclear on what the intended eff ct of the note was. Peter Ruggenthaler, Stalins 
großer Bluff: die Geschichte der Stalin-Note in Dokumenten der sowjetischen Führung (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2007); Jürgen Zarusky, ed., Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952. Neue Quellen und A alysen 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002), particularly Wilfried Loth, “Die Entstehung der Stalin-Note,” 19-115, and 
Gerhard Wettig, “Die Note vom 10. März 1952 im Kontext von Stalins Deutschland-Politik seit dem 
Zweiten Weltkrieg,” 139-196; Stein Bjørnstad, “Soviet German Policy and the Stalin Note of 10 March 
1952” (diss. phil., University of Oslo, 1996). 
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would represent the defining characteristic of inter ational relations for the duration of 
the Cold War. The inaugural governmental address held on 12 October 1949 by Otto 
Grotewohl, prime minister of the newly founded GDR, revealed how the SED’s basic 
self-understanding of East Germany was inseparable from the international context in 
which it was created. He attributed the division of Germany to the “systematic policy of 
division” pursued by the “imperialistic Western powers” in collaboration with the ruling 
circles of West Germany: “In Germany’s western zones th  foundations of German 
imperialism have been re-established. West Germany h s become a playground for 
foreign and German imperialists and militarists. These are the elements that have once 
again erected reactionary rule in the separatist state based in Bonn and that are now 
setting out to lead the German people down the fateful path of capitalist economic crises 
and imperialist military adventures a third time.” Only in this context, Grotewohl 
continued, was the founding of the GDR to be understood: “The impending danger of an 
imperialistic war has pressed upon us the urgent necessity to form effective and strong 
leadership for the struggle to reunify Germany, for the process of democratic 
reconstruction, and for peace. To this end, we have constituted the German Democratic 
Republic and have formed the provisional administration.”14 In the eyes of its leaders, 
East Germany was not simply a state like any other, but one component of a broader 
international drama defined by the clash of two antithe ical forms of socio-economic 
organization, socialism and capitalism. With this understanding shaping its views of East 
Germany and its place in the international system, he SED began constructing a foreign 
policy apparatus not only to underline its claim to legitimate statehood vis-à-vis West 
                                                 
14 Dokumente zur Außenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, vol. 1: Von der 
Gründung der DDR am 7. Oktober 1949 bis zur Souveränitätserklärung am 25. März 1954 (Berlin: Rütten 
& Loening, 1954), 21-22. 
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Germany in the context of the unresolved German question, but also in order to gain at 
least some of the capabilities of a normal state actor on the international stage.15 It was on 
this backdrop that the SED leadership went about constructing a foreign policy apparatus, 
essentially from scratch, to meet its needs as the ruling party of the SOZ and the young 
GDR. 
 
Foreign Policy Expertise in Embryo before the Staatsgründung 
Even in the period before the founding of the GDR in October 1949, the secondary 
importance of foreign policy for the SED did not prevent the party from taking steps 
toward increasing its engagement with international rel tions issues. In the period of the 
SOZ, several initiatives aimed at creating an organizational infrastructure within the party 
capable of addressing international relations issue in accord with the party’s needs were 
introduced at the highest levels of the SED. The initiatives were limited in scope and 
revolved mainly around information-gathering and ruimentary analysis as well as 
internal and external propaganda, yet their importance should not be overlooked since 
they represented the SED’s first attempt to address the questions of how its foreign policy 
apparatus should be organized and how its foreign relations should be handled. The ways 
in which these early initiatives conceived of the role and function of foreign policy 
expertise within the SED established some of the key features that would subsequently be 
                                                 
15 Lemke underlines SED leaders’ desire for East Germany to serve as the basis of a reunified socialist 
Germany (a “German Piedmont”), but also notes that if the goal of reunification could not be achieved, the 
SED’s efforts could just as easily be employed in facilitating the development of East Germany as a 
separate German state. Michael Lemke, “Prinzipien und Grundlagen der Außenbeziehungen der DDR in 
der Konstituierungsphase des DDR-Außenministeriums 1949-1951,” in Sowjetisierung und 
Eigenständigkeit in der SBZ/DDR (1945-1953), ed. Michael Lemke (Cologne: Böhlau, 1999), 233-274, 
251. 
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regularized and implemented throughout the East German foreign policy apparatus 
following the Staatsgründung. 
 In January 1947, Franz Dahlem, second-in-command in the SED behind Ulbricht 
until his neutralization in 1953, proposed to the SED’s Central Secretariat (the forerunner 
of the Politburo) that a daily newspaper dealing with foreign policy issues be created.16 
His proposal was rejected, but a suggestion going significantly further was presented just 
a month later to the Central Secretariat by Albert Norden, editor-in-chief of the 
communist weekly Deutschlands Stimme. Norden was among those German socialist 
émigrés who had spent time in France during the Nazi period and recognized the 
importance of shaping international public opinion n the SED’s favor.17 He accordingly 
called for the immediate creation of an Außenpolitisches Büro (foreign policy bureau) 
that would have two main tasks: “The systematic acquisition and evaluation of all 
information and articles appearing abroad dealing with the German question and 
Germany [as well as] collection and continual compilation of documentation for the party 
leadership and other party bodies” and “organized opposition to the smear campaigns 
abroad against the German left and the Soviet zone and aid for international clarification 
of the situation and problems in Germany as well as for the creation of movements and 
activities sympathetic toward German democracy.”18 These complimentary tasks, which 
                                                 
16 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/57. 
17 In his letter to the Central Secretariat, Norden offers his assessment of the SED’s ability to shape foreign 
public opinion based on his experiences in exile: “If relatively substantial success in terms of influencing 
the foreign press and foreign politicians could be achieved by German antifascists in the emigration—even 
when they were numerically weak and had no organization l apparatus at their disposal—then under the 
current circumstances we can on a much larger scaleand with far better prospects set out to turn broad 
segments of the international population from potential to active allies of German democracy and to bring 
them into the correct position between the fronts.” SAPMO-BArch, NY 4217/14. See also Ulrich Pfeil, Die 
“anderen” deutsch-französischen Beziehungen. Die DDR und Frankreich 1949-1990 (Cologne: Böhlau, 
2004), 195. 
18 SAPMO-BArch, NY 4217/14. 
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encompassed “the establishment of all types of contacts of both a personal and 
organizational nature,” were directed at generating sympathy and support abroad, 
particularly in the US, the UK, and France, for “the democratic solution of the German 
problem, i.e. for our work of democratic construction n the eastern zone and against the 
growth of the reaction in western and southern Germany.”19 
 Otto Meier, formerly a member of the SPD and now responsible alongside Anton 
Ackermann for culture, education, and the press, followed with a suggestion in April 
1947 that a sub-division for foreign policy questions be created in the Publicity, Press, 
and Radio Division of the Central Secretariat. The sub-division was to perform two main 
tasks: publication of material in French and English to influence international public 
opinion and maintenance of an archive consisting of inf rmation gathered from abroad, 
principally press clippings, to serve as a foundation for the division’s foreign relations 
work.20 Norden’s proposal was not taken up for discussion by the Central Secretariat, and 
it remains unclear to what extent Meier’s proposal w s implemented, if at all. The formal 
creation of a division within the SED party apparatus whose main focus was foreign 
relations issues would not take place until early 1948, after the SED had established first 
contact with the communist “fraternal parties” in late 1947, but the two proposals already 
made explicit the close connection between the domestic situation in East Germany and 
developments in the international arena in the minds of East German Außenpolitiker. 
 In January 1948, the Central Secretariat passed a r solution creating a Büro für 
Internationale Fragen, or Bureau for International Questions, under the leadership of 
Grete Keilson, a high-ranking SED functionary who had been part of the Ulbricht Group 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/78. 
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in charge of the SED’s Personnel Policy Division. The main tasks of the bureau lay in 
“evaluating and solidifying the numerous relations that have developed in increasing 
measure since the II Party Congress [of the SED, in September 1947]. In particular, the 
mission [of the bureau] should consist on the one hand in satisfying the requests of the 
fraternal parties und friendly circles abroad for cn rete information on the policy of the 
SED and the situation in Germany and on the other in guaranteeing that the evaluation of 
incoming materials received from various parties is ut lized for the internal orientation of 
the Central Secretariat and for the knowledge of the party as well as the public, the latter 
through the apparatus of the Press Service.”21 The bureau was additionally to serve as the 
basis for a future, expanded division of the Central Secretariat focusing on the tasks 
enumerated above following fusion with the party’s Foreign Press Service, which 
presumably occurred in March 1948 and resulted in the formation of the Abteilung 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (International Liaison Division), under Keilson’s 
leadership.22 The division was renamed Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen 
(International Relations Division)23 in October 194924 as the focus of its activities 
                                                 
21 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/168. 
22 It is namely at this time that the International Liaison Division first appears on the party’s internal 
accounting sheets tracking the number of persons employed in each division of the Central Secretariat; 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/22/12. See also Lemke, “Prinzipien und Grundlagen,” 250. 
23 Use of the word Verbindungen, which can also be translated as “contacts,” instead of the standard term 
for “relations” in the context of foreign policy—Beziehungen—highlights the extremely limited range of 
foreign policy activities available to this body in particular as well as the SED/SOZ in general at this point 
in time. 
24 The archival finding aid on the division maintains that its renaming resulted from its fusion with an 
Außenpolitische Abteilung (Foreign Policy Division) whose existence as a discrete division within the 
Central Secretariat, however, this claim is questioned by Muth on the basis of an interview with Peter 
Florin, deputy head of the International Relations Division at its founding and division head from its re-
founding in 1953. Muth relates that one may have mistakenly believed that Leo Zuckermann, who held the 
title of division head in his capacity as secretary of the Commission for Foreign Policy Questions 
(discussed below), Florin, his deputy, and a secretary, who worked outside the International Relations 
Division, as a discrete division. Sylvia Gräfe, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen im ZK der SED, DY 
30, 1946-1990 (Berlin: Stiftung der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, 2008), 
3; Ingrid Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen (Berlin: Ch. Links, 
2000), 61n22. 
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solidified around maintaining relations with foreign political parties, both Marxist-
Leninist and non-communist leftist parties, all of which, however, fell within the general 
category “socialist and workers’ parties.”25 The division was also made responsible for 
attending to émigrés in the GDR, principally from Spain and Greece,26 where civil wars 
between leftist and rightist forces in each country had produced a significant number of 
socialist refugees, which drew the interest of an SED eager to establish its socialist bona 
fides.27 Before the official founding of the GDR, however, the SED’s preoccupation with 
domestic issues and the exceedingly modest progress made in establishing relations of 
any sort with both other political parties and foreign countries meant that the activities of 
the division,28 which in the years to follow would become the party’s most important 
foreign policy organ, remained for the time being extr mely limited29 and its size small.30 
 While the responsibilities of the International Relations Division, revolving 
around relations with other communist parties, were narrow in scope, the Kommission für 
Außenpolitische Fragen (Commission for Foreign Policy Questions) of the Party 
                                                 
25 Lemke, based on an interview with Peter Florin, underscores that the early work of the division was 
overwhelmingly focused on relations with other parties; “Prinzipien und Grundlagen,” 250. 
26 Wentker, Außenpolitik, 31. 
27 In September 1948, for instance, the Central Secretariat, passed a resolution on the establishment of aid 
committees for political refugees from the two countries. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/230. 
28 Both before and after the founding of the division, decision-making power over the party’s foreign 
relations remained with a few select leaders, principally Walter Ulbricht. Keilson, for instance, was merely 
designated secretary of an SED delegation to Prague comprised of Ulbricht, Josef Orlopp, Bruno 
Leuschner, and Willi Stoph in September 1948 to discus  the coordination of economic plans for 1949 and 
to study methods of state and economic administration. Ibid. 
29 Even more than half a year after the official founding of the GDR—in June 1950—the division only 
encompassed a single sub-division (sector) at a time when other divisions of the Party Executive (dealing 
with the economy, agitation, cadres, etc.) already encompassed a number of sub-divisions and were rapidly 
increasing in size. The main task of the International Relations Division’s Sektor für Information (Sector 
for Information) continued to consist in responsibility for relations with and the flow of information to and 
from the “fraternal parties;” SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/1/81. 
30 The number of persons employed in the division is listed at two in its first documented mention in March 
1948, at which level it remains until increasing to three in March 1949; SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 
2/22/12. In 1950, the Central Party Control Commission’  accounting sheet identifies five employees, all of 
whom were female, but one can presume that this figure is incomplete since Florin, the deputy director, is 
missing, which suggests that only the division head an  the technical employees were accounted for; 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/4/147. 
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Executive of the SED, created in April 1949,31 represented the first party organ meant to 
deal with the full range of foreign policy issues with which the SED as ruling party of a 
nascent communist dictatorship in East Germany was confronted.32 The commission, 
which was headed by the jurist Leo Zuckermann and which comprised ten members 
drawn from the leading ranks of the SED, including Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, 
Wilhelm Pieck, and Franz Dahlem, had a clear propagandistic function to fulfill, as the 
announcement of the commission’s creation placed in the SED’s daily newspaper Neues 
Deutschland made patent: “In connection with the intensification of the struggle for the 
unity of Germany33 and the conclusion of a democratic peace treaty with Germany, the 
Politburo has approved the formation of a Commission for Foreign Policy Questions…. 
The goal of the commission consists in observing the relations of foreign countries with 
Germany, arousing greater interest in Germany-related questions in international public 
opinion, particularly among democratic movements abro d, and systematically informing 
the German public about various powers’ policy toward Germany.”34 
 While the public announcement emphasized the outward role the commission was 
intended to play by shaping public opinion in favor of a “democratic” solution to the 
German problem and thereby demonstrating the autonomy of the SED and the SOZ just 
as an independent West German state was being established,35 internal documentation 
                                                 
31 The impetus for the creation of the commission appe rs to stem from a letter written in March 1949 by 
Georg Krausz, a longtime member of the KPD/SED with a background in journalism and foreign policy 
who would go on to head the Verband der Journalisten der DDR (Association of Journalists in the GDR), 
to Wilhelm Pieck, in which he proposed the creation of an international relations division under his own 
direction; SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/896. 
32 Relations with the “fraternal parties,” however, remained the responsibility of the International Relations 
Division (still called the International Liaison Division at this point). Ibid. 
33 The original draft contained in this spot the alternative phrase “against the imperialistic occupation 
statute.” Ibid. 
34 “Außenpolitische Kommission beim Parteivorstand der SED,” Neues Deutschland, 23 April 1949. 
35 Wentker, Außenpolitik, 31. 
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highlighted the complementary analytical role within the party apparatus the Commission 
on Foreign Policy Questions was supposed to fulfill. The resolution of the Small 
Secretariat (predecessor of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the SED) on the 
commission’s founding listed ahead of its propagandistic functions “the continual 
observation and analysis of Germany’s relations with foreign states—both those of the 
Soviet Occupation Zone and of the western zones” and “continual observation, analysis, 
and evaluation of the position of foreign countries and foreign public opinion on 
questions pertaining to Germany.”36 SED leaders could see the writing on the wall in 
relation to developments in the German question and accordingly recognized the need to 
expand the party’s foreign policy activities both outward and inward on the way to the 
establishment of a separate, communist East German state. The very first reason listed for 
the creation of the Commission on Foreign Policy Questions reflected this understanding: 
“As developments increasingly tend toward the division of Germany for an extended 
length of time, it can only be expected that at a given point the administrative organs of 
the Soviet Zone of Occupation will be entrusted with responsibility for maintaining 
relations with foreign countries. The foreign trade relations which have already been 
initiated and which are growing steadily will be completed by political relations after a 
certain stage of development has been reached.”37 
 Underlying and linking the commission’s complementary propagandistic and 
analytical functions was the task of overseeing “the organized education and training of 
                                                 
36 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/19. 
37 SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/896. An early example illustrating the still rudimentary state of the SED’s 
ability to acquire and evaluate information relevant to the party’s activities is provided by an information 
packet provided to members of the Politburo and other political functionaries in August 1949 consisting 
exclusively in articles published “in the most important bourgeois and progressive newspapers and 
magazines of capitalist countries on issues related to Germany.” 
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cadres for foreign activity.”38 Even at this early point in time, the SED leadership 
recognized the importance of dedicated cadres for the goal of establishing a foreign 
policy apparatus tailored to meet its needs as ruling party in a communist East Germany. 
Foreshadowing the combination of ideological schooling and specialist training that 
would come to characterize the training of East German foreign policy cadres, the 
resolution laid out the SED’s early orientation on the issue: “These new future 
administrative tasks make it necessary that the Politburo immediately creates 
prerequisites ensuring that the coming administration will be staffed in decisive measure 
by professionally and politically qualified comrades who are superior to their partners 
from the bourgeois parties [meaning the non-SED parties in the SOZ] in every respect. 
The issue of training is a task of urgent importance even if an administrative apparatus 
dealing with foreign relations does not yet exist.”39 At this time, however, the training of 
foreign policy cadres was still in its infancy and a considerable amount of time would 
pass before the SED was in possession of the type of cadres that matched its expectations. 
 In light of the secondary importance attributed to foreign policy in this period by 
the SED and the still extremely limited scope of the foreign relations of the SED/SOZ, 
which before the official founding of the GDR did not extend beyond contact with a 
handful of communist parties, the Commission on Foreign Policy Questions, similar to 
the International Relations Division, could only develop a significant level of activity in 
the course of the 1950s. Its main importance at this very early stage in the development 
of East German foreign policy expertise lay rather in providing a vehicle for the SED to 
                                                 
38 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/19. 
39 SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/896. 
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hash out its approach toward the organization its foreign policy apparatus and the 
handling of its foreign relations. 
 Indeed, the first tentative steps within the SED party apparatus expanding the 
party’s foreign policy activities prior to the foundi g of East Germany—not only the 
establishment of the Commission on Foreign Policy Questions, but also the establishment 
of the International Relations Division as well as the initiatives that had preceded them—
make clear the limits of what was possible as well as which areas were most important in 
this period characterized by highly circumscribed foreign policy activity and 
preoccupation with other concerns: maintenance of basic contact with other communist 
parties, elementary propaganda for foreign and domestic consumption (focused above all 
on shaping public opinion on the German question and the relations of the SOZ/SED with 
the Soviet Union), the institutional beginnings of a system of foreign policy training, and 
the acquisition and evaluation of information on the world beyond the borders of the SOZ 
in order to provide the party with basic footing on f reign policy-related issues. 
The informational function fulfilled by these earliest foreign policy-oriented 
organs of the SED represented the nucleus of what would subsequently become a 
comprehensive system of foreign policy expertise, which, however, still unambiguously 
remained at a rudimentary level of development. In he few documented instances when 
informational activities went beyond simple fact-gahering to what one might actually 
call analysis, the output remained extremely limited in scope and rigid in outlook. 
 Reports on the United Kingdom and the United States held before high-ranking 
party members at the SED’s Central House of Unity i the Soviet sector of Berlin in 
October 1948, for example, represented an early instance of the application of class-based 
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Marxist-Leninist analysis to foreign policy questions relevant to the SED. Hermann 
Budzislawski, who had joined the SED in 1948 after n arly two decades as a member of 
the SPD and had spent the years 1940-1947 in the Unit d States after escaping prison in 
France,40 conceded in his oral report on the US that “the essence of the American party 
system is extraordinarily difficult for us to understand,” but nevertheless proceeded to 
characterize “American militarism” as “a genuine, completely true-blue Prussian 
militarism.”41 Budzislawki described the campaign preceding the 1948 presidential 
election as a serious battle between incumbent Harry Truman and challenger Thomas 
Dewey, the former taking up the role of insider and the latter that of outsider, while 
noting that the election, “when viewed from our perspective as a party is a farce since 
both parties in terms of class represent more or less the same thing, albeit with slight 
nuances.”42 Budzislawski, however, while maintaining the applicability of class analysis, 
did not disallow the possibility of potentially significant differences between the two 
candidates and their respective parties in their tactic l approach to dealing with the Soviet 
Union, stating that “it is certainly not the case that Dewey and his supporters behind the 
scenes want a fresh start with the Soviet Union, but it is certainly conceivable and can 
even been seen as in the interest of American high finance that a modus vivendi for 
certain territories be reached [with the Soviet Union].”43 
 Budzislawki’s report on the American presidential election in 1948 displayed two 
features, still in an embryonic state, that would subsequently typify the analytical output 
of East German foreign policy experts: the application of class-based analysis centered on 
                                                 
40 A resolution of the Central Secretariat from January 1948 approved the granting of an entry permit to 
Budzislawski; SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/168. 




the notion that social system determines foreign policy and a clear orientation toward 
illuminating the most pressing international relations facing the SED leadership, in this 
case how further developments in the relationship between the US and the USSR might 
affect the situation in Germany. Also noteworthy is the unmistakable compatibility 
between, on the one hand, the application of Marxist-Leninist categories to foreign policy 
and, on the other, the basic geo-strategic situation w th which the SED was confronted in 
this rather hot phase of the early Cold War, when the fate of socialism in Germany 
remained fully dependent on the further course of developments between socialist East 
and capitalist West, with the SED itself essentially powerless to shape events. Wilhelm 
Pieck, longtime member of the KPD/SED and future president of East Germany, 
highlighted the fundamental interconnectedness of these issues as viewed from the 
perspective of the SED when he thanked the speakers t the conclusion of the meeting 
“for their valuable comments that will help us to better see and judge many things in the 
context of the German question.”44 
 The German question in fact gained a significant degree of clarity in 1949, when 
East Germany was founded in October following the founding of the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG, West Germany) in May of the same year, r p esenting a temporary 
climax in the formation of mutually hostile blocs led by the respective superpowers 
following the steady dissolution of the wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and 
the United States. The formalized existence of two German states—one unambiguously 
oriented toward the capitalist West under the leadership of the US, the other oriented just 
as unambiguously toward the socialist East under the leadership of the USSR—
represented a decisive step on the path to the enduring Cold War division of Germany. 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
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More proximately, it signaled the Soviet Union’s fall-back to its minimal goal in the 
competition over Germany of maintaining a communist sta e encompassing part of the 
German nation and firmly under its control as a bulwark in Central Europe after the 
establishment of a unified Germany either communist or neutral in orientation had proved 
untenable. However Stalin may have envisioned a final resolution of the German 
question and/or no matter what tactical value he assigned to East Germany in relation to 
broader Soviet strategic goals in the Cold War confrontation with the US, the SED 
leadership now found itself in control of a state and, having no intention of giving it up, 
proceeded apace in the establishment of corresponding institutions, all the while still 
highly dependent on Soviet authorities. 
 
Expertise in the Nascent Foreign Policy Apparatus of the GDR 
Following the founding of the GDR in October 1949, East German foreign policy 
expertise developed as one component within the larg r East German foreign policy 
apparatus. And the starting position of the East German foreign policy apparatus was not 
very promising. There existed an acute lack of material and human resources, which were 
that much more difficult to come by given the relatively low priority foreign policy in 
East Germany in general possessed in the period. Complicating the situation further was 
the absence of any sort of cohesive plan for the dev lopment of a foreign policy 
apparatus in East Germany.45 While the Soviet foreign policy apparatus provided a 
general model around which development in the GDR could be oriented (though with 
some significant differences), the process was not approached in a systematic fashion due 
                                                 
45 Ingrid Muth highlights the prevailing vagueness of mission: “In the fall of 1949 at the just-founded 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was still largely unclear what the new foreign policy of the German 
Democratic Republic was supposed to look like in practice.” Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 16. 
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to the near total subordination of the SOZ/GDR to broader Soviet policy on the German 
question and the resulting uncertainty that continually hung over East German statehood 
in the opening stages of the Cold War paired with the SED’s preoccupation with other, 
more pressing tasks. East German leaders were often only in a position to react passively 
and haphazardly to the faits accomplis and frequent interventions of the Soviets, and were 
thus restricted in the active formulation of far-sighted policy on questions of foreign 
policy, which remained circumscribed and over which the exigencies stemming from the 
construction and maintenance of the party’s dictatori l power took priority. The overall 
result was an extremely underdeveloped foreign policy apparatus in the first postwar 
decade whose growth only proceeded in fits and starts. 
 The persistent state of flux present in the East German foreign policy apparatus in 
its earliest years hindered the creation of a cohesive institutional structure with clearly 
delineated areas of competence. The profile and responsibilities of individual institutions 
within the East German foreign policy apparatus were poorly defined and clear 
hierarchies between them were often lacking, a situation which was only complicated by 
the frequent duplication of state institutions with corresponding party institutions. With 
the absence of a systematic approach to the developm nt of a foreign policy apparatus, 
priority was given to fulfilling the most pressing immediate tasks by whichever 
institution was capable of doing so or by creating o e that appeared fit to do so. 
As a result of the prevailing institutional muddle, foreign policy expertise focusing on the 
analysis and conceptualization of the GDR’s foreign relations did not yet exist as a 
discrete activity, but rather took shape in various forms at various institutions as the 
haphazard development of the nascent East German foreign policy apparatus unfolded. 
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 The most important state institution of the emergent East German foreign policy 
apparatus was the Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelenheiten (MfAA), or Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, which was created simultaneously with the GDR itself.46 As Soviet 
authorities envisioned it, the creation of a foreign ministry long before it was able to 
function effectively or make any sort of substantive contribution to East German foreign 
policy—insofar as such an activity existed at this point—would lend the newly founded 
GDR an increased air of legitimacy vis-à-vis the FRG by demonstrating that the Soviets 
were prepared to grant the GDR more autonomy than te Western powers the FRG.47 The 
MfAA was thus also envisioned as the basis of the future foreign ministry of a reunified, 
communist Germany oriented toward the Soviet Union.48 The institutional structure of 
the MfAA throughout the 1950s clearly reflected theambiguous position imposed upon 
the GDR by the unsettled nature of the German question and the equivocal position of the 
Soviets on the issue. On the one hand, an attempt was made to maintain the façade that 
the GDR was a democratic state deriving its legitimacy from the will of the people and, 
therefore, capable of representing the entire German nation; on the other, the SED 
leadership was determined to establish and maintain a o e-party communist dictatorship 
in the part of Germany bequeathed to it by the USSR and had absolutely no illusions or 
reservations regarding the necessity of the GDR’s thoroughgoing integration into the 
Soviet Bloc. This tension, which would only gradually be resolved in the course of the 
                                                 
46 The MfAA was listed as the first of 14 ministries in the law of 07 October 1949 on the establishment of a 
provisional administration. Gesetzblatt der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Berlin: Büro des 
Ministerrats der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1949), 2. 
47 Some critical contemporaneous observers in the FRGclearly saw through the ploy, such as Gerold 
Rummler, who recognized the independent East German foreign ministry as the façade it was: “The 
Soviets, who cannot emphasize often enough the autonomy of the administration of the ‘GDR,’ in reality 
have the administrative apparatus in Pankow firmly in their grip.” Gerold Rummler, “Der außenpolitische 
Apparat der Sowjetzone,” SBZ-Archiv 3 (1952): 183-184. 
48 Wentker, Außenpolitik, 36-37. 
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1950s, became evident even at the highest levels of the MfAA, where a revealing practice 
became firmly established: appointing a member of the “block parties” (i.e. the non-SED 
parties active in the GDR that were nominally independent but in fact subservient to the 
SED) as foreign minister in order to maintain the democratic veneer while naming a 
reliable member of the SED as Staatssekretär, or secretary of state,49 to ensure the 
ministry functioned in accord with the party’s wishes.50 Georg Dertinger, a member of 
the East German CDU, was foreign minister from 1949-1953 while Anton Ackermann, a 
longtime member of the KPD/SED with proven loyalty and significant weight within the 
party, served as secretary of state in the same time period. From 1953 until 1965, Lothar 
Bolz, a member of the NDPD, held the post of foreign minister and was joined by a 
number of different loyal party men in the position f secretary of state or deputy 
minister, including Otto Winzer, who would succeed Bolz as foreign minister in 1965.  
 More telling in this respect, however, was the organizational structure itself of the 
MfAA, which was initially modeled upon the foreign office of the Weimar Republic, not 
the Soviet foreign ministry.51 Wentker and Lemke both attribute this fact to prevailing 
Soviet disinterest in East German foreign policy and the desire to bolster East Germany’s 
claim to represent the entire German nation, which would clearly be undermined by 
                                                 
49 The designation Staatssekretär (secretary of state), common in German-speaking countries even today, 
denotes a type of deputy minister, although the position of Stellvertretender Minister (deputy minister) 
exists and existed in the GDR as well. The position, despite the seeming similarity, is thus not related to the 
position of secretary of state as found in the US. 
50 Wentker, Außenpolitik, 44. 
51 Ibid., 37. The institutional orientation toward the Weimar foreign office went well beyond the surface 
level: it included the structure in terms of divisions (Abteilungen) as well as staff employment schemas, 
budget plans, and salary guidelines and even included a option of guidelines for foreign language 
education. See also Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (hereafter PA AA), Bestand Ministerium für 
Auswärtige Angelegenheitn (hereafter MfAA), A 15560. 
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wholesale adoption of the Soviet model.52 However, as the division of Germany 
increasingly hardened in the course of the 1950s and reunification of any sort became less 
and less likely, the institutional structure of theMfAA, following the broader trend within 
the GDR, gravitated toward its natural point of orientation, the Soviet Union, and came 
increasingly to resemble the Soviet foreign ministry. A total of seven plans for the 
reorganization of the MfAA were implemented in the course of the decade; while 
adaptation to the various foreign policy challenges and institutional imperatives faced by 
the GDR played an important role in these transformations, the Soviet foreign ministry 
clearly served as a model. In October 1957, secretary of state Georg Handke headed an 
East German delegation to Moscow to study how the Soviet foreign ministry functioned 
and how it was organized. Based partly on the observations of the delegation, a plan for 
the reorganization of the MfAA was worked out and by December 1959 the structural 
organization of the ministry had been fully “Sovietiz d.”53 
 After a decade of groping its way forward, the East German foreign ministry 
possessed by the end of the 1950s a hierarchy and organizational structure, including both 
geographic and thematic divisions, that mirrored the Soviet foreign ministry and that was 
oriented toward fulfilling East Germany’s primary foreign policy goal of the period—
obtaining diplomatic recognition—with “all-German” considerations increasingly 
relegated to a position of secondary importance.54 Despite attaining a degree of stability, 
                                                 
52 Soviet “advisors” in the MfAA were also conspicuously absent. Wentker, Außenpolitik, 37. Lemke, 
“Prinzipien und Grundlagen,” 251. 
53 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 116-118. 
54 Jochen Staadt has even argued that an inversely proportional relationship existed between an “all-
German” orientation and diplomatic recognition: “The closer the GDR came to reaching the interim goal of 
diplomatic recognition, that much more energetically the SED tried to hinder and undermine the East 
German population’s cultural, scientific, familial, nd political relations and ties to the West.” Jochen 
Staadt, Die geheime Westpolitik der SED 1960-1970. Von der gesamtdeutschen Orientierung zur 
sozialistischen Nation (Berlin: Akademie, 1993), 13. 
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however, the MfAA was clearly still a work in progress and the ministry had a long way 
to go before becoming a well-organized, professional, and efficiently functioning organ 
capable of administering the foreign relations of the GDR in their entirety. Key 
deficiencies remained in the areas of leadership, internal coordination and coordination 
with other organs of party and state, personnel, and material resources55—all areas where 
significant progress would first be made in the 1960s. Peter Florin, a division head at the 
ministry at the time, held a meeting with GDR diplomats in 1951 at which he hammered 
home the sorry state of affairs at the MfAA: “By nomeans are we at the point that we 
could say we can address our problems…in an exemplary w y—we can’t. We’re all still 
learning. We’re still making too many mistakes. I’ll say that…openly.”56 The institutional 
underdevelopment of the MfAA stemming from the SED’s relative neglect of foreign 
policy in the young GDR, more importantly, also prevented the creation of a foreign 
ministry that fully accorded with the political and ideological requirements of the SED, 
partly because the SED itself did not possess or did not articulate a uniform vision for 
systematic development of the MfAA. 
 While the initial impetus for creation of the MfAA was above all propagandistic 
and it remained unclear exactly what the mission of the ministry was supposed to be 
given the extremely narrow scope of the GDR’s foreign relations at the time, the MfAA 
quickly became engaged in a host of different tasks, ranging from the day-to-day 
execution of foreign policy directives to informational and analytical work, all within the 
broader context of Soviet supremacy in the formulation of East German foreign policy 
                                                 
55 Wentker describes the MfAA as lacking not only thenecessary technical infrastructure like telephone 
installations, transmitters, and a functioning courier and postal service, but also the most basic equipment 
like office furniture, type writers, and paper. Wentker, Außenpolitik, 49. 
56 Cited in Lemke, “Prinzipien und Grundlagen,” 274. 
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and the ongoing haphazard construction of a foreign policy apparatus in a GDR more 
concerned with immediate domestic exigencies than foreign relations. The MfAA in fact 
occupied a unique position among East German foreign policy institutions insofar as its 
primary field of activity was operative foreign policy but was also significantly involved 
in analytical work. The two elements were closely rlated as foreign policy estimates and 
reports produced within the MfAA itself, while also being made available to leading 
party organs, provided the informational basis for operative decisions made within the 
ministry. The interconnectedness of operative foreign policy and expertise as practiced in 
its embryonic form at the MfAA was not exceptional; on the contrary, an orientation 
toward overcoming the divide between operative foreign policy and foreign policy 
expertise would come to characterize the GDR’s entir  system of foreign policy 
expertise. The functional differentiation between institutions dealing mainly with 
operative foreign policy and institutions dealing mainly with research and training was 
supposed to be subsumed under the unity of purpose pr vided by unambiguous 
subordination to advancing the GDR’s centrally dictated foreign policy goals. Operative 
institutions and expert institutions were thus supposed to stand in a symbiotic relationship 
with one another where the so-called “joining of theory with practice” would be 
complete. 
In this context, the MfAA was soon joined by a number of other party and state 
institutions, each of which began to acquire a distinct profile of its own in the institutional 
flux characteristic of the earliest years of the GDR’s formal existence.57 Since the MfAA 
                                                 
57  While by the conclusion of the East German foreign policy apparatus’s initial phase of development in 
end of the 1950s a relatively large number of institutions had emerged whose work touched on foreign 
policy either directly or indirectly in one way or another, the focus of this section is on those institutions 
that comprised important parts of the emergent EastGerman system of foreign policy expertise as well as 
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was prevented from taking the initiative on foreign policy issues by its subordinate status 
as a state institution and thus operated essentially as an executor of policy formulated by 
the SED leadership in collaboration with their Soviet patrons, a party institution was 
needed to take on the position of authoritative party organ on foreign policy issues. The 
creation of such a division within the Central Committee of the SED was already 
discussed in a meeting of the Small Secretariat in October 1949. In addition to taking 
over responsibility for the party’s foreign relations from the International Liaison 
Division, the division as envisioned would also be charged with “deliberating on, 
coordinating, and supervising the activities of all organs that deal with international 
relations” and “overseeing and directing the party o ganizations in all German missions 
abroad.”58 The discussion in the Small Secretariat, however, did not result in the creation 
of the division.59 
 It was only following an up-tick in the foreign relations of the GDR in 1952/1953 
(including intensification of relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, establishment of 
trade representations in Helsinki and Cairo, and continued attempts to establish contact 
with countries outside the Soviet Bloc) and in response to appeals coming from the 
MfAA for a contact within the party apparatus60 that the party leadership once again 
                                                                                                                                      
institutions dealing principally with operative foreign policy but frequently employing the output of the 
GDR’s experts.  
The Ministerium für Außenhandel und Innerdeutschen Ha del (MAI), or Ministry for Foreign Trade and 
Inner-German Trade, represented, for instance, a key institution of GDR foreign policy, particularly in the 
1950s and 1960s, when the ministry was employed as a central instrument in the struggle for diplomatic 
recognition, but will not be addressed here in detail as the expertise which it produced and which it drew on 
from other institutions was narrow in focus and falls outside of the bounds of the current study. The same is 
true for many of East Germany’s “mass organizations,” such as the Free German Trade Union Federation 
and the Free German Youth, which maintained their own international relations divisions. 
58 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/58. 
59 Wentker speculates that this was due to a Soviet veto. Wentker, Außenpolitik, 33. 
60 A note from the MfAA illustrates the need for a party organ responsible for coordination of foreign 
policy, while the conspicuous absence of such a party organ again highlights the secondary importance 
attached to foreign relations at the time: “The only gap in the approval of the guidelines [for participation in 
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addressed the issue. A Secretariat resolution from 19 January 195361 delineated the 
profile of an Abteilung Außenpolitische Fragen (Divis on for Foreign Policy Questions) 
that would fill the vacant the position of authoritat ve party organ on foreign policy 
issues. The division would be responsible for coordinating the activities of the GDR’s 
foreign policy apparatus (principally the MfAA at this point)62 and presenting the 
Politburo, which maintained final decision-making authority within the GDR, with 
reports and proposals pertaining to foreign policy. The division’s concrete responsibilities 
represented an expanded version of the competencies envisioned for such a division by 
the Small Secretariat in October 1949 that would len  it far-ranging authority within the 
GDR’s foreign policy apparatus, including: “Oversight of the implementation of 
resolutions of the CC as well as important resolutins of the state administration on 
foreign policy questions, the preparation of proposals on foreign policy questions to the 
Politburo and the Secretariat of the CC as well as the review of incoming proposals, [and] 
supervision of the selection, development, and assignment of cadres in the realm of 
foreign policy.”63 The division’s further responsibilities would include “monitoring and 
supervising the GDR’s foreign propaganda as well as handling foreign policy questions 
in the press and radio of the GDR [and] oversight and direction of party organizations in 
                                                                                                                                      
international conferences] that still might be closed would be coordination in the CC itself. As is known, 
the current situation is such that we do not have a partner in the CC and therefore have to send our reports 
to the respective relevant divisions [of the CC]… In the CC, however, a uniform political line absolute y 
must be reached before the time of submission and it must largely be avoided that proposals from two 
different divisions dealing with the same matter reach the Secretariat or the Politburo one shortly afer the 
other.” Cited in Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 62. 
61 The resolution was apparently in response to an earlier Politburo resolution (SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 
2/2/244, from 11 November 1952) that called for the creation of such a division. 
62 A former OibE (Offizier im besonderen Einsatz, i.e. a MfS agent working covertly at another party or 
state organ to gather information) who was placed at the MfAA has even called the division the 
“Oberabteilung” of the foreign ministry, highlighting its subordination to the division. Rudolf Nitsche, 
Diplomat im besonderen Einsatz. Eine DDR-Biographie (Schkeuditz: GNN, 1994), 92. 
63 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 J IV 2/3/356. 
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the diplomatic missions and trade missions of the GDR.”64 The resolution also viewed it 
as essential for quality work that the division’s employees “closely observe and study the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the people’s democracies, and capitalist countries, 
especially the US, England, and France, both in general and in particular toward 
Germany as well as the foreign relations of West Germany.”65 
 Instead of creating a completely new institution t take over responsibility for 
these tasks, however, the International Relations Division, which had been created before 
the Staatsgründung and whose activities had not amounted to much, was re-founded and 
reorganized to match the profile laid out in the Secretariat resolution. Peter Florin, son of 
the leading Weimar-era KPD functionary Wilhelm Florin who had already gained foreign 
policy experience through involvement in both party and state institutions, including a 
stint as deputy head of the International Relations Division, took over leadership of the 
reconstituted division from his former superior Grete Keilson. The retooled division was 
in fact initially given the name Division for Foreign Policy Questions, as had been laid 
out in the original Secretariat resolution. However, since the division, alongside its new 
role as authoritative party organ responsible for the coordination of the East German 
foreign policy apparatus (including transmission of foreign policy-related proposals to 
and from the party’s two highest decision-making bodies, the Politburo and the 
Secretariat), was to retain responsibility for maint i ing relations with other communist 
parties and movements, which had been its main task in its earlier incarnation as the 
International Relations Division, it was given the name Abteilung Außenpolitik und 




Internationale Verbindungen beim Zentralkomitee, or F reign Policy and International 
Relations Division of the Central Committee (APIV Division), in September 1953.66 
 The reconstituted division under Florin’s direction initially comprised three 
sectors (general questions of foreign policy, interational social organizations, cultural 
foreign relations) and was staffed by a total of 23 political and six technical 
employees67—a significant increase over the two employees staffing the division at its 
founding in 1948. In 1956, an additional deputy director post was created and the division 
was reorganized into four sectors: socialist abroad, c pitalist abroad, foreign propaganda 
and information, and supervision of political visitors to the GDR and emigration.68 A 
leader headed each sector, whose members held the designation Instrukteur (instructor). 
In addition to its already existing tasks, the division was made responsible for 
fundamental questions in teaching and research in the area of international law and 
international relations (discussed below), reviewing political directives on the GDR’s 
involvement in international organizations, and cooperating with the relevant divisions of 
the CC to prepare East German delegations for their ass gnments. With the assumption of 
these new responsibilities, the APIV Division by the end of the 1950s69 played a central 
                                                 
66 Wentker notes that the assertions of Lemke (“Prinzip en und Grundlagen,” 251) and Muth (Die DDR-
Außenpolitik, 64) that two separate divisions—Außenpolitik (foreign policy) and Internationale 
Verbindungen (international relations)—existed and were then fused to form the Foreign Policy and 
International Relations Division (in September 1953 or March 1956, respectively) have been shown to be 
unfounded by Amos’s research. Wentker, Außenpolitik, 33n37. 
67 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/356. 
68 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/505. 
69 Amos puts the number of political and technical employees active in the division at decade’s end at 38 
and ten respectively, but these figures, which are drawn from a 1959 structural plan presented to the 
Secretariat (SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/648), appear inaccurate in light of a statistical break-down 
provided by the division itself in autumn of the same year (SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/683), which 
listed 21 active political employees. The discrepancy is likely due to the fact that the structural plan, which 
was in the process of being altered, listed all open ositions in the division, while the division’s own break-
down only listed actual employees. An inability to s aff all open positions due to a shortage of qualified 
foreign policy cadres was after all one of the main issues facing the APIV Division in particular and the 
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role in the conduct, if not formulation, of East Germany foreign policy, analogous to the 
powerful International Division of the Central Committee of the CPSU.70 
 As was the case with most other party and state ins itutions in the East German 
foreign policy apparatus, the APIV Division would exp rience further reorganization in 
the years to come alongside considerable growth, which would lead to the continual 
expansion and intensification of the division’s now already extensive activities. While the 
principal emphasis of the division’s activities in both its main areas of responsibility—the 
coordination of the actions of the state foreign policy apparatus by virtue of its position as 
highest party authority on foreign policy and as intermediary on foreign policy issues 
between the Politburo and the Secretariat on the one ha d and all other party and state 
organs on the other and the maintenance of relations with other communist parties and 
movements—lay on the operative side of the foreign policy spectrum, informational and 
analytical activity also played a central role in its work. In a situation bearing 
considerable similarity to the state of affairs at the MfAA, foreign policy research made 
up an indispensable element of the division’s work even while its main focus lay in 
operative activity—the division continually drew ona alysis completed by its own sub-
units, the MfAA, or other institutions.  Here too the East German attempt to bring about a 
symbiotic relationship between operative foreign policy and expertise was in evidence, a 
characteristic that would remain a key feature of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus far beyond the initial period of flux and haphazard development. 
                                                                                                                                      
East German foreign policy apparatus in general at the ime. Amos, Politik und Organisation der SED-
Zentrale 1949-1963, 398. 
70 The International Division of the CPSU, although headed by the ideologue Boris Ponomarev from 1955 
to 1986, nevertheless served as a breeding ground for pragmatic foreign policy thought that would make a 
key contribution to the emergence of Soviet New Thinking. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 19-20. 
The APIV Division, like its Soviet role model, would become a source of pragmatic, non-dogmatic foreign 
policy thought in the GDR. 
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 The impetus for the founding of another major party o gan dealing with foreign 
policy issues, like that of the APIV Division, can be attributed in part to the increase in 
the GDR’s foreign policy activities in 1952/53 and the SED’s corresponding efforts to 
create an effective set of party institutions capable of addressing the new challenges 
stemming expanded foreign policy activity.71 The Außenpolitische Kommission beim 
Politbüro (APK), or Foreign Policy Commission of the Politburo, was the successor of 
the Commission for Foreign Policy Questions from the pre-Staatsgründung era, which 
never took on a substantive role due to the priority enjoyed by domestic concerns and the 
atrophied state of the GDR’s foreign relations at the time.72 In contrast to the APIV 
Division, the APK did not dealt with operative, day-to-day foreign policy, but functioned 
as a deliberative, advisory body that also possessed ome control and coordination 
functions. Within this context, the APK could deal with the full range of issues pertaining 
to GDR foreign policy, from trade relations and participation in international conferences 
to strategic orientation and the internal functioning of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus, with one notable exception: relations to other communist parties and 
movements remained the exclusive preserve of the APIV Division. The first meeting of 
the APK in September 1953 laid out in detail the main functions the commission was 
supposed to fulfill: “Discussion of the foreign policy, the foreign trade policy, and other 
foreign relations of the GDR and presentation of corresponding suggestions to the 
Politburo of the CC;73 oversight and evaluation for the Politburo of the CC of all treaties, 
                                                 
71 The creation of the APK, like that of the APIV Division, was ratified in the Politburo resolution of 11
November 1952. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 IV 2/2/244. 
72 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 58. 
73 The Politburo resolution from 17 February 1953 enumerating the responsibilities of the newly created 
commission indeterminately framed the creation of the APK, which was missing in the APK’s own 
protocol, as “[the] result of international events, particularly the struggle of the USSR for the maintenance 
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agreements, and arrangements of fundamental importance hat are to be concluded by the 
government of the GDR and its organs; clarification of the principal questions of the 
foreign propaganda of the GDR and the handling of foreign policy questions in the press 
and radio of the GDR; quarterly reporting to the Politburo on the state of fulfillment of 
the obligations that the GDR has taken on in treaties, rade agreements, etc.; oversight of 
argumentation on the handling of important foreign policy questions.”74 In the 1950s, the 
APK indeed dealt with a broad, if eclectic, range of topics, including the establishment 
and expansion of official and unofficial relations with foreign countries, agitation and 
propaganda, organization of events such as the Leipzig Trade Fair and the Baltic Sea 
Week, issues relating to the internal organization and administration of the GDR’s 
foreign policy apparatus (including the training of cadres) as well as numerous analyses 
on the general international situation as well as repo ts on specific countries or discrete 
topics (e.g. European integration, the non-aligned movement).75 
 Anton Ackermann was initially tapped as chairman of the APK, but he was 
removed from all his posts for aligning himself with Wilhelm Zaisser’s challenge to 
Ulbricht’s authority in the wake of the June Uprising of 1953 before the commission met 
for the first time in September 1953.76 In Ackermann’s stead, Ulbricht chaired the APK 
for a time himself before handing over the chairmanship in 1955 to Heinrich Rau, 
minister for Foreign Trade and Inner German Trade and member of the Politburo. The 
number of APK members at any given time varied, hovering around 10, and 
encompassed leading figures drawn from both party and state institutions— Peter Florin 
                                                                                                                                      
of peace and the strengthening of friendship among peace-loving peoples.” SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/J IV 
2/2A/246. 
74 SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV 2/2.115/1. 
75 See, e.g., SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV 2/2.115/1; DY 30/IV 2/20/1-4. 
76 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/300. 
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(head of the APIV Division), Paul Wandel (Secretary of the Central Committee), Paul 
Verner (head of the Central Committee’s Division for All-German Questions), Kurt 
Helbig (head of the Free German Trade Union Federation) and Wolfgang Steinke 
(secretary of the central council of the Free German Youth) were among the members of 
the commission in its original incarnation.77 The APK did not possess decision-making 
authority itself, but rather was conceived of as a body where leading representatives of 
the most important party and state institutions involved in the foreign relations of the 
GDR would come together every three weeks78 to discuss outstanding foreign policy 
questions, coordinate their actions, and present proposals to the SED leadership for 
approval. The influence of the commission with the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus 
rested just as much upon the weight of its individual members as formal hierarchical 
relations. As was the case with the MfAA and the APIV Division, informational and 
analytical activity represented an important component of the APK’s work. The 
commission was simultaneously a producer and a consumer of foreign policy expertise as 
it, in deliberating on foreign policy questions, employed expertise created specifically for 
its own use as well as that produced by and for other institutions. 
 One such expertise-producing institution was the Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut 
(DWI), or German Economic Institute. The DWI was created on 01 June 194979 by 
                                                 
77 Ibid. 
78 This was the expectation expressed at the first meeting of the APK: SAPMO-BArch, DY/30/IV 
2/2.115/1. In reality, the frequency of meetings varied considerably. 
79 The resolution approving the official creation of the DWI was passed July 1949, but preparations for its 
creation began as early as March of the same year, when Siegbert Kahn, first director of the DWI, oversaw 
the institute’s take-over of the materials of the economics department of I.G. Farben in Berlin. The entir  
process was subject to the approval and supervision of SMAG. Bundesarchiv (hereafter BArch), DC 
202/56. 
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resolution of the Secretariat of the German Economic Commission (DWK)80 and was 
headed by the leadership duo of Jürgen Kuczynski as president and Siegbert Kahn as 
director. Kuczynski and Kahn were longtime members of the KPD/SED with strong 
antifascist credentials and both were specialists in economics (Kuczynski received his 
doctorate from the University of Erlangen in 1925 and Kahn completed a correspondence 
course in economics while employed at the DWK before coming to the DWI).81 Kahn 
took over sole leadership of the DWI when the positi n of president was left vacant after 
Kuczynski departed in 1953, and in the same year Willi Kling, who up to this point had 
been actively involved in the transformation of theEast German economy82 and who like 
Kuczynski and Kahn possessed solid antifascist credentials, was appointed deputy 
director of the DWI. In 1950 the DWI already counted 90 employees83 and by 1952 
would increase to 13084 (the proportion of scientific employees at the institute at any 
given time totaled between one-third and one-half of the total number of employees; the 
remaining employees were either technical specialists or administrative personnel). 
 While the DWK resolution sealing the creation of the DWI defined the central 
tasks of the new institute rather generally as “thepromotion and development of 
democratic Germany’s economy of peace, investigation and analysis of the economic 
situation in Germany and all other countries, and the theoretical elaboration of individual 
economic problems,”85 the Politburo resolution on the founding of the institute, which 
actually preceded the DWK resolution by a month, presented a more detailed picture of 
                                                 
80 Bundesarchiv (hereafter BArch), DC 15/994. Bruno Leuschner, deputy chairman of the DWK, was 
charged with overseeing the initial development of the DWI. 
81 Biographisches Handbuch der SBZ/DDR, s. vv. “Jürgen Kuczynski,” “Siegbert Kahn,” in Enzyklopädie 
der DDR, CD-ROM (Berlin: Directmedia, 2004). 
82 Ibid., s.v. “Willi Kling.” 
83 BArch, DC 202/56. 
84 BArch, DC 202/3. 
85 BArch, DC 15/994. 
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the role the DWI was supposed to play. The DWI’s “fundamental task” consisted in 
“research on the economy in a unified, democratic Germany” and “examination of the 
political-economic benefits of a united Germany versus a Germany divided into zones,” 
whereby no doubt was left as to what had caused the ivision of Germany: “The goal is 
clarification of the economic policy conducted by the Western occupation powers aimed 
at the division of Germany and the transformation of the Western zones into a colonial 
territory.” 86 The main themes to be addressed within this research agenda included “the 
conquest of the economy by Anglo-American monopolies and their role in the re-
emergence of German monopolies,” “the worsening of the situation of the working 
population in the Western zones,” “the policies of the Western occupation powers aimed 
at the destruction of German competitiveness on world markets,” and “the reconstruction 
of the armaments industry in West Germany.”87 While these orientation points for the 
DWI’s research portrayed West Germany more as a passive victim than an active 
participant in the “imperialistic” division of Germany and even struck certain 
nationalistic tones in the context of the SED’s efforts to appear “all-German,” the 
institute’s initial orientation also clearly evinced the priority given to establishing and 
maintaining the SOZ as a separate, communist state und r the dictatorial control of the 
SED and thoroughly integrated into the Soviet Bloc. Providing research to serve the 
establishment of economic relations advantageous to the SOZ, for example, numbered 
among the DWI’s main responsibilities. Two key topics were “the expedient organization 
of the economic relations of the Soviet Occupation Z e with [capitalist countries]” and 
“examination of means of strengthening the economic relations of the Soviet Occupation 
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Zone with the USSR and the people’s democracies, particul rly a) strengthening the 
exchange of goods [and] b) experience in economic planning.”88 Walter Ulbricht’s 
comments at the opening ceremony of the institute, finally, highlighted how the scholarly 
work of the institute was not meant to be “value-fre,” but to serve the broader political 
and ideological goals of East Germany as defined by the SED. Ulbricht declared: “The 
German Economic Institute cannot be a neutral institute. The purpose of your research 
demands that you approach the issues in a partisan fa hion from the point of view of 
progressive science (Wissenschaft),89 that you let the interests of the people guide you in 
a partisan fashion, and that you wage an unforgivin battle against the camp of the 
enemies of the people and war-mongers.”90 Although the exact political and ideological 
orientation of the SED supposed to be guiding the work of the DWI still contained a 
certain ambiguity, vacillating between an “all-German” position centered around the 
creation of a unified, communist Germany and the striving to transform the SOZ into a 
one-party communist dictatorship firmly incorporated into the Soviet Bloc, the principle 
that would lay at the heart of expertise at the DWI as well as the rest of the GDR’s expert 
institutions was unmistakable: the scientific work f the institute was to be conducted in 
accord with the political-ideological goals and requirements of the SED leadership. 
 With the founding of East Germany in October 1949, the profile of the DWI 
gained further clarity. Following the transformation f the DWK, the organ previously 
responsible for the DWI, into the provisional administration of the young GDR, the 
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Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the GDR and the Central Committee’s Division 
for All-German Questions Division were made the respective state and party organs 
responsible for the institute. By 1952, the DWI’s rather broad initial research profile, 
covering economic developments in both East and West, was narrowed to focus only on 
the West, West Germany in particular, 91 and it was in this capacity that the institute came 
into more substantial contact with foreign policy issues. The scope of research conducted 
by the DWI in the 1950s was much more narrowly concer ed with economics than that 
of other East German institutions dealing with foreign policy, which lent the institute’s 
work a “scientific” sheen, yet the DWI was subjected just as much as all the other 
institutions of the East German foreign policy apparatus to the basic fact of life in the 
SED state: subordination to the specific political and ideological requirements of the SED 
within the broader framework of its foreign policy objectives. Within this framework, the 
DWI—with its work now more tightly focused on West Germany—took on both 
propagandistic and informational responsibilities. The propagandistic function consisted 
in influencing foreign and domestic opinion from a M rxist-Leninist perspective and in 
accord with the prevailing line of the SED. The main vehicle of DWI propaganda was the 
biweekly bulletin DWI-Berichte (DWI-Reports), which was joined by a number of other, 
irregularly appearing publications dedicated to specific issues. In the first decade of the 
GDR’s existence, the DWI also frequently penned articles dealing with topical issues for 
publication in East German newspapers.92 
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 The DWI was an extremely valuable vehicle for disseminating the SED’s 
perspective on important economic issues and for scoring points against the West since, 
with Kuczynski and Kahn at the helm, it could legitimately claim to have assembled a 
staff of economics experts, some of whom enjoyed a degree of esteem in the West. The 
DWI could and did make clever use of the opportunities afforded by this situation as, for 
example, when President Kuczynski and Director Kahn on 12 February 1952 presented a 
DWI volume on foreign investments in West German enterprises to great fanfare at a 
press conference attended by a large number of foreign news correspondents, including 
representatives of the BBC, the New York Times, and the Associated Press.93 Yet 
however “scientific” the propagandistic work of the DWI might have appeared, it was 
premised at all times on a Marxist-Leninist understanding of economics, at times less 
pronounced, at times more pronounced, as the volume on foreign investments in West 
German enterprises demonstrates, which was intended to lay bare capitalism’s take-over 
of the FRG and its incorporation into the “imperialist” bloc. A letter to Director Kahn 
requesting an article on the West German economy and co taining specifications for its 
content revealed how far the pendulum could swing in the direction of crude 
ideologization: “The article must in particular demonstrate that the West German 
economy is overloaded with contradictions and has no future (particularly for the 
workers), rather [sic] that the economic development in our republic is healthier. It has to 
refute the notion that the boom in the West German economy is proof that the general 
crisis of capitalism, its economic fall, and its putrescence are no longer valid.”94 
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 While adherence to a basic Marxist-Leninist interpr tive framework underlay 
both the propagandistic and informational functions f the DWI, important differences 
existed in the output produced for each purpose. Th work of the DWI created for 
internal use typically dealt with much narrower, technical questions than the work created 
for public consumption and for this reason had a much more practical orientation and was 
largely free of the imperative for constant ideologization. As a result, the DWI’s 
informational work did in fact have a rather “wissenschaftlich” character, though was no 
less affected by the basic fact of subordination to the larger goals of the SED. The 
institute served as a sort of clearinghouse for economic data from abroad, processing 
requests from various state and party institutions f r information on a given issue and 
receiving reports from other institutions, which it would in turn incorporate into its own 
work. As a result of its focus on economics and West Germany/the West, the DWI 
worked particularly closely with the State Planning Commission (the organ in charge of 
the East German economy), the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Inner-German Trade and 
the MfAA. In addition to regular reports on the economy of West Germany and West 
Berlin, the DWI completed studies on the armaments industry in the West, the economic 
situation in Indonesia, Iran, Romania, and other countries, the prices of various 
commodities on the world market, the mining industry, and West German exports to the 
US in addition to a host of other topics.95 
 The differences in the DWI’s work produced for external and internal 
consumption underline the partially contradictory nature of the dual mission assigned to 
the institute. It was to engage in “scientific” examination of the economy and its 
relevance for foreign policy in and toward West Germany and the West, but was to do so 
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on the basis of Marxist-Leninism and to serve the specific political goals of the party. The 
obligation to provide sound analysis of international economic developments and foreign 
relations within a framework of strict compliance with the ideological tenets of Marxism-
Leninism contained the seeds of tension between intllec ual subordination and 
intellectual autonomy that would come to characterize East German foreign policy 
expertise in its entirety. However, at this very early stage in the development of East 
German foreign policy expertise, this tension was still very much latent, particularly 
considering that the key prerequisite for its emergence—the full political and ideological 
and subordination of the DWI—had not yet been fulfilled as the haphazard development 
of the East German foreign policy expertise had yet to bring about a fully rationalized 
institutional structure. 
 The principal orientation of the DWI toward West Germany was shared by the 
Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte (DIZ), or German Institute for Contemporary 
History, which was on its way to becoming a key expertise-producing institution in the 
course of the early development of East German foreign policy expertise. The forerunner 
institution to the DIZ was the Zentralstelle für Zeitg schichte, or Central Office for 
Contemporary History, created by decree of SMAD on 1 March 1946 to take over 
“defeated fascism’s collection and documentation of sources and literature.”96 In July 
1947, the Central Office for Contemporary History, which appears to have served 
primarily as a collection and documentation center, merged with the Institut für 
Zeitungskunde, or Institute for Newspaper Studies, and the fused institution was renamed 
the German Institute for Contemporary History in October 1949, the same month the 
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GDR was founded.97 The DIZ was headed from 1951 by Director Karl Bittel, a longtime 
member of the KPD/SED who received his doctorate in 1915 after studying history, law, 
and economics and who had immigrated from the Western occupation zones to the SOZ 
in 1948.98 The Press Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Agitation 
Division of the SED’s Central Committee were made th  respective state and party 
organs responsible for the DIZ.99 The initial mission of the institute, whose name was in 
fact slightly misleading, was to serve as a documentation center for current events in the 
capitalist West, particularly the FRG. As the DIZ’s 1957 labor plan put it:  
The institute has the function of a central documentation site for contemporary history in 
the German Democratic Republic. Archive, library and collections, and the informational 
activity as well as the publications of the DIZ serve to document questions and problems 
related to current events for the practical work of the most varied institutions and 
interested parties …. The basic orientation of the DIZ lies in development of a new, 
democratic economic and social order in Germany as set forth in the principles of the 
Potsdam Agreement and realized in exemplary fashion in the GDR through the 
construction of socialism; [the establishment of a democratic economic and social order] 
in West Germany, however, has been hindered by the politics of imperialistic restoration. 
The re-emergence of German imperialism in West Germany brought about the division of 
Germany, as a result of which two completely different, sovereign German states have 
emerged. The problems of national re-unification are therefore of fundamental 
significance in the work of the DIZ. Further, important international problems that are 
related to the development of Germany in its entirety and to re-unification, particularly 
questions of European security, belong to the institute’s specific thematic profile…. 
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 78
Through its efforts, the institute contributes to the development and strengthening of 
socialist consciousness.100  
Thus the DIZ, like the DWI, was not simply supposed to ocument current events falling 
within its designated thematic rubric in a passive, “ alue-free” fashion, but actively to 
interpret and re-package them in accord with the political goals and ideological 
requirements of East Germany as determined by the SED.
 What this orientation entailed in practice was division of the DIZ’s activities into 
two broad areas, both stemming from its status as a documentation center: propagandistic 
and informational responsibilities, although this was a functional differentiation above all 
since the same underlying political-ideological objective motivated both activities. The 
propagandistic function was fulfilled by publication f, among other works, the biweekly 
Dokumentation der Zeit (Documentation of Current Events), which had a wide 
distribution in both the FRG and the GDR (later reaching a peak circulation of 10,000).101 
In its early years, Dokumentation der Zeit offered little more than a collection of 
clippings taken predominantly from West German news outlets and accompanied by 
commentary written by DIZ staffers, but production of the periodical would become 
increasingly refined over the years. In terms of its in ernal, informational function, the 
DIZ was responsible for following current events in the capitalist West, documenting 
them (particularly by compiling printed documents, which it maintained in its sizable 
archive), and making that information available, after processing it through the specific 
East German Marxist-Leninist perspective, to the organs of party and state in the GDR. 
Here the DIZ fulfilled a role parallel to the DWI’s role for economics—it served as the 
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GDR’s authoritative clearinghouse for information on general current events in the 
capitalist West, which included responsibility for teaching and research on contemporary 
history, though both these, particularly the latter, were not very advanced in their 
development at the time. The DIZ’s initial offerings in the informational realm were 
rather modest, but they would grow rapidly, eventually including daily information 
roundups made available exclusively to high-ranking members of the SED nomenklatura 
on seven separate topics (the states of the Federal R public, the West’s preparations for 
war, the parliamentary representations of the FRG, unity and peace, the economy, 
coverage of Western countries in the foreign press, and miscellanea).102 The result was 
that the DIZ by the mid-1950s was already well on its way to becoming the GDR’s most 
important center for information on currents events i  the capitalist West. 
 Ideological fidelity enjoyed particularly high prio ty among those foreign policy 
cadres that came into regular contact with material from the West, sometimes referred to 
as Giftblätter, or poisonous pages. The DIZ, as a documentation center responsible for 
gleaning information from the Western press for both in ernal and foreign consumption, 
was one such institution that could not tolerate any ideological ambiguity: “Our 
employees need to have a steadfast political worldview in order to carry out their work 
responsibly. The scientific employees must be famili r with the daily, practical 
application of Marxism-Leninism in order to match the hostile ideologies that influence 
them as they process material from the West. Since forward-striding science rejects 
objectivism and demands allegiance to our progressiv  cause, active involvement in the 
struggle against imperialism-militarism and for thecomprehensive consolidation and 
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strengthening of socialist construction in the GDR and the reunification of Germany must 
be a matter of course.”103 
 The fundamental mission of the DIZ, like that of the DWI, was based on an 
attempt to combine “scientific” evaluation of materials from the West with an 
unambiguous political and ideological purpose. Whether he DIZ was engaged in 
external, propagandistic work or internal, informational work, its superordinate goal 
remained “making the progressive forces under the leadership of the party of the working 
class aware of the great power of the people through historical portrayal of their struggle, 
their achievements, and their experiences and conveying to them substantiated 
knowledge for the conscious fulfillment of their historical task.”104 The basis for tension 
between intellectual subordination and autonomy was in place at the DIZ, but it would 
not become manifest for still some time. The full po itical and ideological subordination 
of the institute would have to take place before it would be possible for the incongruity of 
achieving a realistic assessment of international rel tions on the basis of Marxism-
Leninism to become apparent. What is more, the DIZ had very little to assess at the time. 
Its narrow mission as a documentation and information center excluded the type of 
thoroughgoing going analysis that could potentially rouse the embryonic tension 
between intellectual subordination and autonomy at the DIZ. 
 The subordination of the DIZ and its involvement in analytical research, however, 
were on the verge of increasing dramatically in what w s, not coincidentally, a linked 
process. In July 1955, the Politburo issued a resolution on “improving historical research 
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and instruction in the GDR”105 that aimed to increase the utility of East German history-
writing in accord with the requirements of the SED, which required its thoroughgoing 
politicization and ideologization. The resolution stipulated that “progressive German 
history-writing” in the GDR was to become “a sharp ideological weapon,” particularly 
“in the struggle against reactionary West German history-writing” and against its 
“falsification” of German history.106 East German history-writing, further, was required 
to take an unequivocal ideological position: “The discipline of history in the GDR can 
only fulfill its national mission if it rests on the foundation of the single scientific theory 
and method for understanding social development—historical materialism, which was 
developed by the greatest sons of our nation, Marx and Engels—and if it creatively 
applies historical materialism in its investigation a d depiction of all the problems and 
processes of our nation’s history.”107 
 The Politburo’s 1955 “history resolution” applied to history-writing in the GDR 
in general, but it had particular relevance and patent urgency in the realm of 
contemporary history (understood as beginning with the end of the Second World War 
and particularly emphasizing current events), which in turn directly implicated the DIZ as 
the GDR’s authoritative center on contemporary history. Following passage of the 
resolution in July 1955, the DIZ and the Central Committee’s Abteilung Wissenschaften 
(Sciences Division) worked in close cooperation in a series of meetings and consultations 
from 1955 until 1957 to assess the state of contemporary history at the DIZ and to ensure 
that the DIZ conformed to the vision of history promulgated in the Politburo’s resolution. 
The results of the assessment were not good. Research and instruction on contemporary 
                                                 




history were described as “extremely undervalued and neglected” and their place in 
fulfilling the goals designated in the resolution as “wholly unsatisfactory.”108 Given the 
political function ascribed by the SED to history-writing in the GDR, it was no surprise 
that the purported shortcomings of contemporary history in the GDR as practiced at the 
DIZ and elsewhere were viewed not as a scholarly but a political failing: “This neglect is 
that much more politically consequential since contemporary history is pursued very 
intensively in West Germany and its systematic falsification of history produces an 
incorrect understanding of history in broad segments of he population there as well as in 
the GDR through radio and [print] journalism.”109 The SED saw itself compelled to 
respond by ensuring the creation of  “a well-grounded understanding of contemporary 
history with the help of our historians” through the establishment of a “guiding hand that 
is responsible for the planning and coordination of research, instruction, and publishing 
activity in contemporary history.”110 The 1955 Politburo resolution had actually foreseen 
the creation of a new Contemporary History Division within the Historical Institute of the 
East German Academy of Sciences to fulfill this role,111 but in the end it was decided to 
overhaul the DIZ in order to match these new expectations rather than to create a new 
institute from scratch seeing as the DIZ could draw on an existing stock of human and 
material resources. In the envisioned transformation, great emphasis was placed on the 
importance of researching contemporary history in order to demonstrate “why our path in 
the GDR is the only correct path and what great danger developments in West Germany 
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represent.”112 Yet the task of practitioners of contemporary history in the GDR lay not in 
simply asserting the superiority of the socialist path of development but also in 
demonstrating its superiority through investigation of specific developments and topics113 
from the a Marxist-Leninist point of view. The study of current events and the recent past 
was thus unmistakably oriented toward the present. The DIZ, newly designated as “the 
center of scientific research on contemporary history in the GDR”114 was to be key 
institution driving the desired transformation of cntemporary history. While the DIZ 
maintained its responsibilities in the realms of inter al information and external 
propaganda, it took up this new research function, which was to be bound organically 
with its existing activities. 
 The DIZ’s profile, thusly modified, subsequently became codified in a Secretariat 
resolution from August 1957.115 The resolution underscored the new status of the DIZ as 
“the leading contemporary history institution in the GDR” as well as the new importance 
attached to contemporary history: “The scientific investigation and depiction of German 
contemporary history, i.e. developments since 1945, is of extraordinary significance for 
the socialist enlightenment of the workers, for the struggle against German militarism, 
and for the peaceful, democratic reunification of Germany.”116 Several far-reaching 
changes were implemented in order to ensure that the institute would function in accord 
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with its overhauled profile. Foremost among these was the replacement of Director Karl 
Bittel with Walter Bartel, a long-time KPD/SED functionary with pristine antifascist 
credentials,117 personal assistant to Wilhelm Pieck from 1946 to 1953, and professor of 
history at the University of Leipzig from 1953 to 1957.118 The nominal reason for Bittel’s 
dismissal was poor health, which may have played a (limited) role since Bittel was 65 
years old and had previously complained about the physical toll exacted by his work as 
the DIZ, but more important was the fact that Bittel had dragged his feet on the 
transformation of the DIZ ever since passage of the Politburo resolution in 1955.119 Bittel 
appeared incapable, even if not necessarily purposefully, of providing the leadership 
required to reorganize the DIZ in accord with the political and ideological demands of the 
SED, having been criticized for “insufficient guidance of employees” and “suppression of 
criticism,”120 and was dismissed. Other key changes inaugurated by the 1957 Secretariat 
resolution included: replacing the Press Office of the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers and the Agitation Commission with, respectively, the State Secretariat for 
Higher Education and the Central Committee’s Sciences Division as the state and party 
organs responsible for the DIZ; increasing coordinatio  and cooperation between 
different institutions dealing with contemporary history, which was to be facilitated by 
the fact that they were all (including the DIZ) placed under the umbrella authority of the 
State Secretariat for Higher Education; making the substantial material collections of the 
DIZ accessible to other contemporary history institutions; creating a commission to 
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measure the DIZ’s progress in complying with the stipulations of the resolution; and 
establishing a Scientific Research Division.121 This last measure was particularly 
important as it represented the key step in movement of the institute’s work beyond 
simple documentation to systematic study and analysis. The focus of research, in line 
with earlier determinations on the issue, was to lie on “problems of the historical 
development of all of Germany since 1945,” particularly “examination of the 
revolutionary upheaval in the east of Germany and the emergence and development of 
the GDR” and the results of research were “to be published in the form of scientific 
analyses, essays, and monographs.” The Scientific Research Division was to pay close 
attention to works of contemporary history from West Germany in order “to wage an 
active struggle against attempts made in West German publications to falsify 
contemporary history.”122 From this point on, the research activities of the DIZ began to 
grow, although rather slowly at first.123 The expanded scope of the institute’s work also 
led to an increase in the number of persons employed at the DIZ, which reached 166 
(including scientific employees, technical specialists, and administrative personnel) by 
1960.124 Finally, the resolution more clearly defined the sp cific responsibilities of all the 
individual sub-units of the DIZ (documentation, library and archive, publishing and 
editing, etc.), not just those of the new research division, in order to guarantee that the 
DIZ would function in a more efficient and streamlined manner. 
 In sum, the re-orientation of the DIZ undertaken following the Politburo’s 1955 
“history resolution” and culminating in the 1957 Secretariat resolution marked a major 
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step in the development of the DIZ. The institute was now responsible for research on 
current events in the capitalist West alongside its previously existing propagandistic and 
informational functions. The output of the DIZ’s new research division would remain 
modest in the following years, but with time the DIZ would become one of the GDR’s 
most important centers for research on the FRG and the capitalist West. The overhaul of 
the DIZ’s was inseparably connected with a process of rationalization, in which the 
responsibilities of its respective divisions were str amlined and more clearly defined, so 
that the institute could meet the demands of its new profile. The linked process of re-
orientation and rationalization at the DIZ, it is important to note, was implemented from 
above with a single, unmistakable goal in mind: subordination to the practical goals and 
political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership. The attempted transformation 
of the DIZ in 1955-1957 was undertaken because the institute stood at the center of the 
SED’s efforts to build up contemporary history in the GDR to consistently enunciate a 
thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist view of current events, particularly in respect to the 
German question, in accord with the political and ideological demands of the party. The 
linked process of re-orientation and rationalization at the DIZ thus was inseparable from 
the process of political and ideological synchronization. Both the rationalization and the 
subordination of the DIZ in fact remained far from complete, but the process had been 
begun and with it the basis for permanent tension between intellectual autonomy and 
subordination at the DIZ had been established. Once the dual process of rationalization 
and synchronization would be completed, the conditions in which the incongruity of 
producing sound analysis on the basis of strict adherence to Marxist-Leninist tenets could 
become manifest would be in place. 
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Conclusion 
The construction of a foreign policy apparatus in the GDR—and attendant expert 
institutions—proceeded in the 1950s in fits and start . The SED’s preoccupation with the 
interrelated tasks of transforming itself into a party “of the new type” and cementing its 
dictatorial control over a communist East Germany meant that the GDR’s nascent foreign 
policy apparatus did not develop according to a systematic plan, but haphazardly in 
response to the party’s frequently shifting needs and priorities. In this context, foreign 
policy expertise did not develop as a discrete activity centered around analyzing the 
GDR’s foreign relations, but rather took shape in various forms at various institutions. 
There was not a single type of default “expert institution,” but rather a patchwork of 
various institutions, both those located more on the operative side and those located more 
on the analytical side of the foreign policy spectrum, that dealt in foreign policy 
expertise. Thus as state and party organs such as the MfAA, the APIV Division, the APK, 
the DWI, and the DIZ emerged and took on responsibility for a range of differing tasks, 
each one became involved with foreign policy expertis  in its own peculiar way within 
the framework of its specific responsibilities. 
 The designation “expert,” however, was hardly warranted in most cases. The 
emergent East German foreign policy apparatus—and with it the development of foreign 
policy expertise—was marred by ineffectual leadership and deficient coordination 
between different bodies, unclear delineation of responsibilities and overlapping 
competencies, a shortage of material resources, and an acute lack of qualified 
personnel—the fruits of the SED’s relative neglect of foreign policy in the initial years of 
the GDR’s existence. This did not mean, however, that t e essential features that would 
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come to typify foreign policy expertise in East Germany had not yet begun to take shape. 
On the contrary, the SED’s understanding of foreign policy expertise and the role it ought 
to play began to crystallize even before the Staatsgründung in October 1949 and was 
subsequently worked out in the first years of the GDR’s formal existence. In the eyes of 
the SED, foreign policy expertise was to deliver sound analysis of international relations 
developments, but was required to do so on the basis of Marxism-Leninism—the “joining 
of theory with practice,” in which operative institutions and expert institutions would 
stand in a symbiotic relationship with one another, was to be brought about. 
 While these principles characterized the SED’s understanding of the place and 
function of foreign policy expertise, practical implementation of this vision remained 
incomplete in the earliest years of the GDR’s existnce. Given the deficient institutional 
development of the East Germany foreign policy apparatus in the period, itself a result of 
the SED’s relative neglect, the “leading role of the party” (i.e. complete subordination) 
could only be partially realized. Although the ultimate authority of the party was never 
questioned, the absence of a fully rationalized institutional framework prevented the full 
political and ideological subordination of expertise n full agreement with the SED’s 
wishes. In a word, incomplete rationalization equaled incomplete synchronization. From 
this point onward, the two processes would proceed hand in hand, as was the case with 
the attempted transformation of the DIZ in 1955-1957. Starting in the late 1950s and 
continuing throughout the 1960s, the SED would make a systematic attempt to bring 
about the complete subordination of expertise to the party’s practical needs and political-
ideological requirements. The process would encounter a surprising number of obstacles 
and setbacks, but, in the end, would indeed bring about its goal by linking 
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synchronization with rationalization, both of which would become more or less total. The 
successful implementation of the SED’s conception of foreign policy expertise, however, 
would also have the unforeseen outcome of creating the basis for permanent tension 
between intellectual subordination and autonomy, betwe n the imperative to produce 
sound analysis of international relations on the basis of specialist knowledge and the 
imperative to conduct that analysis in strict accord with Marxist-Leninist foreign policy 
tenets. This moment, however, was still far off andthe tension that would later become 
endemic remained, for the time being, dormant. 
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Chapter Two 
The Fruits of Underdevelopment: The Expertise that W sn’t 
 
Introduction 
The failure of the SED to shape the initial development of East German foreign policy 
expertise in accord with a uniform, long-term plan resulted in a hastily created patchwork 
of institutions operating not according to single, coherent vision but rather arbitrarily in 
response to momentary exigencies and without consiste t coordination. The absence of a 
fully rationalized structure meant that the full subordination of East German foreign 
policy expertise in line with the practical requirem nts and political-ideological demands 
of the SED remained incomplete. The SED’s exact understanding of the role and function 
of foreign policy expertise was still in the process of being worked, but it was already 
oriented unambiguously toward the complete politica and ideological subordination of 
expertise—it was above all a question of working out the fine points. Owing to the 
haphazard institutional development of the East German foreign policy apparatus, 
however, the full subordination of expertise in practice remained incomplete, even while 
the ultimate authority of the SED was never questioned. 
 The SED had already begun to address this problematic situation by initiating a 
linked process of rationalization and synchronization, notably at the DIZ, but the process 
would proceed only gradually, lasting well into the 1960s before the SED’s vision of the 
role and function of foreign policy expertise was fully realized in expert practice. In the 
meantime, the panoply of institutions that had arisen in the 1950s whose responsibilities 
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in some capacity included analysis of international relations began to produce the first 
examples of expert output, or rather what would become expert output.  
 Foreign policy expertise as a discrete activity centered around analyzing and 
conceptualizing the foreign relations of the GDR still did not exist; rather, the various 
institutions of the nascent East German foreign policy apparatus engaged in analytical 
activity each within the framework of its specific responsibilities. As a result, for most of 
the 1950s, analytical activity mainly took place incidentally as institutions engaged in 
their primary responsibilities, which at the time remained quite rudimentary in most 
cases: gathering and processing information to establi h a basic footing in foreign policy, 
maintenance of contact with other communist parties and states and efforts to further 
expand the GDR’s foreign relations, and the production of propaganda in various forms 
for domestic and foreign consumption. The content of the analytical output that was 
produced depended decisively on two factors, both of which would maintain long-term 
relevance for East German foreign policy expertise: th  foreign relations themselves that 
were being analyzed and the institutional framework in which analysis was carried out. 
The institutional framework set the parameters for analysis and the GDR’s actual foreign 
relations supplied the object of analysis, which represented the basic dynamic that would 
influence the output of East German foreign policy for the entirety of its existence. 
 And in the first years of its formal existence, the foreign relations of the GDR 
remained highly circumscribed. The absence of diplomatic recognition from states 
outside the Soviet Bloc had a doubly restrictive eff ct on the range of foreign policy 
activities available to the GDR, not only by reducing the options available to the GDR 
but also by deepening the GDR’s existential dependency on the USSR and its reliance 
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upon the Soviet Bloc’s unity of action. This situation in turn severely restricted the 
potential range of analysis conducted by East German institutions in the period. In a 
word, the combined effect of the highly circumscribed foreign relations of the GDR and 
the indispensable necessity of thoroughgoing integration and coordination with the Soviet 
Bloc did not create a great need for insightful foreign policy analysis. 
 Added to this was the institutional underdevelopment plaguing East German 
foreign policy expertise in the earliest phase of its growth. No standardized procedure or 
set of expectations had been worked out for how exactly foreign policy analysis was to be 
conducted. Since analytical activity typically occurred in this period incidentally as the 
institutions of the East German foreign policy apparatus engaged in their primary tasks, 
analysis displayed none of the uniformity and regularity it would later acquire. As the 
patchwork of institutions that emerged within the East German foreign policy apparatus 
in the 1950s began engaging in analytical activity, the results of analysis depended much 
more upon the individual cadres populating the East German foreign policy apparatus at 
the time than the formal division of labor or uniformly acknowledged expectations, since 
these remained underdeveloped and imprecise. 
 The quality of those cadres populating the East German foreign policy apparatus 
matched the state of underdevelopment prevalent in East German foreign policy expertise 
at the time. The training of foreign policy cadres in fact represented a key component of 
the development of the East German foreign policy apparatus as a whole in the earliest 
years of the GDR’s existence and a concerted effort was made to produce a new type of 
“socialist foreign policy cadre” in agreement with the practical needs and political-
ideological requirements of the SED. While the exact characteristics of the SED’s ideal 
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foreign policy cadre and how that could best be achieved were being worked out in the 
course of the 1950s, a clear orientation toward combining specialist knowledge with strict 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism started to take shape that mirrored the SED’s orientation 
toward the function and role of foreign policy expertise more generally, although the 
importance of basic political-ideological compliance still far outweighed concern with 
specialist knowledge. Yet the SED’s attempt to establish a new model “socialist foreign 
policy cadre” suffered a fate similar to that of foreign policy expertise more broadly in 
the 1950s and for similar reasons. The absence of a uniform, long-term plan and a fully 
cohesive vision for the training of foreign policy adres, given existing organizational 
and material obstacles, which were daunting, hindered the creation of a system capable of 
producing cadres that corresponded to the SED’s ideal—by the end of the 1950s, the 
foreign policy cadre situation in the GDR was marked by personnel shortages, 
unfamiliarity with the field, a lack of practical experience and professionalism, a climate 
of extreme distrust and constant suspicion of politica -ideological deviation, and, perhaps 
most serious, substantial deficiencies in specialist knowledge and true expertise. Here 
too, the SED’s cadre problem would only be resolved in time through a linked process of 
synchronization and rationalization imposed from above. 
 On the backdrop of the highly circumscribed foreign relations of the GDR and in 
the context of a haphazardly organized, poorly coordinated, and underdeveloped 
institutional structure within which the results of f reign policy analysis depended much 
more upon individual cadres than standardized working procedures, the quality of expert 
output in this period was correspondingly low. Marxist-Leninist ideological hyperbole in 
its most insubstantial, crassest form paired with unfo nded wishful thinking regarding the 
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respective prospects of each side in the Cold War (typically inspired by a naïve and/or 
cynical belief in the certain victory of socialism), bound together by a severe lack of 
reliable information and/or misinformation about events outside the borders of the GDR, 
were par for the course. However, beyond the shortcomings of analysis in individual 
areas, the most striking feature of East German foreign policy expertise in its earliest 
phase of development was the failure to articulate a comprehensive conception of 
international relations within which the place and i terests of the GDR were clearly 
identified and which could provide a cohesive framework for all analytical activity. The 
basis geo-strategic facts upon which such a comprehensive conception could—and 
would—be articulated were in place, but the underdeveloped institutional structure of 
expertise prevented this from occurring. 
 
The SED and the Establishment of a New “Socialist” Diplomacy 
Following the founding of the GDR in October 1949, the leadership of the SED 
consciously sought to break with past German traditions of diplomacy and to establish in 
their place a qualitatively new, “socialist” foreign policy. The definition of socialist in 
this case was largely tautological—anything that served to advance the international 
interests of the working class, which was led by the SED, whose nominal raison d’être 
was advancement of the interests of the working class, was “socialist”—yet, in line with 
notion that foreign policy was nothing more than the class struggle transferred to the 
international arena, the SED earnestly believed in a real, qualitative difference between 
“bourgeois” and “socialist” diplomacy. Wilhelm Pieck, first president of the GDR, 
emphasized this point to a gathering of high-ranking f gures from the MfAA on 21 
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October 1949, shortly after the founding of the GDR and its foreign ministry: “You 
should not be diplomats of the old bourgeois style…. We need socialist diplomats who 
have proven themselves in the workers’ movement and who are capable of representing 
the new German state, the GDR, with dignity and whogive their all in order to gain the 
confidence of the peoples of the world in our state.”1 When transferred from the realm of 
theory into practice, socialist diplomacy in the GDR entailed the creation of a subordinate 
foreign policy apparatus tailored to meet the specific needs of the SED. 
 In line with its declared intention to create a new socialist diplomacy, the SED, in 
seeking individuals to be trained and to staff the emergent East German foreign policy 
apparatus, largely passed over diplomatic personnel that had served in the foreign office 
of Weimar or under the National Socialists.2 In fact, the SED was so consistent in its 
rejection of “bourgeois” individuals with diplomatic experience that only one case of a 
higher-ranking official has been documented: Gerhard Kegel, who worked in the German 
embassy in Warsaw from 1935-1939, in Moscow from 1939-1941, and in the German 
foreign ministry from 1941-1943, headed the Grundsatzfragen (Fundamental Questions) 
department of the MfAA in 1949 and thereafter served in a number of foreign policy-
related positions, including permanent observer of the GDR at the UN in Geneva. The 
MfAA thus felt confident in its claim that it had prevented the social roots of fascism 
from re-establishing themselves in the young foreign ministry of the GDR, which stood 
in marked contrast to the personnel policy of the Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office) of 
the FRG following its founding in 1951. The SED lead rship instead looked to party 
                                                 
1 Cited in Ingrid Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen (Berlin: Ch. 
Links, 2000), 147. 
2 Upwards of 95 percent of public servants were removed from service in the SOZ 1945-1948. Ulrich 
Bernhardt, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft “Walter Ulbricht” 1948-1971 
(Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1997), 5. 
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members with proven loyalty, many of whom had actively opposed the Nazis and/or been 
imprisoned or in emigration during the Third Reich, as well as individuals drawn from 
the Worker-Peasant Faculties.3 Although a career in foreign service in the GDR in the 
1950s did not necessarily possess the allure and prestige typically associated with the 
occupation,4 a sufficient number of enthusiastic individuals, most quite young, set out on 
a foreign policy career path. 
 Indeed, many participants in the earliest organized foreign policy instruction in 
the GDR shared the desire of the SED leadership to create a qualitatively new type of 
foreign policy. One former participant has remarked: 
Even before the founding of the GDR in 1949, there were individuals in the Soviet 
Occupation Zone who were prepared to take part in a new beginning of Germany’s 
international activity that was to be a rigorous break with the old diplomacy. Often still 
under the sway of their experiences under the despotism f National Socialism and 
during the Second World War, they were filled by a deep need to give voice to their anti-
fascist convictions. They were champions of reparations, reconciliation, and friendship, 
particularly with the USSR and the GDR’s neighbors th ough earnest rejection of 
national arrogance and of disparagement of the achievements and abilities of other 
peoples. Their social background, their experiences were the decisive guarantees for the 
immutability of this position and their steadfast bond with their people.5  
                                                 
3 For a discussion of Worker-Peasant Faculties and “worker-peasant” students, see John Connelly, Captive 
University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945-1956 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 40-45, 226-231. 
4 Wentker, while noting a series of exceptions, attribu es this above all to the lack of influence wielded by 
diplomatic personnel in the 1950s, who, having been r -trained, usually came from other, more important 
areas of administration and who found the prospect of a diplomatic posting, given the possible sites of 
assignment, the challenging material conditions, and the relatively meager compensation, less than 
attractive. Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-
1989 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 47-48. 
5 Joachim Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut 
für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 45. 
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The sentiments expressed here displayed significant overlap with the those of the SED 
leadership and their adherents provided willing human aterial for the SED in its efforts 
to establish a qualitatively new socialist foreign policy. The SED in turn viewed the 
social composition of the individuals selected to undergo foreign policy training—party 
members with proven loyalty and persons drawn from the working class—as the 
guarantee for the creation of the type of socialist cadres it desired, namely individuals 
thoroughly schooled in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and unswervingly loyal to the 
SED. 
 The envisaged break with bourgeois diplomatic tradi ions and the establishment 
of a new socialist diplomacy in their place, in full accord with Stalin’s dictum that 
“cadres decide everything,” was to be realized in the GDR through formation of a pool of 
foreign policy cadres willing and capable of bringi about that goal. Even before the 
formal founding of the GDR—and therefore before a state foreign policy apparatus 
existed—the SED leadership was acutely aware of the pressing need for loyal cadres in 
order to realize its vision. A proposal on the issue bmitted to the Politburo in April 
1949 emphasized: “If we only begin to train comrades for foreign policy work after the 
corresponding administrative structures have been er cted, then we will be faced with 
deficiencies that we in large part have already overcome in other branches of the state 
administration. Additionally, foreign policy more than any other administrative branch 
has always been the exclusive domain not just of the bourgeoisie but even of a certain 
caste within it, which even during the Weimar Republic neither the SPD nor progressive 
bourgeois democrats were able to penetrate.”6 Ingrid Muth has made the important 
distinction that the SED’s stance toward the training of foreign policy personnel did not 
                                                 
6 SAPMO-BArch, NY 4182/896. 
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represent simply a general personnel policy (Personalpolitik) but was a form of specific 
communist cadre policy (Kaderpolitik), which aimed at the production of capable cadres 
completely devoted to fulfillment of the will of the party in every area of administration 
and which represented “an essential element for the stabilization of the political system 
and one of the main instruments with which the SED realized its leading role and 
guaranteed the implementation of its policies.”7 Vital importance within the emerging 
East German foreign policy apparatus thus fell to the training of foreign policy cadres. 
 
The Early Development of Foreign Policy Training 
The first instance of organized foreign policy instruc ion in East Germany actually began 
in 1947 with a series of lectures on the history of German foreign policy from an 
“antifascist perspective” held at the University of Leipzig by the communist historian 
Albert Schreiner.8 The lectures, however, only lasted until 1949 and, i  1950, foreign 
policy as a field of study at the University of Leipz g was discontinued, at which point 
sole responsibility for the training of foreign policy cadres fell to the young Deutsche 
Verwaltungsakademie (DVA), or German Academy for Administration. The DVA had 
been founded in 1948 in Forst Zinna in Brandenburg when SMAG issued a directive9 
based on a resolution drafted by the Central Secretariat of the SED.10 The mission of the 
DVA consisted in the advancement of “the scientific vo ational training of leading 
employees of all branches of the new democratic administration and economy” as well as 
                                                 
7 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 150. 
8 Joachim Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” 46. 
9 Bernhardt, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft, 8-11. 
10 For the draft of the resolution as originally worked out by the Central Secretariat, see Bundesbeauftragte 
für die Unterlagen des Sicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (hereafter 
BStU), Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (hereafter MfS), HA XX Nr. 8038. 
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“research on problems of the new democratic administrat on and preparation of 
educational materials in the area of administrative studies and administrative teaching,”11 
in short, to train cadres loyal to the SED and the Soviets for employment in 
administrative positions. Initially, foreign policy instruction at the DVA was not provided 
in a stand-alone course, but as an add-on to its standard course on administration, as was 
the case from March to July 1949, when a separate mini-course in foreign policy was 
taught for 18 students already studying at the academy.12 
 Following the appointment on 1 September 1949 of Günther Juhre, later head of 
the Building Academy of the GDR, to the position of vice-dean of a discrete International 
Law and International Relations unit at the academy, foreign policy instruction at the 
DVA began to take on more concrete shape. A condensed course of study (Kurzlehrgang) 
in foreign policy at the DVA took place from 12 Sept mber 1949 to 12 January 195013 
(i.e. overlapping with the founding of the GDR) and i cluded 12 participants14 and, 
between 1950 and 1953, a further six condensed courses of study providing a crash 
course on the basics of foreign policy and internatio l law followed, typically lasting 
about five months and including 30 participants on average.15 These courses, especially 
the earliest ones, were conducted with little of the standardization and organization that 
would subsequently characterize foreign policy instruction in the GDR. The very first 
course, for instance, “did not achieve the desired results,” which made preparations for a 
subsequent course “urgently necessary.”16 Nevertheless, some of the graduates of the 
                                                 
11 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.1/81. 
12 Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” 46. 
13 What appears to be an early draft of the course’s curriculum can be found in SAPMO-BArch, NY 
4182/896. 
14 Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” 46. 
15 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 186. 
16 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/13/463. 
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early condensed courses would go on to occupy important positions within the East 
German foreign policy apparatus, including Rudolf Helmer and Werner Wennig (future 
division heads at the MfAA and then ambassadors), Günther Kohrt (future secretary of 
state at the MfAA), Harry Wünsche (future division head at the MfAA and head of the 
international law division of the successor institution of the International Law and 
International Relations unit of the DVA), Manfred Feist (future head of the Foreign 
Propaganda Division of the CC), and Werner Hänisch (future deputy director of the 
successor institution of the International Law and International Relations unit of the 
DVA).17 As the DVA gradually gained experience in organizing foreign policy 
instruction and as the MfAA recognized that “existing demands could only be met with 
longer-term and more extensive training,” the DVA began to offer full-length courses of 
study alongside the condensed courses. The first of three two-year courses of study began 
on 15 May 1950,18 which marked the DVA’s first steps toward establishing a 
standardized form of foreign policy instruction. 
 The process, however, was far from complete and many significant organizational 
changes affecting foreign policy training in the GDR were still to come. The first of these 
was the appointment of Leo Zuckermann, a trained jurist who was co-author of the East 
German constitution and who had been head of the short-lived Commission for Foreign 
Policy Questions, as dean of International Law and Foreign Relations, which was now 
recognized as a discrete Fakultät (school or department) at the DVA. Zuckermann’s fate
epitomized the extremely turbulent early development of East German foreign policy 
expertise. A longtime member of the KPD/SED of Jewish extraction who had spent the 
                                                 
17 Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” 47-48. 
18 Ibid., 48-49. 
 101
years of exile during the Nazi period in emigration n Mexico City with Paul Merker, 
Zuckermann was appointed dean after falling out of favor with the top SED leadership in 
the course of the “anti-cosmopolitan” campaign in the GDR for his earlier support of 
restitution for Jews and for creation of Israel. Forced out of his position as chief of staff 
in the office of East German President Wilhelm Pieck, Zuckermann was now supposed to 
oversee the steady growth and improvement of foreign policy instruction at the DVA and 
was eminently qualified to do so. But in December 1952, in the wake of the Slansky Trial 
in Czechoslovakia,19 Zuckermann was accused of being a “Zionist agent”, at which point 
he fled the GDR and the certain punishment that awaited him. The Zuckermann case was 
of a piece with the larger anti-cosmopolitan campaign taking place throughout the Soviet 
Bloc, which culminated in the GDR in the arrest of Paul Merker, a non-Jew who like 
Zuckermann vocally supported restitution and creation of Israel, as well as the flight of 
Julius Meyer, likewise an ardent advocate of Jewish interests in East Germany.20 The 
anti-cosmopolitan campaign itself demonstrated the SED’s determination to use “state 
power…to enforce political conformity,” where all those who had extensive knowledge 
of the world outside the GDR’s borders and who had demonstrated a capacity for critical 
thought (by voicing positions that did not fully conf rm with party orthodoxy) 
immediately became suspect.21 Groundless and irrational accusations motivated 
exclusively by a drive to ensure complete political-ideological adherence had robbed the 
DVA of a highly qualified leadership figure and disrupted the continued development and 
                                                 
19 For an account of the Slansky trial within the broader context of the Stalinist “anti-cosmopolitan” purges, 
see Georg Hermann Hodos, Schauprozesse. Stalinistische Säuberungen in Osteuropa 1948-1954 
(Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1988). 
20 Jeffrey Herf, “East German Communists and the Jewish Question: The Case of Paul Merker,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 29, no. 4 (October 1994): 627-661. 
21 Ibid., 640. 
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tentative standardization of foreign policy training i  the GDR—basic, unquestioning 
compliance with designated party orthodoxy clearly held priority over specialist 
knowledge and professional competency in East German foreign policy expertise in its 
earliest phase of development. 
 Nor was the central importance of basic political-ideological conformity lost on 
foreign policy cadres themselves, who realized advancement within the young East 
German foreign policy apparatus was dependent upon demonstrating unquestioning 
allegiance to the party line. During the investigation of Paul Merker, Otto Winzer, who 
had succeeded Merker as chief of staff in Pieck’s office, wrote a damning letter to 
Hermann Matern, head of the powerful Central Party Control Commission that was 
chiefly responsible for the investigation and subsequent secret trial against Merker, 
describing Merker’s deviations from the now-orthodox SED stance on “the Jewish 
question.”22 As Merker wallowed in prison and dealt with the consequences of his purge 
even after being rehabilitated, Winzer rose in the ranks of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus to become foreign minister in 1965. 
 Days before Zuckermann fled the GDR, the GDR’s Council of Ministers passed a 
resolution (on 11 December 1952) stipulating that te DVA, which in June 1952 had 
relocated from Forst Zinna to Potsdam-Babelsberg just o tside of Berlin, be merged with 
the Hochschule für Justiz, or College of Justice, to form the Deutsche Akademie für 
Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft “Walter Ulbricht” (DASR), or German Academy for the 
Study of State and Law (the appellation “Walter Ulbricht” had been added to the name of 
                                                 
22 Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1997), 130-132. 
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the DVA before the fusion).23 In Zuckermann’s absence, Heinz Tillmann, a lecturer at the 
DVA and later prorector and professor of history at the Martin Luther University of 
Halle-Wittenberg, was named acting director of the newly created Institut für Völkerrecht 
und Internationale Beziehungen (IVB), or Institute for International Law and 
International Relations, which replaced the International Law and Foreign Relations unit 
of the now-defunct DVA. The IVB, which made up a component part of the new DASR, 
but as a discrete institute possessed greater autonomy than its predecessor institution, was 
made solely responsible for foreign policy instruction, and the drive to expand and 
standardize instruction was now intensified. The two-year course of study was replaced 
by a three-year course, which was modeled on the curriculum of the Moscow State 
Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) and was held three times between 1952 and 
1957.24 The first year of the three-year course covered th fundamentals of Marxism-
Leninism while the second two years saw application of the knowledge gained in the first 
year of study to actual foreign policy topics (including foreign policy of the USSR, 
diplomatic history, German history and the history f German foreign policy, and 
questions of international law). At this point, language instruction covered only Russian 
and English, both of which were obligatory.25 The three-year course of study, however, 
was soon replaced by a four-year course,26 convened for the first time on 05 September 
1955 with 40 participants. The four-year course would s bsequently become the main 
                                                 
23 BArch, DC 20/I/3/159. 
24 Krüger, “Die ersten Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” 50. 
25 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 188. 
26 For an account of the four-year course from a participant who would go on to become an important 
figure in East German foreign policy expertise, see Otto Pfeiffer, “Erfahrungen im 1. Vierjahreslehrgan ,” 
in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard 
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vehicle of foreign policy instruction in the GDR and would remain so until the seventh 
and final four-year course was convened in September 1967. 
In addition to the soon-to-be standard four-year course of study, several other 
forms of foreign policy instruction were established in the early 1950s. Most prominent 
among these was a six-year course of study held at the Moscow State Institute of 
International Relations (MGIMO).27 Each year, an average of 15 students from the GDR, 
along with students from a host of other communist countries, took part in such courses, 
which included country- or region-specific specializ t on and a one-year internship to 
gain practical experience. Students were selected and their areas of specialization chosen 
based on the projected needs of the MfAA, whereby students studying areas and/or 
languages unavailable for specialized study in the GDR were given priority.28 The first 
group of East German students to undergo foreign policy training in Moscow, numbering 
14 total (12 of whom would graduate in 1959), arrived in the Soviet capital in September 
1953. Some had trouble adapting to their new enviroment, particularly due to difficulties 
with the language, with which a number of the East Germans had no prior experience. 
East German students in Moscow also struggled under difficult material conditions (even 
going so far as to contact the MfAA to request the s oes they had been promised upon 
departure as well as a guitar and an accordion to etertain their Russian colleagues).29 
However, they generally expressed enthusiasm for life in the Soviet Union.30 
                                                 
27 A small number of students also studied in Beijing in 1951/1952, but information on this and other 
courses of study conducted in the People’s Republic of China is scarce. PA AA, MfAA, B 3509. 
28 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 190. 
29 PA AA, MfAA, B 3537. 
30 For a former participant’s account of studying at MGIMO, although from a later period, see Klaus Kapr, 
“Exkurs: Studium der internationalen Beziehungen in Moskau (1973-1978),” in Die Babelsberger 
Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Bziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: 
WeltTrends, 2009), 89-95. 
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 Other forms of foreign policy training in the GDR, all conducted by the IVB, 
included: irregular special courses of study (Sonderlehrgänge) of varying length (usually 
from 6 to 10 months) offered as needed to provide rapid, basic orientation in foreign 
policy for employees from other areas of the state apparatus who were to be transferred to 
the MfAA;31 the continuing education (Weiterbildung) of middle and leading cadres 
already active in the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus in courses typically lasting several 
weeks; and five-year correspondence courses of study (Fernstudium), whose importance 
decreased as foreign policy education in the GDR attained an increasing degree of 
standardization in the course of the 1950s.32 
 The practical implementation of a system of foreign policy training at the 
DVA/IVB that would produce cadres capable of establishing a “new socialist diplomacy” 
in line with the practical goals and political-ideological requirements of the SED 
encountered a number of obstacles. There were not nearly enough qualified instructors to 
handle existing teaching demands. A 1951 report draf ed by the DVA itself noted that, 
“given the current number of instructors [in the Inter ational Law and International 
Relations unit], required tasks can only be completed with great difficulty.”33 The MfAA 
put it even more dramatically when it complained of an “extremely deficient supply of 
suitable instructors” at the DVA,34 which sometime resulted in changing instructors in the 
middle of a course as well as keeping back graduates to teach at the DVA/IVB, to the 
                                                 
31 The Sonderlehrgang was particularly common in the 1950s as the SED struggled to staff its foreign 
policy apparatus with professionally and politically qualified cadres. To cite a single example, in 1956/57 a 
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32 Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 189-191. 
33 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/3/467. 
34 PA AA, MfAA, A 15550. 
 106
great chagrin of the MfAA.35 A 1960 graduate and former employee of the successor 
institution of the IVB has noted how most instructors at the DVA/IVB only possessed 
only “a slight advance in knowledge” over their students.36 Added to this, the latitude of 
DVA/IVB instructors to make modifications in style and content was extremely limited 
by an irrational atmosphere of suspicion and “ubiquitous fear of subversion, the activities 
of Western agents, and ideological infiltration.”37 The case of Leo Zuckermann was just 
the most blatant example of the stultifying effect on scholarship an atmosphere of 
supercharged distrust and suspicion could have where unquestioning compliance to the 
party line enjoyed top priority. Developments at the MfAA paralleled those at the 
DVA/IVB as a figure no less prominent than Foreign Mi ister Georg Dertinger himself 
was arrested in January 1953 by the Ministry of State Security and subsequently 
convicted to 15 years in prison for “espionage.”38 
 Coordination between the DVA/IVB, the GDR’s main ste of foreign policy 
training, and the MfAA and the APIV,39 the GDR’s two most important operative foreign 
policy institutions, was another area key that was key to the success of the DVA/IVB’s 
mission, and was another area was marked by deficienc es. A 1951 report from the DVA 
noted how the lack of supervision from relevant stae organs over the academy’s 
respective departments, including the International Law and International Relations unit, 
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hindered the efficacy and value of their work since th y lacked input from the institutions 
for whose needs they were supposed to be working. Specifically in relation to the 
International Law and International Relations unit, the report asserted: “The 
establishment of a close connection with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is necessary.”40 
In 1954, in an attempt to address exactly this situation, the Politburo passed a resolution 
stipulating that a member of the Collegium of the MfAA would be made responsible for 
the IVB as well as that the leadership of the institute would communicate directly with 
the MfAA and be “informed of all important operations” so that “theoretical problems 
might be more closely bound with practice.”41 The position of director of the IVB was 
also taken up into the nomenklatura at this time. Complaints over a lack of coordination 
and communication between the IVB and the MfAA and APIV Division, however, 
remained endemic for the duration of the 1950s,42 and this would represent just one of 
many attempts to increase coordination between the GDR’s most important institutions of 
operative foreign policy and most important institution of foreign policy training. Last 
but not least, the DVA/IVB had a clear problem with continuity of leadership. Aside from 
the spectacular mark of failure that the Zuckermann case represented, the DVA/IVB was 
impaired by lack of a coherent vision on how to train foreign policy cadres who were not 
only “politically qualified” (i.e. politically and ideologically in step with the party) but 
also professionally qualified. The frequently changing leadership of the DVA/IVB, 
however, was not so much responsible for this failure as it was a symptom of the broader 
ad hoc development of foreign policy expertise in the period and the SED’s patent 
demand at the time for little more than politically qualified cadres unquestioningly loyal 
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to the changing party line. Yet the fluctuations in leadership also created favorable 
conditions for imposing party orthodoxy at the institute since only those who 
demonstrated “the requisite conformity” with the party line had a chance to move into the 
vacant positions.43 
 Despite all these difficulties, the IVB, offering its standard four-year course of 
study as well as a host of supplementary courses, became by the mid-1950s “the most 
important site for the training of cadres in the ara of foreign policy,” as it was designated 
in the Politburo’s 1954 resolution.44 While clearly still displaying many features 
characteristic of the broader underdeveloped state of East German foreign policy 
expertise at the time, the IVB would only continue to grow larger and more professional 
and to standardize and streamline its instruction in accord with the wishes of the SED, for 
which professional qualification was gradually gaining in importance alongside political 
qualification. With time, the IVB would also become one of the GDR’s leading sites of 
foreign policy research, but the IVB’s main task for the entirety of the 1950s remained 
training the socialist cadres so urgently needed to staff the GDR’s foreign policy 
apparatus—a task it strained to fulfill given the numerous obstacles it faced. As a result, 
research at the IVB in any significant measure would only begin in the 1960s. 
 The content of the earliest courses of study in foreign policy directly reflected the 
prevailing political and ideological hothouse atmosphere of the period, which witnessed 
the widespread persecution by the SED of purported enemies in the ranks of party and 
state in the context of the ongoing Stalinization of the GDR’s social, political, and 
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intellectual life. The ad hoc nature of the development of foreign policy expertise in the 
period only facilitated the tendency of extreme ideologization in instruction since, in an 
environment where pressure from above was ubiquitous but clear directives were few in 
number, it was easiest to fall back onto default maxi list positions. The central feature 
of instruction at the DVA/IVB was application of Marxist-Leninist categories to foreign 
policy and the history of international relations (beginning with the “Great Socialist 
October Revolution—the start of a new epoch in the history of international relations”45). 
Students were first thoroughly schooled in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, 
including dialectical and historical materialism, theory of state and of law, the political 
economy of capitalism and socialism, and economic geography. Then, once a solid 
Marxist-Leninist foundation had been established, instruction moved on to cover 
international relations issues in earnest, all while never leaving the framework of a class-
based understanding of foreign policy. The foreign policy curriculum, particularly in the 
first half of the 1950s, was frequently subject to revision in order to remain current in 
light of frequent changes to the party line on a given issue promulgated by Soviet leaders 
or the SED leadership in response to signals coming out of the USSR. Until (and in some 
cases even after) his death in March 1953, Stalin’s works (e.g. on economics, on 
linguistics) were binding for the entire DASR, and the IVB, comprising a component part 
of the larger academy, accordingly did not represent an exception.46 Lectures on 
international law and the history of international relations were rewritten according to 
positions voiced by Stalin and an employee of the institute was assigned to scour Soviet 
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newspapers and journals for references to Stalin’s works to ensure that the institute’s 
curriculum was up-to-date.47 
 In brief, foreign policy training in the GDR in its earliest stages emphasized the 
Marxist-Leninist element of instruction and blind obedience much more strongly over the 
specialist element, which was marginalized nearly to the point of irrelevance. Given the 
numerous obstacles in place at the DVA/IVB to training cadres who were both politically 
and professionally qualified, instruction took the fall-back position of conveying a strict, 
class-based understanding of international relations t  students. Capitalism and socialism 
were portrayed as contradictory social systems whose f reign policy activities directly 
reflected the class character of each system. The GDR was presented therein as not just 
another state, but one component part of the broade world-historical clash between 
socialism and capitalism, which represented the defining characteristic of international 
relations, around which all other developments revolved. Overlying this content was the 
atmosphere of extreme ideologization and politicization that touched nearly every aspect 
of life in the GDR in the 1950s, seeing in the slightest deviation from the existing party 
line a sign of potential opposition to the SED and its efforts for the construction of 
socialism in East Germany. The result was a rigid dogmatism in foreign policy training 
that was clearly oriented more toward ensuring ideological compliance and political 
allegiance than conveying in-depth knowledge of the obj ct of study. 
 In the course of the 1950s, the stress on blind obedience abated somewhat. It 
became increasingly common that the curriculum was modified and updated to link 
instruction more closely with the practical foreign policy challenges facing the GDR. A 
plan of study from 1959, for example, contained an extensive section devoted to “the 
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economic tasks outlined by the V Party Congress and their significance in the struggle for 
peace, the strengthening of the worker-and-peasant power, and the victory of socialism in 
the GDR,” going into exhaustive detail on what exactly these tasks consisted in and how 
they were to be achieved.48 While seemingly minor, continual efforts to link foreign 
policy instruction more closely with the outstanding practical foreign challenges facing 
the GDR provided an avenue for more and more expert el ments to enter instruction. The 
more instruction dealt with practical issues of foreign policy, the less useful rigid 
adherence to Marxist-Leninist dogma and blind obedience to the SED were and the 
greater the need for specialist knowledge became. 
 While the Marxist-Leninist orientation of foreign policy instruction predominated 
throughout the 1950s, particularly in the first half of the decade, linking up instruction 
with outstanding issues of practical foreign policy slowly but steadily gained in 
importance. As East German foreign policy expertise would leave its most tumultuous 
and chaotic period of development behind, the balance between the two elements in 
foreign policy instruction—the ideological and the expert—would become more even, 
eventually bringing about a situation where a rough equilibrium between the Marxist-
Leninist understanding of international relations ad expert analysis based on specialist 
knowledge would become the hallmark of East German foreign policy expertise. 
 Essential in this was the growing recognition of SED leaders that they actually 
needed cadres who were not only politically qualified but also professionally qualified. 
At the II Party Conference of the SED in June 1952, at which the goal of constructing 
socialism in the GDR was declared, Hermann Axen, head of the Central Committee 
Division for Agitation at the time and future head of the Foreign Policy Commission of 
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the Politburo, noted the need to approach cadre-related questions from a longer-term 
perspective: “We [can] no longer approach the training, selection, and assignment of 
cadres solely from the point of view of current goals, of the immediate need for cadres, 
but rather from the point of view of the great goal f the creation of the foundations of 
socialism.”49 Alluding to Ulbricht’s comments at the same conference, who in his turn 
had made reference to Stalin’s position on the issue, Axen went on to reiterate the appeal 
to replace “the so-called allwissender Funktionär (omniscient functionary) type with the 
type of comrade who is politically educated and an expert in his field.”50 Such appeals, 
however, represented at the time little more than empty rhetoric, as Axen himself made 
rather clear with his slavish characterization of Stalin as “the greatest genius of our 
epoch” and by highlighting the continued primacy of Marxism-Leninism in cadre 
education: “We stand before the dual task of raising the ideological-political schooling 
(Schulung) and the scientific-technical training (Ausbildung) of our cadres. In this 
question, Marxist-Leninist education (Erziehung) of course enjoys priority.”51  Appeals 
for a greater emphasis of the fachlich (expert)52 element of cadre education thus remained 
for most of the 1950s a dead letter as the GDR lacked the resources, organizational 
ability, and will required to train truly expert cadres in most fields, including foreign 
policy. 
 Although the profile of the socialist foreign policy cadres desired by the SED 
leadership was fairly clear, even if not completely unambiguous, particularly in respect to 
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the relationship between the ideological and the expert element, the results of the 
DVA/IVB’s initial efforts in the instruction of foreign policy cadres were disappointing 
no matter how one cared to measure them. To begin with, the DVA/IVB could not train 
cadres quickly enough to meet the needs of the MfAA. The number of IVB graduates in 
1953 who went on to work at the MfAA were described as “a drop in the bucket,” hardly 
easing the strained employment situation at the ministry.53 In the midst of a shortage of 
qualified personnel affecting the entire governing apparatus of the GDR, acute 
underemployment at the ministry only began to ease in 1956,54 seven years after it had 
been created, and the problem was not fully resolved until the mid-1960s. 
 The most glaring shortcomings of the GDR’s young foreign policy cadres, 
however, were of a qualitative nature. Many were wanting in practical experience and 
contact with the world beyond the GDR’s borders, lacked professionalism, and possessed 
a deficient expert (fachlich) education. These failings were self-inflicted to a certain 
degree since the SED leadership refused to employ qualified personnel from the Weimar 
and Nazi eras and placed wholly exaggerated importance on ideological compliance and 
political obedience, as the Zuckermann episode made clear. Some cadres even lacked the 
most basic competency and aptitude for employment in the realm of foreign relations, as 
a report from the MfAA on the first condensed course of study conducted at the DVA 
bemoaned: “At the conclusion of this course of study, it must once again be noted that the 
fears we had expressed in the interim were justified. The course in its final result did not 
yield the cadres that our ministry so urgently needs. Only a few were above average…. 
This first course was convened in a very hasty manner a d poor decisions were already 
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made the process of selecting participants. At least a third do not appear capable of 
further development or possess certain romantic notio s regarding diplomatic service that 
are difficult to bring into accord with existing realities [italics in original].”55 The 
situation did not improve much with time. Another MfAA report, this time from 1958, 
condemned the appearance of “petit-bourgeois behavior, philistinification 
(Verspiesserung), and objectivism” and made it clear that these were r curring 
problems.56 The language abilities of the GDR’s foreign policy cadres were also a 
constant source of concern in the 1950s. The ability to speak or at least read a foreign 
language was logically viewed as an indispensable skill for a foreign policy professional, 
so the failure of the majority of the MfAA’s employees to gain the ability to conduct 
basic conversations and to evaluate the press in two foreign languages (typically either 
Russian and English or Russian and French) was describ d in 1956 as one of the 
ministry’s “main deficiencies.”57 Even a contemporaneous West German observer noted 
not without a sharp polemical edge the shortcomings of the GDR’s earliest foreign policy 
cadres: “The diplomats trained in this fashion are characterized by a fully deficient level 
[of knowledge] even for the standards of the Soviet zone. They completely lack deeper 
knowledge of foreign policy. Yet they are good Stalinists and as such are perfectly 
qualified to ‘make’ Moscow’s policy in the foreign ministry of the Soviet zone.”58 
 Responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of East Germany’s foreign policy 
cadres in the 1950s was frequently attributed to the institution that had trained them: the 
DVA/IVB. A report for the Secretariat prepared in 1955 by the Department of Organs of 
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State, the highest party authority on cadres at the tim , painted a negative picture of the 
state of teaching and research at the DASR, where t IVB was housed, noting the 
continued existence of “serious deficiencies and weakn sses in the work of the academy 
in its entirety,” which “is exhibited above all by the fact that the academy has not yet 
sufficiently instilled in the mass of students the necessary attributes of the state 
functionary, who must fulfill his mission as class warrior (Klassenkämpfer) 
independently, and that the graduates have not always been up to the challenges faced in 
their practical work.”59 The report went on to describe the political-ideological and expert 
training of the institute’s scholarly employees as “unsatisfactory” and characterized the 
scholarly administration of the academy as a whole as well as the administration of the 
individual institutes, including the IVB, as “inadequate,” criticizing “a liberal, lax attitude 
toward implementation of the tasks identified as correct, both in teaching, research, and 
educational activity and in publication activity.”60 The political-ideological content of 
instruction at the IVB specifically was described as “still insufficient.”61 All of this, 
however, did not mean that the experience of students at the IVB was any easier. 
Apparently emboldened by announcement of the “New Course” in June 1953 and 
strangely not discouraged by the violent suppression of the Uprising of 17 June, foreign 
policy students at the DASR banded together in Julyto draft a letter to Neues 
Deutschland, the official newspaper of the SED, in which they denounced numerous 
facets of life and instruction at the academy, including broken promises made by the 
administration, suppression of criticism, indifferenc  to student concerns, the cancellation 
                                                 




of internships, “steamrollers tactics,” and the administration’s general authoritarian 
disposition.62 
 By the end of the 1950s, the overall cadre situation had improved very little. 
Examples of the failure of training at the DVA/IVB to produce cadres who were 
politically and ideologically reliable and professionally competent were in fact legion.63 
Just how far these cadres, many of whom were extremely young, still had to go to match 
the SED’s ideals of a “new socialist diplomacy” was perhaps best expressed by Karl 
Seidel, who graduated from the IVB in 1956 and later became ambassador to the Soviet 
Union as well as head of the FRG Division of the MfAA: 
When I started, the ministry was made up of a handful of old comrades, that is, 
communists and social democrats who had spent time in jail, concentration camps or 
emigration and who now held leadership posts.... Then t ere was us, the big horde of 
twenty-five year-olds. Thirty was already considered old back then. And for twenty years 
we stayed the “young comrades.” Basically, there was no middle stratum, no middle 
layer, aside from a few exceptions. We couldn’t fall b ck on the old Nazi diplomats. And 
in the middle years there was almost no one who had any idea how a foreign ministry 
worked.64 
And the leadership of the SED and the MfAA was fully aware of the situation. Following 
the V Party Congress in 1958, the MfAA made clear its d spleasure with the state of 
foreign policy cadre training at the IVB: “In order to fulfill the weighty foreign policy 
goals set by the V Party Congress of the SED, a fundamental change in the training and 
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education of the republic’s foreign policy cadres must occur. The course of cadre 
development in foreign policy to date corresponds to the necessary requirements in 
respect neither to content nor to methodology.”65 The main shortcomings of East German 
foreign policy cadres that existed at the start of the 1950s—insufficient numbers, 
unfamiliarity with the field, a lack of practical experience and professionalism, and 
substantial deficiencies in expert knowledge—had only let up slightly by the end of the 
decade. These issues would only be resolved through a series of far-reaching initiatives 
pushed through by the SED as it shifted its attention in the 1960s toward rationalization 
of its foreign policy apparatus. 
 
The Expertise that Wasn’t 
The first instances of analytical activity conducted by institutions within the East German 
foreign policy apparatus thus occurred in the context of a haphazardly organized, poorly 
coordinated, and underdeveloped institutional structu e populated by a set of cadres who 
often lacked much more than basic competency in the field, let alone true specialist 
knowledge. The various institutions of the nascent East German foreign policy apparatus 
engaged, moreover, in analytical activity not as a primary task but rather incidentally as 
they went about pursuing their main responsibilities—analytical activity had little of the 
uniformity and regularity it would later acquire. The absence of a well-established formal 
division of labor and uniformly acknowledged expectations within the GDR’s 
underdeveloped foreign policy apparatus meant, furthermore, that analysis was shaped 
much more by the individual cadres populating the for ign policy apparatus than a set of 
standard working procedures, which remained imprecisely formulated and incompletely 
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implemented. The initial framework within which the first instances of analytical output 
took place was thus not particularly promising. 
 The institutional configuration of East German foreign policy expertise, however, 
only made up one of the factors that decisively shaped the content of analytical output. 
The other was the international relations that were actually being analyzed. The 
institutional configuration set the parameters in which analysis was conducted and the 
GDR’s actual foreign relations supplied the object of analysis, and the interplay of these 
two factors produced the basic dynamic that molded th  output of analytical activity, not 
only in this earliest phase of the development of foreign policy expertise but also 
throughout its entire existence. As the specific content of each of these elements changed, 
so too did the output of East German foreign policy experts. 
 In the first years of its formal existence, the foreign relations of the GDR—and in 
turn their analysis—were inseparable from the specific Cold War context which had led 
to the creation of a separate East German state in th  first place. Occasioned by West 
Germany’s claim to be the sole legitimate state representing the German nation (the 
Hallstein Doctrine, as it would be known from 1955),66 no state outside of the Soviet 
sphere of influence established diplomatic relations with the young GDR. The basic fact 
of non-recognition of the GDR by the West and the vast majority of the non-communist 
world remained the central feature of the geo-strategic situation faced by the GDR into 
the 1970s and created the basic framework within which the foreign policy prospects and 
limits of GDR foreign policy took shape. Diplomatic recognition of the GDR from states 
within the Soviet sphere of influence, in contrast, issued promptly following the creation 
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of the GDR in 194967 and the viability of East German statehood rested entirely upon 
their support, particularly that of the bloc leader, the Soviet Union. Diplomatic 
recognition from states within the Soviet sphere of influence represented the counterpart 
of diplomatic non-recognition from the rest of the world, and the upshot of this situation 
was extreme dependency for the GDR upon the Soviet Union and pronounced reliance 
upon the ability of the entire Soviet Bloc to act in concert to champion the international 
interests of its weakest member, the GDR. The orientation of the GDR, simply by virtue 
of the international context in which it had come to exist, fully corresponded to the 
division of the world into two antagonistic blocs on the basis of ideology contrasting 
forms of socio-economic organization that characterized the Cold War conflict between 
socialist East and capitalist West. 
 What diplomatic recognition/non-recognition meant in more immediate, practical 
terms was an extremely limited range of foreign policy action for the young GDR. 
Lacking official diplomatic relations with the world outside the Soviet sphere of 
influence, the GDR had no basis to become active there. In light of the hostility directed 
at East Germany by the capitalist West, the GDR becam  that much more dependent 
upon its superpower patron, the USSR. Thus also in respect to relations within the Soviet 
Bloc, the GDR in the 1950s possessed minimal autonomy in the formulation of its 
foreign policy—the GDR was obligated to follow the foreign policy course set out for it 
by Moscow. Even after East Germany was nominally granted full sovereignty by the 
Soviet Union in the declaration from 25 March 1954 and Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev made clear the USSR’s support for a separate, socialist GDR with 
                                                 
67 By early 1950, eleven states had taken up diplomatic relations with the GDR: the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, China, North Korea, Albania, North Vietnam, and Mongolia. 
Diplomatic recognition from Yugoslavia would follow in 1957. 
 120
promulgation of the “two-state theory” in 1955 and as the foreign policy activity of the 
GDR slowly but steadily increased in the course of the decade, final authority on 
questions of fundamental importance unambiguously remained with the Soviets.68  The 
role of the GDR was largely limited to implementing the concrete measures required to 
establish diplomatic relations with those states that were willing to do so and working on 
their subsequent expansion as well as steps aimed at the establishment of official 
diplomatic relations with states outside the Soviet sphere of influence (e.g. exchange of 
cultural delegations or the founding of trade representations). Propaganda, particularly 
aimed at resolution of the German question in the GDR’s favor, also represented a major 
foreign policy-related activity, or rather foreign policy ersatz activity,69 in this period of 
acutest dependency on the Soviets. Lemke has describ d the orientation of the MfAA in 
its earliest years in the following manner: “Concrete international tasks did not stand in 
the center of the MfAA’s attention, but rather portrayal of the GDR and its ‘alternative’ 
foreign policy, whose touchstone was supposed to be the friendship with the USSR.”70 
 The GDR’s strong orientation toward the Soviet Union in practical foreign policy 
brought with it a strong orientation toward the starkly dichotomous understanding of 
international relations articulated by the Soviet Union in the opening phase of the Cold 
War. The “two camps theory” in particular, promulgated by Andrei Zhdanov at the 
founding congress of the Cominform in September 1947 in Szklarska Poręba, provided 
the basic categories within which international relations were understood in East 
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Germany. Zhdanov’s theory, which reflected the dynamic of fundamental tension 
between socialist East and capitalist West characteristic of the Cold War, viewed the 
world as divided into two hostile camps: an “anti-imperialist, democratic” camp led by 
the Soviet Union and an “imperialist, anti-democrati ” camp led by the United States. 
The clash between the two camps was not incidental or transient but rather inevitable and 
permanent since it stemmed from the fundamental antithesis between the socialist and 
capitalist forms of socio-economic organization, which in fact represented the essential 
forces driving the formation of two antagonistic camps. Foreign policy was not simply a 
question of states asserting their varied and changing interests on the international stage 
but rather an outgrowth of the class struggle, in which one group of states was a force for 
the working class and socialism and the other group of states a force for the bourgeoisie 
and capitalism. The two camps theory and the presuppositions it rested upon were taken 
up in the GDR and provided the basic categories within which international relations 
were understood, yet the theory’s importance should also not be overestimated since its 
generalized nature left much room for its tenets to be adapted and shaped to fit the 
peculiarities of a given instance of practical foreign policy. 
 The highly circumscribed range of foreign policy activities available to the GDR 
in the 1950s within the context of a haphazardly organized, poorly coordinated, and 
underdeveloped set of foreign policy institutions i turn created conditions that did not 
particularly necessitate and that were not particularly conducive to the production of 
insightful analysis capable of expertly illuminating the various strategic and tactical 
choices and conundrums faced by the GDR since thesehardly existed, something the 
GDR’s inexperienced foreign policy cadres were incapable of producing in most cases 
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anyway. On this backdrop, expert output displayed a level of quality that matched the 
conditions in which it was created. For most of the 1950s, “expertise” consisted mainly in 
the rather simple compilation of information and basic evaluation of international 
relations developments. 
 A general lack of reliable information and the capacity to process it was most 
acute in the earliest years, when “analysis” often co sisted in the compilation of 
statements made by leading foreign policy actors or the gathering of press clippings on 
important events, which were then accompanied by a rief commentary of negligible 
value that essentially re-stated the perspective of the GDR. A MfAA report on a 
communiqué issued by the Western allies in September 1950, for instance, was 
principally concerned with recapitulating the basic terms of the Yalta Declaration and the 
Potsdam Agreement, after which its author reached t conclusion that the creation and 
development of the GDR had proceeded in accord with the terms of the two treaties while 
the activities of the Western allies represented a viol tion of the agreements.71 A series of 
theses on West Germany’s entrance to the Council of Europe from the same year 
followed a similar pattern, providing a basic chronology of the steps that led to the FRG 
joining the Council of Europe followed by enunciation of the East German/Soviet 
position on the issue. The curt conclusion of the repo t stated: “The GDR is therefore 
justified in characterizing Bonn’s entry into the Council of Europe as not binding for the 
German people, in branding the ruling circles of West Germany as guilty of high treason, 
and in lodging energetic protest against the incorporation of the German people resident 
in West Germany into the Atlantic war system.”72 Alongside a general lack of 
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information, one of the most outstanding features of the earliest examples of analytical 
activity was the interpretation of events in extremely overstated ideological fashion. Thus 
an analysis completed by the MfAA in July 1951 on the international peace movement, 
with quotes from Stalin and Zhdanov interspersed throughout, offered the following 
characterization of the Western allies’ intentions: “The imperialists’ preparations for war 
have become increasingly broad and intensive in the last few months…. The American 
imperialists seek a new war, this time against the Soviet Union, the people’s democracies, 
and the German Democratic Republic, in order to draw new, even greater profits from the 
armaments industry and ultimately to conquer the areas lost in two world wars as markets 
and cheap sources of raw materials for the capitalist system, which they have brought 
under their hegemony.”73 The complete lack of analytical value found in this report, 
which did little more than re-state what could be found in official propaganda of the time, 
was representative in particular of the period before Stalin’s death in March 1953, when 
the East German foreign policy apparatus was still in ts earliest, most trying phase of 
development and a supercharged atmosphere of ideological suspicion prevailed. 
 Given the extremely limited capacities of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus, early analytical attention was overwhelmingly directed at issues deemed most 
pressing or most important for the foreign policy situation of the GDR. Since it 
represented the basic fact shaping the GDR’s foreign policy situation and would 
determine whether or not East Germany would continue to exist as a separate German 
state, the German question naturally numbered first and foremost among these, which in 
turn included concern not only with the actions of West Germany itself, but also with the 
general course of developments between East and West as well as with West-internal 
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processes (e.g. NATO, European integration). The flip side of the coin was represented 
by East Germany’s concern with thoroughgoing integration into the Soviet Bloc and 
gaining diplomatic recognition from as many states as possible in order to bolster its 
unstable position in the international arena. 
 Since the GDR wielded so little influence over both facets of the German question 
and was essentially reduced to the status of passive observer for the greater part of the 
1950s, earliest analysis on these topics displayed  t ndency toward unbending 
ideological maximalism borne of a lack of substantive involvement in the most important 
international processes affecting the GDR. This ideological maximalism manifested 
itself, on the one hand, in portrayal of international relations developments in the most 
unsophisticated, dogmatic manner and, on the other, in unfoundedly optimistic prognosis 
of future developments that bore little relation to the reality of the situation, a type of 
ideologically inspired wishful thinking,74 where the Marxist-Leninist notion of 
capitalism’s sure demise provided an easy fall-back position for a GDR powerless to 
control its own fate. Both of these traits were present in a report completed by the MfAA 
in 1953 and circulated in the APIV Division entitled “The Demands of the German 
Imperialists toward their ‘Allies.’” The first section of the report depicted the situation in 
the rigid reductionist manner typical of the time: 
In most flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agreement, the imperialistic Western powers 
have hindered the annihilation of the foundations of German imperialism in Germany. 
The American monopolists have re-established German i perialism in West Germany in 
order to realize, with its help, their aggressive plans. West Germany is not only supposed 
to serve as the main deployment area for the North Atlantic bloc’s armies of aggression, 
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but also as the main ally of American imperialism in Europe and is simultaneously 
supposed to contribute to the complete subjugation of the remaining capitalist states of 
Western Europe under the dominance of American monop ly capital. The German 
imperialists without compunction deliver West Germany to the American dictate because 
they view this as the only way of maintaining the regime in Bonn and expanding their 
imperialistic position in Western Europe.75 
The second section of the report in turn engaged in baseless, ideologically inspired 
prognosis quite distant from the reality of the situation: “The program of the German 
monopoly capitalists unequivocally characterizes the aggressive, antinational, 
antidemocratic, und criminal character of German imperialism. Its existence represents a 
patent threat not only to the German people but to all European peoples. The deep 
political crisis of the Adenauer regime and the prevention of the ratification of the war 
treaties [i.e. Treaties of Paris] demonstrate the weak position of German imperialism, its 
hopelessness, and the growing strength of the patriotic movement in West Germany 
whose victory over the Adenauer administration, which stands in opposition to the 
interests of the people, is the prerequisite for the elimination of imperialism in West 
Germany.”76 
 In October 1956, the MfAA completed a report for the APK on the proposal of 
West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer “for the intgration of Western Europe”77 
that followed the same model of dogmatic depiction of the situation paired with 
ideologically inspired, baselessly optimistic prognsis: “The West German plan for the 
subjugation of Western Europe to the dominance of German imperialism is a plan that 
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must be taken seriously. This aggressive grouping is directed against the socialist camp 
and is further intended to serve the coordination of the efforts of the capitalist countries 
of Europe against the national and colonial liberation movement in Asia and Africa…. 
Adenauer’s new plan for Europe faces growing resistance. Both the increasing activity of 
the masses for peace, security, and comprehensive peaceful cooperation in Europe in all 
areas on the basis of peaceful coexistence and the imperialistic contradictions among the 
main partners of the planned European Federation (England-West Germany, France-West 
Germany, England-France, etc.) will hamper the realization of the plan or even call it into 
question altogether.”78 
 While ideological hyperbole and groundless wishful thinking in analysis on 
developments relating to the German question thus fulfilled a compensatory role of sorts 
for the powerlessness of East Germany in bringing about a solution to the issue and, more 
broadly, in determining its own fate, these features w re joined by a scarcity of reliable 
information and general knowledge about the world outside the GDR’s borders. The 
situation in this regard in the first half of the 1950s, as demonstrated above, was 
abominable. The most frequent sources of outside information were official statements of 
leading foreign policy actors as well as press clippings. Even at the Ministry for State 
Security (Mfs, “Stasi”), in the 1950s employees’ principal activities consisted in 
evaluating press clippings and building up an effectiv  information system, according to 
a former employee of the ministry’s Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung Division (responsible 
for foreign intelligence).79 The situation began to improve in the second half of the 
decade, but change was slow. A report drafted by the MfAA and submitted to the APIV 
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Division in 1956 on the position of several neutral st tes (India, Yugoslavia, Sweden) on 
the German question consisted in little more than brief, quite superficial summaries of the 
position of each country (or rather of the head of state of each country), supported chiefly 
by citations gleaned from official press outlets.80 A report for the APK from the same 
year specifically dealing with the Yugoslav position n the German question was 
likewise just a collection of clippings from official press outlets accompanied by sparse 
commentary providing the East German perspective.81 Indeed, nearly regardless of which 
question was being addressed (Egypt’s relations to the two German states,82 
documentation on the creation of the European Common Market and EURATOM,83 the 
status of the GDR and Berlin in international law,84 East German recognition of the 
Kassem regime in Iraq,85 the GDR’s position on the conference of foreign miisters in 
Geneva in 1959,86 etc.), accumulation of the most basic facts to provide simple 
orientation on the issue at hand comprised the main element of analytical work. 
 The glaring limitations of analytical activity conducted within the East German 
foreign policy apparatus throughout the 1950s—ideological dogmatism and hyperbole, 
completed unfounded prognosis inspired by Marxist-Leninist tenets, a lack of reliable 
information and general knowledge about the outside world, the near total absence of 
analytical value—were the natural outcome of a context within which foreign policy 
expertise as a discrete activity still remain rather inchoately defined and poorly 
understood by its practitioners and lacked solid institutional anchoring. The SED 
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leadership was becoming increasingly aware of this state of affairs as well as the need to 
rectify it. In May 1957, Walter Ulbricht himself wrote a letter to Sepp Schwab, deputy 
foreign minister and a main party confidant at the MfAA, that demonstrated the party 
leadership’s growing cognizance of the problem and its increasing interest in addressing 
it. In the letter, Ulbricht was compelled to ask Schwab to ensure that “the responsible 
employees of the ministry complete a scientific analysis for the members of the Politburo 
on international events that pertain to Germany, declarations by the administration in 
Bonn, NATO resolutions, declarations by the administration of the US, etc.… I request 
that you now take the necessary measures for the inroduction of such a procedure.”87 
The party leadership’s need for specialist analysis of nternational relations was growing, 
but a set of far-reaching changes to the East German foreign policy apparatus was first 
required before that goal could be achieved. 
 A telling contrast to the alternately barren ideological bombast and dearth of 
useful information characteristic of a large part of analysis conducted in the 1950s was 
provided by the MfAA’s coverage of East German rappochement with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. In this, the first concrete larger-scale foreign policy activity undertaken 
by the GDR, active participation in the process had a moderating effect on analysis and 
led to assessments of the situation that were less distant from reality than those found in 
other analyses of the time, even while a strong ideological tint remained.88 Yet this 
example represented the exception that proved the rule, particularly in light of the fact 
that the GDR maintained far more intensive bilateral rel tions with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia than with any other state except the Soviet Union (GDR-USSR relations, 
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however, remained in a class of their own due to the demonstrably peculiar relationship 
between the two) and that establishment and intensification of relations between the three 
states was clearly driven by the hegemonic influence of the USSR.89 
 In the second half of the 1950s, however, tentative steps were in fact made in the 
direction of greater analytical nuance. In tandem with greater recognition of the GDR’s 
own specific foreign policy interests, an attempt at clearer identification of the unique 
prospects and challenges facing the GDR and at moreth oughgoing differentiation of 
foreign policy actors and their particular interests in place of blanket denunciations. Even 
while the GDR remained essentially powerless to shape the course of international events 
in the second half of the 1950s, cognizance of differences between and within Western 
states slowly began to take hold. For instance, a rport from the APK provided a 
summary of the international situation after the crisis year of 1956 (Suez Crisis, 
Hungarian Uprising, disturbances in Poland), in which it ascertained: “One can now 
speak of the possibility of attaining a lessening of tension in the world. In this question 
one can point to contradictions between the imperialistic powers and even between 
groups in the individual imperialistic countries, e.g. in the US. The groups that come 
close to a real assessment of the international situation demand a policy which possesses 
different nuances than the official policy currently being pursued and whose utilization 
seems not to exclude the possibility of coming to terms in specific questions [with the 
Soviet Union].”90 The willingness of the report’s authors to stray too far from a sterile 
ideological interpretive framework, however, was limited as the report proceeded to 
discuss the unaltered aggressive course of the US and West Germany: “Of particular 
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significance is the aggressive behavior of German imperialism, which was rapidly able to 
attain economic predominance in Western Europe and is ow making claims to obtain the 
corresponding instruments of military power. The policy of the German imperialists’ 
state leaves nothing to be desired in terms of openness in regard to its imperialistic 
objectives. German imperialism is closely connected with American imperialism; it has 
become the main threat to peace in Europe.… The extensive agreement between the 
political interests of German and American imperialism is grounded in the fact that they 
are most interested in dividing up the world anew and thus are currently the most 
aggressive powers of the imperialist camp.”91 As the APK report demonstrated, in the 
rare cases when analytical activity in the 1950s went b yond simple information-
gathering, crass ideological overstatement continued to predominate, so much so that it 
actually interfered with the clear identification of the specific foreign policy interests and 
challenges faced by the GDR. For Heike Amos, the centrality of ideology in fact 
represented the main obstacle to quality analysis in the 1950s: “…the ubiquitous 
communist ideology hindered realistic (sachlich) analysis of foreign policy issues.”92 As 
East German foreign policy expertise would continue to develop, the ideological element 
so conspicuous in analysis in the 1950s would naturally not disappear—Marxism-
Leninism would continue to provide the basic understanding within which international 
relations were approach and would even do so in a more consistent, standardized 
manner—but analysis would become much more nuanced and refined and would strike a 
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more even balance between ideological and expert concerns in analysis of international 
relations and the specific place of the GDR therein. 
 
Conclusion 
The gradual ascent of the expert to a position of preponderance over the ideological 
element in East German foreign policy expertise, however, still remained far off at the 
end of the 1950s. Given East Germany’s continuing powerlessness to shape its own fate 
and near total dependence on the Kremlin in the international arena as well as the 
deficient institutional and cadre-related development of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus, analytical output could hardly be categorized as “expert.” As the GDR’s 
inexperienced foreign policy cadres gropingly attempted to orient themselves in the first 
decade of the GDR’s formal existence, they dealt with the most pressing issues the GDR 
faced as they arose and without any type of longer-term, cohesive plan or vision around 
which to orient their work. The result in terms of analysis was a series of ad hoc 
responses that typically bore little relation to the reality of a given situation. Marxist-
Leninist ideological hyperbole in its most insubstanti l, crassest form paired with 
unfounded wishful thinking regarding the respective prospects of each side in the Cold 
War bound together by a severe lack of reliable information and/or misinformation about 
events outside the borders of the GDR were par for the course. Despite the glaring 
shortcomings of analysis in individual areas, however, the most striking feature of East 
German foreign policy expertise in its earliest phase of development was the failure to 
articulate a comprehensive conception of internatiol relations within which the place 
and interests of the GDR were clearly identified. Periodically, the GDR’s specific 
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interests on individual interests were identified clearly enough, yet a solidly established, 
comprehensive conception of the place of the GDR in the international arena that could 
provide an analytical framework extending beyond immediate considerations into the 
middle and longer term was clearly absent among the cadres of the GDR’s young foreign 
policy apparatus. 
 While full enunciation of a comprehensive analytical foreign policy framework 
among East German experts would first take place in the 1960s, this should not obscure 
the critical fact that the fundamental features which defined the GDR’s basic geo-
strategic situation and upon the basis of which a comprehensive framework would 
subsequently emerge were in already in place, having been established in the course of 
the 1950s: erection in East Germany of a one-party communist dictatorship under the 
control of the SED, which, since the forced fusion with the SPD of the SOZ in 1946, had 
moved steadily in the direction of a party “of a new type”; diplomatic recognition by the 
Soviet-led socialist camp (and parallel non-recognitio  by states outside the Soviet sphere 
of influence); reconciliation and establishment of cl se relations with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia; membership in the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA); strict demarcation from West Germany in the context of the “clash 
of systems” being played out on the inner German border; and the still decisive if slightly 
diminished dependency on the Soviet Union not only as patron in the international arena 
but also as essential guarantor of the continued existence of a separate East German state. 
The institutional and cadre-related underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus that existed throughout the 1950s, however, did not yet permit for the fusion of 
the GDR’s peculiar foreign policy interests deriving from this constellation of issues with 
 133
the Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations to form a comprehensive 
foreign policy paradigm. 
 In short, East German foreign policy expertise first had to learn to crawl before it 
could learn to walk. The tumultuous, slapdash development of the East German foreign 
policy apparatus in the 1950s, a period marked by a supercharged concern with basic 
compliance to party orthodoxy, had created a haphazardly organized, poorly coordinated, 
and underdeveloped institutional structure within which analytical activity mainly took 
place incidentally as institutions engaged in their primary responsibilities. Within this 
context, the results of analysis depended much more upon the individual cadres 
populating the East German foreign policy apparatus  the time than the formal division 
of labor, uniformly acknowledged expectations or standard working procedures, since 
these remained underdeveloped and imprecise. Themselves a product of the 
underdeveloped foreign policy apparatus, however, foreign policy cadres were relatively 
few in number, lacked practical experience and professionalism, were largely unfamiliar 
with the field, did not possess much knowledge of the world outside the GDR’s borders 
aside from ideological platitudes, often lacked basic competency, and possessed 
substantial deficiencies in specialist knowledge. The analytical output produced by such 
cadres in the context of the GDR’s underdeveloped, dysfunctional foreign policy 
apparatus and on the backdrop of the GDR’s highly circumscribed foreign policy 
activities was characterized by ideological dogmatism and hyperbole, completely 
unfounded optimistic prognoses inspired by Marxist-Leninist tenets, a lack of reliable 
information and general knowledge about the outside world, and the near total absence of 
analytical value. Only after the institutional inadequacies of the East German foreign 
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policy apparatus were overcome through a linked process of synchronization and 
rationalization imposed from above, would East German foreign policy expertise as a 
discrete activity take shape and would the glaring deficiencies in analytical output be 
surmounted, paving the way for experts’ formulation of a comprehensive conception of 
international relations based upon fusion of the GDR’s specific foreign policy interests 
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The Institutional Development of East German Foreign Policy Expertise in the 1960s: 
Rationalization in Service of Synchronization 
 
Introduction 
At the end of the 1950s, foreign policy expertise in the GDR had already begun to 
emerge from its most tumultuous period of development. Beginning essentially from 
scratch, the development of the East German foreign policy apparatus had proceeded in 
fits and starts—not according to a systematic plan, but rather haphazardly in response to 
the shifting needs and priorities of the SED. The end result was a foreign policy 
apparatus—and attendant expert institutions—marred by ineffectual leadership and 
deficient coordination between different bodies, unclear delineation of responsibilities 
and overlapping competencies, a shortage of material r sources, and an acute lack of 
qualified personnel. The abysmal qualifications of East German foreign policy cadres, 
who lacked practical experience and professionalism, were largely unfamiliar with the 
field, did not possess much knowledge of the world utside the GDR’s borders aside 
from ideological platitudes, often lacked basic competency, and possessed substantial 
deficiencies in specialist knowledge, possessed particular significance since, given the 
existing imprecise formal division of labor and thelack of uniformly acknowledged 
expectations or standard working procedures, responsibility for analytical activity 
principally fell to the individual cadres populating the foreign policy apparatus. Within 
the context of the GDR’s underdeveloped, dysfunctioal foreign policy apparatus and on 
the backdrop of the highly circumscribed foreign policy activities, the results of the 
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earliest analytical activity were, unsurprisingly, substandard. Output typically possessed 
little analytical value and was generally characterized by a combination of shrill 
ideological overstatement, baselessly optimistic prognoses inspired by Marxist-Leninist 
tenets, and a lack of reliable information and general knowledge about the outside world. 
Most striking, however, was the failure to articulate  comprehensive conception of 
international relations within which the place and i terests of the GDR were clearly 
identified. 
 The deficient institutional development of the East Germany foreign policy 
apparatus in the 1950s, itself a result of the SED’s relative neglect, meant that the 
“leading role of the party” (i.e. full subordination) had been only partially realized. 
Although the ultimate authority of the party was never in question, the absence of a fully 
rationalized institutional framework prevented the full synchronization of expertise in 
accord with the practical requirements and political- deological demands of the SED. 
Incomplete rationalization equaled incomplete synchronization, the combined impact of 
which accounted for the poor results of analytical activity in the period. Starting in the 
late 1950s, the SED would steer a different course. Prompted by the partial stabilization 
of party and state as well as the growth of the GDR’s foreign relations activities, the SED 
directed its undivided attention toward establishing a foreign policy apparatus, of which 
foreign policy expertise was a component part, tailored to meet its needs as ruling party. 
The party endeavored to overcome the existing stateof underdevelopment through a 
process of far-reaching rationalization. The rationalization of the East German foreign 
policy apparatus, however, was carried out with a single goal in mind: achieving full 
synchronization. 
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 The process of rationalization in service of synchronization carried out in the 
1960s would engender the most radical transformation of East German foreign policy 
expertise in its history. By the end of the decade,  well-organized, increasingly 
professional, and efficiently functioning system of f reign policy expertise would be in 
place, having supplanted the hastily created patchwork of institutions arbitrarily reacting 
to momentary exigencies and lacking thoroughgoing coordination that had taken shape in 
the 1950s. The rationalization-cum-synchronization of East German foreign policy 
expertise was not total—its institutional completion would only come in the 1970s—but 
the scope of the transformation which expertise underwent in the period would remain 
unmatched. The underdevelopment of the 1950s was all but dispelled and the institutional 
basis was in place that would give rise to experts’ formulation of a comprehensive 
conception of international relations based upon fusion of the GDR’s specific foreign 
policy interests with the dichotomous, class-based Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
international relations. The successful rationalization-cum-synchronization of East 
German foreign policy expertise, however, also establi hed the dynamic of permanent 
tension between intellectual subordination and intellectual autonomy in foreign policy 
expertise. For the time being, the tension remained latent, but the GDR’s integration into 
the international order in the first half of the 1970s would create the conditions for it to 
become actualized. 
 
The Changing Priorities of the SED 
At the end of the 1950s and in the course of the 1960s, a series of internal and external 
events established the conditions in which the SED leadership would attempt to bring 
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about the synchronization of East German foreign policy expertise through a process of 
rationalization. Central among these was the stabiliz tion of the SED itself as a Stalinist-
cadre party under the uncontested leadership of Walter U bricht and in possession of an 
unambiguous chain of command both within the party nd between party and state organs 
in the GDR. This outcome represented the culminatio of a decade of development 
punctuated by power struggles among leading SED figures stemming from disagreements 
over the party’s leadership, character, and policies. By the mid-1950s, Ulbricht had 
gradually but systematically sidelined all serious intra-party rivals—Anton Ackermann, 
Franz Dahlem, Wilhelm Zaisser, Rudolf Herrnstadt—in the course of establishing his 
personal rule over the SED.1 Following the renewed outbreak of dissension in the top 
ranks of the party in the wake of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s secret speech 
denouncing Stalin and Stalinism at the XX Party Congress of the CPSU in February 
1956, Ulbricht successfully weathered what would be the final challenge to his authority 
until his ultimate removal as head of the SED in 1971 presented by the “Schirdewan 
group” and was triumphantly confirmed as First Secretary and undisputed leader of the 
SED at the V Party Congress in July 1958. The settlement of the leadership question 
within the SED created by Ulbricht’s accession to total authority provided a stability and 
uniformity of will within the party that would allow for a more systematic approach in 
the party’s cognizance and handling of the continued d velopment of East German 
foreign policy expertise, something which had been co spicuously absent up to that 
point. 
                                                 
1 For an extremely thoroughgoing account of the power struggles in the top echelons of the SED in the 
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 As the SED’s leadership question was solved in this way in the course of the 
1950s, the existence of the GDR as a state remained extremely precarious. A restive 
population chafed under the dictatorial rule of the SED and the material hardships created 
by the party’s effort to establish a socialist socio-economic order in East Germany—a 
situation which brought the GDR to the brink of collapse when country-wide 
demonstrations and strikes in the summer of 1953 exposed the severe vulnerability of 
SED rule. The Uprising of 17 June rendered the SED leadership temporarily powerless 
and was only put down through the mass intervention of Soviet forces. After SED 
authority was re-established and the country returnd to a normal state of affairs, the 
GDR faced a less immediate but no less perilous threa  to its existence in the form of the 
open sectoral border in Berlin. The porous border allowed East Germans dissatisfied with 
SED rule, many of whom were highly educated and thus indispensable to the East 
German economy, to flee the country for West Germany. SED and Soviet leaders were 
acutely aware that the continued hemorrhaging of the GDR’s most valuable human 
resources would in time bleed the country dry and lead to its economic collapse.2  These 
considerations played a crucial role in the Second Berlin Crisis,3 which was provoked by 
Nikita Khrushchev’s ultimatum to the West. After a three-year diplomatic stand-off 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, the construction of the Berlin Wall, 
sealing the last border crossing allowing free transit from East Germany to West 
Germany via West Berlin, signaled the end of the crisis and secured the continued 
existence of a separate, socialist East German state for he next 28 years. With the threat 
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of internal collapse removed, the GDR’s existential basis became more certain, but, 
significantly, East Germany still remained dependent on Soviet support. 
 It was not just in the view of the SED but increasingly in existing reality that the 
GDR was becoming a normal state actor, however slowly. The GDR’s gradual attainment 
of a degree of stability as well as semi-normalcy correspondingly promoted the further 
development of all the competencies and structures of a normal state actor, including a 
uniform foreign policy apparatus. It simultaneously allowed a broadening of attention 
from issues relating directly to the immediate survival of the GDR to areas that had thus 
far received comparatively less attention, such as the foreign policy goals of a GDR that, 
fortified by the erection of the Berlin Wall and having firmly left behind any remaining 
“all-German” leanings,4 was becoming increasingly self-confident and assertive in the 
expansion of its international relations. 
 The slow but steady growth of the GDR’s foreign policy activities, an area which 
likewise gained in importance as conditions within the GDR stabilized, also lent new 
urgency to rationalizing the East German foreign policy apparatus in accord with the 
notions of the SED. The GDR’s relations with other states in the Soviet sphere of 
influence were becoming more and more extensive, serious efforts were being made to 
“break through” the hated Hallstein Doctrine, which typically involved the establishment 
of all types of relations below the official diplomatic level (e.g. trade agreements, cultural 
exchanges), and general engagement in foreign policy activities beneficial to the interests 
of the GDR wherever the opportunity presented itself all required an efficient foreign 
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policy apparatus staffed by competent specialists in order to bring the GDR maximum 
benefit. Prompted by this need and in the context of partial stabilization of party and 
state, the SED directed its attention toward creating a more rationalized and effective 
foreign policy apparatus in line with its needs as ruling party in a period that saw the 
general expansion and differentiation of foreign policy institutions. In the realm of 
training and personnel, a corresponding process of professionalization and specialization 
was begun that was intended to produce the type of foreign policy cadres who were both 
“politically qualified” and professionally qualified in order to satisfy the demands of the 
GDR’s increasingly complex foreign policy apparatus. 
 The orientation toward greater professionalization and specialization that would 
become the hallmark of the development of the East German foreign policy apparatus in 
the 1960s already began to emerge in earnest at theend of the 1950s. Although appeals 
for Rationalisierung (rationalization) and Verfachlichung (“expertification”) in the 
training of foreign policy cadres and in the orientation of foreign policy analysis in 
general surfaced periodically starting with the founding of the GDR, the political and 
institutional prerequisites necessary for their thoroughgoing implementation remained 
wanting, particularly since a consequent will and sustained efforts on the part of the SED 
leadership in this area were conspicuously absent. As conditions in party and state 
stabilized in the late 1950s/early 1960s and foreign policy grew in importance, the goal of 
the party’s more systematic approach to the issue became adding an emphasis on 
specialist knowledge to the centrality of ideological ompliance and political 
subservience that had been the outstanding feature of East German foreign policy 
expertise throughout the 1950s. The latter aspect by no means disappeared—on the 
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contrary, political-ideological subordination retained its centrality—but was joined by 
deliberate promotion of expert knowledge and professional competency, based on 
recognition of the need to train foreign policy cadres who were not only politically and 
ideologically but also expertly (fachlich) qualified. The SED leadership did not view 
these two elements as contradictory, but rather as compatible since Marxism-Leninism 
remained the “scientific” basis of which expert knowledge merely represented an 
appendage, not an autonomous body of knowledge functioning independently of and in 
opposition to Marxist-Leninist theory and analysis. 
 
The Babelsberg Conference and the Continued Importance of Political-Ideological 
Compliance 
Just as East German foreign policy expertise was emerging from its stormiest period of 
development and expert knowledge and professional competency were gaining in 
significance, the notorious Babelsberg Conference of April 1958 provided unmistakable 
evidence of the unaltered centrality that ideological compliance and strict adherence to 
the party line would continue to possess despite countervailing trends. Taking place at the 
German Academy for the Study of State and Law (DASR), where the Institute for 
International Law and International Relations (IVB) formed a discrete, semi-autonomous 
sub-unit, the conference represented a key element in the neo-Stalinist counter-offensive 
against the “revisionist” tendencies that had purportedly run rampant in the GDR since 
Khrushchev’s secret speech at the XX Party Congress of the CPSU. The broader context 
for the conference was provided by Ulbricht’s securing undisputed authority as head of 
the SED and the linked reestablishment of neo-Stalinist orthodoxy. The content of the 
 144
conference, at which Ulbricht held the key note address and clearly set the tone, was 
principally directed at institutionalizing the SED leadership’s conception of law, which 
consisted in its subordination to the ongoing “construction of socialism” in the GDR. 
Ulbricht denounced “narrow bourgeois legal horizons” and “abstract-normative 
approaches to law” and called for acknowledgment of the resolutions passed by the SED 
as the sole valid basis for legal norms in the GDR and as the point of orientation for the 
practical work of jurists at the DASR, which was on its way to becoming the leading site 
of legal training and research in the GDR.5 
 While the substance of the conference dealt above all with juridical issues—the 
area where its impact would be most lasting6—its effects were felt in every unit of the 
DASR, including the IVB, which by this time was established as the GDR’s main foreign 
policy Kaderschmiede, or cadre forge. A letter sent in May 1958, just one month after the 
conference, by Georg Handke, Secretary of State in the MfAA, which was the 
responsible state organ for the IVB, to the office of Deputy Foreign Minister Sepp 
Schwab highlighted the need to bring training at the IVB into step with the conference’s 
injunctions: “Assessment of the conference…demonstrates [the need for a] 
thoroughgoing re-evaluation of the pedagogical objectiv s, the methods of training, and 
the curriculum [not only of the DASR] but also of [the IVB]. Within this framework, the 
ministry, in assessing training as it has been conducted thus far, faces the task of 
formulating anew its basic position on the requirements and areas of emphasis in the 
training of our cadres and submitting corresponding recommendations to the institute on 
                                                 
5 Cited in Ulrich Bernhardt, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft “Walter Ulbricht” 
1948-1971 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1997), 124. 
6 Ibid., 128-144. 
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the basis of the conference…and the resolutions it passed.”7 A new curriculum drafted for 
the existing four-year course of study at the IVB complied with this injunction and lent 
expression to the post-Babelsberg orientation of foreign policy training in the GDR: 
[The Babelsberg Conference and the subsequent conference of party delegates at the 
DASR] emphatically and vigorously highlighted that the content of the future training of 
state functionaries at the academy is to be dictated by the demands placed on the quality 
of state work by the conditions of the struggle for s cialism in the German Democratic 
Republic and the conscious, systematic administration and organization of the socialist 
transformation. The construction of socialism demands today the type of state functionary 
who is proficient in the essential features of the worldview of the working class, 
Marxism-Leninism; who is capable of creatively applying it to the development of 
society in the German Democratic Republic, in all of Germany, and in the class struggle 
in the international arena; who is loyally devoted o the cause of the working class and 
infused to the core with the certitude of socialism’s victory; and who can win over the 
working class and the remaining masses of the people f r socialism and consciously lead 
them down the path of socialist development. Proceeding from this point of departure, 
comprehensive study of the fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism and their 
application to the concrete conditions of social development in the German Democratic 
Republic and in all of Germany will stand in the center of the future training of state 
functionaries. The foundations of the training of employees in the foreign service of our 
republic must be the same as those of all other branches of our worker-and-peasant 
power. Building upon this foundation, a specialized form of training (Spezialausbildung) 
corresponding to the requirements of the foreign policy f the GDR will be introduced.8 
While particulars of instruction may not have necessarily changed dramatically in order 
to meet the far-reaching vision presented here, a nw statute for the DASR went into 
                                                 
7 PA AA, MfAA, A 17269. 
8 Ibid. The document is also contained in the files of the APIV Division that deal with the matter: SAPMO-
BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/22. 
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effect in March 1959 that brought important changes. The new statute mainly dealt with 
redefinition of the structure and goals of the academy’s law faculties to ensure their 
compliance with the results of the Babelsberg Confere ce, it also created a Prorektorat 
für die Ausbildung von leitenden Mitarbeitern für den auswärtigen Dienst (PAMaD), or 
Prorectorate for the Training of Leading Foreign Servic  Employees, which took over the 
responsibilities of the IVB9 and comprised four “institutes”: general history, the history 
of international relations, international law, economic geography, plus a division for 
language instruction.10 
 Faculty and students at the overhauled PAMaD were acutely aware that the 
Babelsberg Conference’s slogan of linking Wissenschaft (science) with Praxis (practice) 
signaled an attempt to suppress any traces of autonom us scholarship at the prorectorate: 
its work was to be fully subordinated to the practical goals and political-ideological 
requirements of the SED leadership. Klaus Bollinger, a graduate of one of the DVA’s 
early condensed courses of study in foreign policy who was employed as 
wissenschaftlicher Asisstent at the IVB/PAMaD at the time of the Babelsberg 
Conference, later to become head of the USA division of the prorectorate’s successor 
institution, experienced the fallout from the conference first hand. According to 
Bollinger’s account, Herbert Kröger, rector of the DASR at the time, offered him up as a 
scapegoat to Ulbricht’s “anti-revisionist” offensive on the grounds that his dissertation on 
race relations in the US was not sufficiently practice-bound (i.e. in lock-step with the 
                                                 
9 Universität Potsdam (hereafter UP), Universitätsarchiv (hereafter UA), Bestand ASR, 2817. 
10 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13235. 
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perspective of the SED); as a result, Bollinger wascompelled to accept a demotion in 
status and to re-work the dissertation project.11 
 The stifling impact of the Babelsberg Conference on the IVB/PAMaD was also 
felt by a group of students who completed the IVB’s three-year course of study in 1957. 
Before graduating, the students agreed to form an informal association and, upon 
conclusion of their studies, to aid one another in their professional careers as 
circumstances allowed. The members of the associatin were to meet once a year. When 
party authorities in the MfAA and the DASR learned of the pact, they condemned it as 
being fully at odds with “the political and legal principles and the political directives of 
our party,” at which point it was publicly denounced at the Babelsberg Conference as 
“the work of the class enemy.”12 Once discovered, the students’ initiative, which was the 
last of its kind among foreign policy students in the GDR, clearly had no chance for 
success in light of the SED’s newly demonstrated zeal to enforce its monopoly claim on 
East German political and social life since the envisioned association was organized 
independently of the party. Nevertheless, the ideological deep freeze and heightened 
climate of suspicion which set upon the entire DASR in the wake of the Babelsberg 
Conference did not have as long-lasting or damaging effect on the work of the PAMaD as 
that of the academy’s legal faculties due to East German foreign policy expertise’s link 
with international relations practice, which was gaining in importance at the time and 
which would continually provide a counterweight of s rts against the SED leadership’s 
penchant for ideological insulation and dogmatism. The Babelsberg Conference did, 
however, clearly demonstrate that the emergent orientation toward greater emphasis on 
                                                 
11 Klaus Bollinger, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, 28 April 2008. 
12 Krüger, “Die erste Jahre der Lehrtätigkeit,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für 
Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 55-56. 
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specialist knowledge and professional competency in the training of foreign policy cadres 
would not be accompanied by a corresponding downgrading of the importance of 
political-ideological subordination. Rather, the former element was to adapt to the latter 
element, which was supposed to retain its supremacy—  relationship which in practice, 
however, would not always function in accordance with the suppositions of the SED 
leadership. Indeed, an unresolved—and ultimately irresolvable—tension between 
intellectual subordination and autonomy would gradually come the defining characteristic 
of East German foreign policy expertise, a feature which began to emerge in the late 
1950s/early 1960s as the SED leadership initiated a concentrated effort to produce cadres 
who were professionally qualified in addition to being politically qualified. 
 
Practical Needs, Rationalization, and Cadres 
The growing importance of specialist knowledge and professional competency in East 
German foreign policy expertise was driven by the ne ds of the GDR’s two main 
operative foreign policy institutions, the MfAA and the Central Committee’s Foreign 
Policy and International Relations (APIV) Division. As foreign and domestic conditions 
toward the end of the 1950s had ripened to allow the GDR to expand its foreign policy 
activities, the prevailing underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy apparatus 
and the enduring shortage of the qualified “socialist foreign policy cadres” desired by the 
SED leadership, however, represented a brake on the ability of the MfAA and the APIV 
Division to meet the new challenges associated withthe GDR’s expanded foreign policy 
activities.  Reports completed by the MfAA and the APIV Division in 1959 on each 
institution’s cadre situation provided the specific catalyst for a series of far-reaching 
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measures aimed at remedying the situation. These measur s, implementing at the opening 
of the 1960s, in turn marked just the start of a broader process of rationalization and 
professionalization that would transform the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus in the 
course of the decade. 
 The concrete impetus for the entire process lay in an idiosyncratic and easily 
overlooked episode which provided no indication of the far-reaching processes it would 
set in motion, but which clearly highlighted the central issues at play in the continued 
development of the East German foreign policy apparatus. In January 1959, the APIV 
Division sought approval from the Secretariat for the ransfer of Otto Becker, who was 
active at the time in the mid-level position of Länderreferent, or regional expert, for 
Yugoslavia at the MfAA, to the division, where he would work as Instrukteur for 
Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Becker epitomized the type of socialist 
foreign policy cadre so zealously desired by SED leadership and so hotly sought by the 
institutions of East Germany’s growing foreign policy apparatus—he was proficient in 
Russian, Albanian, and Romanian and in his previous work had demonstrated that he 
possessed the necessary “political prerequisites” to “correctly assess” questions 
connected to an area as politically sensitive as Yugoslavia.13 In fact, Becker was 
considered so politically reliable that the Secretaria  and the APIV Division both agreed 
to make a rare exception to the rule that required employees of the Central Committee, of 
which the APIV Division was a part, to have been memb rs of the SED for at least eight 
years (Becker had been a member of the SED for only seven years while being 
considered for employment in the APIV Division). The APIV Division’s proposal to the 
                                                 
13 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV/2/3A/643. Becker also completed a five-year correspondence course at the 
DASR in early 1958, presumably specializing in foreign policy at the IVB/PAMaD. 
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Secretariat, signed off on by division head Peter Flo in, made the case for employing 
Becker in unequivocal terms: “[The APIV Division] is of the opinion that the assignment 
of Comrade Becker as an employee in the CC should be approved since there exists a 
serious dearth of cadres in the area of foreign policy that simultaneously possess such 
political and linguistic qualities.”14 
 The division’s request was approved by the Secretariat, but the leadership of the 
MfAA in turn heftily protested the decision to deprive the ministry of such a valuable 
employee. In a letter sent to Paul Verner, member of the Central Committee responsible 
for “all-German questions,” Otto Winzer, deputy foreign minister and future foreign 
minister, decried the move, arguing that “demands on the MfAA have demonstrably 
increased in recent times and, in light of developments in the international situation and 
the policies of party and state, will continue to gr w. In this situation, it is wrong to draw 
off from, of all places, the ministry’s mid-level cadres who demonstrate good political 
development and who have experience abroad and knowledge of foreign languages. On 
the contrary, if in the coming months the ministry is to live up to its goals even in part, a 
substantial strengthening of personnel must take place.”15 On the very next day, 30 
January 1959, Florin followed Winzer’s letter to Vern r with one of his own, countering 
that “it is right to demand that the party apparatus be staffed with qualified personnel; 
[the APIV Division] all the more ought to be staffed with much better-qualified comrades 
than is currently the case.”16 In the tug-of-war between the MfAA and the APIV Division 
over the employment of Becker, the Secretariat, presumably at the continued urging of 
Winzer and the foreign ministry, ultimately sided with the MfAA, overturning its earlier 





decision to approve Becker’s transfer to the APIV Division. The need to address the 
increasingly acute problem of foreign policy cadres, however, had been impressed upon 
the SED leadership: the Secretariat resolution annulli g its earlier decision also instructed 
both the MfAA and the APIV Division to draw up plans on “how the cadre questions of 
[the MfAA] and [the APIV Division] can be resolved in light of the anticipated increase 
in demands.”17 
The subsequent reports of the MfAA and the APIV division identified in broad 
terms a twofold problem—a general shortage of cadres and the under-qualification of 
existing cadres. The MfAA’s report firmly located the problem in the context of the 
GDR’s expanding foreign relations: “The rapid development of the international 
authority and the consolidation and expansion of the interstate relations of the GDR 
require a [larger] number of leading and mid-level cadres in order to fulfill our foreign 
policy goals. The training of suitable foreign policy cadres has not matched the pace of 
development of the international relations of the GDR. At present, a contradiction exists 
between the foreign policy opportunities available to the GDR to rapidly increase its 
international standing and to expand its international relations and the cadre situation at 
the MfAA, which is manifested in a shortage of cadres and in the partially insufficient 
qualifications of existing cadres.”18 The report went on to reveal just what the insufficient 
qualifications of existing cadres consisted in: “While a satisfactory situation exists in 
terms of the political constitution as well as the oretical qualifications of our 
employees, a large segment of current employees does not yet match the heightened 
requirements in practical foreign policy activity…. Alongside the still-insufficient 
                                                 
17 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV/2/3A/654. 
18 PA AA, MfAA, G-A 58. 
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qualifications of a large segment of our employees in respect to language abilities 
[described as “unsatisfactory” with just over a quarter of cadres proficient in at least one 
foreign language] as well as party and work experience, we lack a great number of 
employees who possess the specialist (fachlich) and linguistic knowledge necessary to 
orient themselves confidently and independently in complex questions of foreign policy 
and who have the capability to perform wide-ranging, creative (schöpferisch) work.”19 
The report further indicated that the ministry was also suffering from a severe shortage of 
personnel—a total of 62 positions that needed to be filled immediately or in the near 
future remained vacant. The MfAA’s twofold cadre problem, according to the report’s 
authors, was attributable above all to a nonchalant attitude on the part of the ministry’s 
leadership toward cadre training, manifested particularly in the MfAA’s relationship with 
the PAMaD: “[The MfAA] has only insufficiently concerned itself with [the IVB],20 the 
most important source of new cadres for foreign policy activity. The curriculum, the 
faculty, and the graduates lack a concrete connection w th practical foreign policy 
activity.”21 
The APIV Division’s report echoed the findings of the MfAA report, highlighting 
in particular the lack of practical experience among its cadres: “There are comrades 
active in the division, particularly in the country sectors, who in their work in the area of 
foreign policy have acquired relatively good theoretical knowledge. A segment of the 
comrades still possesses relatively little experience i  practical party work. The 
international experiences that have been obtained so far result from lengthy sojourns 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 The report, although completed in mid-1959, referrd to the PAMaD by its pre-March 1959 title, 
unwittingly providing an outstanding example of just how little the MfAA concerned itself with the 
PAMaD at the time.  
21 PA AA, MfAA, G-A 58. 
 153
abroad (emigration, study, etc.) as well as occasion l trips abroad. None of the comrades 
has yet been active in diplomatic service.”22 The report noted that the division was under-
staffed—with a total of 13 out of approximately 35 positions vacant—and emphasized 
the need for determined action in order to remedy the situation: “The facts presented here 
and especially the number of vacant positions impede the efforts of the division to 
fundamentally improve its work. The leadership of the division and the leadership of the 
party organization [i.e. the SED cell in the division] did not devote sufficient attention to 
cadre work in the past…. Further decisive measures ar  necessary in order to bring about 
a rapid change of direction.”23 
 The 1959 cadre reports from the MfAA and the Foreign Policy and International 
Relations Division—the GDR’s two main operative foreign policy institutions whose 
needs and requests for this reason enjoyed priority within the dictatorially administered 
East German foreign policy apparatus—both highlighted how the existing shortage of 
qualified foreign policy cadres and the unsatisfactory qualifications of existing cadres 
impaired efforts to meet the new associated with expansion of the GDR’s foreign policy 
activities. The necessary improvement in qualifications, when approached from the 
operative perspective of the MfAA and the APIV Division, would consist not so much in 
augmenting cadres’ knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, which was attested to be at a 
satisfactory level, as in providing cadres, the vast majority of whom underwent a rigorous 
theoretical-cum-ideological education at the IVB/PAMaD, with greater practical foreign 
policy experience, often encapsulated by the pithy slogan “joining theory with practice.” 
                                                 
22 PA AA, MfAA, A 17749. 
23 Ibid. 
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The markedly greater significance assigned at the end of the 1950s by the SED to 
foreign policy in general and the establishment of a well-functioning foreign policy 
apparatus tailored to the party’s needs in particular found unambiguous expression in the 
sustained attention and efforts of the party’s two highest organs, the Politburo and the 
Secretariat, to resolve the deficiencies brought to light in the cadre reports of the MfAA 
and the APIV Division. The reports, in whose formulation and realization the Foreign 
Policy Commission (APK)24 and the Central Committee’s Division for Cadre Questions 
also took part, were presented in August 1959 along with proposed plans of action to the 
Politburo, which approved them and in turn passed th m on to the Secretariat,25 where 
they received exhaustive treatment in October before being sent on in December to the 
Council of Ministers to receive its stamp of approval in what made up the final stage in 
the initiative’s passage.26 The proposed measures displayed a clear awareness of the 
outstanding problems that required attention, but aimed above all at providing immediate 
relief rather than long-term solutions. In the two separate plans of action submitted by the 
MfAA and the APIV Division, which, however, proposed several joint or overlapping 
measures, the most attention was devoted by far simply to filling the ranks of each 
institution without much regard for the quality of cadres. Testament to the urgency 
attached to the problem of under-staffing, particularly at the MfAA and the GDR’s 
representations abroad, was provided by approval of  measure stipulating the immediate 
release of 70 cadres from their positions in other ar as of the state and party apparatus 
(e.g. the Ministries of the Interior, Culture, and Justice, the State Planning Commission, 
                                                 
24 The APK actually confirmed the resolution on the reports on 24 August 1959, two days before it received 
final approval from the Politburo. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/3. 
25 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/716. 
26 BArch, DC 20/I/4/355. 
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the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Division and Finance Division) for 
employment in the MfAA by the end of the year (the resolution was passed in late 
October 1959).27 Another 200 cadres were to be released in subsequent years to ensure 
fulfillment of the MfAA’s long-term employment targets (to 1965).28 
 In light of the personnel shortages afflicting both institutions, a means of 
improving the qualifications of existing cadres without taking them away from their 
current work was sought in the establishment of a Betriebsakademie 29 offering evening 
courses at the MfAA as well as increased independent study (Selbststudium), which, 
alongside the formation of conversations groups (Sprachzirkel), were also meant to 
improve the largely deficient foreign language skill  of foreign policy cadres.30 The 
original resolution for the Politburo also highlighted the possibility of sending cadres 
from the APIV Division to gain experience in the international divisions of the 
communist “fraternal parties,” i.e., the institutional counterparts of the APIV Division in 
other Soviet Bloc sates, but the passage was stricken from the later Secretariat 
resolution.31 The creation of a Kaderreserve (cadre reserve) for each institution was also 
decided upon, which entailed both the qualification of mid-level cadres for higher-level 
positions in each institution and the qualification of cadres of all levels from other areas 
of the party and state apparatus to take over position  in the MfAA if the need were to 
                                                 
27 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/683. However, the Council of Ministers resolution from December 
(SAPMO-BArch, DC 20/I/4 355), pushed the date back to 30 May 1960. 
28 Ibid. The projected figures, however, would prove to be overly optimistic while the MfAA would 
simultaneously encounter difficulties in filling existing vacancies (discussed in greater detail below). 
29 The Betriebsakademie began operating on 18 January 1960. PA AA, MfAA, LS-A 381. 
30 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/683. 
31 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/716. No reason, whethr refusal of the fraternal parties, reservations 
on the part of the SED leadership, or the undesirability of temporarily creating more vacancies in the
division, was given for the absence of the passage in the Secretariat resolution. 
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arise.32 The envisioned influx of new cadres and the improved qualifications of existing 
cadres were to be guaranteed by a more conscientious and systematic approach to the 
cadre situation in the MfAA and the APIV Division. The leadership of each institution 
was expected to take charge of efforts aimed at remedying the cadre problem, which had 
emerged as a result of past neglect: “The leading comrades of the ministry must address 
the unsatisfactory cadre situation and lead an energ tic struggle for the implementation of 
socialist cadre principles…. The responsibility of leading comrades for the realization of 
socialist cadre policy has to be increased. Work with cadres, their selection, raising their 
qualifications to the level of our constantly increasing foreign policy demands, and 
assigning them correctly are inseparable components of socialist leadership activity.”33 In 
the resolution, little attention was paid to another one of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus’s main problem areas—coordination between individual institutions. The 
MfAA and the APIV Division were simply obligated “immediately to draw up a plan that 
provides for a systematic exchange of employees of the division and the ministry as well 
as the temporary assignment of employees of the division in the GDR’s representations 
abroad,”34 but genuine improvements in this area were slow in coming. 
 One of the few areas where the plans of the MfAA and the APIV Division 
extended much beyond consideration of immediate steps to address the cadre problem 
was the training of new foreign policy personnel. In order to guarantee a qualified and 
continual flow of new cadres, it was deemed necessary for the MfAA to increase its 
involvement in the PAMaD’s training of cadres: “The cooperation of the MfAA with 
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sites of foreign policy training, especially [the PAMaD], is to be improved and a close 
connection between theory and practice established.”35 In this case, a closer connection 
between theory and practice consisted above all in charging a joint MfAA-PAMaD 
commission36 with revamping the PAMaD’s foreign policy curriculum to ensure 
graduates of the prorectorate met the specific needs of the MfAA.37 The success of the 
plans to improve foreign policy training depended in large part on simply finding a 
number of students sufficient to meet the increased demand in a climate where cadres 
were urgently needed to staff nearly all areas of the state and party apparatus, including 
such vital areas as economic planning and production. T  meet this goal, the Secretariat 
passed quotas for students to be delegated each year from the administrations of the 
GDR’s 14 districts plus East Berlin (ranging from 1 to 4) as well as the Free German 
Trade Union Federation (10) and the Ministry for National Defense and the Ministry of 
the Interior (10-15) for study at the PAMaD.38 In sum, the energetic steps proposed in the 
cadre reports of the MfAA and the APIV Division and approved by the Politburo and 
Secretariat showed that the SED leadership now considered the state of the East German 
foreign policy apparatus an area of crucial importance where outstanding problems had to 
be addressed. They set in motion a concentrated effort to ensure the East German foreign 
policy apparatus could meet the opportunities and challenges facing the GDR centered on 
“joining theory with practice,” or fostering close cooperation and coordination between 
the main operative foreign policy institutions of the GDR among themselves as well as 
with the PAMaD. 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 PA AA, MfAA, A 18071. 
37 The commission’s output was to be submitted to the APK for approval. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 
2/3A/683. 
38 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/683. 
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 The effort did not get off to an auspicious start. In a case indicative of the poor 
institutional cooperation and general dysfunction still afflicting the East German foreign 
policy apparatus, Fritz Geyer, head of the IVB/PAMaD since taking over from Acting 
Director Heinz Tillmann in 1956, was not directly informed by the MfAA or the APIV 
Division of the resolution, which of course directly affected the PAMaD, but only learned 
of it coincidentally at an unrelated party meeting.39 The MfAA likewise neglected to 
include Geyer in the session of the MfAA Collegium that worked out the ministry’s 
initial response to the resolution.40 Geyer voiced his dissatisfaction with the situation and 
criticized the MfAA’s approach to cadre training, stating that “currently, the ministry’s 
ideas for the improvement of cadre training at the academy revolve almost exclusively 
around learning foreign languages” and “it has once again shown itself to be true that 
there still exists no fundamental clarity at the ministry on how cadre training at the 
academy is supposed to be improved.”41 In this, the very earliest phase of the 
implementation of the foreign policy cadre resolution, the MfAA’s conspicuous failure in 
what was supposed to be the central thrust of the proj ct—cooperation between the 
ministry and the PAMaD—took place in an atmosphere of already strained relations 
between the two institutions. 
 While the MfAA was the responsible state organ for the PAMaD, the prorectorate 
was not fully subordinate to the ministry because it also answered to the APIV Division 
and had to respond to any directives coming from higher party organs such as the 
Secretariat or Politburo. Two main issues complicated relations between the MfAA and 
PAMaD. The first was assignment of cadres; the two institutions, since they drew upon 
                                                 




the same, limited personnel pool, were in constant competition with one another to gain 
and keep qualified individuals, and this in a situat on where personnel shortages affected 
the entire state and party apparatus. The PAMaD would keep on graduates who were 
supposed to take up positions at the MfAA to be instructors at the prorectorate; the 
MfAA would respond in kind by attempting to enlist for employment PAMaD students 
who were completing an internship at the ministry.42 There were no official channels to 
address the situation, which meant that grievances on both sides were often left to fester. 
The second issue complicating the relationship betwe n the MfAA and the PAMaD was 
the ministry’s sometimes haughty attitude toward the prorectorate. The leadership of the 
MfAA, despite official rhetoric on the “joining of theory and practice,” oftentimes 
displayed an unmistakable disregard for the input of the PAMaD, even neglecting to 
consult the prorectorate on issues that directly affected it (the episode with Geyer being 
by no means the first time PAMaD officials had been xcluded from MfAA consultations 
bearing directly on the work of the prorectorate).43 Furthermore, Geyer’s allusion to a 
lack of clarity at the MfAA on how exactly training at the PAMaD was to be improved 
was clearly an exaggeration, but nevertheless contained a kernel of truth since neither the 
MfAA nor the steps proposed in the foreign policy cadre resolution offered a vision for 
change that went much beyond a general desire for greater cooperation between the two 
institutions as encapsulated in the slogan “joining theory with practice.” This lack of 
clarity and vision combined with the patent difficulties inherent in the relationship 
between the PAMaD, the GDR’s most important site of foreign policy training, and the 
                                                 




MfAA, the main state operative foreign policy institu on, did not bode well for the 
ultimate success of the efforts outlined in the foreign policy cadre resolution. 
 The joint MfAA-PAMaD commission44 charged with revamping foreign policy 
training at the PAMaD, in addition to following the steps explicitly outlined in the 
Politburo resolution, could also draw on the work it had conducted since its formation in 
June 1959.45 Building on this foundation, the commission in thecourse of its 
deliberations produced a series of suggestions that demonstrated it took seriously the 
injunction to create a closer bond between theory and practice, particularly by greatly 
increasing the involvement of the MfAA in the work of the PAMaD. Indeed, the MfAA’s 
lack of involvement in the process of foreign policy training was portrayed as the main 
reason for the unsatisfactory cadre situation: “The continual growth of the international 
authority and the foreign policy tasks of the GDR demands the improvement of the 
training of our cadres at the DASR. The main deficin es in the training conducted thus 
far consist in the insufficient connection between theory and foreign policy practice, in 
the ministry’s inadequate exercise of influence on educational work, the formulation of 
curriculum, and the systematic qualification of scient fic employees. Scientific 
employees, with few exceptions, possess no foreign policy experience whatsoever.”46 In 
order to remedy this situation, the commission in early 1960 proposed to the Collegium 
of the MfAA a broad range of measures aimed at increasing cooperation between the 
                                                 
44 The formation of the commission was decided upon in a meeting of the Central Party Direction of the 
MfAA on 12 June 1959, which proposed for membership in the commission nine MfAA employees, 
including Siegfried Bock (as head), Werner Praetorius, Wolfgang Kiesewetter, Horst Grunert, and August 
Klobes, and three PAMaD employees, Prorector Fritz Geyer, Harry Wünsche, and Werner Hänisch. At the 
suggestion of Deputy Foreign Minister Sepp Schwab, PAMaD students, preferably those who were 
advanced in their studies and had already completed an internship, were also to take part in the work of the 
commission. PA AA, MfAA, A 18071. 
45 Ibid.; PA AA, MfAA, A 17400 and A 15824; SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/22. 
46 PA AA, MfAA, A 15824. An earlier version of this document, comprising just one of the drafts worked 
out by the commission, is contained in the files of the APIV Division: SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/22. 
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ministry and the PAMaD at all levels. Close cooperation was to begin at the top, where 
the heads of each institute and their deputies wereto carry out regular consultations with 
one another and to take part in the meetings of the highest decision-making bodies of the 
respective other institution.47 Regular contact was to take place among mid-level 
employees as well—MfAA representatives would take part in meetings of the 
prorectorate’s individual institutes while PAMaD rep sentatives would be included in 
the consultations of MfAA organs relevant to their area of specialization.48 Collaboration 
between mid-level personnel, however, was to extend beyond inclusion in the relevant 
deliberations of the other respective institution t include longer-term exchanges of 
personnel between the MfAA and the PAMaD.49 
 The envisaged intensification of relations between the two institutes logically 
revolved around the training conducted at the PAMaD. The prorectorate’s curriculum in 
foreign policy was reworked with the input of the MfAA and from this point on would 
always be formulated in close cooperation with the ministry. New emphasis was placed 
on forging a balance between the Grundlagenstudium (the study of fundamental 
theoretical-ideological (i.e. Marxist-Leninist) issues comprising the first two years of 
training) and the intensive study of specific foreign policy issues (außenpolitische 
Problematik). The commission advocated more thorough integration of specific foreign 
policy issues into the Grundlagenstudium and proposed that the relevant divisions or 
individuals from the MfAA be consulted on the content of specific lectures.50 Continuing 
in the same vein, MfAA employees were to hold occasional lectures and periodically lead 






seminars at the PAMaD and high-ranking MfAA officials were to supervise the general 
progress of annual cohorts at the prorectorate—according to the commission, this would 
be “an essential contribution to the political-ideological education (Erziehung) of the 
students,” would secure for the MfAA “a direct, constant overview of the political-
ideological and expert (fachlich) conditions of work” at the prorectorate, and would 
provide students “from their first semester on with continual contact with the MfAA, 
which will help to clear up a number of problems among the students because these 
students, except for isolated exceptions, do not have a clear conception of the ministry’s 
work.”51 In respect to another aspect of the PAMaD’s curriclum, the commission noted 
with concern that “in the past, training did not provide students with any specialization 
whatsoever, as is the case at the training sites of the Soviet Union and the other socialist 
countries.”52 This shortcoming was to be remedied in two main ways. First, students were 
to begin a specialization in a certain geographical area at the start of the second year of 
study in accordance with the projected needs of the MfAA—the specialization, however, 
remained fairly broad since it would focus on a certain territory (e.g. Far East, Western 
Europe) rather than a specific country. Second, a student’s course of foreign language 
study would be determined, again, in accordance with the projected needs of the MfAA 
(the study of two languages—Russian and either English, French, or Spanish—was 
required, but the commission, in a move that broke with existing practice, suggested 
allowing specialization in one of the two).53 In another move that broke with existing 
practice, the commission advocated that students carry out their internships exclusively at 
the MfAA—one in the ministry itself and another in o e of the GDR’s representations 





abroad. An even more radical suggestion on the part of the commission called for the 
phasing out of the existing four-year course of study at the PAMaD (the last one would 
be convened in 1962) and its gradual replacement (starting in September 1963) with a 
two-year postgraduate course of study encompassing 15-20 participants every year54 —
the rationale was that participating students, since they had already completed a degree at 
an East German institution of higher education, which included the standard 
Grundlagenstudium and foreign language study, would complete the program more 
quickly without sacrificing quality due to their preexisting qualifications.55 The 
commission in its recommendations did not address the GDR’s other main source of 
foreign policy cadres—the Institute for International Relations in Moscow, which 
continued to produce 15-20 cadres for the East German foreign policy apparatus each 
year.56 The commission actually expressed the desire to establish the PAMaD as an 
institution completely independent of the DASR, butsince this was impossible “for 
economic and cadre-related reasons,” it recognized th  necessity of “making use of all the 
opportunities available at the DASR for a better und more qualified training of foreign 
policy cadres.”57 The leadership of the PAMaD itself recognized that, in light of the 
increased foreign policy activity of the GDR and the resulting greater demand for well-
trained foreign policy cadres, the conditions at the prorectorate were not ideal and drew 
the logical consequences: “The current form and position of the prorectorate appear 
                                                 
54 The first two-year course of study did indeed begin as planned in September 1963, but was not conducte  
each year as envisioned—the fourth and final two-year course of study began in March 1972. Further, th 
four-year course of study was not eliminated until September 1967, when it was convened for the last time. 
“Zeittafel IIB,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der 
DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 218-231. 
55 PA AA, MfAA, A 15824. 
56 The files of the MfAA housed in the Political Archive of the Foreign Office contain rather extensive 
documentation of the annual cohorts of East German students at the Institute for International Relations in 
Moscow. PA AA, MfAA, B 3537-B 3549. 
57 PA AA, MfAA, A 15824. 
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insufficient for the fulfillment of this task. Therfore, we should aim for the creation of 
an independent scientific institution by 1965 in place of the current prorectorate.”58 As it 
would turn out, however, the further development of the PAMaD would not quite 
conform to the wishes of its leadership. 
 The commission focused its attention on one other, inc easingly important aspect 
of the PAMaD’s work—foreign policy research. The significance of this field of activity, 
which to this point had received very little attentio  in light of the pressing cadre problem 
plaguing the East German foreign policy apparatus, wa  clearly on the rise. In accordance 
with the weight assigned to joining theory with practice, research at the PAMaD was not 
to be conducted for research’s sake, but rather to play a central in the improvement of 
foreign policy training: “In the prorectorate, research must take on an essential position 
since it is only on the basis of the results of research that instruction (Lehrarbeit) and 
thereby education (Erziehung) of qualified cadres can be guaranteed.”59 With research 
acknowledged as “the most important foundation of all scientific instructional and 
educational activity,” it was to produce “the greatest possible benefit for the foreign 
policy of the GDR.”60 The commission’s treatment of the question of research at the 
PAMaD signaled growing recognition of the important function foreign policy research 
could fulfill not only in the context of cadre education but also in the East German 
foreign policy apparatus in its entirety—and likewise bespoke the subordinate position of 
foreign policy research in the GDR. As the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus would both 
expand and become rationalized in the course of the 1960s, the importance of foreign 
policy research would grow as well. 





 This development, however, unfolded only gradually, and the issue of cadre 
training remained for the time being the most pressing problem within the East German 
foreign policy apparatus. While the importance placed on specialization and professional 
competency was unmistakably on the rise at the turn of the 1950s—seen particularly in 
the work of the joint MfAA-PAMaD commission—this fact should not overshadow the 
continued centrality of Marxism-Leninism in East German foreign policy training as it 
provided the essential framework structuring East German foreign policy expertise. The 
most important trait demanded of PAMaD graduates remained “comprehensive 
knowledge of the fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism,” which was to enable 
them “to approach all social phenomena from the perspective of the working class’s 
interests and to discern what is necessary for realization of developments whose course is 
determined by the laws of history development (gesetzmäßig). The complexity, diversity, 
and rapid variability of the social phenomena that employees of the MfAA continually 
face demand particular aptitude in the application of the material dialectic.”61 The 
increasing stress placed on familiarity with concrete foreign policy practice and problems 
and on specialization in a specific geographical area was viewed not as a challenge to but 
rather an extension of Marxist-Leninist knowledge. Indeed, since Marxism-Leninism was 
held to represent a body of scientific knowledge that provided the sole valid 
understanding of society and social development, greate  expert knowledge would 
facilitate a deeper, more refined, and more effectiv  application of Marxist-Leninist 
analysis to international relations, which, ultimately, would only contribute to fulfillment 
of the GDR’s foreign policy goals: “Knowledge of the specialized branches of foreign 
policy science (history of international relations, general history, economic geography, 
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international law, etc.) is to enable graduates to discern the historically determined laws 
of development (Gesetzmäßigkeiten) of the international class struggle and of 
international relations in their historical development, in their current phase and in their 
future development, and to take the necessary stepsin their own activity to aid in the 
realization of these historically determined laws of development.”62 
 Specialist knowledge and professional competency therefore were supposed to 
complement, not contradict Marxism-Leninism, whose conception of society and social 
development and whose suppositions on international rel tions continued to form the 
foundations of how international relations were understood at the PAMaD and 
throughout the East German foreign policy apparatus. These expectations were not 
unfounded at a time when the expert element in foreign policy education remained of 
secondary importance and when international relations developments, when considered 
from the perspective of the GDR, could plausibly be se n as in agreement with the 
dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding of interational relations as defined by the 
“clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism. With time, however, these two 
poles of foreign policy training in the GDR, as theexpert element became more 
pronounced, would produce a lasting tension between ideology and specialist knowledge 
that would manifest itself directly in the output of East German foreign policy cadres. 
The efforts to improve foreign policy training at the end of the 1950s marked the start of 
this process, which then gained significant momentum in the course of the 1960s. 
 However, the immediate results of the 1959 resolution on foreign policy training, 
which had been prompted by the greater demand on the part of the MfAA and the APIV 
Division for qualified cadres as a result of the growth in the GDR’s foreign policy 
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activities, turned out mixed. An interim report, from mid-1960, highlighted some of the 
difficulties continuing to impede fulfillment of the resolution. While the resolution had 
designated that 70 new leading and mid-level foreign policy cadres were to be gained 
from other areas of the state and party apparatus, only 34 suitable individuals (plus 12 for 
lower-level positions) had been hired by this point.63 This unsatisfactory result, however, 
was not so much due to a shortage of individuals put forward by other state and party 
organs (134)64 as the large number that were rejected by the MfAA as unfit (70, with 12 
recommendations still being processed as the report was completed).65 The reasons 
named as most important for the rejections were “a) inadequate prerequisites for 
employment in the area of foreign policy; b) inadequate physical condition and/or too 
old; c) the unwillingness of the comrades who had been recommended to take on 
employment at the MfAA for familial reasons or issue  relating to their living situation; 
d) unrealistic recommendations.”66 In light of the large number of unsuitable candidates, 
the report came to the determination that “the tendency prevailed to recommend 
comrades who would not be difficult to replace.”67 By the end of the year, a total of 41 
leading and mid-level cadres had been hired while five had already left the MfAA in that 
time.68 In contrast to the cadre situation at the MfAA, the report related, the APIV 
Division, which with approximately 35 employees was significantly smaller than the 
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MfAA, had an easier time finding and keeping qualified cadres, five of whom had been 
hired in the time period covered by the report.69 
 Outside of the framework of the 1959 resolution, the Secretariat in May 1961 
approved the formation of a brigade to inspect conditions at the MfAA and to issue a 
report on leadership, the cadre situation, and party-educational (parteierzieherisch) work 
at the ministry. The report offered piercing insight into the situation at the MfAA, 
particularly in respect to cadres’ conformity to political and ideological requirements, at a 
time when the efforts of both the ministry and the APIV Division to meet the goals set 
forth in the cadre resolution were proceeding at full steam. The report of the four-person 
brigade, which with one exception only included indivi uals working outside the MfAA70 
and which based its findings on discussions with the ministry’s employees and evaluation 
of meeting protocols and other written materials, came to a rather positive assessment of 
the overall political-ideological situation at the MfAA, noting that “taken on the whole, 
the work of the ministry in the last few years has clearly become more qualified and more 
active” and that “the [MfAA] has at its disposal numerous qualified cadres. Many of 
them are comrades who possess much party and life experi nce and who came to foreign 
policy work after working in other areas. The majority of employees, however, consists 
of young cadres of the next generation who were trained at institutions of higher 
education, particularly [the PAMaD], and who posses relatively good specialist 
knowledge (Fachkenntnisse) and general knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, yet still have 
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a certain Wieland, deputy head of the Central Committee’s Division for Cadre Questions, a certain Palm, 
Second Secretary of the district direction Mitte, and  certain Demel, secretary of the MfAA’s party 
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little party and life experience.”71 As these comments indicated, thorough familiarity with 
Marxism-Leninism and possession of specialist knowledge, which was reported to have 
improved, did not alone make up the desired profile f East German foreign policy 
cadres; theoretical qualification was to be put into practice effectively, but also in a 
manner that matched the SED’s politically and ideologically colored expectations for 
cadres’ work on an everyday level. 
 And it was precisely in the field of practical activity that the MfAA’s young 
cadres were failing to live up to expectations. Thebrigade’s report discussed just what 
these shortcomings consisted in: “A general underestimation of questions relating to the 
domestic development of the GDR,” which prevented MfAA employees from 
“contributing through foreign policy to the solution f domestic policy objectives;” a 
widespread “liberal attitude toward [the implementation of] resolutions;” manifestations 
of “petite-bourgeois behavior,” including “arrogance among many young employees of 
the ministry,” “garrulousness and pompousness,” which represented a serious security 
risk; “a striving for material benefit, particularly while on assignment abroad;” and “the 
continual and often one-sided study of materials from the West,” which “often leads to 
manifestations of bourgeois objectivism” and “the us  of Western terms in place of a 
clear Marxist-Leninist assessment.”72 Moreover, the report continued, “such serious 
deficiencies in the political-ideological situation a d inadequate educational work 
(Erziehungsarbeit) are also manifested in the fact that 22 party [disciplinary] proceedings 
were conducted between April 1960 and the present [Ju e 1961].”73 Based on the 
criticism contained in the brigade’s report, the lead rship of the MfAA initiated a series 
                                                 




of far-reaching measures to remedy the situation, which in turn made up a significant part 
of the ministry’s efforts to meet the goals laid out in the 1959 cadre resolution. As the 
report demonstrated, the GDR’s young foreign policy cadres still had a ways to go to 
translate the theoretical training provided at the PAMaD into a form of practical foreign 
policy work that was entirely in line with the political and ideological requirements of the 
SED, fully integrated into a smoothly functioning, dictatorially controlled East German 
foreign policy apparatus, and working single-mindedly toward fulfillment of the foreign 
policy goals set by the SED leadership. 
The final report on implementation of the measures contained in the 1959 foreign 
policy cadre resolution was presented to the Secretariat in July 1962.74 The report, which 
actually consisted of two separate reports, one completed by the APIV Division and one 
by the MfAA, revealed that the initiative succeeded in alleviating the two most pressing 
issues facing the East German foreign policy apparatus—an acute shortage of qualified 
cadres and a lack of basic qualifications among existing cadres. While making clear the 
importance of the very different role and size of each institution, the reports portrayed the 
respective cadre situations as having significantly improved since the original resolution 
had been passed three years prior. Serious progress had been made in the number of 
vacant positions, though more so in the APIV Division, which with 32 political 
functionaries was fully staffed, than the MfAA, whic  with approximately 500 
employees (not including cleaning staff, drivers, etc.) had come closer to filling all its 
vacant positions, but still fell short of this goal, with the staffing of high-ranking positions 
in North Korea, Syria, Iraq, Indonesia, Ceylon, Mali, Cambodia, and Guinea particularly 
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problematic.75 The MfAA reported success in its efforts to gain exp rienced cadres from 
other areas of the state and party apparatus to fill leading and mid-level positions, hiring 
102 in all, 24 of whom had left the ministry in the meantime.76 “However,” the report 
continued, repeating nearly word-for-word one of the points of criticism from the 
assessment of the brigade commissioned by the Secretariat in 1961, “the majority of 
employees are young cadres of the next generation wh  were trained at institutions of 
higher education, particularly in Babelsberg [at the PAMaD] or Moscow [the Institute for 
International Relations]” and who “possess relatively good specialist knowledge and 
general knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, yet still have little party and life experience.”77 
Despite this, both the MfAA and the APIV Division reported significant improvement in 
the area of qualifications in general while simultaneously highlighting shortcomings in 
specific areas. The report of the APIV Division affirmed that “the political and expert 
knowledge of our employees is with few exceptions good” (graduates of the Institute for 
International Relations in Moscow were particularly praised), while knowledge of 
economics among the division’s employees as well as tho e of the MfAA was 
characterized as insufficient. While the MfAA report n the question of qualifications did 
not extend its consideration much beyond basic issues, the desired specialization in the 
training of foreign policy cadres at the time of the report was lagging behind 
expectations. The comments of Klaus Willerding, head of the protocol division at the 
time and later deputy foreign minister of the MfAA, made this particularly clear: “In my 
opinion, we ought to be past the point where the development of our cadres is more or 
less left to spontaneity. In my opinion, it is essential to set for all employees of the 





ministry at least the geographical region where they ar  later supposed to work.”78 While 
the MfAA’s approach to cadre and educational work was reported to have become better, 
more systematic, and more effective, it was also rep rt d that “manifestations of petite-
bourgeois are still present in large numbers” (evidnced particularly by the fact that 16 
party disciplinary proceedings had been conducted since the brigade report of June 
1961).79 The reports of both institutions similarly attested o a shortage of cadres with 
significant experience abroad; the foreign language knowledge of the APIV Division’s 
employees, however, was exceptional, with 29 of the division’s 32 employees (91 
percent) proficient in at least one foreign language, including less-common languages 
like Danish, Chinese, and Norwegian, which stood in stark contrast to the situation at the 
MfAA, where “despite all efforts on the part of the ministry” only 21 percent of the 
ministry’s employees had passed a language proficiency test (the target figure for 1962 
had been 70 percent).80 Both institutions, furthermore, encountered difficulties in creating 
a cadre reserve, particularly the MfAA due to its sze and already strained personnel 
situation. Connected with this was the failure to carry out personnel exchanges in any 
significant measure between the MfAA and the APIV Division (a total of two individuals 
from the MfAA had been given an assignment in the division), principally because “the 
few comrades of the MfAA who are suitable for an assignment in the division cannot be 
released due to the constantly increasing demands on the ministry and, on the part of the 
division, cadres have not purposefully been prepared for foreign service in sufficient 
measure.”81 Personnel exchanges between the two institutions, however, would gradually 
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grow throughout the 1960s82 to become an established feature in the East German foreign 
policy apparatus, creating a close link between the institutions that ensured familiarity 
with one another’s work and facilitated greater operational coordination and, in turn, 
efficacy. 
  By mid-1962, when the measures enumerated in the 1959 foreign policy cadre 
resolution had been implemented, the MfAA and APIV Division had thus made serious 
headway in addressing the chief problem areas identified in the resolution. The APIV 
Division was fully staffed, the MfAA had moved closer to achieving this goal, and, while 
shortcomings in training remained (foreign language proficiency, knowledge of 
economics, extensive practical experience, geographic l specialization and deepening of 
expert knowledge), the basic qualifications of both institutions’ employees had improved 
significantly and extensive efforts to provide a more practice-bound program of foreign 
policy training at the PAMaD through establishment of a close connection between the 
prorectorate and the MfAA were underway. Furthermore, basic awareness of the “cadre 
problem” had been established, which facilitated continual efforts to rectify the problem 
along the lines established by the 1959-1962 initiative. Indeed, the MfAA’s 
Perspektivplan for cadres for the period 1965-1970 attested to sweeping progress in the 
cadre situation made since the late 1950s. The report, itself testament to increased 
awareness of the relevant issues and greater coordination to address them as numerous 
institutions contributed to its formulation, particularly the APK,83 showed considerable 
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advancement in every category highlighted in earlier eports. Quantitative progress had 
been made as the number of political functionaries employed at the MfAA had grown 
from 507 in mid-1963 to 572 (not including the approximately 338 persons employed in 
representations abroad).84 More importantly, significant progress had been made in the 
ideological-political and expert qualifications of the ministry’s employees:  
The cadres have become more mature in ideological-political terms. The work of the 
MfAA has become more qualified and politically more effective. The cadres possess 
greater party and life experience. They strive earnstly and successfully to carry out their 
responsibilities in accord with the directives of party and state. In general, they are well-
informed about our national policies. As a result of their qualifications, the political 
functionaries are for the most part able to depict the foreign policy of the GDR in 
conversations, gatherings, and forums. In the main, they correctly assess the domestic and 
foreign policy of the countries for which they are responsible and, based on their 
assessments, draw the correct conclusions for the foreign policy of the GDR.85 
The situation in respect to foreign language had also improved—66 percent of MfAA 
employees were now proficient in at least one foreign language, although the MfAA 
leadership still saw room for improvement, particularly in the area of active language use. 
The foreign policy cadre problem, however, had not been completely rectified. The 
MfAA’s overview tempered its positive depiction of the cadre situation by identifying 
several shortcomings: 
Despite the improvements that have been made in the political-ideological development 
of cadres, there are still weaknesses. The political functionaries, in general, possess good 
theoretical knowledge, yet sometimes they are unable to apply it correctly. In particular, 
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concrete conclusions for one’s own work or further course of action are not always drawn 
from analyses. Some employees of the [region- or country-based] divisions do not 
address unclear or false views on the GDR and its policies that exist in their respective 
areas of expertise…. Deficiencies also exist in compliance with and timely fulfillment of 
resolutions and tasks…. A considerable number of political functionaries, as a result of 
their relatively young age, do not yet possess sufficient party and life experience.”86 
Such shortcomings, however, were portrayed as relativ y minor given the overall 
amount of progress that had been achievement in the political-ideological and expert 
qualifications of foreign policy cadres. By the mid-1960s, the specific East German type 
of Außenpolitiker, who was professionally qualified in addition to being politically 
qualified, no longer existed only on paper but increasingly in reality as well. 
 Despite the general trend toward improvement in the cadre situation, in the first 
half of the 1960s the East German foreign policy apparatus, and with it foreign policy 
expertise, had only begun to emerge from the state of institutional dysfunction 
engendered by its haphazard development in the 1950s. Several deeper-lying, thornier 
thorny issues remained partially or fully unaddressed as attention was focused on 
resolving the immediate issues related to the twofold problem of a shortage of qualified 
foreign policy cadres and the unsatisfactory qualific tions of existing cadres. Central 
among these larger issues were: coordination between institutions, unambiguous 
delineation of institutional responsibilities, stand rdization of work routines, a clearly 
formulated and consequently applied conception of the functional purpose and goals of 
the foreign policy apparatus in general and foreign policy expertise in particular as well 
as a shortage of cadres with advanced qualifications and extensive practical experience. 
The attention given by the Politburo and the Secretariat to the state of foreign policy 
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training in the GDR clearly evinced the markedly greater significance attached to the 
state of the East German foreign policy foreign policy apparatus in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, but the steps taken so far represented above all a stop-gap solution, leaving 
central problems largely unaddressed and unresolved. Their rectification awaited further 
concentrated efforts on the part of the SED leadership to transform the East German 
foreign policy apparatus into a smoothly functioning, well-integrated network of 
institutions fully compliant with its political and i eological requirements and working 
toward the exclusive goal of fulfilling its centrally prescribed foreign policy goals. 
 
Rationalization and Operative Foreign Policy Institu ons 
The efforts to improve the foreign policy cadre situation in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
accordingly represented just one half of the ongoin transformation of the East German 
foreign policy apparatus to meet the new challenges st mming from the GDR’s more 
active foreign policy in the period in accord with the needs of the SED as ruling party; 
institutional expansion and rationalization represented the other. The uneven attention 
devoted to the development of the East German foreign policy apparatus in the 1950s 
meant that much work remained to be done to ensure the ffective, coordinated 
functioning of a network of institutions that were growing in both size and scope. The 
central features of this process were institutional differentiation, clarification of each 
institution’s profile and objectives, and standardization of work routines within and 
between different institutions, which, taken together, formed a the key aspects of the 
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continuing move toward greater professionalization and specialization in the 1960s 
carried out for the larger purpose of synchronization.87 
 The positions of the APIV and the MfAA as, respectively, the GDR’s main 
operative foreign policy organs of party and state became cemented in this period. The 
leading role of the APIV Division in the conduct, if not formulation, of SED foreign 
policy had already been established in the second half of the 1950s on the basis of its two 
main areas of responsibility: (1) the coordination of the actions of the state foreign policy 
apparatus by virtue of its position as highest party uthority on foreign policy and in its 
capacity as intermediary on foreign policy issues btween the Politburo and the 
Secretariat on the one hand and all other party and state organs on the other and (2) the 
maintenance of relations with other communist parties and movements. As the scope and 
intensity of the GDR’s foreign policy grew in the early 1960s, the institutional make-up 
of the APIV Division was refined to better reflect the changing reality of the GDR’s 
foreign relations and the resulting new, more complex challenges facing the division. In 
1960, the individual sectors comprising the division were re-named and their activities 
more clearly delineated: the Sector Socialist Abroad became the Sector Socialist 
Countries and Yugoslavia, the Sector Capitalist Abroad was renamed Sector Non-
socialist Countries and was sub-divided into the working groups Europe-America and 
Asia-Africa, and a special Working Group (Re-)emigration was added to the sector that 
handled the supervision of political visitors to the GDR and emigration.88 In the course of 
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the 1960s, the Sector Foreign Propaganda and Information, whose name had been 
changed to Sector Information and Foreign Propaganda in 1960, was gradually detached 
from the division. In 1963, in the wake of the VI Party Congress of the SED, the 
Politburo in 1963 passed a resolution creating two bodies dealing exclusively with 
foreign propaganda: an Arbeitsgruppe für Auslandsinformation (Working Group for 
Foreign Propaganda) attached to the Politburo’s Agitation Commission and a Beirat für 
Auslandsinformation (Advisory Board for Foreign Propaganda). The former took on the 
character of a standing body under the leadership of Werner Lamberz, supported by 
Deputy Director Ernst-Otto Schwabe,89 who was released from his position as director of 
the APIV Division’s own propaganda sector to take up this position; the latter had a 
coordinating and advisory role, periodically bringi together representatives of the 
relevant ministries and mass organizations dealing with foreign propaganda.90 The 
Working Group for Foreign Propaganda and the Advisory Board for Foreign Propaganda 
were to work in close cooperation with one another within the SED’s larger effort “to 
secure effective and uniform direction and coordination of foreign propaganda.”91 In 
March 1967, a fully independent Foreign Propaganda Division (Abteilung 
Auslandsinformation) under the leadership of Manfred F ist, who would head the 
division until 1989, was created within the Central Committee, supplanting the Working 
Group for Foreign Propaganda92 and marking the final step in the removal of 
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responsibility for foreign propaganda from the APIV Division and its transfer to a 
discrete foreign propaganda division of the Central Committee. This process was part and 
parcel of the ongoing delineation and refinement of the APIV Division’s work, 
refocusing its attention on its core objectives of maintaining relations with foreign 
communist parties and movements and, as highest party instance dealing exclusively with 
foreign policy, coordinating the actions of the state foreign policy apparatus, with direct 
responsibility for the creation and dissemination of foreign propaganda not fully fitting 
into either area. 
 As the streamlining process continued apace, the APIV Division filled all of its 
remaining vacant positions in the course of implementing the 1959 foreign policy cadre 
resolution, employing a total of 32 political functionaries in 1962.93 In mid-1963, the 
division was given back its pre-1953 name, Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen, or 
International Relations Division (IV Division), as it would remain designated for the 
remainder of the existence of the GDR. As head of the division, Peter Florin oversaw its 
growth and refinement until he was replaced in 1966 by Paul Markowski, shortly after 
which Florin became the GDR’s ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Markowski, born in 
1929, came from a working class family and rose quickly in the ranks of the GDR’s 
                                                                                                                                      
national liberation as well as our growing economic weight and our technical progress occasion more and 
more people in the world to grapple with our development and our point of view, our domestic and foreign 
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foreign policy apparatus after completing in 1953 one f the first courses of study in 
foreign policy at the DVA/IVB. He began working in the IV Division in 1953, heading 
the sector dealing with capitalist countries from 1956-1964 and serving as deputy head of 
the division from 1964 until replacing Florin in 1966.94 Markowski was the very 
embodiment of the new socialist foreign policy cadre esired by the SED who combined 
unswerving loyalty to the will of the party in practice and political-ideological 
commitment with specialist knowledge and professional competency. At the same time, 
Markowski also served as an example of the tension that existed between these two sets 
of characteristics, a tension that defied the presumptions of the party leadership on their 
compatibility. Markowski was widely viewed within the SED as a pragmatic thinker 
willing to challenge existing dogma and the rigidity of the party leadership’s prevailing 
understanding of foreign policy.95 Although this issue would become moot since 
Markowski died in a helicopter crash in Libya in 1978 together with Werner Lamberz—
the “two figures on whom many younger, open-minded, s nsitive functionaries of party 
and state pinned their hopes”96—the rise of a figure like Markowski to a leading position 
within the SED was emblematic of an important generational changing-of-the-guard that 
took place in the course of the 1960s and that made up a key component of the broader 
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process of professionalization and specialization reshaping the East German foreign 
policy apparatus at the time. 
 By the early 1960s, a generation of cadres began to e ter the East German foreign 
policy apparatus that had come of age and had been educated in the GDR. The 
socialization, life experiences, and formal training of this generation contrasted sharply 
with those of the Alt-Genossen (old comrades), who dominated the IV Division, the
MfAA, the PAMaD, and other East German foreign policy institutions when members of 
the younger generation began their careers. The near-complete absence of a middle 
stratum of foreign policy cadres only served to highlight the differences between the two 
groups. The old comrades were battle-hardened communists, many of who had been 
members of the KPD since the 1920s and who had cut their teeth in the fierce political 
battles of the Weimar and Nazi periods. The Stalinist proclivities of many of the old 
comrades, furthermore, were oftentimes unmistakable, s a member of the younger 
generation has noted: “For them, it was incontrovertibl  fact: the task of the party 
apparatus was implementing the line decided upon by the party leadership without protest 
and with full force, supervising its realization in their designated areas of responsibility, 
and identifying problems that might occur in ‘the appropriate form.’”97 The political and 
ideological credentials of the older generation were correspondingly beyond reproach, 
but the vast majority lacked formal training in foreign policy aside from perhaps a brief, 
hurried course of study at the DVA/IVB. The stark contrast between the two generational 
cohorts—as well as the sometimes-thorny issues associ ted with it—did not go unnoticed 
by East German authorities. A Council of Ministers re olution on foreign policy cadres 
commented: “The main problem in cadre development co sists in creating a healthy 
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relationship between old cadres who have proven themselves in the class struggle (even if 
for the time being they do not possess specialist knowledge to the necessary extent) and 
the young cadres who received their foreign policy training in our state.”98 In a period of 
foreign policy expansion that demanded greater professionalization and specialization 
such as the GDR was experiencing at the time, the shortcomings of the generation of old 
comrades were patent—the difficulties of the IV Division and the MfAA in finding 
individuals who had intimate knowledge of a given rgion, who spoke the language(s) of 
that region, and who could draw on substantial experience abroad were unmistakable. 
The generation of young cadres, in contrast, was much better equipped to meet the task at 
hand since the majority had undergone a thorough and increasingly standardized and 
specialized course of training at the IVB/PAMaD specifically designed to prepare them 
for employment in one of the institutions of the East German foreign policy apparatus. 
While the orientation toward specialization and professionalization was more pronounced 
among these young cadres, this did not necessarily entail a lessening in the importance of 
basic political-ideological subordination—acceptance of the “leading role of the party” in 
the SED state retained its centrality and the young cadres were typically “schooled” by 
the old comrades on how things were done.99 Most cadres of the younger generation, 
moreover, had spent their formative years in the GDR and correspondingly viewed the 
existence of a separate, socialist East German state as a given, a trait which would 
facilitate the fusion of Marxist-Leninist tents with hardnosed pragmatic concerns that 
demanded specialist knowledge and professional competency. In the context of the 
expansion of the East German foreign policy apparatus in the 1960s, these young cadres 
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entered the foreign policy apparatus of the GDR in increasing numbers and, given the 
absence of a large, mid-level age cohort of cadres, would rather quickly come 
numerically to dominate the East German foreign policy apparatus as older cadres retired 
or moved on to other positions. The result was the juv nescence of the GDR’s foreign 
policy apparatus, with the average age at the MfAA, for instance, dropping from 53 in 
1956-1958 to 49 by 1969.100 
 The advent of a younger generation of cadres repres nt d both a cause and an 
effect of the movement away from the most extreme forms of ideological distortion and 
rigid dogmatism and toward increasing professionalization and specialization in the East 
German foreign policy apparatus. This development was also closely tied up with broader 
trends in the GDR, particularly following introduction of the New Economic System of 
Planning and Management (NOS) at the VI Party Congress in 1963. The NOS 
represented an attempt to ramp up East Germany’s economic performance by granting 
greater autonomy to East German enterprises (e.g. in the acquisition of materials and 
credit, the setting of prices). And the NOS did in fact succeed in increasing labor 
productivity (by 7 percent in 1964, by 6 in 1965) and in raising the standard of living in 
the GDR.101 The NOS bespoke the pronounced pragmatic approach of the SED toward 
the economy in the 1960s as the party sought to make use of expertise and specialist 
knowledge while maintaining its political and ideological hegemony. Indeed, the NOS, 
which was predicated upon the notion of introducing material levers into the East 
German economy, was designed by Erich Apel and Günter Mittag,102 young economists 
who better fit the mold of specialists than ideologues, representing as it were economic 
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counterparts to the new generation of specialist foreign policy cadres. The tension 
between economic efficiency and maintenance of the SED’s hegemony was finally 
resolved, in what would eventually prove to be a Pyrrhic victory, in favor of the 
entrenched party apparatus with the re-establishment of full state control over the 
economy by the early 1970s.103 “Eastern Europe leaders feared that moving further down 
the path of economic liberalization and decentralization could undermine political 
control,” as Barry Eichengreen has put it.104 The NOS nevertheless clearly highlighted 
the SED’s increasing cognizance of the need to strike a balance between political and 
ideological rigidity on the one hand and specialist knowledge and professional 
competency on the other for the sake of effective rul  in East Germany. The trend was 
present throughout the GDR in the early 1960s, as Heike Amos has noted: “Younger 
functionaries—academics, scientists, engineers, economists—increasingly moved up into 
leading SED bodies alongsidge long-serving apparatchiks…. With this new cadre policy, 
a trend arose of making party policy in its entirety more fact-based by including more 
expertly trained specialists in the advisory and decision-making bodies of the SED.”105 
 The sharply increasing importance of professional expertise in the 1960s became 
manifest in the specific realm of the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus as a new generation 
of young cadres came onto the scene that seemed finally to match the profile of the 
“socialist foreign policy cadres” desired by the SED. They combined solid specialist 
training with unswerving loyalty to the GDR as the embodiment of socialism in Germany 
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in the context of the “clash of systems” between East and West. Professional competency 
was indeed a point of pride among East German foreign policy cadres, who believed the 
specialist training they received in the GDR was superior to the general foreign policy 
training West German foreign policy personnel received.106 This generational change 
among foreign policy cadres was even evident to some contemporary commentators. In 
1971, the West German Karl Wilhelm Fricke wrote: “The old comrade type who has 
rendered outstanding services to the party can today be found only rarely in the foreign 
service. Apparently, he is being recalled because he incapably represents the GDR and 
because he feels uncertain and overburdened.”107 And it was this young generation of 
cadres with this balance between “political” and professional qualifications that would 
leave their stamp on East German foreign policy expertise. Contrary to the expectations 
of the SED, however, the advent of this generation also marked the advent of the 
characteristic tension at the center of East German foreign policy expertise between 
specialization and expert knowledge on the one hand and strict adherence to 
unsophisticated Marxist-Leninist tenets on the other. As Fricke went on to note: “The 
dilemma [of the new type of cadre] appears to be that of many party and state 
functionaries—their dilemma is the contradiction between appearance and reality in the 
politics of the regime, a dilemma which constantly renews itself.”108 
 As this generational change gradually set in in the 1960s, it overlapped with 
important institutional changes in areas of the East German foreign policy apparatus that 
extended far beyond just the IV Division, the party’s most important foreign policy 
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organ. The work of the MfAA, as the most important state foreign policy organ in the 
GDR, was also streamlined and more clearly defined  order to match the needs of the 
SED as ruling party in a period of foreign policy growth. By the end of the 1950s, the 
structure of the MfAA had been transformed from its initial orientation toward the 
foreign office of the Weimar Republic to mirror the organization of the Soviet foreign 
ministry. As a result of the unique situation of divi ed Germany, however, one 
organizational peculiarity remained: the status of relations with West Germany, which 
still were not administered in the same way as relations with other foreign countries. 
Following one of the last extensive bouts of re-organization at the MfAA in 1959, 
however, an initiative was begun to “normalize” East Germany’s handling of relations 
with the FRG. A series of proposals on the issue were submitted to the Council of 
Ministers and the Politburo,109 culminating in a resolution of the Council of Ministers 
from April 1963 that charged the MfAA with responsibility for the maintenance of 
relations with West Germany as with any other sovereign foreign country: “The 
leadership of the MfAA is strictly to see to it tha relations with West Germany develop 
as relations between two sovereign states…. The leadership of the MfAA is to submit 
proposals on the struggle for normalization of relations between the two German states, 
continually to defend the sovereignty of the GDR against the attacks of the West German 
revanchists, and to advise other ministries and organs of state on their relations with West 
Germany and to coordinate their actions.”110 This organizational modification, several 
years in the making and coming two years after the construction of the Berlin Wall, 
signaled the GDR’s definitive abandonment of an “all-German” orientation in its 
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handling of relations with West Germany, which was now officially categorized as 
“Ausland,” or abroad. The rest of the 1960s witnessed what Jochen Staadt has 
characterized as “a policy of destruction of all-German identity.”111 
 Two other, less significant modifications to the organizational structure of the 
MfAA took place at the same time that, however, demonstrate the intensification of the 
process of specialization at the ministry and the increasing weight and prominence the 
ministry possessed as main actor responsible for the GDR’s expanding international 
relations: the creation of a division dealing exclusively with economic policy and the 
detachment of the individual culture sections from the ministry’s territorial divisions to 
form an independent division dedicated specifically to cultural policy.112 The structure of 
the MfAA was modified again in 1964 and 1966, but these bouts of re-organization, 
which did not radically alter existing structures, were focused above all on streamlining 
administration of the ministry: six deputy foreign ministers positions were created, with 
each responsible for one area into which several of the ministry’s divisions were grouped 
together,113 and a second secretary of state position (simultaneously a deputy position) 
was created.114 Günter Kohrt and Josef Hegen were named as secretaries of state in 1966, 
one year after Otto Winzer had replaced Lothar Bolz as foreign minister. With these 
changes, the MfAA brought to an end the multiple re-organizations that it had undergone 
since it had first been created: “At the conclusion of the MfAA’s consolidation phase in 
1958-1966, organizational and leadership structures had taken shape that largely matched 
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the demands on a modern, functional foreign policy apparatus within the GDR’s power 
structures and that in its basic structures hardly changed until 1989/90.”115 The MfAA 
was now well-positioned to fulfill its role as main state foreign policy organ and to work 
in concert with the other institutions of the dictatorially controlled East German foreign 
policy apparatus toward achievement of the GDR’s centrally determined foreign policy 
goals. 
 The MfAA naturally cooperated very closely with the IV Division, which 
maintained responsibility for directing and supervising the work of the ministry. 
Although the main focus of each institution’s operative work encompassed a discrete 
field of activities that in theory could remain distinct from one another (state foreign 
relations for the MfAA, foreign relations of the SED for the IV Division), the IV 
Division’s additional responsibility for coordinating the foreign policy apparatus of the 
GDR in its entirety (including the MfAA) created the likelihood of its involvement in 
foreign policy issues that went beyond its formal area of competency. This was not as 
much the case in the 1960s as in the 1970s, when the IV Division increasingly turned its 
attention to questions of state foreign policy following the massive growth in the GDR’s 
official international relations resulting from the GDR’s attainment of diplomatic 
recognition.116 Despite the potential for redundancies and ineffici n y created by this 
situation, the working relationship between the IV Division and the MfAA, the two most 
important foreign policy institutions of party and state, was attested to be “collegial and 
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professional,” which “guaranteed the successful day-to-day functioning of the foreign 
policy apparatus and of [the GDR’s] bilateral relations.”117 Two factors in particular 
allowed for this: “The fact that qualified specialists with experience abroad who valued 
the input and collaboration of experts worked [in the IV Division]” and “a relatively close 
personal connection” between cadres employed at the two institutions.118 Since 
exchanges of personnel between the two institutions t ok place on a fairly regular basic 
and many employees knew one another personally from studying together at the 
IVB/PAMaD or at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), 
“both partners knew how the respective other institution functioned and what was 
necessary to ensure the smoothest work flow possible.”119 
 Indeed, what was true for the working relationship between the MfAA and the IV 
Division also held true for the East German foreign policy apparatus more broadly. An 
effective working relationship between its various operative and training and research 
institutions was fostered by a common stock of foreign policy cadres, most of whom 
either were trained at the IVB/PAMaD or received a similar education at MGIMO. 
Further, exchanges of personnel in the 1960s were becoming an increasingly common 
phenomenon, not only between the MfAA and the IV Division, but between a majority of 
institutions within the East German foreign policy apparatus, particularly the MfAA and 
the IVB/PAMaD, which had already begun in the early 1950s. The ultimate guarantee for 
cooperation between East German foreign policy cadres, whose training was now 
becoming increasingly “expert,” was finally provided by the basic nature of SED rule, 
which demanded in its dictatorial administration of the foreign policy apparatus 
                                                 




uniformity both in political-ideological outlook and practical behavior. All component 
parts of the apparatus were utterly subordinated to a single goal: fulfillment of the GDR’s 
centrally dictated foreign policy goals. This unambiguous point of orientation formed the 
key element determining the place of foreign policy expertise within the broader foreign 
policy apparatus. Scientific foreign policy analysis was to be conducted not as a process 
of value-free scholarly inquiry, but in direct service of the GDR’s foreign policy goals 
and in line with the practical requirements and political-ideological goals of the SED. 
Accordingly, no clear distinction could be drawn betw en operative foreign policy and 
foreign policy expertise as practiced in the GDR; the two facets of foreign policy activity 
rather represented flip sides of the same coin, and the essential interconnectedness of 
these two facets was observable across the spectrum of East German foreign policy 
institutions, whether dealing primarily with operative foreign policy or with training and 
research. 
 This key fact was apparent in light of the responsibilities and activities of the 
other most important institutions populating the East German foreign policy apparatus. 
The Politburo’s Foreign Policy Commission (APK) repsented, alongside the IV 
Division, the other central organ within the party apparatus of the SED dealing 
exclusively with foreign policy. Unlike the IV Divis on, the responsibilities of the APK, a 
deliberative body, did not touch upon direct operative activity but were limited to 
coordination, control, and advisory functions, which t fulfilled in its periodic meetings 
(approximately every two to three weeks). As the 1950s gave way to the 1960s, the 
official responsibilities of the APK, which was typically convened anew following each 
party congress of the SED, diverged very little from those defined at the commission’s 
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creation in 1953. Its main tasks as delineated in 1957120 and 1963121 essentially 
duplicated those from 1953.122 The APK’s mission, confirmed by Politburo resolution in 
1967, provided clear definition of its role in what was becoming an increasingly complex 
and professional foreign policy apparatus: “[The APK] is to ensure the systematic 
coordination of the foreign relations of the German Democratic Republic in the realm of 
foreign policy, foreign economic relations, international scientific-technical cooperation 
as well as foreign relations in the areas of culture, science, and public health.”123 The 
nature of the commission’s relationship with other institutions of the foreign policy 
apparatus was also clarified: “[The APK] organizes the coordination of the foreign 
relations of the state organs and mass organizations [of the GDR], which continue to bear 
full responsibility for their activities in this area.”124 The APK, however, was not a 
standing body and could be rather eclectic in the issues with which it dealt. As a party 
institution dealing exclusively with foreign-policy related issues, it came in a clear 
second to the IV Division, and the APK’s influence, which could be considerable, was 
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included: “Oversight of the uniform and purposeful implementation of the resolutions of the Central 
Committee in the main areas of foreign relations; coordination of the long-term work plans of the state nd 
mass organizations in respect to foreign relations; continual assessment of the political and economic 
efficacy of the GDR’s cooperation with other states; creation of a system of qualified and rationally nd 
frugally organized scientific work that conforms to the political and economic needs of the GDR.” Ibid. 
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based as much on the weight of its individual members as on the formal competencies 
ascribed to it. 
 In terms of membership, the APK continued to be comp sed of leading figures 
drawn from both party and state institutions whose work involved foreign policy in some 
capacity. In accordance with the profile of the APK, its size consistently remained small, 
but fluctuated considerably over the years; the commission counted 15 members in 
1957,125 between 11 and 14 in 1958,126 10 in 1962,127 18 in 1963,128 12 in 1967,129 and 14 
in 1970.130 As for the leadership of the APK, Heinrich Rau, minister of Foreign Trade 
and Inner-German Trade and head of the commission from 1955, died in 1961 and was 
succeeded by Hermann Axen. Axen, born in 1916 to a Jewish family, had spent time in 
French emigration during the Nazi period before being interned in Auschwitz III and 
Buchenwald between 1942 and 1945. His subsequent rise in the ranks of the SED was 
rapid—interrupted only between 1953 and 1956 as a consequence of Axen’s support for 
Ulbricht’s opponents in the Politburo power struggles surrounding the “New Course” and 
the Uprising of June 17—culminating in his selection as the Central Committee’s 
                                                 
125 The 1957 incarnation of the APK included: Peter Florin, head of the IV Division (and secretary of the
commission); Otto Winzer, deputy foreign minister and future foreign minister; Georg Handke, member of 
the Central Revision Commission of the SED and later pr sident of the Society for German-Soviet 
Friendship; Gerhard Weiss, deputy minister of Foreign Trade and Inner-German Trade; and Paul Wandel, 
future GDR ambassador to China. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/20/1. The 1957 composition and 
responsibilities of the APK were confirmed by Politburo resolution in March of that year. SAPMO-BArch, 
DY 30/J IV 2/2A/558. 
126 The Politburo resolution on the composition of the APK contained multiple versions of persons 
proposed for membership in the commission, but did not indicate which variant was finally confirmed. 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/643. 
127 The number of members was reduced in the course of “improving the political efficacy of the 
commission by accordingly adjusting its qualitative composition.” SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/870. 
128 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/946. 
129 The Politburo resolution confirming the composition f the APK stipulates that the commission was to 
be completed by “a comrade, who deals with question of economic cooperation with the socialist 
countries,” which would have brought the total number of members to 13. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 
2/2A/1230. 
130 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.115/11. 
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secretary for international relations in 1966 after taking over direction of the APK in 
1962. Axen would remain a foreign policy fixture within the SED for the remainder of 
the GDR’s existence, even gaining the informal title of “foreign minister of the party.” 
Unlike many other leading SED figures, Axen was not only solidly educated but also 
possessed a certain cultural refinement; as a result of his time spent in French emigration, 
he even spoke fluent French. However, in contrast to a figure like Paul Markowski, the 
head of the IV Division who was known for his independent streak, Axen, like many 
SED members whose formative years had been spent in Weimar and Nazi Germany, 
placed highest priority on conformity with the existing party line.131 Manfred Uschner, 
Axen’s personal assistant from 1976 to 1989, reveals that his boss was also sometimes 
referred to with a nickname much less flattering than foreign minister of the party: 
Kugelblitz (lightning bolt) for the speed with which he would obsequiously scurry into 
the office of Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the SED from 1971-1989, whenever 
summoned.132 
 The subordinate role of the APK as primarily an advisory and coordinating, not a 
policy-making, body received formalization of sorts in a 1963 Politburo resolution 
stipulating that Axen was “to coordinate [problems to be discussed in the commission] 
with the First Secretary of the SED [i.e. Ulbricht].”133 True to its profile, the APK in the 
course of 1960s dealt with a broad range of issues pertaining to the foreign policy of the 
GDR, usually falling into one of three categories: analysis of issues of fundamental 
strategic and tactical importance; longer-term prognoses on the development of specific 
                                                 
131 The title of Axen’s 1996 autobiography, written in collaboration with Harald Neubert, is illuminating in 
this regard: Ich war ein Diener der Partei (I was a servant of the party) (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1996). 
132 Uschner, Die zweite Etage, 53. 
133 Amos, Politik und Organisation der SED-Zentrale 1949-1963, 07n245. 
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countries or regions; and questions relating to the internal functioning of the foreign 
policy apparatus.134 In a 1969 self-assessment, the APK, while noting some token 
shortcomings, presented a largely positive estimation of its work: “The exhaustive 
consultations of [the APK] have made a constructive contribution to the development and 
formation of the socialist foreign policy of our republic and to closer coordination of 
actions in the most important areas of the GDR’s foreign relations. The large majority of 
the proposals handled in the commission became resolutions of the Politburo, the 
Secretariat, and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers or informational materials for 
these bodies.”135 The influence of the APK on the formation of foreign policy is generally 
believed to have receded with time, particularly in the later 1970s and 1980s, when 
decision-making authority became ever more concentrated in the hands of an increasingly 
small number of individuals,136 but the question of the commission’s influence on foreign 
policy decision-making at the highest levels is of econdary importance when approached 
from the perspective of foreign policy expertise in the GDR since, until the final 
dissolution of the GDR in 1989/1990, the APK would remain a key body composed of 
leading figures drawn from the most important party nd state foreign policy institutions 
that continually commissioned and drew on expertise in fulfilling its duties within the 
East German foreign policy apparatus. 
                                                 
134 For the biannual work plans of the APK from 1962 to 1970, see SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.115/17. 
The APK’s work plans appear to have been created in particularly close cooperation with the IV Division. 
See SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/6. 
135 The contributions of the APK highlighted in the report include: conceptualization (Konzeption) of the 
foreign policy tasks of the GDR after the VII Party Congress of the GDR; assessment of the situation in the 
Middle East and foreign policy measures of the GDR; assessment of the international situation and the 
central foreign policy tasks of the GDR in 1968; foreign policy activities toward the “fraternal states”; 
development of relations with Cuba; creation of the socialist foreign policy weekly newspaper Horizont; 
foreign policy teaching and research; conceptualization of the development of relations with the states of 
Northern Europe; conceptualization of the development of relations with the countries of Latin America, 
South and South-East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.115/10.  
136 See, for instance, Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 60-61; Wentker, Außenpolitik, 192-193. 
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Conclusion 
At the end of the 1950s, the development of foreign policy expertise in East Germany 
took a sharp turn. Following a decade of relative neglect, which had resulted in a foreign 
policy apparatus and attendant expert institutions marred by ineffectual leadership and 
deficient coordination, unclear delineation of responsibilities and overlapping 
competencies, a shortage of material resources, an acute lack of qualified personnel, and 
the inability to produce analysis of any real value, th  SED shifted the focus of its 
attention toward addressing the problems its disinterest had created. Prompted by the 
partial stabilization of party and state and the growth of the GDR’s foreign relations 
activities at the end of the 1950s and the start of the 1960s, the party set about creating a 
foreign policy apparatus tailored to meet its needs as ruling party. The demands of the 
MfAA and the IV Division, the GDR’s most important state and party organs of foreign 
policy, brought about a new emphasis on specialization and professionalization. As the 
two institutions grappled with the new practical challenges stemming from increased 
foreign policy activity, it became clear that they r quired cadres who were not only 
“politically qualified” (i.e. schooled in Marxism-Leninism and loyal beyond question to 
the SED) but also professionally qualified (i.e. in possession of specialist knowledge and 
professional competency). As the East German foreign policy apparatus was modified to 
accommodate the growing importance of professional qu ification, political-ideological 
subordination, whose dominance within the East German foreign policy apparatus had 
been absolute for most of the 1950s, did not experience a corresponding drop in 
importance; rather, the greater fachlich (expert) orientation was supposed to complement 
and increase the effectiveness of Marxism-Leninism, which provided the basic 
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framework within which foreign policy was understood. The highest echelons of the 
SED, moreover, were now acutely aware of the need to increase the expert orientation 
within the foreign policy apparatus and throughout the GDR in order to guarantee 
maximal utility and efficacy. The Politburo and the S cretariat as well as the APK, 
accordingly, were intimately involved in the formulation and implementation of measures 
aimed at satisfying the demands of the MfAA and the IV Division for professionally 
trained cadres. 
 The success of such measures was greatly facilitated by the advent of a young 
generation of individuals who provided the ideal human material with which to create a 
new type of foreign policy cadre. The “old comrades,” battle-hardened communists who 
occupied the leading positions within the East German foreign policy apparatus, 
possessed political and ideological credentials that were beyond reproach, but were not 
foreign policy specialists by any stretch of the imagination, possible participation in a 
brief crash course in foreign policy at the DVA/IVB notwithstanding. The members of 
the young generation, in contrast, could successfully combine acknowledgement of “the 
leading role of the party,” which remained indispensable, with the new emphasis on 
specialist knowledge and professional competency as they underwent a thorough and 
increasingly standardized and specialized course of training at the IVB/PAMaD, now 
specifically designed to meet the expectations of the MfAA and the IV Division. The 
advent of this young generation of foreign policy cadres in the 1960s would prove 
immensely important since, given the lack of a substantial middle stratum, they and the 
characteristic fusion of Marxist-Leninist tenets with hardnosed, specialist-based concern 
 197
with practical foreign policy issues they embodied would shortly come to define East 
German foreign policy expertise. 
 The new emphasis on specialization and professionalization in the training of 
cadres was mirrored in the broader process of streamlining the East German foreign 
policy apparatus. Starting in the late 1950s and continuing throughout the 1960s, a 
concerted effort was made to ensure the effective, coordinated functioning of the MfAA 
and the IV Division as well as the APK. Institutional differentiation, clarification of each 
institution’s profile and objectives, and standardization of work routines within and 
between different institutions were the central features of this process and their combined 
impact established the permanent importance of specialist knowledge and professional 
competency in the East German foreign policy apparatus. As a result of the streamlining 
process, by the end of the 1960s a well-organized, ncreasingly professional, and 
efficiently functioning foreign policy apparatus—along with the attendant expert 
institutions—had supplanted the hastily created patchwork of institutions arbitrarily 
reacting to momentary exigencies and lacking thoroughgoing coordination that had taken 
shape in the 1950s. 
 Both the streamlining of the East German foreign policy apparatus and the 
“expertification” of foreign policy training, howevr, were implemented with a single 
goal in mind: synchronization with the practical goals and political-ideological 
requirements of the SED. Rationalization from above largely overcame the existing 
underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy apparatus, but did so exclusively to 
facilitate the removal of all traces of political and intellectual autonomy. The 
rationalization-cum-synchronization of East German foreign policy expertise was not 
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total—the institutional completion of expertise would only come in the 1970s—but the 
East German foreign policy apparatus would never again undergo such a radical 
transformation. Yet the process of rationalization in service of synchronization would 
also have an unforeseen effect: it laid the groundwork for the dynamic of permanent 
tension in foreign policy expertise between ideology and specialist knowledge, between 
intellectual subordination and intellectual autonomy. In the prevailing conditions of 
diplomatic isolation, the tension would largely lie dormant as minimal engagement with 
the world outside the Soviet Bloc would foster insularity and ideological dogmatism, but 
foreign policy normalization would eventually revers  this dynamic. In the meantime, 
however, rationalization-cum-synchronization would bear fruit. The emergence of expert 
analysis of international relations as a discrete ac ivity within the East German foreign 
policy apparatus would in turn engender experts’ enunciation of a comprehensive 
conception of international relations based upon fusion of the GDR’s specific foreign 












Starting at the end of the 1950s, the SED squarely directed its attention at re-shaping East 
Germany’s haphazardly organized and poorly coordinated foreign policy apparatus to 
meet its specific needs as dictatorially ruling party of the GDR. As institutions like the 
MfAA, IV Division, and APK underwent consolidation and streamlining, East German 
foreign policy expertise began to take on concrete shape as analysis of international 
relations became a discrete field of activity within the broader foreign policy apparatus. 
Yet analytical activity did not gain in importance only at operative institutions like the 
MfAA and IV Division; it also became a primary task of what could now be identified as 
analysis-producing institutions. These were the German Economic Institute (DWI) and 
the German Institute for Contemporary History (DIZ) as well as the Prorectorate for the 
Training of Leading Foreign Service Employees (PAMaD), which added research 
responsibilities to its mission as the training of foreign policy cadres at the prorectorate 
became consolidated and regularized. 
 The growth of these three institutions to become res arch centers devoted to 
international relations issues was driven by the same process of rationalization in service 
of synchronization as the contemporaneous transformation of the MfAA, the IV Division, 
and the APK. At the DWI, the DIZ, and the PAMaD, the process would encounter a 
surprising number of obstacles, ranging from direct opposition to foot-dragging, from 
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institutional inertia to simple inability. The considerable turbulence which occasionally 
accompanied rationalization-cum-synchronization of the GDR’s emergent analysis-
producing institutions was emblematic of the scope f the changes envisioned by the 
SED, aspiring at nothing less than the complete elimination of political and ideological 
autonomy. Despite a number of false starts and setbacks, the efforts were ultimately 
successful, even if not complete—the process would n y be capped off in the 1970s. All 
semblances of autonomy were eliminated and subordination to the practical needs and 
political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership became the defining 
characteristic of East German foreign policy expertis . Subordination, however, 
contained a certain ambiguity since it required compliance with the party line at all times 
and the application of Marxism-Leninism as the theoretical foundation of expertise but it 
also demanded analysis conducted on the basis of specialist knowledge and professional 
competency in order to provide the party leadership with valuable information that could 
fruitfully be used in the formulation of foreign policy. At the GDR’s emergent analysis-
producing institutions, autonomy, which had entailed a degree of opposition to the vision 
of the SED, was replaced by the melding of political- deological and professional criteria, 
which, however, entailed tension within the vision of the SED. 
 With the institutional underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus essentially a thing of the past and with expert analysis of international relations 
established as a discrete field of activity on the basis of successful rationalization-cum-
synchronization, glaring deficiencies in analytical output were also able to be overcome. 
Gone were the shrill ideological overstatement, baselessly optimistic prognoses inspired 
by Marxist-Leninist tenets, and a lack of reliable information and general knowledge 
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about the outside world characteristic of analytical output in the 1950s. In their place was 
more refined, penetrating analysis, which was testament to the new emphasis on 
specialist knowledge and professional competency. The basic Marxist-Leninist 
framework of expertise by no means disappeared—it actually became more thoroughly 
and firmly established as a result of the thoroughgoin  standardization of working 
procedures and clarification and refinement of the formal division of labor. The 
improvement of analytical quality in individual ares in turn permitted the articulation of 
a comprehensive conception of international relations within which the place and 
interests of the GDR were clearly identified and which could provide a cohesive 
framework for all analytical activity, something whic  had been conspicuously absent in 
the 1950s. The key geo-strategic features upon which t s conception would be built were 
already in place—national division in the context of he Cold War “clash of systems,” 
non-recognition from the West, acute dependency on the Soviet Union, pronounced 
reliance on the Soviet Bloc—but the prevailing institutional underdevelopment of the 
East German foreign policy apparatus had prevented them from being combined into a 
single, overarching GDR-specific conception of inter ational relations. However, within 
the context of the newly rationalized East German foreign policy apparatus, where expert 
analysis had become a discrete activity, the GDR’s foreign policy experts were now able 
to address this shortcoming and to construct a comprehensive conception based upon 
fusion of the GDR’s specific foreign policy interests with the dichotomous, class-based 
Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations. 
 
Rationalization and Synchronization at the GDR’s Emergent Research Institutions 
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At the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, the stat  of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus was a major concern to the SED leadership. After a decade of relative neglect, 
the SED set about re-shaping the apparatus to meet its concrete needs as ruling party of a 
state, which had achieved a degree of internal stability and whose international relations 
were growing significantly while still remaining restricted by the diplomatic isolation 
imposed by West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine. The process of consolidating and 
streamlining the foreign policy apparatus encompassed operative institutions like the 
MfAA and IV Division but also institutions like the DWI, DIZ, and PAMaD, which were 
on their way to becoming the GDR’s leading centers fo  research on international 
relations. The success of the process of rationalization in service of synchronization at 
these institutions would establish foreign policy analysis as a discrete field of activity 
within the East German foreign policy apparatus and in doing so would mark the 
emergence of East German foreign policy expertise as such. Yet, while ultimately 
successful, the process of rationalization-cum-synchronization at the GDR’s emergent 
expert institutions, since it entailed the eliminaton of all traces of political and 
intellectual autonomy, was accompanied by a considerabl  amount of turbulence as the 
SED imposed its vision of the role and function of expertise. 
 The process played out in most turbulent fashion at the German Economic 
Institute (DWI). In the 1960s, the DWI continued to orient its work around the central 
task it had been given at its creation in 1949—propagation of a parteilich (partisan) 
perspective on economics issues externally and provision of information internally, with 
a Marxist-Leninist interpretative framework providing the common foundation for both 
activities. The DWI occupied a peculiar position in the East German expert landscape 
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since, of all the institutions dealing with foreign policy-related issues, its work was easily 
the most “wissenschaftlich” by virtue of the fact that it dealt primarily with economic 
questions. The DWI-Berichte (DWI-Reports), published biweekly,1 continued to 
represent the institute’s main vehicle for fulfillment of its external propagandistic 
function. The reports even enjoyed an amount of esteem in West Germany and other non-
communist countries for its thorough treatment of economic issues, which was often 
supported by detailed statistical analysis.2 In terms of its internal, informational role, the 
DWI’s status within the East German party and state apparatus as the final authority on 
economic issues was cemented in the first half of the 1960s. The institute maintained and 
expanded its position as a clearinghouse for economic data, processing requests from 
various state and party institutions for information on a given issue and receiving reports 
from other institutions, which it would in turn incorporate into its own work. The DWI 
worked with a range of East German institutions, but its main partners were the State 
Planning Commission, the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Inner-German Trade, and the 
MfAA. The scope of its research grew to include studies on the foreign trade of West 
Germany with communist states, trade agreements among developing countries, 
industrial production in capitalist countries, the causes and effects of inflationary 
tendencies in the member-states of the European Ecoomic Community, the activities of 
West German monopolies abroad as well as a host of other topics.3 While the work of the 
DWI did not deal exclusively with West Germany, theFRG nevertheless remained at the 
center of the DWI’s attention, manifested for instace in the clear emphasis on West 
                                                 
1 At the end of the 1950s, the average print run was 4,500 copies. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A 677. 
2 Indeed, the reputation of the journal outside the borders of the GDR was a major concern at the DWI, 
where statements on the DWI-Berichte in the West German press were fastidiously tracked. BArch, DC 
202/15. 
3 See, for example, BArch, DC 202/4 and 5. 
 204
Germany in the DWI-Berichte and in regular publication of internal reports on the FRG’s 
economic indicators. 
 The interconnected process of institutional rationalization and political and 
ideological Gleichschaltung à la SED played out at the DWI in extremely tumultuous 
fashion, claiming a number of casualties, including Director Siegbert Kahn, and nearly 
resulting in the very dissolution of the institute. The same rationale that applied to all the 
other institutions of the East German foreign policy apparatus also applied to the DWI: 
the institute was to comply with the political-ideological requirements set for it by the 
SED leadership in the context of fulfilling its designated objective within the GDR’s 
dictatorially administered foreign policy apparatus. However, the DWI’s focus on 
economics as well as employees’ access to otherwise forbidden material from the West 
meant that the “wissenschaftlich” aspect of its work could potentially detract from the 
institute’s central mission of producing Marxist-Leninist analysis keyed to the needs of 
the SED leadership. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the SED focused its 
attention on creating a well-coordinated and effectiv  foreign policy apparatus in line 
with its “leading role” in East Germany following the relative neglect of this area in the 
1950s, efforts on the part of the party aimed at the complete subordination of the DWI 
repeatedly clashed with the institute’s own efforts to maintain a degree of operational and 
intellectual autonomy. 
 The first instance of conflict flared up following a January 1959 resolution of the 
Politburo. The resolution attested that “the leadership of [the DWI] has succeeded in 
creating a collective of scientific employees who possess good knowledge of economic 
developments in West Germany and in the capitalist camp,” but simultaneously 
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demanded that the DWI play a more constructive, active role in fulfilling the 
superordinate political-ideological goals of the SED: “The main task of [the DWI] 
consists in continually analyzing and depicting the economic development of West 
Germany and thus providing through its scientific work effective aid to the party in its 
struggle against re-emergent German imperialism. The scientific work of [the DWI], 
however, has to be made more thoroughly subordinate to the resolutions of the party and 
the current demands of the class struggle. The DWI-Berichte must do a better job of 
exposing and refuting the class enemy. Marxist-Leninist theory has to provide the basis 
for this process in a more pronounced and sounder manner than has been the case thus 
far.”4 In order to combat these “apolitical” and “objectivistic” tendencies, the Central 
Committee’s Sciences Division, replaced the All-German Questions Division, as the 
party organ responsible for the DWI and was instructed to take an active role in ensuring 
the institute’s work complied with the vision laid out in the Politburo resolution. 
 The Sciences Division in turn dispatched a five-memb r brigade led by Karl 
Kampfert, first deputy director and subsequently rector of the Labor Union Academy 
“Fritz Heckert,” to the DWI in July 1959 to get a clearer picture of the situation at the 
institute. The brigade’s report, completed on the basis of personal interviews with 
employees of the DWI and examination of its output, was submitted in final form to the 
Secretariat in April 19605 and presented a damning account of conditions at the institute 
and of the leadership of Director Siegbert Kahn and Deputy Director Willi Kling. Not 
without mentioning the accomplishments of the DWI (e.g. “The scientific employees 
have developed into solid specialists on the various areas of the economic development 
                                                 
4 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A 677. 
5 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3/J/150. 
 206
of West Germany as well as the capitalist camp”6), the report nevertheless stressed the 
shortcomings discovered by the brigade. Chief among these was the DWI’s failure to 
fulfill its central objective: Marxist-Leninist analysis of economic processes. The report 
described this failure as the result of an “unclear conception of the mission” of the 
institute, which created a propensity for simple compilation and presentation of data in an 
“objectivistic” manner.7 Closely connected with this was the existence of “an unhealthy, 
uncritical atmosphere bordering on liberalism.”8 “An essentially petit-bourgeois attitude 
toward critique and self-critique,” according to the report’s authors, was an impediment 
to bringing the institute’s employees into lockstep with the party line and led to 
“political-ideological vacillation.” Such “vacillation” was manifested in a particularly 
grievous case in the fall of 1956, when no oppositin was voiced to then-Party Secretary 
Kruß’s “false political line” toward the Hungarian Revolution. The DWI’s ability to 
fulfill its mission was likewise severely impaired by “inadequate knowledge of the 
fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism,” even among group leaders and other leading 
employees. According to the brigade’s report, the pernicious tendencies it described were 
reflected in the DWI’s output, which was criticized for ideological laxness and the 
inclusion of elements of “bourgeois” economics such as Keynesianism. These grievous 
political and ideological shortcomings were attributed to the fact that “the leading role of 
the party ha[d] not been established” at the DWI.9 More specifically and with ominous 
connotations for Director Kahn and Deputy Director Kling, the unacceptable situation at 
the DWI was attributed in large part to a failure of leadership: “Comrades Kahn and 
                                                 





Kling bear an essential portion of the responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs 
in party work. They are both old comrades with great party experience and the fact that 
they have not actively used this experience to improve the work of [the SED party 
organization at the DWI] and to rectify the situation has inhibited the development of [the 
party organization]. A large segment of the young comrades have understandably 
oriented themselves around Comrades Kahn and Kling and have often uncritically 
accepted their attitude.”10 
 The solution to these numerous and serious problems was sought in a series of 
far-reaching measures intended to bring the work of the DWI into line with the SED’s 
vision for the institute. The measures matched greate  standardization of procedures at 
the DWI with increased supervision by outside organs including but not limited to the 
Sciences Division. A new statute detailing the goals and structure of the DWI was to be 
drawn up and approved by the Sciences Division and the State Planning Commission; a 
long-term research plan (to be approved by the DWI’s Scientific Advisory Council and 
the Sciences Division) and a semi-annual work plan were likewise to be drawn up in 
order to create a more regularized work flow; the resolutions of the SED and the West 
German KPD (Communist Party of Germany) were to form the “key foundation” of the 
DWI’s work; the leadership of the DWI’s party organization was to draw up a plan to 
ensure the institute’s employees mastered the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism; the 
DWI-Berichte were to be assessed by outside specialists on a bi-annual basis; and, finally, 
the Sciences Division was to strengthen its direction of the DWI’s party organization.11 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. The information provided to the Secretariat by the Sciences Division noted that both the leadership 
of the DWI and the leadership of the DWI’s party organization had “acknowledged these conclusions as 
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 The Sciences Division, in collaboration with the party organization at the 
institute, accordingly kept a close eye on the DWI in the subsequent period in order to 
measure progress made toward remedying the unacceptbl  situation at the institute. At a 
consultation on 14 March 1961, one year after the Sci nces Division brigade had 
concluded its assignment, the party organization of the DWI, with Director Kahn and 
Deputy Director Kling also present, informed Johannes Hörnig, the head of the Sciences 
Division, that “no essential changes have been made in the work of the institute since the 
conclusion of the brigade’s investigation” and that “a decisive transformation of the work 
of [the DWI] can only be effected if fundamental changes to the institute’s leadership are 
made, if Comrades Kahn and Kling, who have shown themselves incapable of fulfilling 
the tasks that have been set, are discharged of their unctions at the DWI.”12 The very 
next day, Reinhold Kowalski, party secretary at the DWI, dispatched a letter that 
summarized the position of the party organization to the Sciences Division, the office of 
Walter Ulbricht, and the Central Party Control Commission, which was the highest party 
authority on cadre-related matters. Hörnig and the Sci nces Division supported the party 
organization’s initiative to remove Kahn and Kling—two separate resolutions to be 
submitted to the Secretariat for approval were drawn up, one in March, the other in 
June13—but Kurt Hager, a party grandee and head of the Politburo’s powerful Ideological 
Commission, intervened at the last minute and rescued Kahn and Kling’s heads from the 
chopping block.14 The intervention of Hager, whom Kahn had already contacted in late 
                                                                                                                                      
correct” in a consultation on the brigade’s report on 1 March 1960 with Kurt Hager, head of the Politburo’s 
Ideological Commission. 
12 Ibid. 
13 The March draft resolution even designated Kahn and Kling’s potential replacements: Heinz Mehrmann 
and Gerhard Hiller, respectively. Ibid. 
14 In a short note from 10 July 1961, Hager informed Hörnig of his opposition to removing Kahn and Kling 
from their posts, which signaled the initiative would not be passed by the Secretariat. Ibid. 
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1959 to voice his displeasure with the Sciences Division brigade’s intensified scrutiny of 
his leadership at the DWI, saved two fellow old comrades15 from certain removal, but 
also ran counter to the SED’s broader interests since it impeded the process of 
rationalization in service of synchronization at the DWI, leaving the DWI’s political-
ideological subordination incomplete and the issue unresolved. The unsurprising result 
was that another bout of even more serious conflict erupted at the DWI within a few short 
years. 
 The spark that re-ignited the latent conflict betwen the SED and the DWI was 
furnished by a party meeting at the DWI in early January 1965. Since the first bout of 
conflict had concluded with a stalemate in mid-1961, some changes in personnel at the 
DWI had been made. A second deputy director, Gerd Maurischat, had been brought in to 
exert greater influence on the leadership duo of Kahn nd Kling and a number of other 
individuals were also brought in, including a certain Hahn as party secretary, with the 
idea being that these new figures would be more amen bl  to the SED’s vision of a 
thoroughly politicized and ideologized institution. Ironically, these changes appear to 
have had the opposite effect since the SED in 1965 found itself battling against not only a 
recalcitrant leadership, as was the case in 1959-1961, but also a refractory group of rank-
and-file employees. At the party meeting in January 1965, DWI employee Helen Borges 
led an effort (characterized by its detractors at the DWI and the Sciences Division as an 
“organized action”) to submit to party authorities a letter critical of the party’s 
construction plans for East Berlin, particularly the Television Tower, whose construction 
                                                                                                                                      
Hermann Matern, the head of the powerful Central Party Control Commission with whom Kahn also 
maintained friendly relations, may have also played a role in blocking the initiative’s realization. 
15 Kahn and Kling were both longtime KPD/SED members and remained active and loyal to the party 
during the Nazi era, with Kling having spent six years interned at Sachsenhausen and Mauthausen. 
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had been approved in 1964 but had not yet begun at the time. This episode of outspoken 
criticism of party policy, which was accompanied by critical remarks directed at the 
person of party leaders, was seen as just the tip of a much larger iceberg. Testimony 
provided by DWI employees to the Sciences Division claimed that “some comrades at 
the DWI openly defame the policies of the party in fu damental questions and view them 
as false…. [T]he basic outlook of many comrades at the institute is markedly 
objectivistic,” and that “the party organization [at the institute] is ideologically 
contaminated.”16 The last claim was based in particular on the fact that the secretary of 
the SED party organization at the DWI, Hahn, was said to have openly supported critical 
attitudes toward the decisions and decision-making process of the party leadership. 
 The matter took on even greater explosiveness since Helen Borges, the leader of 
the critical letter-writing effort, was a close friend of Robert Havemann’s wife, who was 
also employed at the DWI but did not herself take part in the critical discussions under 
question. DWI employees who voiced criticism of theSED also expressed sympathy for 
Robert Havemann, whose contentious, public expulsion from the SED for his overly 
critical attitude toward the party just ten months prior remained a very sensitive issue.17 
These circumstances prompted the Sciences Division to view the situation at the DWI as 
parallel to the Havemann episode: “Apparently there exists at the DWI a similar political-
ideological situation as was earlier prevalent in the party organization in the chemistry 
department of Humboldt University [where Havemann had been active]; the discussions 
[at the DWI] display parallels to Havemann’s position and arguments.”18 To top things 
                                                 
16 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/197. 
17 Clemens Vollnhals, Der Fall Havemann. Ein Lehrstück politischer Justiz (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2000), 17-
18.  
18 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/197. 
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off, Siegbert Kahn as head of the institute was portrayed as complicit in the existence of 
open anti-party sentiment at the DWI: “Comrade Professor Kahn as institute director 
fulfills his duties as comrade and as institute head only insufficiently. Comrade Kahn is 
often not informed about the situation at the institute. He does not work together with the 
comrades and as an older and more experienced comrade hardly engages in educational 
work. The political-ideological leadership of the institute, which is especially necessary 
in light of the work of the DWI, evidently is not assured.”19 
 In a letter from 22 February 1965, Johannes Hörnig, head of the Sciences 
Division, informed Erich Honecker, Politburo member and future General Secretary of 
the SED, and Kurt Hager of the scope of the “great ideological carelessness” present at 
the DWI as well as the initial steps taken to remedy the situation.20 But significant 
movement on the issue only came with the formation of a nine-member working group 
comprised of members of the Sciences Division and the District Administration of East 
Berlin, which was charged with investigating the reasons for the “ideological 
backwardness of a number of comrades, their anti-party-oriented attitude toward the 
resolutions and policies of the SED, and their uncritical attitude toward their own work 
and the situation at the DWI.”21 The working group carried out approximately 20 
personal interviews with employees of the DWI and concluded its work on 20 May 1965. 
Its report seconded and greatly expanded upon the preliminary findings of the Sciences 
Division. The situation at the DWI was portrayed in no uncertain terms: “There has 
existed for years among many comrades of the German Eco omic Institute disbelief in 
the strength of the party, the workers, and socialism and many questions relating to the 





policies of the party have not been understood…. The resolutions of the party have not 
been taken as the starting point of [the institute’s] political-ideological and scientific 
work; the resolutions rather have been met with reservations and arrogance.”22 Failures 
on the part of the leadership of the party organization at the DWI as well as the leadership 
of the DWI itself were held responsible for what was, from the perspective of the SED, 
an entirely unacceptable situation. In an atmosphere where “great distrust toward the 
party leadership”23 existed, the leadership of the party organization at the institute “was 
not conscious of its responsibility for the political-ideological state of the DWI and 
engaged in essentially no party-oriented educational work,” which was deemed “not 
surprising since even many party members demonstrated a considerable lack of clarity 
and incorrect positions on the party and its resolutions.”24 The behavior of Hahn, who as 
head of the DWI’s party organization was supposed to be responsible for enforcing 
ensuring compliance with its will, went rather in the opposite direction, even moving 
beyond “liberal” interpretation of party resolutions and directives to an openly critical 
stance, as when he supported Helen Borges’s critical letter-writing action or criticized 
Havemann’s expulsion from the party. DWI Director Siegbert Kahn, who in 1961 had 
already been on the verge of being removed from his position, came in personally for 
heavy criticism in the working group’s report: 
Comrade Kahn was incapable of making use of the support of the party organization [at 
the DWI] and of cooperating with the party leadership in order to prepare the collective 
of scientists and other employees for their new, greater tasks. What is more, efforts in this 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 The working group’s report cites Helena Borges to provide one example of the widespread opposition at 
the DWI to the SED’s methods of democratic centralism: “Party members should be informed of every 
discussion in the Politburo so that each member gets a picture of individual members of the Politburo and 
can better determine who is worthy of being a member of the Politburo.” Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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direction that were undertaken by individual comrades were heeded insufficiently… 
Comrade Kahn also has not lived up to his responsibilities in the political-ideological 
leadership of the DWI’s employees, neither in his work as director nor as longtime 
member of the leadership of the party organization. He made too little use of his rich 
experiences in political work to bring about a change of course in the political life of the 
party organization and its leadership. He also did not become involved in the process of 
clarifying the political-ideological state of the party organization; instead, he asserted that 
he knew nothing of this weighty state of affairs, expressed his shock over the seriousness 
of the situation, and adopted a wait-and-see position. He still has not recognized that the 
direction of the institute bears a large portion of the guilt for the situation that has 
arisen.25 
Kahn’s shortcomings were thus understood more as sins of omission than commission, 
but were no less serious given the “objectivistic” and “anti-party” disposition of 
significant numbers of the DWI’s employees, including leading personnel in the SED 
party organization at the institute. 
 The working group’s conclusions were presented to employees of the DWI and 
subsequently rubber-stamped by the institute’s now-prostrate party organization on 17 
June 1965 in a declaration that attested to the “grat process of political and ideological 
clarification” underway at the DWI.26 Given the gravity of the situation and the lack of 
progress, if not regression, following the 1959-196 episode, responsible figures in the 
SED this time around would not be satisfied with halfhearted measures in order to correct 
the “completely unsatisfactory political-ideological state of affairs at the DWI.” One 
option under serious consideration was the dissolution of the DWI as an independent 
institute and its incorporation into another institution. Gerhard Schürer, deputy chairman 




and future head of the State Planning Commission (SPK), the organ responsible for 
coordination of the East German Economy, circulated  draft Secretariat resolution to 
Johannes Hörnig, Kurt Hager, Albert Norden, and Günter Mittag that envisaged the 
absorption of the DWI into the SPK’s Economic Research Institute.27 However, the final 
Secretariat resolution on the issue, passed 25 August 1965, preserved the DWI as an 
organizationally distinct institution, but introduced a set of sweeping changes.28 First off, 
a completely new leadership team was brought in to guarantee the “leading role of the 
party” at the DWI and to ensure that the institute’s work fully corresponded to the 
ideological presuppositions of the SED. Director Siegbert Kahn had already been given 
ample opportunity to right the ship so even his statu  s an old comrade could no longer 
prevent his dismissal. He was replaced by Lutz Maier,  36-year old economics specialist, 
who was joined by two deputy directors, Karl-Ernst Reuter and Alfred Lemnitz, Margot 
Honecker’s predecessor as minister of education. Gerd Maurischat, to whom remarks 
critical of the SED leadership were also attributed, was removed from his position as 
deputy director, which he had taken over to strengthen the role of the party at the DWI 
after the 1959-1961 episode, and was made scientific secretary to the direction of the 
institute and to a scientific council that was to be created. The Sciences Division of the 
Central Committee remained the party organ responsible for the DWI, but the State 
Secretariat for Higher Education replaced the State Planning Commission as the 
responsible state organ. 
 However, much more important than the issue of formal subordination was a 
fundamental overhauling of the mission of the DWI. hile the institute had previously 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1216. 
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concerned itself rather narrowly with economics, it designated objective now became 
“investigation and presentation of the development of state-monopoly capitalism in West 
Germany in its entirety [italics added].”29 The SED leadership took advantage of the 
opportunity for drastic change at the DWI afforded by the need to rectify its political and 
ideological deficiencies not only to bring the work of the institute into line with the 
demands of the party but also to alter the very profile f the institute in order to make its 
work of greater value to the party. The Secretariat resolution clearly expressed the role 
the SED expected the revamped DWI to play: “The main t sk of the DWI consists in 
analyzing on the basis of the current requirements of he class struggle the new problems 
and developmental tendencies of state-monopoly capitalism, particularly in West 
Germany, and in drawing theoretical conclusions from its analysis. It is necessary to 
unveil convincingly and to grapple with the essence, th  aggressive role in domestic and 
foreign policy, and the misanthropic policy and ideology of West German imperialism in 
the current stage and thereby effectively to aid the party in its struggle.”30 The DWI-
Berichte, which now were to appear monthly, remained the main publication produced by 
the institute for public consumption (alongside irrgularly appearing publications devoted 
to specific topics) while a wide range of topics in accord with the DWI’s overhauled 
profile were covered in the institute’s reports for internal use. 
 Another important innovation intended to ensure the predominance of Marxist-
Leninist analysis in the context of the institute’s new mission was the creation of a 
Scientific Council (Wissenschaftlicher Rat). The council was responsible for setting the 
general tone of research at the DWI and approving the institute’s long-term research 




plans as well as coordinating collaborative efforts between the DWI and other 
institutions. The inclusion in the Scientific Council of representatives from several 
outside institutions, including the Central Committee’s West Division, Sciences Division, 
and Propaganda Division,31 was intended to provide an extra guarantee for the Marxist-
Leninist character of research conducted at the DWI. The structure of the DWI was also 
overhauled in order to better correspond to the institute’s new, broader mission. Seven 
separate research groups were created, each devoted to a single theme: the capitalist 
world economy, capital and concentration of power, state-monopoly reproduction 
processes, the technical revolution and structural an ysis, the social situation and class 
struggle, ideology and class struggle, and imperialist c research on the East.32 The 
direction, editing, documentation, library, and administration divisions made up the other 
units comprising the DWI. As a result of both the broadened mission of the institute and 
incorporation into the DWI of other institutions like the Division for West German State-
Monopoly Capitalism of the Institute for Social Sciences and the Division for 
Imperialistic Research on the East of the Philosophy Department of Humboldt 
University, the number of persons employed at the institute mushroomed. With the influx 
of historians, legal specialists, and political philosophers who joined the existing stock of 
economic specialists at the DWI, the institute grew from 100 employees at the start of the 
1960s33 to 183 by the end of the decade, approximately half of whom were scientific 
                                                 
31 The resolution designated that the Agitation Division, the Economic Research Institute of the SPK, the 
Institute for Social Sciences, and the Party School “Karl Marx” were also to have representatives on the 
Scientific Council of the DWI and that representatives of other institutions would likely also join the 
council. Ibid. 
32 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/197. 
33 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/198. 
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employees, the remaining employees being either technical specialists (e.g. editing, 
documentation) or administrative personnel.34 
 Following two bouts of major conflict between SED authorities and a DWI 
struggling to resist implementation of the “leading role” of the party at the institute, the 
corner had now been turned. Siegbert Kahn in the position of director, although an “old 
comrade” with great party experience, proved incapable of creating the type of DWI 
desired by the SED, one centered on Marxist-Leninist analysis of its designated field of 
investigation and full compliance with the political injunctions of the party. After Kahn 
had been given a second chance following the 1959-161 episode, he was finally 
removed from his position in 1965 when the “anti-party” sentiment at the DWI, which 
Kahn’s neglect had allowed to go unchecked, revealed th  scope of the problem. Change 
then came swiftly. Kahn’s replacement by Lutz Maier, who as a young economic 
specialist with unswerving loyalty to the SED very much fit the party’s image of the ideal 
foreign policy cadre, was only the most visible in a set of drastic changes in personnel. At 
the same time, the SED made use of the necessity of thoroughgoing change at the DWI to 
overhaul the institute’s profile to better match the growing and increasingly complex set 
of foreign policy-related needs of the GDR. The transformation of the DWI from semi-
autonomous institute with a rather narrow focus on economics to fully subordinate 
research center dealing with “state-monopoly capitalism in its entirety” in 1959-1965 was 
of a piece with the broader process of rationalization in service of synchronization to 
which the entire East German foreign policy apparatus being subjected at the time. At the 
end of the process, the DWI had been brought to heel and outright opposition of the 
                                                 
34 BArch, DC 202/82. A 1970 report envisaged an annual i crease of five in the total number of employees 
at the DWI. 
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SED’s vision for the institute had been eliminated. Yet that opposition was replaced by a 
tension between intellectual subordination and autonomy resident within the vision of the 
SED as the synchronization of the DWI enshrined the importance of specialist knowledge 
and professional competency within the framework of political-ideological subordination. 
 A similar process of rationalization in service of synchronization took place in the 
1960s at the German Institute for Contemporary History (DIZ), which shared the DWI’s 
focus on West Germany. Institutional growth, differentiation, and standardization were 
joined with more thoroughgoing and effective subordination to the practical goals and the 
political-ideological requirements of the SED’s dictatorially controlled foreign policy 
apparatus, yet the process played out in less turbulent fashion at the DIZ than at the DWI, 
principally because it had already begun in 1955 with the Politburo’s “history 
resolution,” which had aimed at establishing the DIZ as the central institution of Marxist-
Leninist contemporary history in the GDR. With the conclusive re-orientation of the DIZ 
in 1957 and its simultaneous assumption of responsibility for conducting research on 
contemporary history (i.e. since 1945), the work of the institute in fact increasingly 
complemented that of the DWI, with the latter focusing specifically on economics and the 
former on current events in general, with both centeri g on developments in the FRG and 
the capitalist West, particularly as they related to the German question. The new research 
responsibilities taken up by the DIZ in the late 1950s did not supplant its existing 
external, propagandistic function and internal, informational function, but rather joined 
them in what was supposed to be a fruitful symbiosis. The DIZ’s biweekly publication 
Dokumentation der Zeit formed, as in the 1950s, the main vehicle for the outward 
propagation of the distinct East German Marxist-Leninist perspective on current events in 
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the capitalist West (a quarterly journal, Unsere Zeit, was also published from 1958 to 
1962). In respect to its internal, informational function, the DIZ continued its work of 
making available to party and state organs documentatio  and information on current 
events, earning it the designation “the leading institution for all social-scientific 
information in the area of contemporary politics and ideology” and “the center for 
information on contemporary political and ideological problems in the clash of systems 
between socialism and imperialism.”35 
 Although Walter Bartel’s replacement of Karl Bittel as director and the institute’s 
re-orientation in 1957 were supposed to secure the complete subordination of the DIZ to 
the political and ideological goals of the SED in the realm of contemporary history, 
progress was slow. In July 1958, one year after the Secretariat resolution sealing the re-
orientation of the DIZ had been passed, a report submitted by the SED party organization 
to the Sciences Division, the party organ responsible for the DIZ, portrayed the institute’s 
fulfillment of the resolution as wanting. A series of negative traits were identified, all of 
which were attributed to the fact that “the leading role of the party not been established in 
practice.”36 The report declared that the DIZ had only enacted superficial, piecemeal 
changes in order to fulfill the demands placed on it by its new profile when what was 
needed was a fundamental transformation of the institute and its work. The DIZ had 
neither a thoroughgoing plan nor a comprehensive vision of how to achieve this goal, 
which became directly manifest in the atmosphere at the institute and in its output. The 
report identified a lack of “collectivity” and “critique” and “self-critique,” which in 
practice were intended to bring about uniformity of opinion in accord with the party line. 
                                                 
35 BArch, DC 201/2. 
36 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/9.04/113. 
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According to the report, “political-ideological work,” indispensable for the SED’s goal of 
establishing the DIZ as an institute of Marxist-Leninist contemporary history, received 
insufficient attention: “Party work is carried out more or less as a formality. The 
resolutions of the CC are only superficially evaluated and are not taken as the foundation 
of the institute’s work.”37 Furthermore, procedures in place at the institute exacerbated 
rather than mitigated the problem. For example, material from the West, which was 
indispensable to the DIZ’s work but whose very presence was viewed by the party as a 
potential source of ideological subversion, could easily be perused by all employees of 
the institute whether relevant to their work or not. In some instances, material from the 
West had even been taken off the premises off the DIZ. The deficient political-
ideological work at the institute and lax operating procedures had, in the eyes of the party 
organization at the DIZ, pernicious effects, manifested particularly in “revisionist” 
views38 and several instances of “Republikflucht,” or fleeing the GDR. A large part of the 
responsibility for the DIZ’s failure to fulfill the demands placed on it by the SED was 
indirectly placed at the doorstep of Director Bartel, who had “differences of opinion” 
with the party organization in a number of “central questions” discussed in the report.39 
The party organization highlighted the need for a concrete plan clearly outlining how the 
DIZ was to be transformed in accord with the vision of the SED, but the leadership of the 
institute under Bartel had failed to take this step. Connected with this was the fact that 
Bartel, in addition to his position as director of the DIZ, also held a professorship at 
Humboldt University, which prompted the authors of the report to protest that, “due to 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Similar to the situation at the DWI, a bout with “revisionism” at the DIZ broke out in response to the




the strain on Comrade Bartel from the most varied tasks and obligations outside of the 
institute, there arise serious difficulties in the fulfillment of the scientific tasks of the DIZ. 
A qualitative strengthening of the direction of theinstitute is therefore urgently 
necessary.”40 
 In sum, the party organization’s report to the Scien es Division attributed the 
numerous problems it identified, collectively signifying the DIZ’s lack of progress 
toward becoming the Marxist-Leninist institute of cntemporary history envisioned by 
the SED, to a failure of leadership that contained two separate, yet closely intertwined 
elements: failure to take the lead, in cooperation with the party organization at the DIZ, to 
establish a uniform “political-ideological” line atthe institute and failure to organize and 
administer the institute in such a way so as to ensure its functioning and output 
corresponded to the vision of the SED. As was the cas  at the DWI, the goal of 
subordinating the DIZ to the political and ideological goals of the SED, encapsulated in 
the pithy phrase “establishing the leading role of the party,” thus was predicated upon 
greater institutional rationalization and regularizt on. 
 And it was exactly this feature—rationalization in service of synchronization—
that characterized the further transformation of the DIZ. What would be the conclusive 
round in the re-orientation of the DIZ, however, would not be led by Director Walter 
Bartel, who had already come in for serious criticism because he appeared neither willing 
nor able to oversee the transformation of the DIZ into a Marxist-Leninist institute of 
contemporary history. During his tenure as director, his work had revealed a number of 
“serious defects and mistakes” in respect to “basic questions of the struggle of anti-fascist 
opposition in Germany and developments after 1945,” questions which “ha[d] already 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
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been answered in the works41 of Comrade Walter Ulbricht.”42 What exactly Bartel’s 
“deviations” consisted in is not known, but Bartel, as one of the leaders of the inmate 
uprising that contributed to the liberation of Buchenwald concentration camp, certainly 
had grounds enough to dispute the official party version of anti-fascist activities during 
the Nazi era. This issue notwithstanding, the leadership of the party organization at the 
DWI in March 1962 came to the conclusion that Bartel “does not live up to the 
expectations which his scientific functions place upon him.”43 In April 1962, although he 
kept his position as professor of history at Humboldt University, Bartel was removed 
from his post as director of the DIZ and replaced by Stefan Doernberg. 
 Doernberg, who began working at the DIZ in 1961 as deputy director and as 
editor-in-chief of the journal Unsere Zeit, was supposed to succeed where Bartel had 
failed—he was to ensure the establishment of “the leading role of the party” at the DIZ, 
“our most important institute of contemporary history,” as the Secretariat resolution 
removing Bartel and appointing Doernberg put it.44 Doernberg, born in 1924 into the 
family of a KPD functionary, enjoyed tremendous respect within the SED, in part 
because he, after emigrating in 1935 at the age of eleven with his family to the Soviet 
Union, served as lieutenant in the Red Army and personally took part in the Battle of 
Berlin.45 After taking over the reins of the DIZ in 1962, Doernberg would remain a 
fixture within East German foreign policy expertise for the duration of the GDR’s 
existence, holding a number of key positions in a variety of areas, mostly scientific but 
                                                 
41 Ulbricht and a team of authors issued a multi-volume work on the history of the German labor 
movement. Walter Ulbricht, Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, 8 vols. (Berlin: Dietz, 1966) 
42 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/860. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 For an autobiographical account of his time in the Soviet Union, his service in the Red Army, and his life 
in the GDR, see Stefan Doernberg, Fronteinsatz: Erinnerungen eines Rotarmisten, Histor kers und 
Botschafters (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2004). 
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also operative positions (e.g. ambassador to Finland), which again highlights the 
fundamental interconnectedness of the two enterpriss in the GDR. 
Combining ideological reliability, a “scientific” approach to history (he had 
formal training in history in both the USSR and theGDR), and organizational aptitude, 
Doernberg provided the leadership needed to remedy existing deficiencies at the DIZ in 
the quest to establish the institute as the leading site for Marxist-Leninist contemporary 
history in the GDR. By the early 1960s, the DIZ’s re earch division, created in 1957 as 
the centerpiece of the institute’s envisioned transformation, had only made limited 
progress46 and its output correspondingly lagged behind in comparison to the work 
produced for the DIZ’s two other main areas, external propaganda and international 
information. Doernberg as newly appointed director of the DIZ emphasized this failing in 
a May 1962 letter to Johannes Hörnig, head of the Sci nces Division: “[The DIZ] has 
fulfilled the resolution from 1957 only in part. The tasks formulated in the resolution in 
respect to strengthening research on the emergence and development of the GDR in 
particular have thus far been addressed in a fully unsatisfactory manner. Furthermore, the 
institute has yet to publish the results of its research in the form of scientific analyses, 
essays, and monographs in sufficient measure.”47 Doernberg’s letter had been prompted 
by instructions from the Sciences Division to overhaul the profile of the institute and was 
part of a larger, concerted effort on the part of the DIZ in close collaboration with not 
only the Sciences Division but also the Ideological Commission of the Central 
Committee finally to bring the DIZ in line with the profile demanded by the SED. 
Expanding the research competencies of the DIZ made up a large part of the institute’s 
                                                 
46 The research division’s 1962 report on its own activities goes into exhaustive detail, but in the endattests 
only to limited growth. BArch, DC 201/155. 
47 BArch, DC 201/2. 
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overhauled profile and the DIZ’s final draft of the proposal presented to the Sciences 
Division and the Ideological Commission for approval depicted this as a necessary step in 
light of changing internal and external conditions: “In the time [since passage of the 1957 
Secretariat resolution], changes in the political situation that have occurred 
internationally and in Germany have produced a serie  of new problems and have created 
new goals in the field of contemporary history. Scientific work in the GDR in the field of 
contemporary history has simultaneously reached a higher level. We therefore find it 
necessary and viable to charge a scientific institution in the GDR with the task of 
comprehensively investigating and presenting political developments i  both German 
states as well as other states’ policy toward Germany. Further, it is also necessary to 
investigate the most important questions of internatio l current events, which are often 
closely tied to the so-called German question or at least strongly influence it [italics 
added].”48 The DIZ, of course, was to be this institution. Strong emphasis was placed on 
increasing the practical utility of the DIZ’s work: “With its activities in the areas of 
compilation, information, documentation, and research, the DIZ should help inform the 
leadership of party and state in a swift and scientif cally grounded manner and should 
analyze political processes of the most recent period.”49 The refashioned institute was to 
resemble in general character if not in specific organization and functioning the model 
provided by the Soviet Institute for World Economy and International Relations 
                                                 
48 Ibid. The proposal expounds on the new focus of research in more detail: “The object of research will
comprise the current essential questions of politica  developments in both German states on the basis of the 
national and international role of the GDR. Proceeding from this foundation, research will analyze in 
particular domestic and foreign policy and social relations in West Germany. Furthermore, questions of 
international politics, particularly the policy toward Germany of the USSR’s and other socialist state but 
also of imperialistic, other capitalist as well as non-aligned states will be examined and presented. 
Important focal points of international politics, insofar as they influence the policy of the two German 
states, will likewise be examined.” 
49 Ibid. 
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(IMEMO) or the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM).50 In 1963, Doernberg 
even visited PISM personally, which led to the establishment of more comprehensive ties 
between the two institutions.51 By 1966, the DIZ had made agreements establishing close 
cooperation with several other socialist research institutes,52 by which time the institute 
had also established contact with institutions in capitalist countries, but such relations 
remained limited and would only expand in significant measure following foreign policy 
normalization in the first half of the 1970s. 
After the Sciences Division in March and the Ideological Commission in April 
1963 confirmed the proposal,53 the DIZ immediately moved to take the practical step  
necessary to match its revamped profile as “research institute for German and 
international politics.”54 The working and research plans of the institute were modified to 
reflect the expanded thematic scope of the DIZ’s research. The institute’s research plans 
from this point both on would go into greater detail, which would allow a greater 
influence over the results of individual research projects, and would cover a longer period 
of time, permitting consideration of longer-term processes affecting the GDR and 
                                                 
50 Ibid. While highlighting the desired affinity with t e Soviet and Polish institutions, the proposal also
highlighted the specificity of a retooled DIZ: “The [DIZ] should have the general character of an institute 
for German and international politics and fulfill in its research tasks similar to those of [IMEMO] or 
[PISM], with both of which our institute already maintains close relations. The main difference from these 
institutes will consist in the unambiguous focus of our work on the national role of the GDR and 
developments in West Germany.” 
51 The agreement on cooperation between the DIZ and PISM included exchanges of personnel, research 
plans, and publications. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ IV A 2/9.01/144. 
52 In addition to IMEMO and PISM, the DIZ maintained contractual relations with the West Institute in 
Poznan, the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Prague, the Institute for Research on 
Socialist States (likewise in Prague), and the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Belgrade. 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.01/145. 
53 In its approval of the proposal, the Sciences Division emphasized the correctness of the DIZ’s principal 
engagement with current events: “The focus of the institute’s scientific work rightly lies after 1945; in 
particular, the most topical (aktuellste) issues of the immediate present should be addressed, for example of 
the last two to three years. BArch, DC 201/2. 
54 The leadership of the DIZ in June 1963 drafted a set of measures to be implemented posthaste. Ibid. 
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allowing closer coordination with the relevant party and state organs;55 the lack of both 
these elements in the past had previously been identified as a major impediment to 
synchronization. Greater regulation was likewise reflected in the fact that the individual 
divisions of the DIZ were now obliged to draft reports detailing their work and 
identifying to what extent they had fulfilled a given work or research plan. The expanded 
thematic scope of the DIZ’s work was likewise manifested in the creation of a new 
“international questions” research division alongside the existing “West Germany” and 
“GDR” research divisions.56 The international questions research division grew quickly 
and by 1965 had been subdivided into three sectors: “imperialist countries,” “socialist 
countries,” and “developing countries.”57 
 Finally, the re-orientation of the DIZ did not only include internal growth and 
rationalization but also affected the place of the DIZ in the broader East German foreign 
policy apparatus. The DIZ in particular and contemporary history in the GDR in general 
were only useful to the SED insofar as they could contribute to fulfillment of the party’s 
broader policy goals, which required thoroughgoing integration into the foreign policy 
apparatus. To this end, the DIZ formed closer working relationships with other party and 
state institutions, particularly the MfAA and the DWI. This process reached a high point 
in 1967, when the MfAA made a bid to replace the State Secretariat for Higher Education 
as the state organ responsible for the DIZ. The resolution on the issue asserted: “The 
work of the DIZ is not intimately connected with the day-to-day and long-term objectives 
                                                 
55 For instance, the DIZ’s Perspektivplan for 1966-1970, while making explicit reference to the 1963 
proposal, was “to serve the goal of raising research in the area of contemporary history and especially 
investigation and presentation of current aspects of national and international developments to a higher 
level in accord with the directives of the party, in particular the determinations of the Ideological 
Commission on the development of the social sciences. BArch, DC 202/81. 
56 Lexikon der Institutionen und Organisationen, s. v. “Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte,” in 
Enzyklopädie der DDR, CD-ROM (Berlin: Directmedia, 2004). 
57 BArch, DC 201/55. 
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of the foreign policy of the GDR. The MfAA therefore believes it expedient to 
subordinate the DIZ to [the ministry]. This would ensure systematic supervision of the 
DIZ.” 58 As the overhauled DIZ became more thoroughly integrated into the broader East 
German foreign policy apparatus and, in the process, became increasingly implicated in 
the realm of operative foreign policy, the institute’s practical utility grew proportionally. 
The more pronounced orientation of the institute’s work toward issues of practical 
foreign policy, however, also had the potential to undermine the “Marxist-Leninist 
contemporary history” practiced at the DIZ since th connection with international 
relations practice provided a corrective of sorts to ideological dogmatism and insularity. 
Yet for the time being this potential conflict would remain incipient, its further 
development requiring more direct engagement on the part of the GDR in general and the 
DIZ in particular in international relations. 
 A key element in the process of increasing the DIZ’s orientation toward the 
practical goals and the political-ideological requirements of the SED and carving out a 
clearly delineated niche for the institute in a uniform, standardized, and growing system 
of foreign policy expertise was its relationship with the DWI. The relationship between 
the DIZ and DWI was a peculiar one since the thematic focus of each institution’s work 
was so similar, the main difference consisting in the DWI’s focus on economics. The 
peculiarity of the relationship, which included the potential for both fruitful cooperation 
and inefficient double work, was addressed in the Sci nces Division’s approval of the 
1963 proposal, which noted: “Current national and international economic problems and 
analyses have thus far been covered too little in the work of the institute. In order to 
                                                 
58 PA AA, MfAA, MR-A 42. However, it remains unclear whether the resolution was actually 
implemented. 
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resolve this deficiency, there has to be a strengthening of personnel through the addition 
of specialists (economists, economic historians). Furthermore, close cooperation with [the 
DWI] must occur in order to offset these deficiencies. Close cooperation should take the 
form of joint scientific enterprises, documentation, information, and, potentially, a joint 
work plan without, however, bringing about the organiz tional fusion of the two institutes 
at this point in time.”59 With the thematic scope of the DWI expanding beyond a narrow 
focus on economic questions after 1965 to include consideration of “state-monopoly 
capitalism” in West Germany in its entirety and with the growth of the DIZ from an 
information and documentation center to a full-fledg  research institute including 
investigation of economic questions, the fusion of the two institutes in fact became more 
and more logical and more and more likely. For the tim  being, however, the DWI and 
the DIZ remained separate entities while steadily deepening their working relationship.60 
 In the meantime, the DIZ had completed a major transformation—it had grown 
from an information center documenting current events a d packaging them for internal 
and external consumption in the mid-1950s to become by the second half of the 1960s the 
GDR’s important institution of “Marxist-Leninist contemporary history”—and a leading 
site of “scientific” research on West Germany, the German question, and international 
politics, that was responsible for providing analysis and prognoses on this constellation of 
topics to organs of party and state.61 Marxist-Leninist analysis formed the common 
                                                 
59 BArch, DC 201/2. 
60 Not surprising given the two institutes’ overlapping thematic foci, the working relationship between the 
DIZ and the DWI in the second half of the 1960s wasnot always free of tension, sometimes resulting in a
tug-of-war over human resources and competencies with the Sciences Division playing the role of arbiter. 
Shortly after the re-orientation of the DWI in 1965, for instance, Director Lutz Maier made a plea to 
Johannes Hörnig, head of the Sciences Division, for his institute to take over some of the responsibilities as 
well as some of the employees of Doernberg’s DIZ. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/9.04/197 and 198. 
61 Toward the end of the 1960s, the DIZ succinctly summed up its role in the following manner: “The main 
function of the DIZ consists in the completion of scientific analyses and information as required by the 
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denominator of both the propagandistic and information l/analytical areas of the DIZ’s 
work, but a thicker line was drawn between “expertis ” produced for public consumption 
and expertise produced for internal use. In terms of personnel, the DIZ experienced 
considerable growth, employing 226 individuals in 1970 (scientific employees, technical 
specialists, and administrative personnel) as compared with 166 in 1960,62 marking a 27 
percent increase. As was the case at the DWI, increasing standardization, refinement, and 
specialization at the DIZ in the 1960s were inextricably linked with establishment of “the 
leading role of the party,” i.e. complete political and ideological subordination.  
Here too, then, rationalization in service of synchronization had left its mark, in the 
process laying the groundwork the for the dynamic of permanent tension between 
ideology and specialist knowledge, between intellectual subordination and intellectual 
autonomy, that was setting in across East Germany’s young system of foreign policy 
expertise. 
 
The Central Role of the PAMaD/IIB 
In the ongoing rationalization of the East German foreign policy apparatus, the 
Prorectorate for the Training of Leading Foreign Servic  Employees (PAMaD) of the 
DASR occupied a lynchpin position. The centrality of the PAMaD, which had taken over 
the responsibilities of the DASR’s Institute for International Law and International 
Relations (IVB) in 1958, derived from the fact that it played a dual role in the East 
German foreign policy apparatus. As the GDR’s central institution for foreign policy 
                                                                                                                                      
party leadership and in the organization of a competent flow of information in the field of contemporary 
politics and ideology. The DIZ continues to convey n eded information to the state leadership, the mass 
media, and scientific institutions.” BArch, DC 201/2. 
62 BArch, DC 201/72. 
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training, the PAMaD produced cadres to staff East Germany’s operative foreign policy 
bodies, principally the MfAA and the IV Division; as an emergent foreign policy research 
institution, the PAMaD analyzed the GDR’s international relations to produce 
“scientific” expertise meant to aid in the process of policy formation. While at the end of 
the 1950s the PAMaD still devoted the majority of its attention to foreign policy training, 
the prorectorate in the course of the 1960s would increasingly expand its research 
activities to become one of the GDR’s most important centers for foreign policy research 
alongside the DWI and DIZ. By virtue of its dual responsibility for foreign policy 
training and research, the PAMaD thus occupied a unique position within the East 
German foreign policy, intimately involved in foreign policy training and research and 
deeply implicated in issues of practical foreign policy. 
 The PAMaD had played a central part in the 1959-1962 foreign policy cadre 
initiative designed to meet the needs of the MfAA and the IV Division in the context of 
the GDR’s increasing foreign policy activities. The initiative, which marked the start of 
the SED’s efforts to create a well-integrated, effective foreign policy apparatus, 
succeeded in addressing the most pressing issues—a short ge of qualified cadres and 
poor qualifications among existing cadres—but the GDR’s larger foreign policy “cadre 
problem” remained unresolved as a shortage of individuals with advanced qualifications 
and practical experience was paired with the lack of a clearly formulated and 
consequently applied conception of the functional purpose and goals of the respective 
institutions of the East German foreign policy apparatus. The gradual process of 
professionalization and standardization that had begun in the late 1950s had already made 
headway in this area, as the examples of the MfAA, the IV Division, the DWI, and the 
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DIZ make clear. However, the SED’s attempt to create a well-integrated, effective 
foreign policy apparatus out of the loosely connected, poorly coordinated network of 
institutions inherited from the 1950s would hinge upon the success of these efforts at the 
PAMaD, the GDR’s premier foreign policy cadre forge. 
 A fundamental turning point not only in cadre training but also in the general 
orientation of the East German foreign policy apparatus and its system of expertise came 
with the VI Party Congress of the SED in January 1963. The congress announced the 
triumph of “socialist relations of production” in the GDR and set the stage for the 
inauguration of the New Economic System of Planning a d Management (NOS) in June 
of the same year. The NOS’s emphasis of efficiency and practical results extended 
beyond its immediate area of concern, the economic realm, to include a general 
orientation on the part of the SED leadership toward improving performance in the GDR 
by balancing maintenance of the SED’s political andideological hegemony, which 
naturally remained central, with expertise and specialist knowledge. The initiative was 
encapsulated in the term Wissenschaftlichkeit, which connoted belief in the ability to plan 
processes “scientifically” in order to achieve optimal results63 and which extended to all 
areas of administration and fields of knowledge. The VI Party Congress, while placing 
new emphasis on the importance of specialist knowledge, simultaneously made clear that 
scientific activity was not to be conducted in a value-free manner; instead, it was to serve 
the ends of the SED: “Analysis of the work of many social science institutes shows that 
the main issue is whether a close bond exists between instruction and research with the 
struggle of the party to fulfill the goals it has set for itself, whether the unity of theory and 
                                                 
63 As noted above, the German term Wissenschaft connotes not only the natural sciences (as is the cas with 
the English term “science”) but also the social scien es and humanities. 
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practice has been achieved. There are still scientists who are beholden to an old, dogmatic 
notion of the role of science, which is demonstrated by the fact that they depict, detail, 
describe life and social processes, yet insufficiently support the struggle of our party.”64 
 The new emphasis on specialist knowledge in servic of the party’s goals was 
concretized in a Politburo resolution from February 1963, one month after the congress, 
which established the Produktionsprinzip,65 or production principle, as the guiding 
principle for all party work.66 In regard to cadres, the production principle entailed a clear 
upgrading of specialist knowledge vis-à-vis political and ideological compliance, as a 
Secretariat resolution from May of the same year made clear: “[Leading party 
functionaries] must have a solid understanding of technical-economic issues alongside 
comprehensive political-ideological knowledge.”67 A Secretariat resolution from October 
1963 continued in the same vein: “Comrades who haveproven themselves in the struggle 
to carry out complicated tasks, who with great expert knowledge (Sachkenntnis) and 
political understanding have performed a host of highly complicated and demanding jobs, 
should be supported und systematically prepared to take over greater responsibility.”68 
While the image presented here of the ideal functioary, politically dedicated and 
expertly trained in equal measure, pertained most immediately to individuals directly 
involved in the implementation of the NOS (e.g. industrial and agricultural cadres), it 
marked a fundamental shift of orientation in SED cadre policy in its entirety following 
the VI Party Congress. As a subsequent Secretariat resolution put it: “Realization of the 
                                                 
64 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 1/VI/8. 
65 The concept was shaped by Günter Mittag, one of the main architects of the NOS. Günter Mittag, Fragen 
der Parteiarbeit nach dem Produktionsprinzip in Industrie und Bauwesen (Berlin: Dietz, 1963). 
66 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/949. 
67 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/954. 
68 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/996. 
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program passed by the VI Party Congress for the period of the comprehensive 
construction of socialism and the implementation of the technical revolution demands 
that all social processes be planned scientifically and that use of the economic laws of 
socialism be made comprehensively. It is therefore necessary…to work out an exact plan, 
determined by the political, economic, and cultural requirements, for the systematic 
development of cadres in all areas of social life.”69 This new, “scientific” approach would 
become ingrained not only in respect to cadre training and not only at the PAMaD, but 
also throughout the East German foreign policy apparatus and all its emergent expert 
institutions. 
 As the GDR’s main site of foreign policy training and as an increasingly 
important site of foreign policy research, the PAMaD responded immediately to the new 
orientation in cadre work introduced by the VI Party Congress. Indeed, the entire DASR, 
of which the PAMaD was a part, underwent drastic change in order to meet the new 
demands placed on it. The leadership of the DASR, headed by Rector Herbert Kröger, 
drafted between May and June 1963 a Grundsatzbeschluß, or fundamental resolution, on 
the future orientation of the DASR and its respective prorectorates that demonstrated full 
compliance with the new line: “The discussions of the VI Party Congress and the new 
program of the SED [passed at the VI Party Congress]…demonstrate in all clarity that the 
existing system for the training and qualification of state functionaries in all areas must 
undergo fundamental change. We must produce individuals who possess outstanding 
expert (fachlich) qualifications and who at the same time are politically educated.”70 The 
draft was given provisional approval by the Council of Ministers and was re-submitted 
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after taking into account the results of the June 1963 economic conference, which 
unveiled the NOS.71 The resolution received final approval from the Council of Ministers 
in October 196372 and brought with it a fundamental re-orientation of the work and 
organization of the PAMaD as well as the DASR as a whole. It replaced the previous 
organizational division of the DASR into prorectorates with discrete institutes. The 
PAMaD was accordingly dissolved and re-formed as the Institut für Internationale 
Beziehungen (IIB), or Institute for International Relations. 
 The Institute for International Relations began operating on 1 January 1964 and 
stayed in operation under that name until the final dissolution of the GDR in 1990. The 
mission of the newly established institute closely r sembled that of the prorectorate it had 
replaced: “The Institute for International Relations conducts research in the area of 
international relations and international law, is re ponsible for the scientific training and 
continued education of employees of the foreign servic  of the GDR, and supports the 
work of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in scientific matters.”73 Yet much more detailed 
delineation of its profile, responsibilities, and operating procedures were intended to 
better equip the IIB to fulfill the goals set for it and to do so in a more integrated and 
coordinated manner with the other institutions of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus. Central among these was the MfAA, whose operative needs were to form the 
basis for teaching and research at the IIB. Unlike all the other institutes of the DASR, 
which were subordinated to the GDR’s Council of Ministers, the IIB was directly 
subordinate to the MfAA (the IV Division was the corresponding party institution 
                                                 
71 For the meetings of the DASR senate that handled th  resolution, see SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 
2/13/211. 
72 BArch, DC 20/I/4/832. 
73 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13107. 
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responsible for the IIB), which lent the institute an extraordinary position at the DASR—
the IIB was formally part of the larger academy, but the academy exercised minimal 
influence over the IIB’s internal functioning. This fact was underlined by the creation in 
the same year of a separate party organization at the IIB decoupled from the party 
organization at the DASR.74 The subordination of the IIB to the IV Division as
responsible party organ was a further step that both strengthened the de facto autonomy 
of the institute in respect to its mother institution, the DASR, and bolstered the IIB’s 
orientation toward issues of practical foreign policy and the needs of East Germany’s 
most important operative foreign policy organs. 
 Greater emphasis had already been placed on cooperation between the IIB and the 
MfAA in the context of the 1959 Secretariat resoluti n on foreign policy cadres, and now 
the institutional basis was created for the intensification and regularization of relations 
between the two institutions. The MfAA was to be thoroughly involved in all aspects of 
the IIB’s work, which was to be conducted “in strict consideration of the needs and in 
most intimate connection with foreign policy practice.”75 Herbert Kröger, previously 
rector of the DASR,76 became head of the newly established IIB, which was sub-divided 
into seven Lehrstühle (academic chairs or caucuses): the history of international relations, 
international economic relations, world economics, general history, international law, 
constitutional law, and cultural policy and cultural relations, which were joined by 
divisions for foreign language instruction as well as documentation and information.77 
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The IIB was already in the process of phasing out its existing four-year course of study as 
its main vehicle of foreign policy training and replacing it with a two-year postgraduate 
course, the first of which began in academic year 1963/64. Foreign policy training would 
initially revolve around four themes that built upon ne another: the international 
constellation of forces in economics and politics from the time of the Second World 
Word and the continual progress of socialism toward becoming the determining factor in 
world events; the economic development and the foreign trade policy of CMEA states as 
the main weapon in the struggle against imperialism; fundamental issues in the foreign 
policy of the GDR; and international law as an instrument of the foreign policy of 
socialist states.78 Exams in the following areas would then conclude the two-year course: 
the history of international relations and current questions in the foreign policy of the 
GDR, general history, world economics and the economy f the GDR, international 
economic relations, international law, and foreign la guages.79 The content of the new 
two-year course of study, which now explicitly required the approval of the minister of 
foreign affairs, varied, but the overriding goal remained constant, as was made patent in 
the introduction to the curriculum for the two-year course of study convened in 1967: 
The aim of the two-year course of study at [the IIB] is the education and training of 
socialist state functionaries for the organs and institutions of [the GDR] active in the 
realm of foreign policy, particularly for service at [the MfAA]. After completing their 
studies, students must possess the necessary expert, political-moral, and ideological 
qualities, they must be fit and prepared for subsequent assignment in the various fields of 
foreign policy activity, and they must commit themselves unreservedly and with all their 
energies to fulfillment of the goals set by party and state. They must embody the type of 




socialist foreign policy functionary who is capable of meeting the constantly growing 
tasks in the area of foreign policy and of working as propagandist and representative of 
the first socialist German state. Animated by the ideas of proletarian internationalism, 
they must contribute as partisans of peace, democracy, and socialism to the further 
consolidation and strengthening of the prestige of our worker-and-peasant state and its 
foreign relations. As a result of their training, they must as political employees be capable 
of unwaveringly and consequently representing the int rests of the GDR and of the 
socialist world system in all settings of the interational class struggle.80 
The foreign policy training provided by the newly established IIB was thus meticulously 
oriented toward matching the operative needs of the MfAA and represented an important 
step in the broader intensification of cooperation and coordination between the various 
operative and research and instruction institutions within the East German foreign policy 
apparatus. 
While the creation of the IIB in 1964 and its strict orientation toward the practical 
goals of East German foreign policy did in fact provide the needed foundation in the 
realm of foreign policy instruction and research to overcome the institutional 
underdevelopment and lack of coordination inherited from the 1950s, thoroughgoing and 
effective cooperation between the IIB and the MfAA would not be brought about over 
night. Cognizance of the need and a desire for greater cooperation was certainly not 
lacking, but the necessary institutionalization andregularization of such links progressed 
only slowly. In a 1965 report completed for the Secretariat, the leadership of the MfAA 
did not mince words: “There are still serious defici n ies in our cooperation with the 
Institute for International Relations.”81 Chief among these was the absence of a binding 
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agreement regularizing relations between the ministry and the IIB, something the original 
Council of Ministers resolution approving the transformation of the PAMaD into the IIB 
in fall 1963—one and a half years prior—had stipulated. Furthermore, the report 
described the influence of the MfAA on the curriculum of the IIB, one of the areas where 
its input was supposed to be greatest, as minimal: “The ministry’s constitutive influence 
on the content and the political quality of the [IIB’s] curriculum and on [bringing about] 
practice-bound training is insufficient.”82 It is therefore no surprise that the MfAA in 
1965 in a separate report described the two-year course of foreign policy training at the 
IIB simply as an “interim solution” to the MfAA’s attenuated yet still pressing “cadre 
problem,” i.e., the availability of politically and expertly qualified individuals in 
sufficient number.83 The MfAA found the two-year postgraduate course of study at the 
IIB to be unsuitable because it was simply a course of supplementary study (participants 
had already gained a degree elsewhere in another field) and “not part of a self-contained 
course of study.”84 As a result, the slack had to be picked up by EastGerman graduates of 
the Institute for International Relations in Moscow (MGIMO), which continued to 
graduate approximately 15 East German students each year, or suitable candidates from 
wherever else within the East German party and state apparatus they could be found. The 
critical stance of the MfAA toward the IIB’s two-year course of foreign policy training 
made clear the need for a different form of training at the IIB given the increased 
emphasis on Wissenschaftlichkeit and the strict orientation toward the practical foreign 
policy goals of the GDR, but changes in this area wre slow in coming as the two-year 
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course of study remained, for the time being, the IIB’s main vehicle for training foreign 
policy cadres. 
 
Emergent Expertise’s Research Orientation 
The prevailing trends within the East German foreign policy apparatus in the 1960s of 
increased Wissenschaftlichkeit, deepened institutional coordination and integration, and a 
pronounced orientation toward practical utility came together in the IIB’s other main area 
of activity—foreign policy research and analysis. Indeed, the emergence of foreign policy 
research and analysis as a discrete undertaking at stitutions like the IIB, the DWI, the 
DIZ, the MfAA, and the IV Division formed a key element in the process of adapting the 
East German foreign policy apparatus to meet the specific foreign policy challenges faced 
by the GDR in the 1960s. Resolution of the most urgent cadre issues had already brought 
about a broadening of focus within the foreign policy apparatus from fulfillment of the 
most pressing, day-to-day tasks to longer-term planning and prognostication. The GDR-
wide orientation toward Wissenschaftlichkeit and the “scientific” planning of all social 
processes inaugurated by the VI Party Congress and the NOS only served to bolster this 
trend. Simultaneously, the increasing number of foreign policy cadres both professionally 
and politically qualified fulfilled another prerequisite for development of foreign policy 
research and analysis since the necessary personnel t  bring specialist knowledge to bear 
on outstanding foreign policy problems was now avail ble. Furthermore, the steady 
expansion of the GDR’s international relations starting in the late 1950s meant that East 
German foreign policy was becoming that much more cmplex, which demanded more 
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sustained analysis and longer-term consideration in order to ensure the GDR could meet 
its increasingly ambitious foreign policy goals. 
This concatenation of processes produced a set of institutions and individuals 
whose main goal consisted in analysis of the GDR’s international relations from a 
“scientific” perspective. Analysis took on different forms and dealt with a range of issues, 
but for all its variety it was bound together by the common foundation of Marxism-
Leninism and the common goal of advancing the foreign policy interests of the GDR.  
Starting in the 1960s, in stark contrast to the situat on in the 1950s, when the myriad 
problems created by the institutional underdevelopment of the East German foreign 
policy apparatus prevented the establishment of foreign policy analysis as a discrete 
activity with a cohesive, standardized character, one may thus begin to speak in earnest of 
East German foreign policy expertise. Although the responsibilities of the institutions 
responsible for its production varied considerably, foreign policy expertise in the GDR 
possessed a cohesiveness that transcended institutional boundaries since the significance 
of functional differentiation within the East German foreign policy apparatus was 
dwarfed by the unity of purpose created by unambiguous subordination to the practical 
goals and political-ideological requirements of the ruling SED. The result was a 
symbiotic relationship between the two general types of foreign policy institution in the 
GDR—operative institutions and research and teaching institutions—where expert 
analysis was meant to aid operative activities and where practical experience gained 
through operative activities was supposed to enrich expert analysis. The unity of purpose 
created and sustained by the GDR’s dictatorially controlled foreign policy apparatus 
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provided the lynchpin of the entire system in which operative and expert activities were 
to exist in a symbiotic relationship. 
 The concrete shape of nascent East German foreign policy expertise was imparted 
by the process of rationalization in service of synchronization that affected the East 
German foreign policy apparatus in its entirety in the 1960s. Cognizance of the need for 
“scientifically” grounded research on foreign policy already began to grow in the late 
1950s and a led to a series of corresponding measurs, but the trend, however, was 
greatly accelerated in the wake of the VI Party Congress in 1963 with its emphasis on 
Wissenschaftlichkeit, where a “scientific” approach stressing rationalization of working 
procedures and long-term planning was supposed to infuse the work of all party and state 
institutions. 
 This emphasis on “scientific” analysis and prognostication was immediately 
incorporated into the orientation of the MfAA, when a  April 1963 resolution of the 
Council of Ministers stipulated: “The leadership of the MfAA is to supply the Politburo 
of the SED and the Council of Ministers and, after corresponding directives have been 
added, representations abroad with political assessm nts or scientific analyses of 
important international events, conferences, and the treaties of other states. The 
leadership of the MfAA must ensure that political, economic, and military developments 
in the imperialist camp as well as in the camp of young national states are painstakingly 
tracked both at the ministry and in the representations abroad and that the necessary 
conclusions for GDR policy are drawn from new events and processes in a timely 
manner.”85 While all the various territorial and topical divisions of the MfAA could and 
did complete a range of scientific studies (e.g. asses ments, reports, analyses) in their 
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respective areas, there was only one division whose primary responsibility lay in 
conducting analytical research for “the development of strategic foreign policy planning 
and the conceptual elaboration of foreign policy initiatives”86: the Grundsatzabteilung, or 
Fundamental Questions Division. The division, which until the early 1960s operated 
under the name Abteilung Grundsatzfragen, fell within e bailiwick of Otto Winzer until 
he took over the position of foreign minister in 1965, at which point he was succeeded by 
the new secretary of state and first deputy minister of the MfAA, Günter Kohrt, who had 
worked his way up to the position of deputy head of the IV Division in 1958-1964 before 
serving for two years as GDR ambassador to China.87 The VI Party Congress’s emphasis 
on Wissenschaftlichkeit and long-term planning entailed an increase in the s atus of the 
division: “The Fundamental Questions Division of the MfAA must be strengthened 
substantially so that the leadership of the MfAA may meet the growing political and 
scientific demands in the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy of the 
GDR as well as its obligations toward the Politburo of the CC of the SED and the 
state.”88 The retooled division, which was headed from 1966 by Siegfried Bock and 
which was now subdivided into four sections (socialist states, German questions, non-
aligned states, the imperialist system),89 was given a host of different responsibilities, but
two areas in particular were identified as central: (1) “elucidating the fundamental 
questions of the GDR’s foreign policy and providing scientific grounding for the foreign 
policy steps and initiatives of the GDR” and (2) “advising the leadership of the MfAA in 
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fundamental questions of international relations, producing estimates and suggestions for 
the development of the foreign policy of the GDR, and thereby facilitating a qualified 
flow of information for the orientation of the GDR’s representations abroad in 
fundamental questions of international relations.”90 The final element in the upgrading of 
the position of the Fundamental Questions Division—and with it the status of foreign 
policy research and analysis as a discrete activity at he MfAA and in the broader East 
German foreign policy apparatus—was personnel enhancement. The 1963 Council of 
Ministers resolution on the new role of the division stipulated that it was to be 
strengthened through the addition of “international law experts, historians, and 
constitutional law experts who have demonstrated th capacity for independent scientific 
work.”91 
 The division underwent a significant shake-up in 1967, after a March 1966 report 
for the Politburo had attested to the insufficiency of research conducted by the MfAA, 
but not necessarily by the division itself: “Despite progress, the results of scientific work 
show a highly variable level of quality. Alongside acceptable performance there are still 
too often analytical works of low quality and someti es even incorrect assessments. A 
considerable failing consists in the fact that analytical work pertaining to questions of the 
socio-economic development of individual countries is not yet developed and that 
existing scientific capacities within and outside th MfAA are not yet deliberately utilized 
to that end.”92 In response, an initial MfAA proposal submitted to the Politburo in 
September 1966 recommended the creation of specialized expert groups “in order to 
improve analytical work and above all to attain a scientifically grounded and systematic 
                                                 




handling of complex and regional questions (Warsaw P ct and CMEA, NATO and EEC, 
[the Organization of African Unity], Arab League, [the Organization of American States], 
etc.) and to overcome the hitherto existing fragmentation among various country 
divisions.”93 In 1967, the Fundamental Questions Division was actually dissolved and its 
competencies divided among two newly created divisions: the Division for Foreign 
Policy Planning (Abteilung für außenpolitische Planung) and the Division for Global and 
Regional Problems (Abteilung für globale und regionale Probleme).94 Given the stated 
goal of “a precise, systematically controlled, scientifically managed foreign policy,” the 
role of the MfAA’s Division for Foreign Policy Planning was envisioned as follows: 
“What is required are thorough, scientific analyses of the internal and external, 
constructive and constrictive, objective and subjectiv  factors which the historically 
determined laws of international development, elucidated in their fundamental tendencies 
by the international communist and workers’ movement, counter in specific countries 
and regions so that on this basis the direction of social developments in different 
variations may be expounded (developmental prognoses). Proceeding from this 
foundation, the thrust and foci of the foreign policy activities of our state can then be 
determined.”95 Furthermore, the Division for Foreign Policy Planning, as a center of 
analytical activity at the MfAA, was to be the IIB’s main point of contact at the MfAA in 
the area of research.96 While the Division for Foreign Policy Planning was responsible 
above all for the coordination and formulation of strategy based on foreign policy 
research, the Division for Global and Regional Problems took over the lion’s share of the 
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actual analytical responsibilities of the dissolved Fundamental Questions Division. In 
addition to the previously existing slate of topical, regional, and supranational questions, 
the Division for Global and Regional Problems also to k over responsibility for questions 
relating to European security and disarmament.97 
 The upgrading of the status of foreign policy research and analysis as a discrete 
activity in the wake of the VI Party Congress in 1963 was also in evidence at the IIB, 
which largely owed its establishment in 1964 as the replacement for the outmoded 
PAMaD to the impulse for Wissenschaftlichkeit produced by the congress. In its new 
statute, research was given for the first time equal standing with the IIB’s other main 
task, the training of foreign policy cadres. “Research in the area of foreign policy and 
international law” was to be oriented toward “the demands stemming from the resolutions 
of the VI Party Congress” and was to be adjusted to meet “new, heightened 
requirements.”98 Just as was the case in the realm of teaching, the IIB’s research activities 
were to be conducted in collaboration with the MfAA in order to guarantee the institute’s 
work was clearly directed toward fulfillment of the practical foreign policy goals of the 
GDR. And also just as was the case in the realm of instruction, seamless cooperation 
between the IIB and the MfAA in the area of research would not be established 
overnight—the regularization of links between the two institutions would take time. 
However, the gradual tempo of the progress of institutional coordination ought not to 
obscure the critical fact that from the very moment foreign policy research began to come 
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into its own—and not just at the IIB, but throughout the East German foreign policy 
apparatus—it was subordinated to the ideological and political requirements of the SED. 
 Indeed, the ideological and political instrumentalization of nascent East German 
foreign policy expertise to the SED’s centrally dictated goals was unmistakable at both 
research institutions like the IIB, the DWI, and the DIZ and operative institutions like the 
MfAA and IV Division, which employed expertise creat d either by other institutions, 
their own sub-units or both. The main thrust of the rationalization of the East German 
foreign policy apparatus in the 1960s was the suppression of all traces of intellectual 
autonomy and the thoroughgoing ideologization of analysis along Marxist-Leninist lines. 
Marxist-Leninist foreign policy presuppositions on f reign policy were to be handled as 
incontrovertible and were to form the starting part of all analysis. A statement on the 
“political-ideological objective” of research at the PAMaD, the IIB’s immediate 
predecessor, expressed this expectation in undilute form: 
[What is required is] the comprehensive investigation and depiction of the process of the 
inevitable decline of the exploitative capitalist order, the historically determined certainty 
of the ultimate dissolution of the imperialistic system of colonialism, and the victory of 
the anti-imperialist national liberation movement as well as the final victory of socialism 
on a global scale… The continual shift of the interational constellation of forces in favor 
of peace and socialism resulting from the struggle of the two systems on a global scale as 
the expression of the progressive resolution of the undamental contradiction of 
international development in our time—the contradiction between socialism and 
capitalism—must be elucidated and substantiated.99 
While a basic Marxist-Leninist disposition thus repr sented the sine qua non of foreign 
policy expertise in the GDR, the SED leadership likewise demanded that foreign policy 
                                                 
99 PA AA, MfAA, A 15824. 
 247
research and analysis produce real practical benefits for the process of foreign policy 
formulation and implementation. And sweeping declarations of ideological loyalty would 
do little to advance the concrete foreign policy goals of the GDR. It is for precisely this 
reason that the SED leadership pushed and pushed hard for specialization and 
professionalization within its foreign policy apparatus in the 1960s after the combined 
effects of extreme dogmatism and relative neglect in the 1950s had left foreign policy 
expertise in a sorry state. Ulrich Bernhardt has even spoken of a reform process in the 
1960s that “sought to find a balance between the heg monic position of the SED and 
limited autonomy in the sciences.”100 Bernhardt’s assertion of a “re-autonomization of 
science,” which he discerns above all in regard to legal scholarship, certainly overstates 
the case, at least in regard to foreign policy expertise, but his emphasis on the “increased 
significance of expert knowledge (Fachwissen)”101 correctly highlights the growing 
importance, even indispensability, of expertise in all its forms for the success of the 
SED’s goals. The unmistakable need for true specialist knowledge in foreign policy 
expertise, however, brought with it the potential for serious conflict since the increased 
emphasis on specialization and practical utility could in its continued development easily 
clash with the Marxist-Leninist presuppositions which were supposed to form the 
unassailable theoretical foundation of East German foreign policy. As Werner Hänisch, 
deputy director for research at the IIB 1974-1990, has put it: foreign policy expertise 
continually moved back and forth within “a field of tension (Spannungsfeld) between 
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partisanship (Parteilichkeit) and a striving for objectivity.”102 For the time being, 
however, this tension remained largely latent. The GDR’s circumscribed foreign relations 
prevented the type of extensive foreign policy engagement and exposure to the full scope 
of international relations developments necessary to turn the existing tension between 
unyielding ideological dogmatism and specialist-driven realism from a potential into a 
real conflict. 
 
The Result of Rationalization in Service of Synchronization: The Formulation of a GDR-
Specific Conception of International Relations 
The process of rationalization in service of synchronization to which the East German 
foreign policy apparatus was subjected in the 1960s radically altered the institutional 
context in which analysis of the GDR’s foreign relations was carried out. In the course of 
establishing “the leading role of the party,” it transformed the hastily created patchwork 
of institutions arbitrarily reacting to momentary exigencies and lacking thoroughgoing 
coordination inherited from the 1950s into a well-organized, increasingly professional, 
and efficiently functioning foreign policy apparatus. As the East German foreign policy 
apparatus was re-shaped to meet the practical requirements and political-ideological 
requirements of the SED as ruling party of a state which had achieved a degree of internal 
stability and whose international relations activities were on the rise, East German 
foreign policy expertise was born—expert analysis of international relations became a 
discrete activity with a cohesive, standardized character. The cohesive character of the 
analysis conducted by the various institutions of the East German foreign policy 
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apparatus, although their responsibilities could vary widely, was provided by the unity of 
purpose created by unambiguous subordination to the practical goals and political-
ideological requirements of the ruling SED. 
 While the institutional development of the East German foreign policy apparatus 
progressed significantly in the 1960s, the international relations of the GDR themselves 
did not keep pace, a fact which exercised a key influe ce on expert output in the decade. 
At any given time, the institutional configuration f East German foreign policy expertise 
set the parameters in which analysis was conducted and the GDR’s actual foreign 
relations supplied the object of analysis, and the interplay of these two factors produced 
the basic dynamic that molded the output of analytical activity. In the 1960s, the East 
German foreign policy apparatus became increasingly we l-organized, increasingly 
professional, and efficient, but the GDR’s foreign relations essentially remained those of 
its infancy—highly restricted in range and influenc. The foreign relations of the GDR 
did in fact grow considerably in the 1960s, but the central features of the geo-strategic 
situation facing East Germany remained unchanged: national division, non-recognition 
by the West, and acute dependency on the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc. With 
“breaking through” the suffocating diplomatic isolation imposed by the Hallstein 
Doctrine still the superordinate goal of East German foreign policy, the GDR attempted 
to bolster its position within and outside the Soviet Bloc and generally sought to extend 
its activities and influence wherever the opportunity presented itself. Because the foreign 
policy horizons of the GDR remained limited throughout the 1960s, revolving around a 
set of goals as clear as they were circumscribed, th  range of its foreign policy expertise, 
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which was oriented toward issues of practical foreign policy, perforce remained limited 
as well. 
 On this backdrop, analytical output differed sharply from that produced in the 
1950s. The emergence of foreign policy expertise, consisting in practice in the 
application of specialist knowledge to international relations within a Marxist-Leninist 
framework adapted to the GDR’s interests, would allow the glaring deficiencies of earlier 
analytical output to be overcome—more refined, substantive analysis would take the 
place of the combination of shrill ideological overstatement, deficient knowledge, and a 
near total absence of analytical value typical of the 1950s. What is more, successful 
rationalization-cum-synchronization had created the foundation to rectify the most 
conspicuous failing of the 1950s—the failure to formulate a comprehensive conception of 
international relations within which the place and i terest of the GDR were clearly 
identified and which could provide a cohesive framework as the basis for all analytical 
activity. The GDR’s “socialist foreign policy cadres,” now both politically and 
professionally qualified, enunciated a comprehensive conception of international 
relations based upon fusion of the GDR’s specific foreign policy interests with the 
dichotomous, class-based Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations. The 
key geo-strategic features upon which this conception was built—national division in the 
context of the Cold War “clash of systems,” non-recognition from the West, acute 
dependency on the Soviet Union, pronounced reliance o  the Soviet Bloc—were not new. 
They were in place essentially from the founding of the GDR, but the prevailing 
institutional underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy apparatus had 
prevented them from being combined into a single, ov rarching GDR-specific conception 
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of international relations. Once the institutional prerequisites had been fulfilled, East 
German experts’ fusion of the GDR’s foreign policy interests with the dichotomous, 
class-based Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations flowed almost 
naturally, one might say, since there existed in fact a strong correlation between the 
GDR’s realpolitical interests and a strict black-and-white, class-based understanding of 
international relations, where a monolithic socialism squared off against an equally 
monolithic capitalism in an ineluctable “clash of systems.” On the basis of this strong 
correlation, international relations were understood essentially in ideological terms—to a 
significant degree, ideology became reality for East German foreign policy experts. 
 This fusion entailed the use of Marxist-Leninist con epts as the framework for 
analysis of international relations. The key concept shaping experts’ understanding of 
international relations in this regard was the inter ational constellation of forces (das 
internationale Kräfteverhältnis). The Systemauseinandersetzung, or clash of systems, 
between socialism and capitalism represented the defining characteristic of international 
relations, a notion based upon the idea that foreign policy was a direct reflection of social 
system and accordingly a form of the class struggle (Außenpolitik als Klassenpolitik).103 
Within this context, the constellation of forces denoted the relative strengths and 
weakness of the socialist and capitalist blocs in the Cold War and represented a type of 
barometer by which the position and prospects of international socialism could be 
measured at any given point in time.104 By the early 1960s, the notion was well on its 
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way to becoming the overriding question guiding foreign policy analysis in the GDR, 
with all other issues essentially being supplementary lines of investigation dealing with 
one, smaller constituent element of this larger question. The “constellation of forces” was 
the object of countless reports, both large (e.g. for SED congresses) and small (e.g. 
individual IIB studies). To name but one example, th  concept formed the central 
question around which a major report drafted by the MfAA in 1964 reviewing the GDR’s 
international relations was organized. The positive developments discussed were framed 
in terms of the concept: “The international constella ion of forces continues to change in 
favor of the forces of peace and socialism;” as were the negative: “Changes to the 
constellation of forces, however, are not taking place in all areas at the same tempo.”105 
The term reveals much by highlighting the baseline ideological understanding of foreign 
policy among East German experts, who at this point could not imagine the GDR as a 
“normal” foreign policy actor with its own set of discrete interests but only within the 
context of an international socialist movement in unremitting conflict with capitalism, 
which was understood as a social system transferred onto the world stage rather than a 
differentiated aggregation of distinct states. Since the assumptions underlying the notion 
of the constellation of forces—the existence of a socialist movement under the leadership 
of the Soviet Union, its unified character and unified behavior in the international arena, 
and its eventual triumph in the international class struggle—touched on both the vital 
interests of the GDR as a state and the most hallowed ideological precepts of the SED as 
ruling party, the concept’s basic validity was not up for discussion; the focus was rather 
on working within the broad framework established by the notion of an international 
constellation of forces to advance the interests of he GDR and the international socialist 
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movement, which were seen as essentially one and the same thing. The task 
correspondingly fell to East German expertise to elucidate, in grappling with specific 
issues, the particular foreign policy interests of the GDR given the paradigmatic position 
of the Marxist-Leninist, class-based understanding of international relations. 
The specific practical framework in which East German experts did so was 
provided by “peaceful coexistence,” the Soviet-promulgated general line that provided 
both the strategic orientation and the theoretical foundation for the foreign policy of 
Soviet Bloc states. The concept of peaceful coexistnce had a long history,106 but was 
first adopted in the postwar period by Nikita Khrushchev at the XX Party Congress of the 
CPSU in 1956 in the context of the post-Stalinist Thaw. Peaceful coexistence, a 
permanent feature of Soviet foreign policy following 1956, rejected the Stalinist notion 
that wars between socialist and capitalist countries w re inevitable without disavowing 
belief in the essential incompatibility of socialism and capitalism and thereby maintained 
a fundamentally ideological understanding of international relations. Correspondingly, 
foreign policy under peaceful coexistence continued to embody the class struggle on the 
international stage; direct military conflict between the socialist and capitalist blocs was 
simply rejected in favor of other forms of competition, e.g. in the economic and 
diplomatic realms, with indirect military conflict in the form of proxy wars or support for 
armed insurgent groups also not excluded. It was in the practical and theoretical 
framework provided by peaceful coexistence in which East German experts were to 
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analyze the place of East Germany and the Soviet Bloc, the embodiment of socialism in 
the international arena, in relation to the international constellation of forces. 
 In terms of tracking the international constellation of forces and divining its 
further course so as to provide a sounder, more “sci ntific” foundation for East German 
foreign policy, a natural focus of foreign policy exp rtise was the actions of the US, the 
leader of the capitalist word and superpower rival of the Soviet Union. Considering the 
limited means available to the GDR to exert influenc  on the international stage, a 
significant amount of expertise in the 1960s was either descriptive or prognostic in 
character and less often oriented toward supplying a basis for operative action on the 
topic being analyzed itself than toward providing a rounding upon which to assess the 
GDR’s prospects in that specific area as well as in relation to other issues. The character 
of expert analysis of the US in the 1960s was overwh lmingly descriptive since the 
course of US-GDR relations was completely out of the hands of the GDR and dependent 
on relations between the bloc leaders and their larger Cold War considerations.107 This, 
however, did not mean that the actions of the US were unimportant for the GDR—on the 
contrary, expert knowledge of the foreign policy of the US was gaining understanding of 
US policies and how they might affect the position of the GDR. A 1964 report on US 
policy in Europe did exactly that. The report, drafted by the MfAA in consultation with 
the APK and submitted to the Politburo and Secretariat, examined the effects of the US 
“strategy of peace,” initiated by the Kennedy administration and continued by the 
Johnson administration, on the states of the Soviet Bloc. The outstanding characteristics 
of East German foreign policy expertise in the 1960s—a basic Marxist-Leninist 
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understanding of foreign policy matched with greater nalytical refinement—were on 
clear display. The report highlighted the fundamentally “imperialistic” nature of the US 
by ascribing to the entire “monopoly bourgeoisie” in the US the tendency to misread 
superficial, ephemeral phenomena as objective changes to the constellation of forces in 
capitalism’s favor, but the report’s authors were also concerned with making important 
differentiations in terms of practical policy: “[The two groups within the monopoly 
bourgeoisie] differ from one another—and this is esential in the struggle to preserve 
peace—in regard to the method of achieving their goals and to the length of time they 
believe they need.”108 This seemingly small nuance had great import for the report’s 
authors, who then provided an exposition of the significance of the strategy of peace, in 
place of the Eisenhower-era vision of “rollback” and the associated doctrine of massive 
retaliation, for the Soviet Bloc and the GDR.  
 The strategy of peace was seen as both an opportunity and a danger. It represented 
an opportunity because it could, through the prospect of increased trade and cultural 
relations between the Soviet Bloc and the US, facilit te the desired realization of 
“peaceful coexistence” on the way to lasting détente between the two superpowers and it 
represented a danger because its ultimate aim was identif ed as undermining Soviet Bloc 
unity and weakening ties between the Soviet satellite states and the Soviet Union itself. 
Romania in particular appeared to be falling into the trap laid by the Johnson 
administration. The GDR in this case was the odd-man out since the US, in accord with 
the Hallstein Doctrine, maintained its refusal to take up direct contact with the GDR, 
which, as the report noted, meant the strategy repres nted a particularly grave threat to 
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the exposed, dependent GDR: “The so-called ‘strategy of peace’ aims to isolate the GDR 
in terms of foreign policy and economic policy.”109 The Ulbricht Doctrine, enunciated in 
February 1967, was aimed at preventing exactly this outcome from coming to pass by 
insisting that no Soviet Bloc normalize its relations with the FRG before the FRG 
normalized its relations with the GDR. The states of the Soviet Bloc agreed, although 
Romania established diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1967 anyways. The conclusion 
of the report highlighted the ambivalent nature of the strategy of peace from the 
perspective of East German experts: on the one hand, it represented real progress since 
the US was starting to treat the constituent members of the Soviet Bloc not simply as 
Soviet satellites but as independent states and adopte  a more conciliatory tone toward 
the Soviet Union; on the other, it represented a significant threat to the still-tenuous 
position of the GDR by potentially undermining the bloc unity on which East Germany 
was so heavily dependent. 
 The same, essentially descriptive concern with the significance of the actions of 
the US for the global constellation of forces and, i  turn, the position of the GDR was on 
display at the end of the decade in a 1969 MfAA repo t. The report, submitted to the 
APK in April of that year,110 addressed the foreign policy orientation of the recently 
elected Nixon administration. It portrayed the strength of “US imperialism” in “the 
worldwide clash of antagonistic class forces” as weakened by setbacks in Vietnam and 
other areas, which limited the chastened American foreign policy establishment’s room 
for maneuver at a time when domestic turmoil was reching a highpoint.111 The authors 
of the report therefore saw the US compelled to become more flexible in the use of its 
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political, military, and economic might and to take into greater account the interests of its 
allies and potential partners in order to break out of its current defensive position. The 
report highlighted, for instance, the softening of the US line toward China, a more 
differentiated approach in the Middle East after the Six Day War, a greater reliance on 
regional alliances to represent the interests of the US, Nixon and Kissinger’s reluctance to 
engage in an arms race, and the “Vietnamization” of the Vietnam War. The analysis 
contained in the report displayed a high level of refinement in comparison to analysis 
produced in the 1950s; at the same time, however, this more differentiated type of 
analysis was unmistakably placed within a strict class-based understanding of 
international relations. The report portrayed the Nixon administration as concerned above 
all with representing the interests of the American “monopoly bourgeoisie” and 
underscored the fundamental class nature of US foreign policy in warning that however 
differentiated the foreign policy of the US might become, it would in no way “signif[y] 
the abandonment of the global-strategic objectives of US imperialism.”112 
 As the foreign relations of the GDR grew steadily in the 1960s, the increased 
involvement in international provided no shortage of material for expert analysis. Yet the 
GDR’s inability to fully engage in international relations as a normal state actor and its 
highly restricted range of foreign policy actions meant that the task of East German 
experts was not so much to ponder important tactical and strategic questions as passively 
to provide an account of how the actions of the other, more powerful states of the world 
might affect the position and interests of the GDR and how the GDR might respond. This 
meant that East German experts could, on outstanding issue after issue, clearly delineate 
the specific interests of the GDR, but could only do so within the established Marxist-
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Leninist framework. In short, the GDR’s diplomatic isolation, which ensured a strong 
correlation between the actual conditions in which the GDR had to conduct foreign 
policy and the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist conception of international relations, 
effectively precluded any alternative understanding of international relations. This was 
particularly clear on the issue of unity within the Soviet Bloc, where the threat of 
isolation discussed in the report on the US strategy of peace was but one manifestation of 
a constant, overriding concern with bloc unity in light of the GDR’s extreme vulnerability 
stemming from ongoing non-recognition and national division. An IV Division report on 
the SED’s relations with other communist and workers’ parties from 1961 was exemplary 
in its identification of the goals of inter-party relations as “the strengthening of the unity 
of the socialist camp and the international workers’ movement…the bolstering of 
friendship and cooperation with the CPSU...the bolstering of a common front against 
West German militarism and imperialism.”113 The acid test by which unity was measured 
was adherence to the Soviet line, at the time embodied by the resolutions of the XX and 
XXII Congresses of the CPSU and the international consultations in Moscow in 1957 and 
1960. The report on inter-party relations noted approvingly: “All these parties [i.e., of the 
Soviet Bloc] evaluated the XXII Congress at extraordinary meetings and drew concrete 
conclusions for their own work. It must be emphasized that these parties time and time 
again show themselves capable of creatively applying the experiences of the CPSU to 
conditions in their own countries. In this way, theparties have contributed to the 
comprehensive strengthening of the socialist camp.”114 In the conditions of diplomatic 
isolation, where the GDR’s foreign policy fortunes were completely dependent on the 
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fortunes of the Soviet Bloc, the interests of the GDR and “international socialism,” 
embodied by the Soviet Bloc, were viewed as one and the same. 
 The flip side of the bloc unity coin was the GDR’s clear demarcation from those 
elements within the socialist movement that challenged the claim to ideological and 
political hegemony made by the GDR’s superpower patron and existential guarantor, the 
Soviet Union. The GDR’s hostile stance toward state like China and Yugoslavia which 
effectively asserted their ideological and political independence from the Soviet Union 
was one area in which the importance of bloc unity and the merging of the GDR’s 
specific interests with the Marxist-Leninist conception of international relations became 
particularly apparent. From the very the founding of the GDR, its position toward 
Yugoslavia had shifted in lock-step with the Soviet line and could not have been 
otherwise since the status of the fraught relationship between the USSR and Yugoslavia 
set the tone for GDR-Yugoslav relations. It was Yugoslav-Soviet reconciliation in the 
1950s, overcoming the divide created by the Tito-Stalin split in 1948, that resulted in 
Yugoslavia’s diplomatic recognition of the GDR in 1957—as well as West Germany’s 
first application of the Hallstein Doctrine in response. Yugoslavia’s position outside the 
Soviet Bloc and its skilled maneuvering between the socialist and capitalist worlds, 
however, represented a thorny issue for East German experts, who clearly recognized the 
benefits for the GDR of greater rapprochement betwen Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc 
yet also demonstrated constant wariness of Yugoslavia’s political and ideological 
independence and the debilitating effect it could have on socialist unity and, in turn, the 
position of the GDR. A MfAA report from 1962 reflect d the complexity of the situation. 
The report’s authors noted with satisfaction that Yugoslavia was striving to improve its 
 260
relations with the Soviet Bloc as “the Yugoslav lead rs must increasingly take into 
account the movement of the international constellation of forces in favor of the socialist 
camp.”115 The possibility of improved USSR-Yugoslav relations, however, did not 
automatically result in improved relations between the GDR and Yugoslavia since 
Yugoslav leaders were most concerned with restoring their severed diplomatic relations 
with West Germany and were willing “to sacrifice a great deal with respect to the GDR” 
to achieve that end.116 The report correspondingly claimed that, despite the improved 
relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and other Soviet-Bloc states, “the 
Yugoslav regime objectively supports the regime in Bonn in its efforts to exclude the 
GDR from the process to improve relations with the socialist bloc and to isolate it.”117 
East German experts could now accurately identify the key interests of the GDR and the 
most important factors influencing GDR-Yugoslav relations. Yet, as a result of the 
GDR’s limited ability to actually shape those relations, East German experts could only 
passively highlight the importance of bloc unity in order to bolster the position of the 
vulnerable GDR vis-à-vis a Yugoslavia that had the potential to be an important ally, yet 
which also appeared susceptible to the blandishments offered by West Germany and 
other capitalist countries. 
 While East German analysis on Yugoslavia was thus c aracterized by a certain 
ambivalence, vacillating as Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Bloc vacillated, 
analysis of China in the 1960s was categorical. Despit  the divergent outcome in 
expertise, the same dynamic underlay East German anlysis in both cases—a strict 
concern with the importance of bloc unity for a vulnerable GDR that wielded little 
                                                 




influence over the developments in either area that directly affected it. While the 
Yugoslavs showed themselves willing to cooperate wih the Soviets in many areas, 
China’s frontal challenge to the Soviets’ claim to political and ideological leadership of 
“international socialism” offered no points of engagement for the dependent GDR and, 
correspondingly, was rejected in toto in expertise on the topic. With Sino-Soviet 
antagonism becoming public in 1960, clearly delineated support of the Soviet position 
and rejection of the Chinese position became imperativ . By the time the split had 
become formalized in 1963/1964 with the rupture of party relations,118 East German 
analysis on China displayed the characteristic featur s of expertise in the 1960s: the 
pronounced ability to locate China-related issues in relation to the GDR’s own interests 
matched with limited capacity to actively shape relations. In 1964, for instance, the IV 
Division in an assessment for the Politburo described the goals of China’s leaders as 
follows: “They are making desperate efforts in order to undermine the authority of the 
CPSU, to sow confusion and uncertainty in the international communist movement, and 
to gain widespread recognition for the position of Mao Zedong and they hope that the 
development of international events … will confirm their line.”119 However, given the 
limited influence and latitude of the GDR on the issue, the IV Division could do little 
more than recommend: “The principled ideological struggle against the views and 
policies of the leaders of the CP of China through public presentation of the policies of 
our party must be continued.”120 A report drafted by Hermann Axen’s Foreign Policy 
Commission in 1964 similarly ascertained that “the divisive activities of the leadership of 
                                                 
118 For an excellent account that places the split in the context of Soviet and Chinese domestic politics, see 
Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); see 285-301 in particular for the final rupture in party relations. 
119 PA AA, MfAA, A 17962. 
120 Ibid. 
 262
the Chinese CP currently remain the main danger within the international communist 
movement,” which in turn threatened to weaken the position of the dependent GDR by 
removing a powerful potential ally; tellingly, however, the report could propose no active 
means to remedy the situation.121 
 The supreme strategic important attached to bloc unity by East German experts 
was given unambiguous expression in the face of the greatest crisis within the Soviet 
Bloc since the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Alexander Dubček’s leadership during the 
Prague Spring of 1968 put Czechoslovakia on a course fo  liberal democracy, which 
threatened fatally to undermine the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc through the loss of one its 
main members. Although troops of the East German Nation l People’s Army did not take 
part in the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 1968, strategic 
considerations dictated SED leaders’ enthusiastic support of the action. The emergence of 
a democracy based around “socialism with a human face” in the heart of Soviet-
dominated Central Europe would have had unpredictable consequences, certainly 
negative, for the exposed GDR and future of the Soviet Bloc in its entirety. For East 
German experts, the crushing of the Prague Spring therefore represented a case where the 
outcome of analysis was nearly pre-determined owing to the highly restricted range of 
foreign policy options available to the GDR. A joint APK-IV Division report on “The 
International Situation and the Situation in the Inter ational Communist Movement after 
the actions of the Five Socialist States on 21 August 1968,” claimed that “imperialism 
suffered a strategic setback as a result of these masures.”122 The report further asserted 
that the crushing of the “counter-revolution” in Prague had strengthened the position of 
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international socialism, which—seen from the narrow perspective of the GDR that 
equated the Soviet Bloc with international socialism—was essentially true: “The actions 
taken to secure a socialist order in the ČSSR have strengthened the socialist position in 
the international constellation of forces in the long run. However, temporary tactical 
difficulties in foreign policy as well as adverse effects on the unity and capacity for 
action of the international workers’ movement and its allies cannot be ruled out [italics in 
original].”123 The reaction of various parties within the international communist 
movement toward the “relief measures” of 21 August 1968, which were expounded in 
extensive detail in the report, again provided for East German experts a kind of acid test 
to measure adherence to the Soviet line within the larger concern with bloc unity. It was 
in this respect that the crushing of the Prague Spring had its greatest significance for East 
German experts: “The process of differentiation within the international communist 
movement has been intensified by the events in the ČSSR and the actions of the five 
socialist states. On the one hand, Marxist-Leninist par ies closed ranks around the CPSU; 
on the other, revisionist forces intensified their activities by a degree of magnitude. This 
situation has created the urgent necessity to intensify the principled debate on the 
fundamental questions of Marxism-Leninism and to refute revisionist views.”124 For East 
German experts, fully cognizant of the crucial importance of bloc unity for the dependent 
GDR, analysis of the crushing of the Prague Spring offered no platform for the 
expression of critical views, only the opportunity to assess how the events might affect 
the unity of “international socialism,” upon which t e GDR so strongly depended. 




  And if recognition of the crucial importance of bloc unity was not itself sufficient 
to prompt East German experts to acknowledge the “necessity” of crushing the Prague 
Spring, the SED did not hesitate to undertake disciplinary measures in order to ensure 
conformity with the party line. Joachim Schulz, an employee of the IIB who worked as a 
lecturer in the institute’s International Law Division, voiced open criticism of the 
Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia.125 For his deviation from the party line, 
Schulz received an official party reprimand at an assembly of the IIB, at which Paul 
Markowski as head of the IV Division was present, was stripped of his lectureship, which 
he never regained, and was demoted to the position of assistant. 
 The reason the GDR was so dependent on the capability of the Soviet Bloc to act 
in unison on the international stage, which dictated support for steps like the crushing of 
the Prague Spring, lay in the fact of national division and its consequences. While the 
GDR’s weight within the Soviet Bloc was growing considerably and its relations with 
countries outside the Soviet Bloc were expanding (though still without attaining 
diplomatic recognition), East Germany in the 1960s still unambiguously remained “the 
second German state” behind the FRG. The immediacy of the still-unresolved 
Deutschlandfrage abated with the end of the Second Berlin Crisis and the construction of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961, but it retained immense significance for the GDR—the focus of 
concern simply shifted from securing the immediate survival of a separate East German 
state to how the German question shaped the GDR’s foreign policy prospects in 
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connection with superordinate goal of finally achieving diplomatic recognition. The 
German question was another area where the GDR was not in a position actively to shape 
further developments as much as passively to observe and to react to actions taken by 
other states. Thus the German question was also an are  where the lack of viable policy 
alternatives meant analysis took on above all a descriptive character, whereby experts 
clearly identified the fundamental features of the situation as well as potential positive 
and negative developments without being able to offer much in the way of alternative 
tactical or conceptual approaches.  
 In 1961, in the midst of the Second Berlin Crisis and just a few months before the 
Berlin Wall was built, a report drafted by the MfAA noted that “the common objective of 
the Western powers remains prevention of the emergence of a unified, peaceable, and 
democratic Germany” and claimed that the only thing preventing fulfillment of Western 
“imperialists’” designs on Germany was the “increasing predominance of the forces of 
socialism and democracy.”126 Underscoring the growing strength of “socialism” in the 
abstract and its “objective” role as a bulwark against “imperialism” was a recurring 
feature in East German analysis, highlighted how the particular situation in which East 
Germany found itself uniquely corresponded to the dichotomous, Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of international relations. The report, after asserting that “the strategic 
objective of US imperialism in the German question remains unchanged,” conceded that 
the new Kennedy administration might engage in a tactic l re-orientation on the issue.127 
The report’s conclusion bundled together two of the most characteristic features of East 
German foreign policy expertise in the 1960s: passive description of the issue, which 
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stemmed from the GDR’s inability to do much at all to shape the resolution of the 
question, and a resulting retreat to flat ideological platitudes. The analysis concluded: 
“Our task consists in attentively tracking this development and in initiating corresponding 
steps at the appropriate time. Every change in the position of US imperialism in the 
German question, be it only of a tactical nature, povides us with new opportunities and 
starting points for action in our struggle against West German imperialism.”128  
 Analysis of the German question naturally included intensive coverage of the 
position and actions of West Germany itself. The ideological-dogmatic element was 
particularly prominent in this area since the inherent ideological hostility of the GDR 
toward its greatest rival combined with the FRG’s non-recognition of the GDR as well as 
the FRG’s “presumption of exclusivity” (Ausschließlichkeitsanmassung), as GDR 
commentators disdainfully referred to the FRG’s claim to an exclusive mandate to 
represent the German nation, to give free rein to shrill ideological analysis. The FRG’s 
objective in regard to the GDR was depicted as nothi g short of its eradication: “In its 
policies toward the GDR, [the orientation of] the West German government continues to 
be based on the fundamental revanchist conception of weakening, wearing down, tearing 
apart, isolating, and finally eliminating the GDR.”129 This dynamic applied more broadly 
to East German expertise: generally the less contact the GDR maintained with a given 
country, the more rigidly ideological its analysis of that country tended to be; the 
converse was also true, but, until foreign policy normalization in the first half of the 
1970s, conditions generally favored the former. A MfAA report submitted to the APK in 
1963 stated the default view of the FRG in the 1960s: “From the first days of the 
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existence of the separatist West German state, the West German government has pursued 
a policy of the violent revision of the results of the Second World War, which finds 
theoretical expression in the presumption of exclusivity to be the sole representative of 
the German people within the territory of the forme German Reich in its 1937 
borders.”130 In relation both to the FRG and the conflict between socialist East and 
capitalist West, the construction of the Berlin Wall was viewed as a key turning point: “In 
the struggle between socialism and imperialism and to secure peace, the measures taken 
by the German Democratic Republic on 13 August 1961 were an important caesura. They 
made clear the changed international constellation of forces in Germany and changed it 
further in favor of the GDR and the world socialist system.”131  
 East German experts continually understood the GDR’s foreign policy situation as 
one component of the larger clash between socialism and capitalism—it was not that the 
foreign policy interests of a single state actor wee at stake but rather socialism in its 
entirety as social system. Due to the peculiar strategic situation faced by the GDR, no 
clear distinction could be drawn between the narrow realpolitical interests of the GDR 
and the ideological concerns of “international socialism.” Realpolitical and ideological 
elements continually overlapped in analysis of the German question because the GDR’s 
experts were acutely aware of the inability of the GDR to effect change in the German 
question on its own and correspondingly viewed the support of its Soviet Bloc allies as 
indispensable: “The GDR can wage a successful struggle against the Hallstein Doctrine 
only with the support of friendly states, particularly those of CMEA.”132 West Germany’s 
“presumption of exclusivity” therefore was not understood simply as a challenge to the 
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GDR’s interests but also as a manifestation of the essential “imperialistic” nature of the 
FRG, which for this reason threatened the entire socialist bloc, not just the GDR. A 
MfAA report submitted to the APK in 1965 identified the FRG’s “presumption of 
exclusivity” as “a main component of West Germany’s policy of revanchism,” which was 
aimed at both the Soviet Union and Poland in addition to the GDR: “With its dogged 
refusal to recognize existing borders in Europe and to confirm in binding form the 
illegality and invalidity of the Treaty of Munich and with its appeal to an alleged 
homeland right (Recht auf Heimat), [the West German government] reveals that it has 
territorial claims that extend even further…. This policy is the main obstacle to 
rapprochement and to ensuring peace in Europe…”133 In East German analysis of the 
Hallstein Doctrine, the specific challenge to the GDR’s interests posed by the doctrine 
was understood not just as a conflict between two sate  but rather within the broader 
context of the clash between socialist East and capitalist West. East Germany’s lack of 
opportunities to effect much change on the issue by itself facilitated an analytical rigidity 
that in turn reinforced East German experts’ black-nd white understanding of foreign 
policy, where the strategic situation faced by the GDR was manifestly compatible with 
the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding thatviewed international relations as the 
embodiment of the class struggle on the internationl stage. 
 The flip side of the coin was the markedly less dogmatic view that prevailed in 
respect to the GDR’s relations with other states as part of the quest to “break through” the 
Hallstein Doctrine and gain diplomatic recognition. The urgency with which the task of 
expanding the GDR’s foreign relations in order to bolster its position internationally was 
viewed fostered a type of ideational flexibility tha  was less willing to apply class-based 
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analysis to that large group of states, including countries as diverse as India, Sweden, and 
Egypt, where the GDR saw the possibility of successfully challenging West Germany’s 
claim to be the sole representative of the German people. What is more, the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of states in this category formally maintained a policy of 
neutrality, i.e. did not belong to either the socialist or capitalist bloc, provided a further 
disincentive to apply an unbending and strictly dichotomous approach to the topic. The 
GDR’s growing system of foreign policy expertise had a key role to play here because a 
shrewd approach to establishing and/or improving relations with foreign states depended 
upon gaining extensive knowledge of existing opportunities, which included analysis of 
the position of states with whom diplomatic relations might be established or whose 
actions could substantially influence the broader context in which the GDR had to 
operate. 
 The result was a near-constant stream of estimates on various states’ position on 
the German question. Shortly after the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Fundamental 
Questions Division of the MfAA compiled a list of the arguments proffered by non-
socialist states for their refusal to take up diplomatic relations with the GDR. The reasons 
enumerated varied widely, but the common denominator was fear of the political and 
economic repercussions if West Germany were to make good on its threat, enunciated in 
the Hallstein Doctrine, to sever relations with any country that recognized the GDR. This 
was particularly apparent in the case of a country like Sukarno’s Indonesia, whose basic 
position toward the GDR was favorable and where the establishment of diplomatic 
relations was described as “not a question of principle but rather a question of time.”134 
Indonesia’s position was described as follows: “Such a step currently does not serve 
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Indonesia’s interests, particularly in light of Indonesia’s close economic relations with 
West Germany and the consequences that would issue from the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. President Sukarno asserted he is p rsonally ashamed that relations 
between Indonesia and the German Democratic Republic do not have a higher status 
since the government of the German Democratic Republic is much closer to Indonesia 
than West Germany.”135 The main motivation for a neutral country like Finla d not to 
take up diplomatic relations with the GDR lay, in contrast, in the very maintenance of its 
position of neutrality. From the Finnish perspective, the German question could only be 
resolved by the great powers and Finnish involvement would violate its pledged position 
of neutrality. Its position in regard to the German question was formulated accordingly: 
“Finland shares neither the view that two German stte  exist nor the view that the 
Federal Republic is the only German state. It operates on the assumption that the German 
question has not yet been resolved and, as long as it considers the question as still in a 
provisional phase, Finland will maintain relations of a provisional character with both 
German states.”136 
 In the numerous estimates completed on the position of ther states on the 
German question in the 1960s, East German experts’ pronounced tendency to fall back on 
simplistic ideological argumentation was mitigated by the fact that the GDR could not 
afford to be choosy in attempting to expand its foreign relations—opportunities had to be 
seized wherever they presented themselves. And becaus  the Hallstein Doctrine 
stipulated that relations would be severed only in the case that official diplomatic 
relations were established with the GDR, the door was left open for the GDR to establish 




and expand its relations with foreign countries in a bevy of forms short of full diplomatic 
recognition (e.g. trade representations and delegations, general consulates, agreements for 
technical cooperation, delegations of the Volkskammer, cultural exchanges). By mid-
decade, the GDR had succeeded in doing just that, significantly expanding its relations in 
one form or another with numerous foreign states, including Egypt, Syria, Burma, 
Indonesia, Tanzania, Ceylon, Cyprus, Finland, Ghana, d Guinea. A MfAA report from 
1965 highlighted the urgency attached to expanding relations with the non-socialist 
world: “It is necessary to intensify in all areas the struggle for the gradual surmounting 
and final breach of the Hallstein Doctrine and to deci e upon new concrete measures for 
the development of the GDR’s relations with non-socialist states.”137 The report’s authors 
called for “rational use of the means at the disposal f the GDR” (referring above all to 
trade relations and the provision of credit), but also highlighted the necessity of 
coordinating its actions with its Soviet-Bloc allies: “Overcoming the West German 
presumption of exclusivity demands that the GDR make new efforts in order to 
coordinate its own efforts in the struggle against the presumption of exclusivity with the 
socialist states and more effectively to make use of their potential.”138 
 The success or failure of the GDR’s attempts to breach the Hallstein Doctrine 
indeed depended much less upon the GDR’s own efforts than upon broader international 
relations developments over which it wielded little influence. This was particularly the 
case in respect to the GDR’s efforts at diplomatic recognition in the Middle East, “the 
central focus of East German foreign policy in the 1960s.”139 Hostility toward Britain and 
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France as former colonial powers and general suspicion toward the West for its 
imperialist past, a broadly socialist orientation augmented by increasing cooperation with 
the Soviet Union from the time of the Suez Crisis, and, perhaps most importantly, a 
critical attitude toward West Germany on account of i s relations with Israel combined to 
make a number of countries in the region, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq most prominently, 
amenable to East German overtures. Ten Arab states140 broke off diplomatic relations 
with West Germany following its recognition of Israel in 1965, which itself was 
prompted in part by one of East Germany’s greatest foreign policy triumphs of the 1960s: 
Egyptian President Nasser’s reception of Walter Ulbricht’s in Cairo with all the trappings 
of an official state visit.141 A MfAA reported commissioned by the APK identified Arab 
states’ severing of diplomatic relations with the FRG as “a significant foreign policy 
defeat for the West German government,” but did not view the act in isolation, seeing it 
rather as a setback to “imperialist” designs in the Middle East as a whole: “West German 
policy in the Middle East is a component part of imperialism’s total design, whose main 
goals are to weaken the anti-imperialist movement for national liberation in Arab 
countries through division, differentiation, and enticements as well as the fomentation of 
anti-communism and to prevent the implementation of further social transformations as 
well as overturning as far as possible the transformations that have been already been 
implemented.”142 The MfAA analysis noted, correctly as it would turn out, that the Arab 
states which had broken off relations with the FRG would not in turn take up diplomatic 
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relations with the GDR. The report’s explanations of why Arab states would not to do so 
ranged from a sympathetic account of Egypt’s vulnerability to economic blackmail from 
the West (the ten Arab states had not severed their trade relations with the FRG) to 
contemptuous explication of the position of states like Saudi Arabia which refused to 
establish relations with communist states due to its “class character”.143 Since the Arab 
states were not yet prepared to take the step of full normalization of their relations with 
the GDR, the report concluded that “further prerequisites for advancement toward 
establishment of diplomatic relations must be created through the expansion of de facto 
relations in all areas where this corresponds to the interests of the GDR and the wishes of 
its partner [italics in original].”144 
 Significant progress in this area was in fact made in the following years, but was 
due much more to the correlation of interests betwen Arab states and the Soviet Bloc in 
the broader Cold War context than the GDR’s own efforts. The Soviet Bloc threw its full 
support behind the Arab states in the Six-Day War with Israel, which, paired with the 
Arab states’ defeat in that war, increased their dependency and their orientation toward 
the Soviet Union. The Soviets, following West Germany’s resumption of diplomatic 
relations with Yugoslavia in 1968, pushed the Arab states to recognize the GDR, with 
both the USSR and the GDR offering substantial financi l incentives. The coordinated 
efforts of the Soviets and the East Germans paid off in 1969 as Iraq, Sudan, Syria, 
Yemen, and Egypt (as well as Cambodia) took up official diplomatic relations with the 
GDR—the only significant breach of the Hallstein Doctrine before it was completely 
abandoned in the context of détente in the early 1970s. 




 The analysis of the situation in the Middle East following 1965—by far the most 
promising region for the GDR’s efforts to expand its foreign relations—manifested a 
deftness that was clearly lacking in the 1950s and bespoke the greatly improved 
competence of East German experts. Greater differentiation and less ideological rigidity 
was on display, yet these features applied to specific topics without affecting the larger, 
relentlessly class-based framework in which individual topics were understood. Indeed, 
the very fact that change in the GDR’s relations with Middle Eastern states took place 
gradually and came about without fundamentally changing any of the basic features of 
the strategic situation facing the GDR ensured that greater analytical refinement largely 
remained restricted to isolated issues and had a negligible impact on the overall 
conceptual framework in which expertise was conducted. This was reflected above all in 
the fact that relations with “the third world” were considered not only in respect to the 
GDR’s narrow interests in the struggle for diplomatic recognition but also as a key 
constitutive element in the superordinate global conflict between socialism and 
capitalism. The place of the developing world in relation to the competing blocs was 
introduced into the matrix of the GDR’s overlapping strategic and ideological concerns 
and in turn comprised one of the main pillars of the comprehensive conception of 
international relations enunciated by East German experts in the 1960s. 
 The decisive impulse for inclusion of the developing world into East German 
experts’ class-based understanding of international rel tions was provided by the Soviet 
line on the issue. Already at the XX Party Conference of the CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev 
spoke of the “objectively anti-imperialist” character of national liberation movements in 
the developing world. The notion that the de-colonizing states of Asia and Africa 
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represented natural allies for the communist movement then received explicit and 
detailed formulation at the 1960 conference in Moscow that brought together 
representatives of 81 Communist parties from around the world. The declaration signed 
by the representatives of all the parties placed new emphasis on the importance of the 
developing world for the “world-revolutionary process.” The numerous national 
liberation movements in Asia and Africa were described as “objectively anti-imperialist” 
as a result of their colonial pasts, and the establi hment of anti-imperialist “national 
democracies” encompassing both “proletarian” and “bourgeois” elements was viewed as 
the natural outcome of the de-colonization process. The historical significance of “the 
dissolution of the system of colonial slavery under the onslaught of the movement for 
national liberation” was portrayed as “the most important phenomenon after the 
emergence of the socialist world system.”145 Most importantly, the Moscow Statement of 
1960, issued coincidentally in the “Year of Africa,” when de-colonization was reaching a 
peak, provided the conceptual foundation for the incorporation of the developing world 
into the ideological canon of communism. 
 The foreign policy experts of the GDR, which at the ime was just “discovering” 
the significance of Asia and Africa in the course of xpanding its foreign relations, 
subsequently enshrined the interpretation found in the Moscow Statement in their 
analysis of the GDR’s relations with the developing world. Thus shortly before the 
Moscow Conference, a MfAA report for the Politburo on the GDR’s relations with Africa 
proclaimed: “The fact that, of 160 million people living under colonial oppression, 140 
live in Africa alone and that the center of the struggle for colonial liberation has shifted 
from Asia to Africa proves the accuracy of N. S. Khrushchev’s conclusion ‘that the 
                                                 
145 Cited in Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 40. 
 276
question of the complete abolition of the shameful colonial system is one of the most 
urgent questions we face.’”146 A report from 1966 was based on the same assumption that 
the affairs of states in the developing world could only be understood in the context of the 
broader clash of systems between socialism and capitalism: “The foreign relations of the 
GDR with African states are based on the essential realization that the alliance between 
socialist and non-aligned states represents a common, objective necessity of the anti-
imperial struggle.”147 Accord to this view, events the developing world, where the 
movement for national liberation was viewed as “objectively anti-imperialist,” only 
possessed significance insofar as they related to and impacted the international 
constellation of forces. 
 While the notion of the international constellation f forces most commonly 
referred to the constellation of forces between socialism and capitalism, East German 
experts often examined applied the concept to developments within a given country. 
Class-based analysis of the local the constellation of forces between bourgeois, 
proletarian, and peasant elements was to illuminate whether that country might adopt “the 
non-capitalist path of development.” This was the case, for example, in respect to 
Southeast Asia: “The development of the constellation of class forces in countries in 
Southeast Asia was heavily influenced by the colonial powers. The colonial status of 
these countries had the consequence that industry was developed only minimally and in a 
lopsided manner. As a result, the working class in all of Southeast Asia is not only 
numerically relatively small in comparison to the population as a whole but also can be 
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addressed only partially as a modern industrial proletariat.”148 While the focus of East 
German expertise on the developing world, matching the GDR’s concrete efforts to gain 
diplomatic recognition, was directed at states of Asia and Africa, Latin America was also 
incorporated into the class-based understanding of the process of de-colonization as 
objectively anti-imperialist, particularly on the example of the Cuban Revolution. A 
MfAA plan from the mid-1960s was submitted to the APK unambiguously reflected this 
understanding: “Latin America is the most important sphere of influence of US 
imperialism. The continent occupies in political, economic, and strategic terms a 
prominent position in the plans of the US…. However, as a result of the development of 
national and social contradictions, particularly the central contradiction between on the 
one hand national interests and on the other exploitati n by foreign capital and under the 
influence of the changing international constellation of forces, in the second half of the 
1950s a new upsurge in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the peoples of 
Latin America began…. Latin America has become an important front in the anti-
imperialist struggle.”149 Expert analysis of Latin America, like that applied to developing 
countries in Africa and Asia, integrated the topic into experts’ broader class-based 




The formulation of a comprehensive conception of the place of the GDR in the 
international arena that clearly delineated East Germany’s specific foreign policy 
                                                 
148 PA AA, MfAA, A 17246. 
149 PA AA, MfAA, A 13412. 
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interests was in fact the major achievement of the GDR’s system of foreign policy 
expertise in the 1960s. In contrast to expertise produced in the 1950s, which typically 
possessed little analytical value and was generally characterized by a combination of 
shrill ideological overstatement, unfounded wishful thinking, a shortage of information 
that went much beyond basic facts, and the near totl absence of analytical value, 
expertise produced in the 1960s investigated all the most pressing foreign policy issues 
facing the GDR—the relationship between the superpowers and the international 
Kräfteverhältnis, the dynamics of Soviet Bloc unity, the complexities of the German 
question, the GDR’s prospects to “break through” the Hallstein Doctrine, the “objectively 
anti-imperialist” movement for national liberation—and in doing so enunciated a 
comprehensive, GDR-specific conception of international relations that fused East 
Germany’s clearly identified realpolitical interests with the class-based Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of international relations as defined by the “clash of systems” between 
socialism and capitalism. International relations was not simply the realm where the 
interests of different states collided but where the two antithetical systems of socio-
economic organization battled for hegemony and where all developments possessed 
significance only insofar as they affected that batle. 
 As a result of the peculiar strategic situation faced by East Germany—national 
division, lack of diplomatic recognition, dependency on the Soviet Union, and reliance on 
the Soviet Bloc’s unity of action—the GDR’s concrete foreign policy interests were 
uniquely compatible with Marxist-Leninist assumptions on foreign policy, which resulted 
in a fusion of the specific interests of the GDR with ideological precepts to a degree 
unmatched in other Soviet Bloc states, so much so tat the two features at times became 
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indistinguishable. The enunciation of this comprehensive, GDR-specific conception of 
international relations by East German experts at this particular point in time, however, 
did not depend upon external as much as internal changes—the key features of the 
strategic situation faced by the GDR remained essentially unchanged from the 1950s to 
the 1960s, it was the structure and make-up of the GDR’s system of foreign policy 
expertise that had changed dramatically. 
 The outstanding feature of the institutional development of East German foreign 
policy expertise in the 1960s was the process of ration lization in service of 
synchronization. At the end of the 1950s, the SED, prompted by the stabilization of party 
and state as well as the growth of the GDR’s foreign relations activities, set out to re-
shape the East German foreign policy apparatus to meet its needs as ruling party. 
By the end of the 1960s, this process had brought about the transformation of the hastily 
created patchwork of institutions arbitrarily reacting to momentary exigencies and 
lacking thoroughgoing coordination inherited from the 1950s into a well-organized, 
increasingly professional, and efficiently functioning system of foreign policy expertise 
where “the leading role of the party” (i.e. subordinat on to the practical requirements and 
political-ideological goals of the SED) had been established. Certain Steps to improve 
coordination and maximize efficiency remained to be made, but East German expertise in 
the 1960s made a quantum leap forward in comparison with the situation in the 1950s.  
What is more, the East German foreign policy apparatus was now populated by those 
“socialist foreign policy cadres” who had been so eagerly sought by the SED and who 
would be the standard figure within East German foreign policy expertise from this point 
on. These overwhelmingly young, capable cadres combined unswerving political-
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ideological reliability with specialist knowledge and professional competency and it was 
they who, working within the GDR’s newly rationalized and coordinated foreign policy 
apparatus, were responsible for the formulation and entrenchment of a comprehensive 
conception of international relations within which the place and interests of the GDR 
were clearly identified and which provided a cohesiv  framework for all analytical 
activity. Rationalization in service of synchronizat on had overcome the institutional 
underdevelopment inherited from the 1950s and in the process had given rise to the 
emergence of expert analysis of international relations as a discrete activity within the 
East German foreign policy apparatus. 
 The fact that East German foreign policy expertise had been made strictly 
subordinate to the GDR’s practical foreign policy goals severely constricted the latitude 
available to East German experts in their analysis, which was only compounded by the 
state of the GDR’s limited foreign relations in the 1960s. The range of foreign policy 
options available to the GDR was highly circumscribed y the fact of diplomatic isolation 
outside the Soviet Bloc engendered and enforced by the Hallstein Doctrine, which in turn 
resulted in the single-minded pursuit of diplomatic re ognition and protracted East 
German dependency on the Soviet Union. Given the lack of viable options and the strict 
subordination of expertise, East German experts’ conceptualization of international 
relations in the 1960s necessarily represented morea reflection and elucidation of 
pressing foreign policy concerns than an exploration of tactical, let alone strategic, 
alternatives. This situation, however, would not and could not remain static since the 
output of East German foreign policy expertise would continue to be shaped by two main 
factors: the institutional configuration of expertise, which set the parameters in which 
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analysis was conducted, and the GDR’s actual foreign relations, which supplied the 
object of analysis. As these two elements changed, so too would output. Following the 
radical transformation of East German foreign policy expertise in the 1960s by the 
process of rationalization in service of synchronization, the essential features of foreign 
policy expertise were more or less in place. Yet th foreign relations of the GDR were 
about to change dramatically. The output of East Germany’s experts would 
correspondingly change to reflect the new realities and the new conditions of East 
German foreign policy would make it possible for the latent tension between intellectual 
subordination and autonomy, between ideology and specialist knowledge that had 
emerged with the synchronization of East German foreign policy expertise in the 1960s 
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The Institutional Completion of East German Foreign Policy Expertise 
 
Introduction 
The East German foreign policy apparatus underwent a radical transformation in the 
1960s as the process of rationalization in service of synchronization was successfully 
carried out. The underdevelopment inherited from the 1950s was largely overcome, 
which engendered the emergence of expert analysis as a discrete activity with a cohesive, 
standardized character. On this basis, East German experts articulated a comprehensive, 
GDR-specific conception of international relations that fused East Germany’s clearly 
identified realpolitical interests with the Marxist-Leninist understanding of international 
relations as the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism. As a result of the 
conspicuous correlation that existed between the actual onditions in which the GDR had 
to conduct foreign policy—diplomatic isolation, national division, acute dependency on 
the USSR, pronounced reliance on the Soviet Bloc—and a strict dichotomous, class-
based understanding of international relations, experts’ GDR-specific conception in fact 
rested upon a strong objective basis. 
 Yet as the GDR’s actual foreign relations changed, since they delivered the object 
of expert analysis of international relations, changes in expert output became that much 
more likely. And in the 1970s, the GDR’s foreign relations underwent their most radical 
change in East German history. The foreign policy normalization achieved in the first 
half of the decade dramatically altered the definitive geo-strategic features of the GDR’s 
foreign policy situation and opened the door for the latent critical tendency within East 
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German foreign policy expertise to come to the fore. Yet the manner in which foreign 
policy normalization was achieved—as part and parcel of the broader gains of 
“international socialism” in the era of détente—delayed the advent of this development. 
 In the meantime, the institutional configuration of East German foreign policy 
expertise, which made up the other essential element shaping expert output since it set the 
parameters in which analysis was conducted, also underwent considerable change. While 
the breadth and depth of expertise’s transformation in the 1960s would remain 
unparalleled, East German foreign policy expertise nevertheless continued to develop in 
such a way that would have an important influence on h w East German experts 
understood the world and the GDR’s place in it. TheGl ichschaltung à la SED of East 
German foreign policy expertise that made up the central thrust of the process of 
rationalization in service of synchronization in the 1960s had gone a long way in 
transforming the hastily created patchwork of institutions arbitrarily reacting to 
momentary exigencies and lacking thoroughgoing coordination inherited from the 1950s 
into a well-organized, increasingly professional, and efficiently functioning set of 
institutions. At the end of the 1960s, however, the SED still viewed the process as 
incomplete and the “the joining of theory with practice” (i.e. the complete subordination 
of expertise to the practical goals and political-ideological requirements of the GDR’s 
dictatorially controlled foreign policy apparatus) as unfinished. Efforts to increase levels 
of standardization, professionalization, and centralization were correspondingly 
redoubled in order to take the final step in the creation of a uniform and efficient system 
of foreign policy expertise to match the vision and demands of SED leadership. 
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 These “systematization” efforts, as they were dubbed, did not mark a departure 
from previous efforts but rather their continuation and perfection. They represented the 
culmination of the long attempt, begun in the 1950s, to create an East German foreign 
policy expertise that fully corresponded to the SED leadership’s vision of the role and 
function of expertise. Yet the completion of the inst tutional development of East German 
foreign policy expertise in the 1970s, which established its conclusive structure and 
character, also marked the final entrenchment of the dynamic of tension between 
intellectual subordination and autonomy, between idology and specialist knowledge, 
within foreign policy expertise. In the era of East Germany’s greatest foreign policy 
triumph, the seemingly irresistible march forward of “international socialism” served to 
mute this tension and to reinforce the comprehensiv conception of international relations 
developed by East German experts in the 1960s. The changing character of those 
relations and the context in which they were conducted, however, would in time provide 
the decisive impulse for a corresponding change in expert output. 
 
The “Systematization” of East German Foreign Policy Expertise 
At the end of the 1960s, the “systematization” of East German foreign policy expertise 
increasingly became the stated goal of the SED. Previous efforts had laid the necessary 
foundation in terms of rationalization and coordination; currents efforts now sought to 
weld together the individual parts into a comprehensive and smoothly functioning whole 
in order to seal the development of East German foreign policy expertise in line with the 
practical goals and political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership. The first of 
these systematizing efforts was directed at the Institute for International Relations (IIB), 
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which occupied a uniquely important position within the East German foreign policy 
apparatus as both the GDR’s main foreign policy “cadre forge” and its leading site of 
foreign policy research, which entailed extensive int raction with both the MfAA and the 
IV Division as well as with other research institutes. Correspondingly, the IIB was at the 
center of a push to establish a “system of administrat on for scientific research and 
instruction in the realm of foreign policy” begun in 1968. The initiative was consonant 
with the broader trend of centralization and “scientification,” which received 
confirmation at the VII Party Congress of the SED in 1967, and was linked with passage 
of the Third Reform of Higher Education (Dritte Hochschulreform) in 1968, but above all 
represented a continuation of the pre-existing tendency within East German foreign 
policy expertise toward rationalization in service of subordination and “joining theory 
with practice.” A meeting of Hermann Axen’s Foreign Policy Commission (APK) on 19 
May 1968, at which Otto Winzer, minister of foreign affairs, Horst Sölle, minister of 
foreign trade, and Gerhard Hahn, deputy director of the IIB, were present, provided the 
initial impulse and direction for an “analysis of the current situation in the area of 
scientific research and instruction in questions of foreign policy and foreign trade” and 
called for the MfAA in collaboration with the IIB and other relevant institutions to submit 
a plan of action by September of the same year.1 After an initial proposal was rejected by 
the APK on the basis of “insufficient quality,” a reworked proposal, discussed at the 
APK’s meeting on 4 October, was approved and passed on for approval by the 
Secretariat.2  
                                                 
1 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.115/9. 
2 Ibid. 
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The final version of the proposal approved by the Secretariat in its meeting on 27 
October clearly detailed what benefits further centralization and standardization were to 
bring: 
The continued development of research and instruction in the realm of foreign policy is 
part of the socialist reform of higher education and secures the unity of research and 
instruction and strengthens class-based education on the basis of a practice-bound and 
well-founded Marxist-Leninist instruction. Research capacities in the realm of foreign 
policy will be effectively concentrated on the requirements of the foreign policy of the 
German Democratic Republic and closely bound with practice as a contribution to the 
achievement of a scientific manner of operating and s the point of departure for 
instruction on a high level. Proceeding from this set of objectives, institutional and 
conceptual fragmentation, irregular lines of subordination, and thematic duplication in 
foreign policy research as well as the fragmentation of foreign policy education and 
training and the resulting variations in effectiveness and quality will be overcome. In 
their entirety, foreign policy research, instruction, and continued education must be 
oriented in terms of content and organization around a scientific manner of operating that 
is timely and rational within the framework of a firmly established system.3 
The drive for further centralization and rationalizt on was intended entirely to dispel 
fragmentation from the life of East German foreign policy research and instruction with 
the ultimate aim of creating a closer bond between “theory and practice,” or a system of 
foreign policy research and instruction rationally organized and oriented exclusively 
around the GDR’s practical foreign policy goals.  
 The IIB was designated the “central institution” (Leiteinrichtung)4 around which 
foreign policy research and instruction capacities w re to be concentrated through a dual 
                                                 
3 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ J IV 2/3A/1671. 
4 The original proposal submitted to the Secretariat even envisaged changing the name of the IIB to Central 
Institute for International Relations in order to reflect its new status as central institution for foreign policy 
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process of horizontal consolidation and vertical integration. The number of region-
specific research institutes (regionalwissenschaftliche Institute) attached to universities 
that dealt with foreign policy-relevant topics was reduced so as to avoid thematic overlap 
and to consolidate resources and personnel. It was in this respect that the systematizing 
initiative was most closely connected with the Third Reform of Higher Education as the 
reform abolished the remaining vestiges of the Humboldtian ideal5 of the unity of 
research and instruction in the service of a humanistic education in order completely to 
subordinate the now-separate fields to the goals of the SED. Under the reform, university 
Fakultäten (departments) were abolished in favor of Sektionen (sections) and, in 
conjunction with the proposal approved by the Secretariat, five of the newly organized 
sections supplanted the previously existing ten region-specific research institutes and 
were incorporated into the new system of foreign policy research being established under 
the aegis of the IIB, each with its own clearly defin d profile.6 The sections, since they 
were attached to universities, remained subordinate to the Ministry of Higher Education 
(and the status of the Afro-Asian Research Center of the German Academy of Sciences, 
which dealt with fundamental questions of the developing world in its entirety, remained 
unchanged), but the goal of central coordination of research through the IIB was to be 
served by direct incorporation of the Central Council for Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
                                                                                                                                      
research and instruction and was referred to as such in the proposal, but the decision was ultimately made 
to leave the name unchanged. Ibid. 
5 For a discussion of application of the Humboldtian ideal to German academic life prior to the Cold War, 
see Rüdiger vom Bruch, “A Slow Farewell to Humboldt? Stages in the History of German Universities, 
1810-1945,” in German Universities Past and Future: Crisis or Renewal?, ed. Mitchell G. Ash 
(Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1997), 3-27. 
6 The five were: the Section Asia Studies of the Humboldt University Berlin, the Section Middle East and 
Africa Studies of the Karl Marx University Leipzig, the Section Latin America Studies of the University of 
Rostock, the Section Northern Europe Studies of the Ernst Moritz Arndt University Greifswald, and the 
Section Orient and Antiquity Studies of the Martin Luther University Halle. 
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Studies (ZENTRAAL),7 “the coordinating organ that encompasses all branches of Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America studies [italics in original],” as the Secretariat resolution put it, 
into the IIB.8 This move also entailed the MfAA replacing the Ministry for Higher 
Education as the organ to which ZENTRAAL was subordinate.9 
 The increase in the IIB’s direct influence over the newly consolidated region-
specific research institutes made up just one half of the vertical integration of foreign 
policy research around the IIB as central institution; the other was an increase in the 
MfAA’s direct influence over the IIB in particular and foreign policy research in general. 
The stated goal of the Secretariat resolution was to shape research to meet “the 
requirements of foreign policy,” which necessitated that the MfAA exercise a continual 
influence over the research activities of the IIB and the other relevant institutions. The 
resolution stated plainly: “The MfAA plans, directs, coordinates, and manages in accord 
with the resolutions of the Council of Ministers foreign policy research and region-
specific research…. The research plans of the central i stitute [i.e. the IIB] and 
ZENTRAAL are coordinated with the annual research plans of the MfAA, deliberated 
upon in the Collegium of the MfAA, and confirmed bythe Minister of Foreign Affairs.”10 
The goal of foreign policy research coordination was served by the activities of two 
                                                 
7 Lothar Rathman, the official head of the council, and the head of the IIB were jointly responsible for 
administering ZENTRAAL. The council was created in 1966 to coordinate East German universities’ 
research on the developing world to serve the foreign policy interests of the GDR. As Renate Wünsche, 
head of the IIB’s division for Asia, Africa, and Latin America from 1973 and deputy chairwoman of 
ZENTRAAL has put it: “Foreign policy practice was supposed to be able directly to use the results of 
research on developing countries and to influence its basic orientation correspondingly.” Renate Wünsche, 
“Das IIB und der ZENTRAAL,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale 
Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 181-185. 
8 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1671. 
9 The Secretariat resolution stipulated that the subordination of the Institute for Intensive Language 
Training in Brandenburg-Plaue also be switched from the Ministry for Higher Education to the MfAA so 
that the institute could better fulfill its designated purpose of providing intensive language instruction for 
foreign policy cadres. Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
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councils. The first was the Scientific Council (Wissenschaftlicher Rat) of the IIB, which 
brought together leading representatives of the IIB and the MfAA and thereby ensured 
the MfAA’s intimate involvement in the most importan  affairs of the IIB; the second was 
the Council for Foreign Policy Research (Rat für außenpolitische Forschung), which was 
created at this time as a direct result of the initiative11 and which brought together leading 
representatives of not only the IIB and MfAA but also nearly all other foreign policy-
research institutions12 in order to coordinate foreign policy research GDR-wide under the 
chairmanship of the head of the IIB. 
 It was also precisely at this time that the IIB underwent a change in leadership. 
Herbert Kröger, who had led the IIB since its creation in 1964, was demoted to the 
position of deputy director while Gerhard Hahn, hitherto deputy director, was elevated to 
the position of director. The leadership swap came bout because Kröger “no longer lived 
up to” the new requirements placed upon the IIB by the systematization process, 
particularly because “in recent years and especially in the past few months he ha[d] made 
a series of serious political mistakes in public appearances.”13 Hahn, meanwhile, was 
described as “a politically reliable and qualified scientist.”14 Hahn’s replacement of 
Kröger as director of the IIB was in fact consonant with the general trend within East 
German foreign policy expertise toward promotion of y unger, expertly trained cadres in 
place of older cadres who lacked specialist training in foreign policy. Kröger, who was 57 
                                                 
11 The original Secretariat resolution did not stipulate the formation of the Council for Foreign Policy 
Research; the stipulation rather was contained in the Council of Ministers resolution from March 1969, 
which formally made the provisions of the resolution binding. BArch, DC 20/ I/4/1942. 
12 The heads of the following institutions were members of the council: the five region-specific university 
sections, ZENTRAAL, the Afro-Asian Research Center of the German Academy of Sciences, the Scientific 
Council of the Department of the International Labor Movement of the Institute for Social Sciences, the 
German Institute for Contemporary History, and the Institute for Intensive Language Training in 
Brandenburg-Plaue. 
13 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1827. 
14 Ibid. 
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at the time of his demotion, had a specialist training in law, not foreign policy, while 
Hahn, who was just 40 years old when he was appointed head of the IIB, gained his 
doctorate from the IIB in 1962 and his Habilitation (a type of second, more advanced 
doctorate) in 1966. Hahn thus matched perfectly the profile of the “socialist foreign 
policy cadres” sought so zealously—and successfully—b  the SED in the 1960s and 
represented a natural choice for the directorship of the IIB, which he would lead, barring 
his time as ambassador to Yugoslavia in 1977-1982, until the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
The final, key step taken in order to bolster the new “systematic” character of 
foreign policy research in the GDR was the creation of a central research plan covering 
an interval of five years. The first Perspektivplan for foreign policy research, which 
encompassed the years 1971-1975, was compiled in July 1970 both as a consequence of 
the 1968 Secretariat resolution and as part of the broader process underway to 
systematize social scientific research in the GDR in its entirety.15 The plan was drafted 
jointly by the MfAA and the IIB and received the stamp of approval of the heads of the 
IV Division (Paul Markowski), the APK (Hermann Axen), and the Sciences Division 
(Johannes Hörnig) as well. The reasons given to substantiate the centrally drafted and 
supervised plan underscored how the plan was perceiv d as necessary to guarantee the 
                                                 
15 The October 1968 Politburo resolution that initiated he systematization of the “Marxist-Leninist social 
sciences in the GDR,” which formed the broader context in which the systematization of foreign policy 
research was carried out, depicted the need for the process in the following manner: “It is imperative that 
the social system of socialism as a whole and in its component systems be pervaded by science, that 
corresponding models for the planning and direction of social processes be developed, and that all workers 
be continually familiarized with the new aspects of s cial development and be enabled to participate 
actively in the formation of socialist society. It is necessary that the research and education of social 
scientists are oriented toward the goals of the future and that capacities are employed so that the greatest 
benefit for socialist society is obtained. In this process, an increase in the quality of research repres nts an 
essential precondition for higher-quality results in education and instruction.” SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 
2/2A/1334. 
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larger goal of complete subordination of foreign policy research to the GDR’s practical 
foreign policy goals: 
The conceptual orientation, the process of formulation, and the provisional and final 
results of individual research projects must satisfy the demand for a maximal increase of 
the social benefit of foreign policy research. The heads of the scientific collectives need 
to ensure that research serves to fulfill the main foreign policy objectives of the German 
Democratic Republic. For this reason, all capacities and resources must be employed in 
the period 1971-1975 toward the following uniform research goal: ‘Analysis and 
prognosis of the international constellation of forces, of the developmental tendencies and 
developmental prospects of international relations, f international politics, and of 
international law in the epoch of the transition from capitalism to socialism in the 1970s 
and the resultant tasks for the foreign policy of the GDR’ [italics in original].16 
In particular, foreign policy research as directed by the new central plan was explicitly 
called upon to produce results that “secure such a theoretical manner of operating in the 
analysis and prognosis of developmental tendencies of international relations and the 
international constellation of forces as is required by praxis” and that “identify points of 
contact and include concrete suggestions for the formation of policy options in foreign 
policy decision-making in the interest of realizing the fundamental aims of the foreign 
policy of the GDR.”17  
 The influence of the MfAA and the IV Division over the research agenda of the 
IIB and other research institutes had grown steadily in the course of the 1960s as the 
synchronization of foreign policy research and operative institutions progressed apace. It 
was not just that the MfAA and the IV Division as the leading operative institutions set 
the general orientation or designated specific topics for individual research projects, it 
                                                 
16 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1455 and 1456. 
17 Ibid. 
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was rather that research topics were so closely attuned to the concrete concerns of those 
institutions that, combined with the predominant positi n of the Marxist-Leninist 
paradigm in foreign policy expertise, the conclusion  f research projects were heavily 
influenced in advance. The creation of a central foreign policy research plan raised the 
influence of the MfAA and the IV Division even further over the newly “centralized 
system of foreign policy research” as research now became even more minutely planned 
and thoroughly coordinated in the drive for systematization. In the 1971-1975 plan, ten 
broad “theme-complexes” supplied a specific research topic to be covered that 
corresponded to a main area of East German foreign policy activity and demonstrated the 
unique fusion of Marxist-Leninist presuppositions with the realpolitical interests of the 
GDR at the center of East German foreign policy expertise. For instance, the first two of 
the ten theme-complexes were: “The system of interna io al relations under the 
conditions of the class conflict between socialism and imperialism” and “Analysis of the 
main factors in the continued strengthening of the socialist states of Europe, the 
consolidation of unity and solidarity of the community of socialist states, and the 
resultant effects on the international constellation of forces.”18 Each theme complex was 
in turn sub-divided into several, more specific topics and an individual at the IIB was 
made responsible for coordinating research on a given complex. Institutions, whether 
East German (e.g. the Northern Europe Studies Section of the University of Greifswald) 
or Soviet (e.g. IMEMO), with which research was to be coordinated were also 
                                                 
18 Further examples include: “Main developments in the societal development of the national-revolutionary 
liberation movement. The effects of the political and socio-economic development of Afro-Asian and Latin 
American states on the international constellation of forces and the system of international relations; the 
influence of socialism on these processes and the struggle against the neo-colonial strategy of imperialism” 
and “the tasks of the foreign policy of the GDR in the struggle against West German imperialism and the 
foreign policy strategy and tactics of the Federal Republic in the 1970s.” Ibid.  
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designated. The model of a centrally directed research plan, inaugurated by the 1971-
1975 Perspektivplan for foreign policy research, would subsequently become a 
permanent feature of the East German foreign policy apparatus that made an important 
contribution to sustaining the fusion of “theory and practice.” For the years 1976-1980, 
foreign policy research was integrated into the mamoth “Central Research Plan of the 
Marxist-Leninist Social Sciences,” which, as the name suggested, encompassed all 
social-scientific research in the GDR.19 The plan specifically relating to foreign policy 
research for the years 1976-1980 included therein was far more extensive in both quantity 
and quality than the 1971-1975 Perspektivplan as the number of designated research 
topics ballooned and the specificity with which topics were identified increased 
dramatically. The trend subsequently continued with the 1981-1985 central research plan, 
which set a new standard in terms of scope and detail.20 
The sum total of the efforts aimed at synchronizing foreign policy research in the 
late 1960s—in particular the establishment of an administrative system structured around 
                                                 
19 The draft of the plan submitted to the Politburo identified the main objective of foreign policy research 
for the plan period: “Research in the realm of inter ational development and foreign policy has the goal of 
contributing to the investigation of new developments and real processes in the continued transformation of 
the international constellation of forces in favor of socialism in its historical interrelations and to 
elucidation of means of solving current problems of foreign policy practice.” The three broad areas into
which foreign policy research was divided directly reflected the prevailing Marxist-Leninist 
conceptualization of GDR foreign policy: “socialism’s growing influence in the process of world revolution 
and on international relations,” “the continued deepening of the general crisis of capitalism” and the 
intensification of contradictions and the increasing i stability of state-monopoly capitalism,” and 
“fundamental questions of socio-economic and societal development in the states of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America and their role in the process of world revoluti n.” Foreign policy research’s role as a weapon of 
ideological struggle was also unambiguous: “An effective offensive must be carried out against reactionary 
bourgeois and opportunistic views of international relations as well as against the anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, 
and great power-chauvinistic ideology and policy of Maoism.” SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1895. 
20 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/2356 and 2357. The central research plans for 1976-1980 and 1981-
1985 became so comprehensive that simply compiling them demanded a great amount of time, work, and 
coordination between different institutions. Complying with the plans and supervising their fulfillment 
represented similarly arduous tasks as specially made Erfüllungsberichte (fulfillment reports) for each “Z-
project” (a research project contained in the central research plan, with “Z” being derived from the Grman 
Zentralforschungsplan) had to be submitted to the Sciences Division, the body responsible for issuing the 
plans and supervising their fulfillment. See, e.g., SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7466, DY 30/8208, DY 30/8240, 
DY 30/8296, DY 30/8297, DY 30/8300, DY 30/8301. 
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the IIB as Leitinstitut, the formation of the Council for Foreign Policy Research, and the 
creation of a central research plan21—built upon the rationalization realized in the 1960s 
to attain a new level of subordination of research to the needs of operative institutions. 
The repeated avowal of the need to systematize foreign policy research was much more 
than just rhetoric; concrete measures were taken to realize the vision of a smoothly 
operating system where research institutions and operative institutions worked together to 
achieve the common end of fulfilling the GDR’s centrally dictated foreign policy goals. 
The two types of institutions performed different eough functions, but were linked in a 
symbiotic relationship—now more than ever in the wake of systematization efforts—by 
the unity of purpose created and sustained by unambiguous subordination to the practical 
goals and political-ideological requirements of the ruling SED within the dictatorial East 
German party-state. Just as the push for systematization based on the 1968 Secretariat 
resolution was underway, the MfAA’s assessment of the process spoke to the symbiotic 
nature of the relationship between foreign policy research and practice: “[These steps] 
guarantee the central designation of complex research topics oriented toward our areas of 
focus and corresponding to the real requirements of the oreign policy of the GDR for the 
entire scope of research in the realm of foreign policy…. Through its clear lines of 
direction and coordination, [the new system] facilitates the necessary reciprocal 
relationship between science and practice.”22 
 
                                                 
21 The IIB’s role as Leitinstitut in the GDR’s system of foreign policy research andthe responsibility of the 
newly created Council for Foreign Policy Research for “the formulation and fulfillment of the 
Perspektivplan for scientific research in the realm of foreign policy, international law, and region-specific 
studies” were confirmed in the new statute given to the DASR, where the IIB was housed, in 1969. 
SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/20/133. 
22 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1671. 
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Systematization and Foreign Policy Training 
The systematization of research was to be accompanied by the systematization of foreign 
policy instruction in order to guarantee the complete fusion of “theory and practice” 
within the East German foreign policy apparatus. To this end, the Secretariat resolution 
bolstered the position of the IIB as the GDR’s leading foreign policy “cadre forge” and 
sought to bring about a complete rationalization of the GDR’s system of foreign policy 
instruction that mirrored the efforts made in the realm of research in the context of 
creating a “uniform system of research and instruction in the realm of foreign policy.”23 
The five region-specific research institutes attached to universities had a role to play 
herein by training, in accord with each institute’s specialization, regional experts for 
employment in a range of institutions, such as the Ministry of Culture or the State Radio 
Committee, where they could put their highly specialized knowledge to productive use in 
support of a given institution’s specific set of objectives. The lion’s share of 
responsibility for training foreign policy cadres, however, remained with the IIB as an 
extremely large part of the demand for foreign policy cadres in the GDR was met by 
graduates of the IIB (although a number of East German cadres still were trained at 
MGIMO, the Soviet Union’s main training site for foreign policy cadres, as well as other 
East German institutions).  
 Foreign policy instruction at the IIB, despite theefforts made throughout the 
decade, by the end of the 1960s still did not fully match the SED’s vision of a 
rationalized system of instruction fully oriented toward the practical foreign policy needs 
of the GDR. The two-year postgraduate course of study, which had been introduced in 
1963 and was intended to replace the existing four-yea  course of study, was viewed as 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
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early as 1965 as an unsuitable vehicle to train foreign policy cadres and little more than 
an “interim solution” since it was a course of supplementary study (participants had 
already gained a degree elsewhere in another field)an  “not part of a self-contained 
course of study.”24 The 1968 Secretariat resolution correspondingly spoke of the need “to 
configure anew the content and methods of instruction and education.”25 The result was 
the abolition of the two-year course of study, which was convened for the last time in 
March 1970,26 and its replacement by a comprehensive five-year cou se of study, which 
unlike the two-year course it replaced was treated s a stand-alone, not supplementary, 
course of study. The new five-year course of study in terms of form and content 
borrowed significantly from the previously existing four-year course of study (convened 
for the last time in September 1967), but the prevailing concern with rationalization and 
practical utility meant that each phase of instruction was even more minutely planned and 
keyed to the needs of the MfAA and other operative institutions than previously. The 
now-characteristic dual emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and specialist knowledge was 
fully in evidence in the new offering, which was divi ed into three parts: instruction in 
the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Grundstudium); general instruction in foreign 
policy (außenpolitisches Fachstudium), which was supposed to “build upon the study of 
the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism” and to “apply the knowledge gained thereby” to 
international relations; and regional specialization (außenpolitisches Spezialstudium) to 
produce region- and country-specific experts tailored to “the future function of 
                                                 
24 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1184. 
25 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1671. 
26 For an account of the last two-year postgraduate course from a participant who would go on to become 
an important figure in East German foreign policy exp rtise, see Helmut Ettinger, “Der letzte 
Zweijahreslehrgang,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen 
der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 65-69. 
 298
graduates” at the MfAA or other institutions of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus.27 In accord with the drive to produce regional experts, great emphasis was also 
placed on language instruction, the longtime bête noire of foreign policy expertise in the 
GDR: students of the new five-year course at the IIB were required to study three foreign 
languages, either three “world languages” (i.e. Russian, English, French, Spanish, and 
Arabic) or two world languages and one language specific to the student’s area of 
specialization, whereby the first foreign language was required to be Russian;28 students 
were also required to demonstrate their fluency in each language through mandatory 
proficiency exams, which were gradated according to the language’s relevance for 
students’ specialization.29 
The five-year course of study at the IIB, which was convened for the first time in 
September 1970 with 40 participants,30 would remain the main vehicle of foreign policy 
instruction in the GDR for the remainder of the state’s existence.31 In this time, 
approximately 90 percent of East German foreign policy cadres would go through the 
IIB.32 As was the case with research, the systematization of foreign policy instruction was 
to be fostered by vertical integration centered around the IIB, which served as the main 
                                                 
27 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1671. 
28 Language instruction at the IIB was limited to the“world languages” specified above; instruction in other 
foreign languages was provided at MGIMO in Moscow. 
29 The language requirement, either before the first five-year course was convened or soon thereafter, was 
reduced to the study of two foreign languages. 
30 PA AA, MfAA, C 5828. The program for the first five-year course of study drafted by the IIB itself, 
which goes into far greater detail on the features of instruction presented in the Secretariat resolution, 
highlighted the significance of the new course for fulfillment of the IIB’s mission: “[With the conveni g of 
the first five-year course] the transition to a new stage in realization of the institute’s objectives as principal 
bearer of foreign policy instruction will be completed.” 
31 For participants’ accounts of the five-year course of study, see Jochen Franzke and Lutz Kleinwächter, 
“Das fünfjährige Außenpolitikstudium,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für 
Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 71-79; and 
Wolfram Adolphi, “Fünf-Jahres-Studium Außenpolitik,” in ibid., 81-88. 
32 Benno-Eide Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1976-1989. Strategien und Grenzen (Paderborn: Schönigh, 
1999), 105n343. 
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pivot in the system by virtue of its position between the MfAA, to which it remained 
subordinate, and the region-specific and other research institutes, which were made 
subordinate to it. The new “system” was therefore meant to facilitate the smooth flow of 
authority and directives from top to bottom and to guarantee foreign policy instruction in 
complete conformity with the needs of the MfAA and the other operative foreign policy 
institutions of the GDR, such as the IV Division. The 1968 Secretariat resolution and the 
1969 Council of Ministers resolution33 that formally made its provisions binding capped 
the long period of construction, begun in the late 1940s, of a system of foreign policy 
instruction in the GDR that fully “joined theory with practice,” that is, completed the 
subordination of instruction to the political, ideological, and operational goals of the 
GDR’s dictatorially controlled foreign policy apparatus. By the early 1970s, the essential 
features of foreign policy instruction in the GDR were in place and the subsequent two 
decades would bring nothing more than minor changes. The most significant change 
would come rather in the output of experts trained within this system, which with its dual 
emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and specialist knowledge created an inherent, if still 
latent, tension between intellectual subordination and autonomy. 
 
The Consolidation of “Imperialism Research” 
The 1968 Secretariat resolution, despite its systematizing aspirations, clearly fell short of 
comprehensively revamping foreign policy research in the GDR as it completely passed 
over the two East German institutions engaged in “West expertise” (i.e. expertise 
concerned primarily with West Germany and secondarily with the capitalist West): the 
German Institute for Contemporary History (DIZ) and the German Economic Institute 
                                                 
33 BArch, DC 20/I/4/1942. 
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(DWI). The failure to include the two institutes in the reform can be attributed at least in 
part to the peculiar position occupied by the DIZ and the DWI within East Germany’s 
expert landscape. First, proper foreign policy research and analysis did not belong to the 
original objectives of either institution but only became a main area of activity after the 
profile of each had been extensively re-worked in the course of the 1950s and 1960s (the 
DIZ had begun as a center for documentation and propaganda and the DWI as a research 
institute dealing exclusively with economics). Second, the idiosyncratic nature of East 
Germany’s relationship with West Germany and the latt r’s unique importance for the 
international relations of the GDR had for a long time rendered research and analysis of 
West Germany a rather amorphously defined undertaking as the SED leadership grappled 
with how best to approach the very thorny matter of West Germany and the GDR’s 
position toward it. The SED’s vacillation between an “ ll-German” orientation and 
unabashed affirmation of the separate, socialist character of East Germany, which 
resulted in not insignificant measure from the ambiguity of the Soviet position on the 
GDR in its broader Cold War calculus, particularly in the 1950s, had significant 
consequences for how West expertise was understood and practiced since, as a 
subordinate element within the broader foreign policy apparatus, the orientation of West 
expertise was dependent on what function(s) the SEDwanted it to fulfill. Was expertise 
on West Germany to be nothing but another instrument of day-to-day operative policy 
toward West Germany and the West or was it also to be a “scientific” tool of longer-term 
analysis and prognostication, as was increasingly the case with foreign policy expertise in 
the GDR as a whole? The development of the DIZ and DWI in the 1960s largely resolved 
this question in favor of the latter option. As theSED conclusively abandoned all 
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elements of an “all-German” orientation and vehemently asserted the status of the GDR 
as an independent, socialist state behind the security provided by the Berlin Wall, the DIZ 
and DWI were subjected to the same type of rationalzation in service of synchronization 
as all the other institutions comprising the East German system of foreign policy 
expertise, which entailed “scientifying” expertise on West Germany and promoting its 
analytical, prognostic function. As was the case with the IIB and other expert institutions, 
rationalization in the 1960s laid the groundwork for the “systematization” of the work 
and performance of the DIZ and DWI that would be implemented starting in the late 
1960s and extending into the 1970s. 
The particular importance and sensitivity with which expertise on West Germany 
was invested as a result of the GDR’s peculiar relationship with the FRG would by no 
means disappear in the process of systematization; rather, the peculiar character of the 
GDR-FRG problematic would persist in the realm of West expertise even as the push for 
systematization would effect far-reaching institutional changes. The legacy of 
rationalization in service of operational and ideological subordination as carried out at the 
DIZ and DWI in the 1960s was mixed. Dramatic changes and frequent interventions on 
the part of party authorities had been required, but a high level of institutional 
standardization paired with thoroughgoing politicizat on and ideologization had been 
established at each institute after mid-decade—the “leading role of the party” was 
thoroughly realized at both institutes. However, the process of rationalization had been 
accompanied by a reworking of each institute’s profile that included in both cases a 
significant broadening of responsibilities. The responsibilities of the DIZ under the 
leadership of Stefan Doernberg (from 1962) expanded from external propaganda and 
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internal documentation to include analytical research on West Germany and the West in 
the realm of contemporary history (i.e. from 1945); the scope of research at the DWI had 
likewise expanded from a narrow focus on economics in West Germany and the West to 
include investigation of political and ideological issues in accord with its new mission for 
the “investigation and presentation of the development of state-monopoly capitalism in 
West Germany in its entirety”34 following the re-vamping of the institute under the 
leadership of Lutz Maier (from 1965). The process of rationalization thus actually created 
the need for rationalization where none had existed before since expansion of the two 
institutes’ responsibilities resulted in overlapping competencies and thematic duplication. 
Added to this was the still somewhat amorphous institutional position of West expertise 
within the broader East German foreign policy expertis  landscape as a result of the 
ambiguity that had earlier surrounded West expertise as an enterprise and its function(s) 
in the GDR—a simple tool of propaganda and day-to-day policy or instrument of 
“scientific” analysis and prognostication. While the decision to render expertise on West 
Germany and the West a clearly defined field of activity capable of providing a 
“scientific” foundation for operative policy (joinig “theory with practice,” as had been 
done with non-West foreign policy expertise) had ineed been made in the process of 
rationalization in the 1960s, the fact that this process was set in motion later for West 
expertise than for non-West expertise meant that the institutionalization and 
“scientification” of West expertise lagged somewhat behind. Correspondingly, the 
disentanglement of expertise on West Germany and the West from its earlier non-
“scientific” propagandistic and operative functions to become a clearly demarcated 
“scientific” undertaking concerned with expert analysis and prognostication was not as 
                                                 
34 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1216. 
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far advanced. This condition combined with the muddle of overlapping competencies and 
thematic duplication between the DIZ and DWI meant tha , given the broader push for 
systematization at the turn of the 1960s, the need for further efforts at rationalization was 
particularly pronounced at the DIZ and the DWI, theleading institutions dealing in “West 
expertise.” 
The push for the further rationalization and systematization of West expertise was 
carried out nearly simultaneously with the push for the systematization of foreign policy 
expertise discussed above, and with good reason: both were the result of a broader 
initiative to systematize the “Marxist-Leninist social sciences” in the GDR in their 
entirety. The key difference was that by late 1968, when the push was started, foreign 
policy expertise (i.e. as practiced at the IIB) was treated as a discrete field of activity and 
its systematization was implemented separately while t e West expertise practiced by the 
DIZ and DWI was still lumped together with disciplines like Marx and Engels research 
and sociology in the general category of social sciences, which provided the context for 
its systematization. It was on this backdrop that Kurt Hager, head of the Ideological 
Commission of the Central Committee, sounded the starting shot for the systematization 
of all social-scientific research in the GDR. Hager argued that the “intensification of the 
ideological struggle between socialism and imperialism” placed new demands on the 
social sciences: “Under the current conditions of struggle, the social sciences can only 
live up to their growing importance if research in all disciplines is concentrated in a 
consequent manner and teamwork is increased, if great efforts are undertaken to improve 
teaching and instruction and to apply more effective forms of organization, planning, and 
direction. It is precisely on this front of the class struggle that no shortcomings, no 
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mediocrity, no self-satisfaction whatsoever may be tolerated [italics in original].”35 In 
order to ensure the social sciences in the GDR met the demands voiced by Hager, the 
Politburo in October 1968, the same month the Secretariat passed its resolution on the IIB 
and foreign policy research, approved a proposal drafted by Hager and his Ideological 
Commission in collaboration with Hörnig’s Sciences Division that brought far-reaching 
changes to social-scientific research in the GDR. 
 The concrete measures taken echoed those taken to systematize foreign policy 
research around the IIB as central institute; the situation only differed insofar as the DIZ 
and DWI were just two institutions affected in the implementation of a much larger 
initiative while the IIB had essentially been the sole object of the 1968 Secretariat 
resolution. First, the resolution stipulated that all research within a given field had to be 
centrally coordinated. The injunction that “capable research collectives” be formed 
provided the impulse for the subsequent formation of a series of Räte, or councils, to 
fulfill this coordinating function that were placed under the chairmanship of designated 
Leitinstitute, or central institutes.36 A Rat für Imperialismusforschung, or Council for 
Imperialism Research, was created to coordinate all r search on “state-monopoly 
capitalism,” focusing particularly on West Germany but also encompassing 
“imperialism” (i.e. the capitalist West) as a whole. The DWI was named central institute 
for research on “state-monopoly capitalism in West Germany and in the systematic 
confrontation with West German imperialism,”37 yet the newly created Council for 
                                                 
35 SAMPO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1334. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. It appears that the DWI’s designation as central institute for research on “imperialism” entailed a re-
shuffling of the party and state bodies to which it was subordinate: the former switched from the Sciences 
Division to the West Division and the latter from the Ministry for Higher Education to the State Secretariat 
for West German Questions. However, the Sciences Divi ion, as the responsible party organ for all the 
social sciences, maintained a certain influence over the work of the DWI. 
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Imperialism Research was placed under the chairmanship of the Department of 
Imperialism Research of the Institute for the Social Sciences. The Politburo resolution 
also stipulated, as the Secretariat resolution on foreign policy research at the IIB had, that 
all social-scientific institutions of the GDR were to draft long-term research plans 
covering the years 1971-1975. The Council for Imperialism Research and the sundry 
other councils set up to coordinate research in other fields were likewise obligated to 
draft their own five-year research plans to prevent duplication in the selection of research 
topics and to foster joint projects between the various institutions that were under the 
councils’ aegis. All five-year research plans had to be submitted to the relevant division 
of the Central Committee for approval (e.g. the Council for Imperialism Research was 
required to gain the approval of the West Division f r its research plan). The 
Perspektivpläne drafted by individual institutes for the years 197-1975 were a key step 
in the establishment of thoroughgoing central coordination of all social-scientific research 
(including that of the DIZ and DWI) and lay the groundwork for the next step in the 
process: the formulation of the mammoth and far more c mprehensive Central Research 
Plan of 1976-1980, which encompassed non-West expertise foreign policy research as 
well after the IIB and the Council for Foreign Policy Research had had their own, 
separate Perspektivpläne for 1971-1975. Michael Klein has described the creation of 
central research plans in the wake of the VIII Party Congress in 1971 as evidence of the 
renewed emphasis on “rationalization (Versachlichung) of working methods and 
expansion of functionaries’ specialist qualifications.”38 
                                                 
38 Michael Klein, Das Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft der DDR in seiner Gründungsphase 
1971 bis 1974 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 67-68. 
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 The Politburo resolution on the social sciences thu  made significant progress in 
reducing the peculiarity of the position occupied by West expertise in the GDR, yet the 
resolution’s wide-ranging concern with the social sciences in their entirety also meant 
that a number of irregularities went unaddressed. The resolution lent the position and 
profile of the DWI new clarity by designating it central institute for imperialism research, 
but the exact function and profile of the DIZ—as well as its position vis-à-vis the DWI—
remained rather poorly defined. The DIZ became, alongside the DWI and the Department 
of Imperialism Research of the Institute for the Social Sciences, a central member of the 
DWI-led Council for Imperialism Research and was integrated into the new structure 
established for the central coordination of research on “imperialism” based around the 
DWI as central institute. As for the profile and responsibilities of the DIZ itself, the 
institute at the initiative of the Politburo resolution was to become a “center for political-
ideological information with its own research output in the framework of imperialism 
research.”39 In practice, however, this designation brought very little change as the DIZ 
continued its three-pronged approach toward West Germany and the rest of the capitalist 
West that combined propagandistic, documentary, and analytical activity, which, as the 
leadership of the DIZ envisioned it, were supposed to function in a mutually beneficial 
manner. The institute characterized its analytical work in January 1970, over a year after 
the Politburo resolution originally went into effect, in the following manner: “The 
emphasis of research activity must be placed on the formulation of theoretically grounded 
process analyses of prognostic character that fulfill the leadership requirements of party 
and state organs and that simultaneously provide the foundation for high-quality 
publications that effectively support the formation of socialist consciousness. Particular 
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weight should be attached to the offensive engagement (Auseinandersetzung) with 
imperialistic and revisionist, particularly West German, ideologues [italics in original].”40 
In other words, the Politburo resolution brought very little change to the practical 
activities of the DIZ; much more important was the fact that the DIZ was now embedded 
in the newly created structure for the central coordination of research on “imperialism.” 
The research responsibilities of the DIZ were so similar to those of those of the DWI, 
however, that the new framework for central coordination still failed to prevent continued 
thematic duplication in the work of the two institues. 
The creation of a centralized structure for the coordination of research on West 
Germany and the rest of the capitalist West, however, provided the forum for the gradual 
overcoming of the wastefulness and inefficiency created by the overlapping research 
profiles of the DIZ and the DWI. As early as the mid-1960s—when each institution 
began to take on more and more general research responsibilities on West Germany and, 
secondarily, the West—responsible officials were cognizant of the problems created by 
the overlapping competencies of the two institutes, which included a certain competition 
for resources aside from the simple inefficiency borne of duplication. A solution was 
sought in greater coordination and cooperation betwe n the two institutions, which in fact 
steadily increased from the mid-1960s and reached a first point of culmination with the 
creation of the Council for Imperialism Research and the establishment of a centralized 
system of administration for research on West Germany and the West based around the 
DWI in 1968. Cognizance of the problem, however, remained limited and further 
developments were necessary before decisive steps could be taken. Such steps were 
facilitated by the upgrading of the DWI’s status to “center of imperialism research in the 
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GDR” in 1970. Although the DWI had been named central institution for imperialism 
research by the 1968 Politburo resolution, chairmanship of the newly created Council for 
Imperialism Research had been given to the Department of Imperialism Research of the 
Institute for Social Sciences. A Secretariat resoluti n from February 1970 reversed this 
decision, which after all contradicted the stated objective of rationalization and central 
coordination around a single institution, as the chi f element in an effort aimed at “the 
further concentration of imperialism research in the GDR”: “The goal is the assurance of 
complex research on the social system of state-monopoly capitalism, particularly state-
monopoly capitalism in West Germany, with an emphasis on the economy.”41 The 
attention of the council, however, extended far beyond investigation of economic issues; 
economic issues were rather to be understood as one element of a larger, more complex 
whole: “This emphasis [on the economy] is to be realiz d in close connection with 
investigation of social processes in the class structu e, of the system of political rule, of 
ideological developments, and of the strategy of imperialism.”42 
 The re-constituted Council for Imperialism Research was chaired by Lutz Maier, 
the head of the DWI, and included representatives from a plethora of institutions 
connected in one way or another to the topic.43 However, the DWI and the DIZ, the latter 
of which was represented at the council by the Stefan Doernberg, the institute’s director, 
and other DIZ employees, were two of the council’s most active members and built upon 
existing forms of bilateral cooperation to develop an increasingly close working 
relationship. Initially, the council’s efforts were mainly directed at drafting its 1971-1975 
                                                 
41 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/1847. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Examples include: the State Secretariat for West Grman Questions (Herbert Häber), the West Division 
of the Central Committee (Max Schmidt), and the East German Academy of Sciences (Jürgen Kuczynski). 
Ibid. 
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Perspektivplan for the central coordination of imperialism research and the organization 
of collaborative projects. A great deal of time and e ergy was spent on designing the 
plan, and the final product revealed much about expectations relating both to the 
ideological character and the practical function of East German “imperialism research”:  
Imperialism research as a component part of the Marxist-Leninist social sciences must be 
organically integrated into the main strategic objective of shaping the developed social 
system of socialism in order to demonstrate imperialism’s lack of prospects and 
socialism’s superiority as a system and societal alernative to late capitalism. Its objective 
consists in creating a scientific manner of operating for the preparation of decisions of the 
organs of party and state, to which end systematic prognostic work must be developed, 
and contributing to the development of the consciousness of the population of the GDR, 
which demands a politically effective, scientifically grounded portrayal of capitalism’s 
process of decline, the exposure of its contradictions, and offensive engagement with 
imperialistic ideology.44 
Imperialism research, conducted in the main by the DIZ and the DWI, was tasked with 
using the considerable resources now at its disposable to analyze scientifically the 
capitalist world in order to aid in the process of foreign policy formulation, yet was 
expected to do so on the foundation of Marxist-Leninist presuppositions about the nature 
of international relations and the inevitable demise of capitalism.45 Demands such as 
these placed on imperialism research (and foreign policy expertise in its entirety for that 
matter) were not necessarily contradictory into the early 1970s since there existed a 
                                                 
44 BArch, DC 201/22. 
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strong correlation between the specific geo-strategic challenges faced by the GDR and 
the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist conception of inter ational relations that viewed 
socialism and capitalism as monolithic, contradictory blocs fighting out the inexorable 
class struggle on the international stage.46 It was only following achievement of foreign 
policy normalization in the first half of the 1970s and the unfolding of its consequences 
that the contradictions implicit in such demands would become explicit. In the immediate 
term, however, the re-constitution of the Council for Imperialism Research under the 
chairmanship of the DWI pushed forward the development of research on West Germany 
and the capitalist West into a discrete “scientific” undertaking (“imperialism research”), 
where West Germany still comprised the main object of investigation, but a much larger 
share of attention than previously was devoted to other “imperialist” powers of the West 
and that was closely connected with the practical foreign policy goals of the GDR yet 
clearly in possession of its own distinct profile, placing it on a par with the foreign policy 
research carried out by the IIB. And this was achieved in no small measure as a result of 
increased cooperation between the GDR’s two main institutes engaged in West expertise, 
the DWI and the DIZ. 
 It was precisely the intensification of cooperation between the DWI and DIZ 
facilitated by their collaboration in the Council for Imperialism Research and within the 
broader framework of the centralization of imperialism research around the DWI as 
central institution that engendered full recognition of the wastefulness and inefficiency 
created by the overlapping research responsibilities of the two institutes. Both the 
                                                 
46 This dual task was expressed neatly in the council’s preparatory material for the plan: “In the clash of 
systems between socialism and imperialism, the ideological struggle is continually intensifying. This 
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leadership of the DWI and the DIZ came to realize that he full potential of their 
institutions could not be fulfilled and their full weight could not be brought to bear on the 
stated goals of imperialism research as long as significant overlap and duplication existed 
in their work. In September 1970, the directors of the two institutes, Lutz Maier and 
Stefan Doernberg, came together to discuss these issu s in a meeting that had been 
agreed upon in a prior session of the Council for Imperialism Research. The express 
purpose of the meeting was to address “fundamental issues relating to closer cooperation 
between the DWI and the DIZ” based on recognition of “the necessity of articulating for 
both institutes in the framework of imperialism research a clear-cut scientific profile 
aimed at forming a larger unit of scientific research, of achieving the greatest possible 
complexity in research and information, and matching the continually growing demands 
in the area of research and information through greate  concentration of capacities and 
resources.”47 The option of complete fusion of the two institutes was discussed and 
received a favorable hearing. Fusion seemed to offer a number of significant benefits 
over the existing situation: “Assurance of uniform planning and direction of research 
processes; avoidance of the overlap in the assignment of tasks and research that arises 
with loose cooperation. Each institute strives for substantial complexity in its research, 
which in certain areas leads perforce to duplication. The consolidation of the two 
institutes would produce more effective possibilities for the composition of research 
groups; the availability of researchers will be raised; rapid and non-bureaucratic 
opportunities for exchange and work assignments. The opportunity for the complex 
processing of short-term research assignments from the party and state leadership.”48 The 
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option of complete fusion of the DWI and DIZ had never before been addressed with 
such seriousness by the heads of the two institutes and now became a real possibility. For 
the time being, however, the work of the two institutes continued as normal with both, for 
example, drafting separate research plans for the year 1971 as well as the period 1971-
1975.49 
 While Maier and Doernberg were thus increasingly cognizant of the drawbacks of 
the existing situation and, conversely, of the benefits fusion could bring, it is unclear to 
what extent the two directors were ultimately involved in the final decision that actually 
brought about the fusion of the DWI and DIZ. Whether party grandees like Hager, 
Hörnig, and Albert Norden, head of the West Commission of the Politburo, all of whom 
wielded great influence in the realm of imperialism research (the former two by virtue of 
their responsibility for scholarship, the latter by virtue of his involvement in operative 
policy toward West Germany), facilitated the Politburo’s decision completely at their 
own initiative or partly as a result of input from below (i.e. from Maier and Doernberg) 
remains an open question. What is certain, however, is that the fusion of the DWI and the 
DIZ to form a single institute ultimately depended on the consent of the highest party 
authorities and could not have alone been the result of Maier and Doernberg’s shared 
view that the interests of imperialism research in the GDR would be best served by 
fusion, however important a role this view may have played in fostering cognizance of 
the same among party leaders. The move, however, was doubtlessly consistent with the 
prevailing drive for rationalization and was a natur l extension of the ongoing push for 
the systematization in foreign policy expertise andthe social sciences in their entirety in 
the GDR. 
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 The final decision for fusion came with the Politburo’s approval of a resolution 
drafted by Norden in July 1971, less than a month after the VIII Party Congress of the 
SED, over which Erich Honecker presided for the first time as General Secretary 
following Walter Ulbricht’s removal from power. The DWI and the DIZ were to merge 
with the State Secretariat for West German Question and their competencies and 
resources were to be consolidated to form a new institution: the Institut für Internationale 
Politik und Wirtschaft (IPW), or Institute for International Politics and Economics, 
characterized by the Bundestag’s Enquete-Kommission as “the most important braintrust 
for SED policy on Germany.”50 The Politburo resolution on the founding of the IPW 
echoed the concerns voiced earlier by the DWI and DIZ themselves regarding 
overlapping competencies and thematic duplication and likewise highlighted the benefits 
rationalization of West expertise would bring. By consolidating the existing capacities of 
the DWI, DIZ, and the State Secretariat for West German Questions, whose main tasks 
had included propaganda directed at West Germany and evaluation of political processes 
there, the new IPW would be in a position “to make th  results of analytical and research 
work available for political use more quickly; largely to overcome the division between 
political and economic research on imperialism in the FRG; to expand and shape more 
systematically cooperation with relevant institutes of the Soviet Union and other socialist 
states; to increase the political and scientific efficacy of work on the basis of existing 
cadres and positions as well as heretofore expended financial means and spaces…to 
eliminate fragmentation in the publication of agitational material for West Germans and 
to obtain uniform political direction as well as cons lidation of material resources in this 
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area as well.”51 The new institute had two main functions to fulfill, one directed inward, 
the other directed outward: (1) systematic analysis of all facets of “imperialism” in West 
Germany and the capitalist West and provision of such information to leading organs of 
party and state and (2) propagandistic representatio  of the position of the GDR in its 
offensive engagement with “imperialistic” ideology. The responsibilities of the IPW 
immediately after its creation correspondingly did not significantly diverge from those of 
the institutes that had been merged to create it (ladership of the Council for Imperialism 
Research also naturally fell to the IPW). Indeed, the greatest difference consisted rather 
in the fact that the disparate responsibilities of the institute’s predecessor institutions were 
now fulfilled within the single, centralized institutional framework provided by the IPW, 
which, as had been the rationale for its creation, provided for more efficient, economical, 
and effective fulfillment of those responsibilities. 
 The first director of the IPW was Herbert Häber, previously deputy secretary in 
the State Secretariat for West German Questions, whose employees and resources were 
incorporated into the IPW. Lutz Maier, head of the DWI, and Stefan Doernberg, head of 
the DIZ, were made deputy directors of the newly created institution, with the former 
more responsible for covering domestic policy in the FRG and the West and the latter 
more responsible for covering the foreign policy of the FRG and the West.52 Häber’s 
tenure as director of the IPW, however, was extremely brief as he left the institute in 
1973 to become head of the West Division of the Central Committee, the party organ to 
which the IPW was subordinate. Häber’s brief tenure may have been due in part to his 
temperament and leadership style, which one former e ployee of the IPW has described 
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as authoritarian and a poor fit for the type of wissenschaftlich work the IPW was 
expected to produce.53 Häber in fact did not have a scholarly background, but his 
successor, Max Schmidt, did and managed the IPW in corresponding fashion. Schmidt, 
who was 41 years old at the time of his appointment as director of the IPW, embodied, 
like Gerhard Hahn, the head of the IIB, the combinatio  of political-ideological loyalty 
and well-grounded specialist knowledge the SED demanded of its leading cadres. Unlike 
Hahn, however, Schmidt’s background was in law (he rec ived his doctorate from the 
DASR) rather than foreign policy.54 A background in law nevertheless made Schmidt no 
less suitable a candidate for the directorship of the IPW; on the contrary, in combination 
with the practical experience and intimate familiarity with West Germany-related matters 
he had gained during his tenure in the West Division as section leader and deputy head, it 
made Schmidt the perfect choice to lead the GDR’s main institution dedicated to the 
sensitive area of “imperialism research” with all the complex political, ideological, and 
scientific considerations it entailed. In contrast to Häber, Schmidt proved himself capable 
of balancing the tensions that stemmed from the incongruous demand at the heart of the 
IPW’s mission of combining scientific analysis with deological faithfulness in order to 
produce analytical output fully attuned to the party’s practical needs in the realm of 
imperialism research. On this basis, Schmidt would lea  the IPW as director until its 
dissolution in 1990. 
News of the merger to create the IPW struck the rank-and-file employees of the 
DIZ like a bolt from the blue. On 13 July 1971, they were hastily summoned to a meeting 
at which they were informed their institute would be absorbed into the IPW. A former 
                                                 
53 Siegfried Schwarz, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, 9 June 2008. 
54 Biographisches Handbuch der SBZ/DDR, s. v. “Max Schmidt,” in Enzyklopädie der DDR, CD-ROM 
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employee has claimed that even Doernberg and Maier as respective heads of the DIZ and 
DWI were caught off guard by announcement of the impending merger, 55 yet given 
earlier discussions between the two on the appositeness of fusing the two institutes it is 
difficult to imagine the decision to create the IPW was made completely without the two 
directors’ input. Be that as it may, it stands to reason that the rank-and-file employees of 
the DWI and the State Secretariat for West German Questions, the other two institutions 
that were dissolved to create the IPW, were just as urprised by the news as those of the 
DIZ. Nearly all employees of the DWI, DIZ, and State Secretariat for West German 
Questions carried on their work at the newly created IPW. As a result, the IPW as the 
GDR’s new central institute for imperialism research employed a huge number of 
employees—approximately 450 by the mid-1970s.56 
 Given the number of employees with considerable experience and the 
consolidated resources at its disposal, the IPW was well-equipped to fulfill the dual task 
given to it by the SED leadership: systematic analysis of “imperialism” to aid in the 
process of policy formulation and propagandistic representation of the position of the 
GDR in the clash with “imperialistic” ideology. The latter function was fulfilled by 
publication of an entire range of different publicat ons with the monthly journal IPW-
Berichte the centerpiece of the IPW’s propagandistic efforts, which was supplemented by 
the quarterly IPW-Forschungshefte. The IPW-Berichte followed in the tradition of the 
DWI-Berichte, presenting “scholarly” substantiation of the East-German Marxist-Leninist 
perspective on the most important East-West issues of the day. Like the DWI-Berichte, 
the seeming seriousness and scholarly nature of the IPW-Berichte, which were not widely 
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available in the GDR itself, earned for the journal a certain degree of esteem in the West, 
where it was recognized as a potentially useful source of information on the SED’s 
orientation on East-West issues and deemed the only “readable” East German 
publication.57 Contemporary Western observers could occasionally even provide 
trenchant analysis of the internal workings of the GDR based upon a close reading of the 
IPW-Berichte.58 
 The newly created IPW was made up of four large topical divisions 
(Hauptabteilungen) corresponding to the main foci of the institute’s activity: economics, 
politics, ideology, and information.59 Each division was in turn sub-divided into 
specialized research units dedicated to a specific topi and staffed in most cases by 
specialists on the topic. The objectives of the IPW were defined in an exceedingly narrow 
manner and its activities, it was clear to director and rank-and-file employee alike, were 
subordinate at all times to the operational goals and ideological demands of SED 
leadership. The IPW was even explicitly told not to deal with questions relating to GDR 
foreign policy itself. During his brief tenure as director of the IPW, Herbert Häber 
commented on this issue to Albert Norden, the Central Committee secretary responsible 
for the IPW: “For an institute like the IPW that so-to-speak serves as central institute in 
the area of imperialism research focusing on the FRG, it’s unavoidable that it deals with 
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problems of a foreign policy nature and must provide input in this area. Of course, this 
doesn’t change the fact that we, as an institute, do not comment independently on 
questions of foreign policy.”60 
 The internal role of the IPW indeed consisted in providing analysis on which the 
SED leadership could draw in the process of policy formulation, not providing policy 
proposals on West Germany and the West, and the compulsion to produce output in 
accord with the party line was naturally ubiquitous and strong. Nevertheless, 
characterizations of the work of the IPW as shot-through with ideology, distant from 
reality, fully devoid of value, and lacking all substance61 fundamentally misunderstand 
the nature and function of foreign policy-related exp rtise in the GDR, whether at the 
IPW or the IIB. General adherence to the Marxist-Leninist paradigm and compliance 
with the given party line were certainly a sine qua non of such expertise, yet 
consideration of the foreign policy challenges facing the GDR on the basis of specialist 
knowledge also formed a key component of the work of experts at the IPW and IIB, 
which were expected to provide sound analysis of the outstanding issues facing the GDR. 
As Director Max Schmidt would later put it before the Bundestag’s Enquete-
Kommission: “Naturally, I was not responsible for the strategy and tactics of the SED, 
yet, as a political scientist, I dealt with strategic as well as tactical questions…. Part of 
our work, also because we tried to adopt a non-dogmatic approach, consisted in 
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examining real issues and also putting them into writing.”62 Furthermore, the overlap 
between the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding of foreign policy and the 
strategic interests of the GDR was strong into the 1970s and remained in place until the 
very end of the GDR. Even as the GDR increasingly took on the characteristics of a 
“status quo” state following foreign policy normalization, the distance between the two 
elements would grow, but a fully antithetical relationship between ideology and expertise 
would never develop. Rather, as the distance increased, it provided an opening for the 
tension between intellectual subordination and autonomy inherent to East German foreign 
policy expertise to become manifest. Subsequent interna ional relations developments 
would prompt some East German experts to view the rigid class-based approach to 
international relations as incapable of offering true insight while others would not, yet 
providing sound analysis of the most import foreign policy issue facing the GDR in the 
conditions of the East German dictatorship would remain a central concern for all. 
 With the fusion of the DWI, the DIZ, and the State S cretariat for West German 
Questions to create the IPW in 1971, the SED was now i  possession of a centralized 
institute to further its specifically defined goals in the area of imperialism research: 
systematic analysis of all facets of imperialism in West Germany and the capitalist West 
and provision of such information to leading organs of party and state and propagandistic 
representation of the position of the GDR in its offensive engagement with imperialistic 
ideology. The establishment of the IPW capped a process of centralization that had lasted 
for more than twenty years and that saw the progressiv  rationalization of expertise on 
West Germany and the West. This however was not simply rationalization for the sake of 
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rationalization but rather toward an explicit end: standardization and subordination of 
“West expertise” to the operative needs and politica -ideological requirements of the SED 
leadership in their dealings with West Germany and the West. The key elements in this 
process in the realm of imperialism research—the consolidation of existing resources and 
personnel within a single institute, the creation of a central coordinating body for West 
expertise (the Council for Imperialism Research), te establishment of an unambiguous 
hierarchical structure with authority flowing from top to bottom, and complete assurance 
of political-ideological compliance—were essentially the same in the case of general 
foreign policy research, where the centralization process reached its climax at precisely 
the same time. The IIB, although its responsibility for training foreign policy cadres and 
its subordination to the MfAA and the IV Division set it apart from the IPW, became by 
the early 1970s mutatis mutandis for general foreign policy research what the IPW had 
become for West expertise. With the culmination in the early 1970s of the process of 
systematization in the area of both general foreign policy research at the IIB and 
“imperialism research” at the IPW, the long-standing goal of establishing a 
comprehensive system of expertise in each area centered around a single institution, fully 
attuned to the practical needs of the relevant operativ  organs of party and state, and 
completely faithful to the political-ideological requirements of the party was 
accomplished. After this point, there would be no further substantive changes to the 
institutional make-up of foreign policy expertise in the GDR. The IIB and the IPW were 
firmly established as central institutions in their r spective fields and each in accord with 
its profile was expected to apply its expert analysis to aid the practical goals of the 
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GDR’s operative foreign policy institutions, whose institutional completion also took 
place in the first half of the 1970s. 
  
Operative Institutions and Expertise in the Era of F reign Policy Normalization 
The systematization of West expertise and foreign policy research around the IPW and 
IIB respectively was achieved at the same time the main period in the institutional 
development of the GDR’s operative foreign policy inst tutions was coming to a close. 
Although the consolidation of a settled institutional framework for the GDR’s operative 
foreign policy institutions took place roughly contemporaneously with the GDR’s 
achievement of foreign policy normalization, the two developments were not directly 
connected. The completion of institutional development in the early 1970s was rather the 
result of the lengthy process of supplanting the peculiar organizational elements of the 
East German foreign policy apparatus inherited from the initial provisional status and 
“all-German” orientation of the East German state in favor of the regularized, uniform 
structures characteristic of other state-socialist regimes conducting themselves as 
“normal,” sovereign states internationally. This process had proceeded apace from the 
very founding of the GDR in 1949, was accelerated in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and 
reached its climax in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Just as was the case with expert 
institutions, the GDR’s operative foreign policy institutions would undergo institutional 
changes in the period following the early 1970s, but by this time the fundamental 
structures, goals, and forms of interaction among operative institutions were firmly in 
place. The imperative to standardize, centralize, and “scientify” provided the impulse 
institutional development of operative foreign policy nstitutions, just as it had the 
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development of expertise institutions, and the completion of both processes in the late 
1960s/early 1970s meant that the GDR now possessed a full-fledged system of foreign 
policy expertise founded on what was supposed to be a symbiotic relationship between 
the two types of foreign policy institution in the GDR—operative institutions and 
research and teaching institutions—where analysis provided by expert institutions was 
meant to aid the performance of operative institutions and where the practical experience 
gained by operative institutions was supposed to enrich the analysis of expert institutions, 
with the unity of purpose created by subordination o centrally determined foreign policy 
goals in the SED’s dictatorial party-state underpinning the entire enterprise. 
 The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MfAA) remained the GDR’s largest operative 
foreign policy institution and occupied a central position within the GDR’s system of 
foreign policy, although not as a result of its influence over the GDR’s foreign policy. 
The MfAA had always been responsible for the execution of foreign policy, not for its 
formulation, and the ministry’s direct influence on foreign policy decisions became even 
more curtailed following Erich Honecker’s accession t  power in 1971. Although initially 
more focused on issues of domestic politics, which corresponded to his background, 
Honecker soon established his authority over all areas of foreign policy, where his 
influence became “nearly unlimited.”63 Honecker’s leadership style in foreign policy 
differed from that of Ulbricht, who ruled through established decision-making channels 
within the SED, in that he all but circumvented leading party bodies by presenting them 
with faits accomplis to be rubber-stamped after he had already made the key decisions on 
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the basis of informal consultations held beforehand.64 With time, authority in foreign 
policy-related matters would only become even more c ncentrated in the hands of 
Honecker personally and a small coterie of his closest confidants, such as Günther 
Mittag, Central Committee secretary for the economy, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, 
head of the Commercial Coordination (KoKo) Division f the Ministry for Foreign 
Trade, and Erich Mielke, head of the Ministry for State Security (MfS). The role of the 
GDR’s massive foreign policy apparatus, including the MfAA, was thereby largely 
reduced to faithfully fulfilling the policies and strategic orientation decided upon on high. 
The MfAA’s subordinate role in regard to policy formulation, however, in no way 
lessened it significance within the GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise. 
 The MfAA’s immense importance within the GDR’s system of foreign policy 
expertise derived both from the role its played within the system—it was responsible for 
coordinating foreign policy research and ensuring its subordination to the practical needs 
and ideological requirements of the ministry as well as those of the entire East German 
foreign policy apparatus—and from its own work, which ncluded the production of 
expert analysis by the ministry’s own sub-units. With the “systematization” of foreign 
policy research around the IIB as central institution, the MfAA occupied the key position 
at the top of the chain of command, from which it directed the research activities of the 
IIB and other subordinate institutions, coordinated projects, and molded curriculum for 
instruction, all in order to guarantee the complete subordination of foreign policy 
research to the practical foreign policy goals of the GDR. The establishment of the 
MfAA, the GDR’s most important operative foreign policy institution, as the final 
authority over now-rationalized foreign policy research represented the central element in 
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joining “theory with practice” and making foreign policy expertise in the GDR into a full-
fledged system working in a coordinated manner toward a single goal and not simply a 
collection of disparate institutions lacking central direction. 
 The MfAA’s importance for East German foreign policy expertise also derived 
from the fact that the ministry did not simply rely upon the expertise produced by other 
institutions like the IIB but produced a significant amount of its own as each sub-unit of 
the MfAA, which was divided into Sach- and Regionalabteilungen, or topical (e.g. 
international economic organizations) and regional divisions (e.g. USA, Canada, and 
Japan), produced expertise in accord with its area of specialization. Although a fair 
amount of the expertise produced by the MfAA’s various divisions dealt more with day-
to-day, operative issues of limited scope (which was thus of a different character than 
“scientific” expertise conducted, for instance, at the IIB) than in-depth analyses of longer-
term developments and prognostic reports, the latter typ  of expertise was by no means a 
rarity at the MfAA. Not only were regional divisions periodically called upon to furnish 
assessments that considered developments in their area of specialization in relation to the 
strategic interests and current concerns of the GDR and the prevailing “international 
constellation of forces,” but individual cadres, in accord with their specialist training, 
were also expected to go beyond familiarity with individual issues to have comprehensive 
knowledge of the most important issues facing a given region and how they would affect 
the interests of the GDR. Furthermore, the Division for Fundamental Questions and 
Planning (Hauptabteilung Grundsatzfragen und Planung), which in 1973 replaced the 
Division for Foreign Policy Planning and was directly subordinate to foreign minister 
Otto Winzer, had as one its express goals the formulation of scientific and conceptual 
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studies to contribute to “a precise, systematically controlled, scientifically managed 
foreign policy.”65 The Division for Fundamental Questions and Planning, focusing on 
larger questions of foreign policy strategy, became  c nter of “scientific” foreign policy 
expertise and by virtue of this status was one of the main contact partners for experts 
from the IIB, which frequently collaborated with their colleagues in the MfAA. 
Furthermore, the imperative to “scientify” its work affected the MfAA in the late 
1960s—just as it did the purely expert institutions—and further increased the importance 
of the analytical element in the ministry’s work. In the same time period that the APK 
was deliberating on measures for “the creation of a uniform system of research and 
instruction in the area of foreign policy” that would lead to the systematization of foreign 
policy research discussed above, it also addressed how to establish a more scientific 
manner of working at the MfAA, particularly in the area of “long-term analysis of 
international developments [and] long-term prognostication and planning in the realm of 
the foreign relations of the GDR.”66 The sum effect of all these developments was the 
creation of analytical capacities at the MfAA that fit seamlessly into the broader 
enterprise of foreign policy expertise in the GDR, which by this time had taken on a 
systemic character. 
 The position of the MfAA as a main pillar within the East German system of 
foreign policy expertise was cemented by the late 1960s/early 1970s, when its main 
period of institutional development came to an end. As with the GDR’s expert 
institutions, it was not the case that no further institutional changes whatsoever would 
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take place, but, following an approximately twenty-year period of development, the now-
uniform structures of the MfAA and its profile and accompanying responsibilities within 
the East German foreign policy apparatus were firmly established.67 One of the most 
significant changes at the MfAA—Oskar Fischer’s ascension to the position of foreign 
minister following Otto Winzer’s death in 1975—brought no far-reaching changes to the 
position the MfAA. Despite his good relations with Honecker, Fischer, out of no fault of 
his own, presided over a MfAA that continued to function in accord with its narrowly 
circumscribed role, i.e. above all as an executive organ: “[Fischer] remained Honecker’s 
gofer (Erfüllungsgehilfe) who, although he was well-liked in the ministry for his modesty 
and his commitment, did not possess his own power basis.”68 The onset of foreign policy 
normalization in the first half of the 1970s greatly increased the number of persons 
employed at the MfAA, which reached approximately 3,000 in the 1980s,69 and generally 
increased the prestige associated with foreign service in the GDR,70 but did not bring 
significant changes to the basic institutional structure of the ministry. With “the 
conclusion of consolidation” in the period 1967-1972, “an organizational and 
administrative structure had emerged at the foreign ministry which largely corresponded 
to the demands on a modern and functional foreign policy apparatus within the power 
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structures of the GDR and which in its basic structures hardly changed until 
1989/1990.”71 
 The International Relations (IV) Division of the Central Committee played a 
similarly important role in the system of foreign policy expertise established in the GDR 
by the early 1970s, by which time the IV Division’s position as leading party organ 
dealing exclusively with foreign policy had been log established. As the division had 
developed in the 1950s and 1960s, it took on responsibility for two main tasks: 
cultivation of relations with foreign political parties, many of which, though not all, were 
communist, and direction of the state foreign policy apparatus of the GDR, with the 
MfAA comprising the main institution, whose instituional structure was mirrored by that 
of the IV Division. Although the IV Division was small in comparison with the MfAA—
the number of political functionaries it employed grew from approximately 30 in the 
early 1960s to over 100 in the 1980s72—it retained ultimate authority over the ministry 
and, by virtue of its position as the SED’s top foreign policy body and as intermediary 
between the Politburo and Secretariat and the rest of the party and state apparatus, 
possessed a certain amount of influence over the shaping of policy that the MfAA could 
never hope to gain. Similar to the MfAA, however, the IV Division’s importance for 
foreign policy expertise in the GDR stemmed both from its responsibility for directing 
foreign policy research and from its role as a producer of expertise itself. The IV Division 
had been intimately involved in every step of the institutional development of East 
German foreign policy expertise since its inception and, like the MfAA, guaranteed the 
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full subordination of research to the GDR’s practical foreign policy goals through its 
authority over the foreign policy apparatus, which included strict oversight of the 
research activities of the IIB and other research institutions. Paul Markowski, who took 
over leadership of the division in 1966 and who stood head and shoulders above most 
other party functionaries for his intelligence, openn ss, and flexibility, headed the 
division for most of the 1970s and fostered a comparatively critical atmosphere among its 
employees. A former subordinate, for instance, recalls that Markowski internally voiced 
criticism of the black-and-white foreign policy vision of the “antiquated and half-
educated party leadership.”73 The nature of the IV Division’s work, which was based 
around intimate familiarity with the complexities of international relations, also 
contributed to a critical disposition among the division’s employees that did not mesh 
particularly well with the prevalent Marxist-Leninist simplification of foreign policy to a 
form of the class struggle since, of all the East German cadres involved in one form or 
another with foreign policy expertise, the specialists of the IV Division probably had the 
most complete picture of the foreign relations of the GDR as they actually were. Access 
to otherwise restricted knowledge and sources (including those from the West) as well as 
the opportunity to travel abroad, for which members of the IV Division were 
simultaneously disliked and envied, only bolstered the IV Division’s tendency for 
independent analysis. The division even had a reputation of being “Honecker-feindlich,” 
or hostile toward Honecker.74 The expertise produced by the IV Division itself did not 
address only issues of immediate, operative importance but also covered longer-term 
analysis and prognostication. Although Markowski died together with Werner Lamberz, 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 34. 
74 Ibid., 35. 
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his close friend and Honecker’s likely successor in the SED, in 1978 in a helicopter crash 
above Libya, the IV Division’s tradition of independence of thought would subsequently 
be carried on by his successors, Egon Winkelmann (head of the IV Division 1978-1980) 
and Günther Sieber (1981-1989), under whose leadership in the 1980s the IV Division 
would make a key contribution to East German experts’ b eak with a strict Marxist-
Leninist understanding of international relations.75 
 The Foreign Policy Commission (APK) of the Politburo, although it fulfilled a 
function quite different than both the MfAA and the IV Division, continued to play an 
important role in East German foreign policy expertis  following the latter’s 
systematization. The basic mission of the APK remained unchanged in the 1970s and 
1980s: it was to fulfill an advisory and coordinatig function in the realm of foreign 
policy, in respect both to the GDR’s foreign relations and the internal development of the 
GDR’s foreign policy apparatus.76 In contrast to the IV Division, the APK was not a 
standing body—it met on a periodic basis—and its work did not directly deal with day-
to-day operative foreign policy. Instead, it fulfilled its advisory and coordinating function 
by holding consultations on select issues, which in t e 1960s had always been chosen for 
inclusion in the APK’s agenda with the express approval of Walter Ulbricht. Hermann 
Axen, Central Committee secretary of international relations, after taking over leadership 
of the APK from the late Heinrich Rau in 1962, provided for great continuity at the top of 
the commission as he would head the commission for the emainder of the GDR’s 
existence. After learning of the perils associated with opposition to the party line during a 
                                                 
75 In its penchant for a hardnosed approach, the IV Division thus mirrored the International Division of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU, its Soviet analog. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), 19-20. 
76 For a listing of the commission’s agendas in the 1970s, see SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.115/18. 
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short period in the political wilderness in the mid-1950s following his support for 
Ulbricht’s intraparty rivals Wilhelm Zaisser and Rudolf Herrnstadt, Axen subsequently 
deferred to the wisdom of SED leaders in all matters. However, the APK under Axen’s 
leadership was not conceived of simply as a body to provide confirmation of existing 
policy but, while remaining within designated boundaries, was expected to make a 
constructive contribution on the issues it addressed, whether assessing the continued 
development of the international constellation of forces vis-à-vis the West or considering 
how best to streamline foreign policy expertise in the GDR. The membership of the APK, 
which included some of the most important figures in East German foreign policy, 
likewise bespoke a certain critical potential. The APK began the 1970s with 18 members, 
including Paul Markowski, head of the IV Division, Otto Winzer, minister of foreign 
affairs, Peter Florin, former head of the IV Division and currently a secretary of state at 
the MfAA, Manfred Feist, head of the Central Committee’s Foreign Propaganda 
Division, and Gerhard Hahn, head of the IIB.77 Discussion in the APK was said to be 
“concrete and open” in comparison to leading party o gans like the Politburo and 
Secretariat,78 which should not necessarily come as a surprise given the intimate 
familiarity of the commission’s members with the practical foreign policy challenges 
facing the GDR. 
 Broad agreement exists79 that the influence of the APK on the actual formulation 
of policy declined over time—particularly in the 1980s, when decision-making authority 
in foreign policy matters increasingly centered around the person of Erich Honecker and 
                                                 
77 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2/1344. 
78 Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, 76-79. 
79 Wentker, Außenpolitik, 376-377; Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, 76-79; Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik, 
60-61. 
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a miniscule group of his closest confidants80—but this should not distract from the 
continuing importance of the APK for East German foreign policy expertise on the 
whole. In fulfilling its designated functions, the commission both produced it own 
expertise and drew on that produced by other institutions. By virtue of its coordinating 
role, it also retained importance for the internal development of East German foreign 
policy expertise, in whose formative development it had been intimately involved. 
Finally, the APK, similar to the situation with the IV Division, enjoyed a privileged 
perspective on East German foreign policy since the commission’s members represented 
some of the leading East German figures involved in practical foreign policy. This 
knowledge of the GDR’s foreign relations as they actu lly were as well as the ability 
realistically to judge the GDR’s prospects and problems created a critical potential that, 
as challenges to the Marxist-Leninist foreign policy paradigm would mount in the years 
to come, would receive expression on several occasions. 
 
Conclusion 
By the mid-1970s the institutional development of East German foreign policy expertise 
in its fundamental outlines was complete. The process of rationalization in service of 
synchronization that had advanced unevenly though continually from the very creation of 
the SED in 1946 culminated in the full “systematization” of East German foreign policy 
expertise in the early 1970s. In the IIB and IPW, general foreign policy expertise and 
West expertise as the two branches of foreign policy research were centralized around a 
single institution responsible for molding its own research and that of subordinate 
                                                 
80 One clear indication of the APK’s waning influence in later years was the increasing infrequency and 
irregularity of its meeting—from the mid-1980s, only four yearly meetings were planned. Siebs, Die
Außenpolitik der DDR, 76-79. 
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institutions to meet the practical goals and political-ideological requirements of the 
respective operative institutions to which it was in turn subordinate. The clear flow of 
authority from top to bottom within a uniform and centralized hierarchy effectively 
brought about the long-desired union of “theory with practice” and transformed what 
previously was a disparate set of institutions oftentimes working at cross-purposes or 
inefficiently duplicating one another’s output into a full-fledged system of foreign policy 
expertise wielded together by the dictatorial rule of the SED and the unity of purpose in 
foreign policy expertise it imparted. 
And this unity of purpose was at the center of East Germany’s system of foreign 
policy expertise in that it provided a uniform orientation and set of goals for the various 
institutions which comprised the system and which differed greatly from one another in 
respect to their specific field of activity. The systemic nature of East German foreign 
policy expertise was expressed in the expectation that interaction and collaboration 
between expert institutions like the IIB and the IPW and their operative counterparts like 
the MfAA and the IV Division would take on a symbiotic character. Analysis provided 
by expert institutions was meant to aid the performance of operative institutions and the 
practical experience gained by operative institutions was in turn supposed to enrich the 
analysis of expert institutions. Despite functional differentiation, there was in theory to be 
no clear distinction between the work of exclusively xpert institutions and operative 
institutions—foreign policy expertise was viewed as a cientific undertaking based on the 
tenets of Marxism-Leninism with the sole purpose of advancing the centrally designated 
foreign policy goals of the GDR. The desired symbiosis between expert and operative 
institutions, further, was not limited to institutional coordination and cooperation within 
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the newly centralized institutional framework of exp rtise, but also extended to include 
extensive personnel overlap and exchange. Nearly all the institutions of East German 
foreign policy expertise, whether expert or operative, drew essentially on the same pool 
of cadres—those trained at the IIB and, to a lesser extent, at MGIMO in Moscow. The 
“socialist foreign policy cadres” that overwhelmingly populated the institutions 
comprising East Germany’s system of foreign policy expertise by the 1970s, whether as 
an expert on the UN and other international organizations at the IIB or as a specialist on 
sub-Saharan Africa at the MfAA, went through a rigoous process of both political-
ideological schooling and thorough specialist training that guaranteed a fundamental 
uniformity in outlook as well as understanding of what the role of foreign policy 
expertise in East Germany was supposed to be. Cadres trained in this manner 
unsurprisingly worked extremely well with another ac oss institutional divides in most 
cases, contributing to the desired symbiosis between purely expert and operative 
institutions. Beyond a common understanding of the rol  of foreign policy expertise, 
which facilitated fruitful cross-institutional cooperation within East German foreign 
policy expertise, symbiosis was further fostered by frequent exchanges of personnel. The 
shared background of East German foreign policy cadres paired with the unity of purpose 
at the center of the system of foreign policy expertis  allowed individuals to switch from 
institution to institution with ease (whether in the form of short-term exchanges or 
permanent change) and/or simultaneous membership in several bodies. Such far-reaching 
personnel exchange and overlap was at once both a cause and a result of the unity of 
purpose at the center of East German foreign policy expertise, which by the early 1970s 
lived up to the demands for systematization placed on it by SED leadership. 
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 The systematization of East German foreign policy expertise thus effected the 
total subordination of expertise to the sole practical-political purpose of advancing the 
GDR’s foreign policy goals. Total subordination, however, was not without its 
contradictory elements since the GDR’s “socialist foreign policy cadres,” who populated 
the system and whose training contained equal partsolitical-ideological schooling and 
specialist instruction, were expected to generate ou put that was directly relevant to the 
GDR’s practical activities, which could easily clash with categorical maxims from drawn 
the Marxist-Leninist canon. This dynamic had the potential to check the tendency toward 
overbearing ideological interpretation and to manifest itself in a fundamental tension 
between the two poles—realpolitical and ideological—of East German foreign policy 
expertise. This tension remained latent for a long time since the GDR’s peculiar strategic 
situation and diplomatic isolation meant the GDR’s actual interests corresponded nicely 
to Marxist-Leninist tenets of foreign policy, which fostered the fusion among East 
German experts of the GDR’s interests with the Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
foreign policy to create a GDR-specific conception of international relations. It was only 
after foreign policy normalization in the first half of the 1970s that the objective basis for 
the Marxist-Leninist foreign policy paradigm in East German would grow weaker as the 
strong correlation between the GDR’s interests and a strict dichotomous understanding of 
foreign policy would begin to dissolve. In the wake of the GDR’s greatest foreign policy 
triumph, however, the Marxist-Leninist paradigm in East German foreign policy 








The “systematization” push of the late 1960s and early 1970s brought about the 
institutional completion of East German foreign policy expertise. What began as a 
hodgepodge of inefficient, haphazardly organized, poorly coordinated institutions with 
imprecisely defined responsibilities had become a highly effective, thoroughly 
coordinated, and professional system of expertise. Th  IIB and the IPW were established 
as, respectively, the central institutions of general foreign policy expertise and West 
expertise and their work became fully coordinated with the needs of the MfAA and the 
IV Division, the two most important operative foreign policy institutions of, respectively, 
state and party. The systematization of foreign policy expertise completed the process of 
rationalization in service of synchronization begun in the 1950s and realized the SED’s 
long-sought union of “theory with practice,” where the unity of purpose provided by the 
party’s dictatorial rule would ensure that, despite functional differentiation, operative and 
expert institutions worked together in a tight symbiosis on the basis of adherence to the 
tenets of Marxism-Leninism and with the sole purpose f advancing the centrally 
designated foreign policy goals of the GDR. At the same time, institutional completion 
also conclusively entrenched the dynamic of tension between intellectual subordination 
and autonomy, between ideology and specialist knowledge, within East German foreign 
policy expertise. 
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 The systematization process also had an important impact on the training of 
foreign policy cadres. Efforts to bring about the id al “socialist foreign policy cadres” 
desired by the SED who would be politically and professionally qualified in equal 
measure had been a central component in the process f rationalization in service of 
synchronization in the 1960s. In the context of systematization, the SED’s declared goal 
for the training of foreign policy cadres became producing “party functionaries in the 
realm of foreign policy.” The profile of this new type of foreign policy cadre did not 
different substantively from the profile of the ideal type it replaced—the same 
characteristic combination of political-ideological subordination with expert knowledge 
and professional competency distinguished the SED’s “party functionaries in the realm of 
foreign policy” as it had the “socialist foreign policy cadres” of the previous period. Any 
changes inaugurated by the new concept were rather changes in degree than in kind. Yet 
the changes in degree the new concept entailed were in fact quite important since they 
placed renewed emphasis on the importance of specialist knowledge and professional 
competency in the training—and work—of the East German foreign policy cadres. In the 
détente era, which saw the dramatic growth of the GDR’s foreign relations following 
foreign policy normalization, the complexities of the numerous new challenges facing the 
GDR demanded the type of knowledge and thoroughgoing familiarity that only a 
specialist could provide. In fact, under the combined impact of systematization and 
foreign policy normalization, the center of gravity within East German foreign policy 
expertise would tack ever more in the direction of specialist knowledge and professional 
competency to the detriment of ideological dogmatism. 
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 The actualization of East German foreign policy expertise’s critical potential in 
terms of concrete analysis, however, would be delayed by foreign policy normalization, 
or rather the manner in which normalization was achieved. Fulfillment of the GDR’s 
greatest foreign policy goal—establishing diplomatic relations with the world outside the 
Soviet Bloc in order to become a “normal” foreign policy actor—was achieved not as a 
result of the GDR’s own efforts but as part and parcel of the broader gains made by 
“international socialism” (i.e. the Soviet Bloc) in the détente era. As a result, the East 
Germany’s achievement was seen not as the key moment in the transformation of the 
GDR into a normal state actor with a discrete set of idi syncratic interests but of a piece 
with the inexorable forward march of socialism—the notion that the GDR’s interests and 
those of international socialism were one and the same was reinforced. Thus, just as the 
strong correlation between the actual conditions in which the GDR had to conduct 
foreign policy and the dichotomous class-based understanding of international relations 
began to dissolve, experts’ GDR-specific foreign policy conception that fused East 
Germany’s clearly identified realpolitical interests with ideological precepts drawn from 
the Marxist-Leninist canon actually reached its zenith. It was only after the fortunes of 
international socialism were reversed at the start of the 1980s that this ideological 
triumphalism would yield to a more sober accounting of the GDR’s foreign relations and 
would activate the latent tension between ideology and specialist knowledge inherent to 
the mission of East German foreign policy experts. 
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“Abgrenzung” and Expertise in the Détente Era 
Foreign policy normalization placed new demands on the training of foreign policy 
cadres in the GDR. On the one hand, increasing importance was placed on acquiring 
specialist knowledge and professional competency in order to meet the new and more 
varied challenges facing the GDR; on the other, foreign policy normalization and the 
broader process of détente also led to intensification of the ideological element in East 
Germany’s general foreign policy orientation. Erich Honecker, who replaced Walter 
Ulbricht as head of the SED in May 1971, was acutely aware that détente represented a 
certain danger to the GDR because it threatened to undermine the Cold War antagonism 
at the very heart of East Germany’s raison d’être as a clearly defined socialist state of the 
German nation. So that rapprochement between East and West and between the GDR and 
the FRG could not undermine this central pillar of the GDR’s legitimacy, Honecker set 
the country on a clear course of ideological Abgrenzung, or demarcation, vis-à-vis the 
capitalist West in general and West Germany in particular. The hope was that 
demarcation and the corresponding intensification of the ideological element in the self-
presentation of East German foreign policy would counteract the effects of conciliation 
and engagement with the capitalist enemy. 
This orientation reigned supreme at the VIII Party Congress of the SED in June 
1971, over which Honecker presided as newly confirmed First Secretary. The social 
scientists of the GDR were called upon “fully and effectively to unveil the misanthropic 
essence of imperialism” for which task “Lenin’s theory of imperialism…is our 
intellectual instrument.”1 The orientation received further confirmation in 1972, when 
Honecker designated West Germany “imperialistisches Ausland” (an imperialist foreign 
                                                 
1 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/ IV A 2/2.024/56. 
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country) and, in what was the final nail in the coffin of the GDR’s “all-German” 
orientation toward a unified, communist Germany, for whose realization serious hope had 
long been given up, the constitution of the GDR (ratified in 1968) was revised in 1974 to 
remove all references to the German nation.2 With the attempted replacement of German 
with socialist nationhood, combined with efforts to make a clean break with the Ulbricht 
era, a January 1973 Politburo resolution3 expunged references to both from the name of 
the DASR, where the IIB was housed, dropping “German” as well as “Walter Ulbricht” 
from the name of the academy so that it was simply called Akademie für Staats- und 
Rechtswissenschaft (ASR), or Academy for the Study of State and Law.4 
Ideological demarcation vis-à-vis West Germany and the capitalist West, 
however, was to have a much greater impact on East German expertise than a simple 
change of name. In October 1971, shortly after the VIII Congress, Kurt Hager, head of 
the Politburo’s Ideological Commission and the party’s leading authority in ideological 
matters, gave a lecture at the SED’s Party School “Karl Marx” on “The Tasks of the 
Social Sciences after the VIII Party Congress,” in which he expounded on the 
implications of ideological Abgrenzung in response to the nascent process of foreign 
policy normalization. Hager first underscored the continued centrality of Marxism-
Leninism as the theoretical foundation for all practical activities of the SED: “In all of its 
                                                 
2 The most conspicuous change was found in the first line of the constitution, which was changed from 
“The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of the German nation” to read “The German 
Democratic Republic is a socialist state of workers and farmers.” For a detailed discussion of ech German 
state’s self-understanding as reflected in their respective constitutions, see Horst Möller, “1949. Zwei 
deutsche Staaten, eine Nation? Zum nationalen Selbstv rständnis in den Verfassungen der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und der DDR,” in Das doppelte Deutschland. 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz, eds. Udo Wengst 
and Hermman Wentker (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2008), 15-34. 
3 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1656. 
4 The Politburo resolution may have simply confirmed what had already occurred in practice since a notice 
in Neues Deutschland from March 1972 announcing the appointment of Gerhard Schüssler as new rector of 
the academy already referred to it by its new name. Neues Deutschland, 4 March 1972. 
See also Ulrich Bernhardt, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft “Walter Ulbricht” 
1948-1971 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1997), 205. 
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activities, our party conducts itself in accord with Marxism-Leninism, the most 
progressive, revolutionary science of the present age. It is the unshakeable foundation of 
our theoretical and ideological work.”5 Hager also highlighted the ideological task of the 
social sciences specific to the time period when rapprochement between East and West 
and between the GDR and the FRG was proceeding apace:  
[The Marxist-Leninist social sciences] face the task of conveying knowledge and 
conviction of the historical greatness and purpose of our actions under often difficult 
conditions and conveying understanding and conviction of the correctness of our path to 
the members of the party and all workers, in a word, f contributing to the formation of a 
socialist worldview, to the enlightenment of the workers in the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism. This can only occur through constant offensive engagement with bourgeois 
ideology as well as revisionism of all shades, whose attacks upon our theory and 
worldview grow stronger to the extent that the socialist world system and the entire 
revolutionary world movement continue to grow, that vic ories in the struggle for the 
safeguarding of peace are achieved, and that the GDR in community with the Soviet 
Union and the other socialist states further strengthens its position.6 
Hager highlighted one danger in particular, namely that rapprochement between East and 
West could undermine the theoretical integrity of Marxism-Leninism and thereby strike a 
blow at the heart of the ideology upon which the legitimacy of the GDR and the entire 
Soviet Bloc was founded. Hager’s depiction of the situation conformed with the position 
of Honecker and other SED grandees, which had provided the impulse for ideological 
Abgrenzung to begin with. Conciliation between East and West appeared particularly 
dangerous because it could dilute a strict ideological viewpoint by replacing a class-based 
                                                 
5 SAMPO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/2.024/56. In addition tobeing printed as a pamphlet, Hager’s lecture was 
also deliberated upon and approved by a meeting of the Politburo. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2 J/3708. 
6 SAMPO-BArch, DY 30/IV A 2/2.024/56. 
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position in favor of “general human values (allgemein menschliche Werte).”7 Hager 
highlighted the potential dangers of rapprochement on the example of the aggressive 
character of imperialism: “The exposure of the aggressiveness of imperialism, 
particularly the imperialism of the FRG, is especially urgent because imperialist 
ideologues and social-democratic politicians alike currently seek to make people believe 
that, in light of the treaties that the administration of the FRG concluded with the 
governments of the USSR and the PR Poland and the Four-Power Agreement on West 
Berlin and the more realistic approach among Western politicians toward individual 
international questions, imperialism has lost its aggressive character.”8 In response to this 
threat, Hager demanded complete ideological clarity nd consistency from the GDR’s 
social scientists as constant affirmation of the “class-based perspective” was seen as the 
only means of checking the advance of ideological dilution: “Social scientists and 
propagandists bear great responsibility for the unmasking and annihilation of the 
ideological diversion of the enemy, for the heightening of class vigilance” as well as for 
“theoretically grounding in a comprehensive and convincing fashion the class essence of 
socialism and its internationalist character.”9 
 Hager’s injunctions to the assembled social scientists of the GDR were not 
directed exclusively or specifically toward issues of foreign policy instruction, yet 
nevertheless had great import for the training of foreign policy cadres at the IIB. The 
presentation, given by one of the SED’s leading authorities on ideology and the social 
sciences, expounded the party’s vision for the role of social-scientific expertise in the era 
                                                 
7 Ibid. Not for nothing, the same exact term would later be used, but with a positive connotation, by East 




of foreign policy normalization. An intensification of the ideological element in expertise 
in the form of Abgrenzung from the capitalist world was viewed as necessary to 
counteract the very serious danger of ideological dilution as a result of the East-West 
conciliation at the heart of the détente process. Ideological retrenchment in the face of 
practical engagement with the West became the guiding principle of social-scientific 
expertise in the era of foreign policy normalization, and the training of socialist foreign 
policy cadres was shaped to conform to these expectations. Simultaneously, however, this 
tendency was partially offset by another need created by foreign policy normalization: the 
need for ever-higher levels of qualification and skill among East German foreign policy 
cadres in order to deal successfully with the more c mplicated set of international 
relations issues now facing the GDR. The tension betwe n the ideological and the expert 
in East German foreign policy expertise continued unabated, yet the latter element was 
gaining more and more in importance at the expense of the former. 
 
The IIB and the Training of “Party Functionaries in the Realm of Foreign Policy” 
As the push for systematization was applied to foreign policy training in order guarantee 
production of cadres fully attuned to the practical needs and political-ideological 
requirements of the MfAA, the IV Division, and the GDR’s other operative foreign 
policy institutions, the bulk of the effort was directed at the Institute for International 
Relations (IIB), long established as the GDR’s premier foreign policy “cadre forge.” The 
basic features of the ideal foreign policy cadre had been in place since the 1950s, but it 
was only with the rationalization and, finally, the systematization of foreign policy 
instruction in the GDR that the necessary institutional framework for full realization of 
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this vision was established. Foreign policy instruction was marked by a dual emphasis on 
Marxism-Leninism and specialist knowledge, which were largely seen as flip sides of a 
single coin rather than discrete, let alone incongruous, elements. Marxism-Leninism, 
which saw the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism as the defining 
feature of international relations, formed the basic framework for training, within which 
thoroughgoing specialist training was intended to produce experts who, whether working 
as an attaché at a foreign embassy or as an analyst at the IIB, could skillfully identify and 
contribute to realization of the GDR’s concrete foreign policy interests. The SED’s ideal 
foreign policy cadres were expected to be, as a report from 1979 would have it, 
“Parteiarbeiter auf außenpolitischem Gebiet,”10 or party functionaries in the realm of 
foreign policy, who were both faithful Marxist-Leninists and true specialists. 
 Whereas the 1950s and 1960s had been characterized by, first, the working-out of 
exactly what comprised the profile of the SED’s ideal socialist foreign policy cadres and, 
second, the development of an institutional structure o guarantee realization of that 
profile, the 1970s saw the focus in foreign policy training shift to attaining ever-higher 
levels of qualification and skill within the existing framework. The prevailing dual 
emphasis in foreign policy instruction on political-ideological schooling and specialist 
knowledge did not disappear in the process; on the contrary, the arrangement, in which 
Marxism-Leninism provided the theoretical framework in which foreign policy was 
understood and specialist knowledge served as concrete tool for the realization of 
“socialist diplomacy” was rather reinforced. What was different was that the greater 
emphasis on attaining ever-higher levels of qualification and skill necessarily brought 
                                                 
10 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13093. 
 344
with it a shift toward the expert side of the equation in foreign policy training at the 
expense of ideological dogmatism. 
 And, thanks to the success of earlier rationalization and systematization efforts, 
the IIB was well-equipped in the 1970s to meet the c allenge of producing foreign policy 
cadres schooled in Marxism-Leninism yet simultaneously trained as true specialists. In 
November 1973, the MfAA and the IV Division in cooperation the IIB itself completed 
an assessment of the IIB’s activities for the Secretariat, which was signed off on by Otto 
Winzer, Paul Markowski, and Gerharhd Hahn—the respectiv  heads of the three 
institutions.11 The assessment testified to the IIB’s success in adapting its foreign policy 
training program to keep pace with the far-reaching changes underway in the era of 
détente and foreign policy normalization: “The new international situation attained as a 
result of the concerted policies of the community of socialist states, the increased 
international authority of the GDR, and the heightened demands of the international 
development of socialist science place new demands upon the activities of the IIB in their 
entirety.… In the training and continuing education of cadres for foreign policy activities 
and diplomatic service, the continued development of positive experiences has been 
realized in a targeted manner in accord with the new situation.”12 The assessment’s 
specific evaluation of the IIB’s five-year course of study, which had served as the 
institute’s main vehicle for foreign policy training after replacing the previous four-year 
course of study and two-year course of postgraduate study13 in 1970, was likewise very 
                                                 
11 Impetus for the assessment apparently came originally from a consultation of the Foreign Policy 
Commission in July of the same year. 
12 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30 J/IV 2/3A/2439. 
13 The last four-year course of study took place 1967-19 1 and the last two-year course 1970-1972. 
“Zeittafel IIB,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der 
DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 222, 4. 
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positive: “Experiences in the instruction and education of foreign policy/diplomatic 
cadres heretofore gained in the five-year course of study underscore that the selection and 
preparation of students as well as the program of instruction and education in its entirety 
have proven themselves.”14 The assessment further highlighted the efficacy of the IIB’s 
curriculum in producing the type of cadres needed by the various operative and expert 
institutions comprising the East German foreign policy apparatus. The dual emphasis of 
the IIB’s curriculum—on the ideological and on the expert—was particularly stressed: 
“Instruction in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism has been provided beyond the 
obligatory level set by the Ministry for Higher Education. Particular emphasis is placed 
on the development of a steadfast class-based point of view and a Marxist-Leninist 
consciousness of history. Treatment of the party’s policies for the formation of developed 
socialist society in the GDR, of problems in the development of the community of 
socialist states, of relations to the USSR, of socialist economic integration, and of the 
coordinated foreign policy of the states of the socialist community occupies a central 
place in the curricula.”15 The assessment’s overall picture of foreign policy training at the 
IIB, while making the obligatory appeal for continued improvement in accord with the 
continued development of the international class struggle, was overwhelmingly positive. 
When compared with the finding that research at the IIB was “not yet satisfactory,”16 the 
glowing appraisal of foreign policy training conducted at the IIB testified to the success 
of earlier rationalization and systematization efforts, which put the institute in a position 
to fulfill its central task as the GDR’s main foreign policy “cadre forge”: the production 
                                                 




of cadres both thoroughly schooled in Marxism-Leninism and rigorously trained as 
specialists. 
 In the very same year that the MfAA, IV Division, and the IIB completed their 
assessment for the Secretariat (1973), the revised “instructional and educational 
conception” (Ausbidlungs- und Erziehungskonzeption) for the IIB’s five-year course of 
study captured the essence of the dual emphasis—on the ideological and on the expert—
of foreign policy training in the GDR. A new Absolventenbild enumerating the 
characteristics IIB graduates were expected to possess as a result of their training was 
issued the same year,17 and based on that profile the IIB’s new training program took as 
its central goal the production of cadres who, “as cl s-conscious cadres of party and 
state trained in Marxism-Leninism and qualified as specialists, are capable of rapidly 
meeting the demands of foreign policy practice.”18 The IIB’s 1973 program did not 
change the basic format of training at the institute— he five-year course of study 
remained divided into three main parts: instruction in the fundamentals of Marxism-
Leninism, general instruction in foreign policy in which Marxism-Leninism received 
concrete application to international relations, and regional specialization, plus obligatory 
study of Russian and one other foreign language. Th main thrust of the revised program 
lay rather in securing and tautening the dual emphasis on ideological education and 
expert training at the heart of East German foreign policy instruction in order to ensure 
graduates of the IIB were up to the new, more complex tasks facing the GDR in the era of 
                                                 
17 The Absolventenbild, while presenting a detailed picture of the qualities cadres were expected to 
possessed, at the same time was not completely rigid. As the MfAA’s own 1971 catalog of “expectations 
for foreign policy-diplomatic cadres” noted, the profile it laid out was an “ideal type” and that cadres 
should not be judged on the presence or absence of individual characteristics but rather on the entire 
complex of characteristics possessed by a cadre. PA AA, MfAA, C 5815. 
18 PA AA, MfAA, C 5829. 
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foreign policy normalization. The two elements continued to be seen as indispensable and 
complementary components of a successful course in foreign policy training: “The 
[course of] study is conducted in intimate connection with societal practice as a unity of 
class-based political-ideological education and self-education as well as instruction in the 
fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, in expert specialization, and in foreign languages. 
The systematic and effective conveyance and acquisition of knowledge and insight, of 
faculties and skills are joined with their creative application in instruction, in independent 
scientific-analytical work, and in societal practice.”19 
 And by this time the experienced instructors and pe agogues at the IIB were able 
to satisfy the exacting demands placed on foreign policy training at the institute. In 
particular, the application of Marxist-Leninist foreign policy precepts to outstanding 
international relations issues facing the GDR—the activity that comprised the most 
essential task of training at the IIB—could be planned in minute detail in a broad array of 
areas. For example, the IIB’s 1972 lecture series on “imperialist counties,” part of the 
IIB’s program in general foreign policy instruction, encompassed 36 hours and delved 
into the particulars of such topics as “causes, character, and main manifestations of 
imperialist integration in capitalist Europe and its developmental tendencies” and “the 
function of NATO and the EEC vis-à-vis the socialist states.”20 The IIB’s lecture series 
from the same year on developing countries, comprising 131 hours, likewise allowed 
exhaustive treatment of a range of topics, including “causes and results of the collapse of 
the imperialist colonial system,” “the objective basis and the significance of the anti-
imperialist alliance between socialism and the movement for national liberation,” 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13044. 
 348
“international economic aspects of petroleum production,” and “basic features, level of 
development, and prospects of the deformed capitalist mode of production in the 
countries of Latin America and its political and socio-economic consequences.”21 
 The simultaneous presence of both a strong ideological element and a strong 
expert element in the IIB’s revised course of study was unambiguously oriented toward 
producing the desired “party functionaries in the realm of foreign policy” capable of 
identifying and advancing the concrete interests of the GDR from a firm Marxist-Leninist 
perspective. The rigidity in instruction that could potentially result from the imperative to 
inculcate in cadres a thoroughgoing Marxist-Leninist understanding of foreign policy was 
balanced by the equally important imperative to shape expertise to keep pace with 
practical developments in foreign policy in order to ensure the highest possible level of 
efficacy und utility. As a result, there existed a certain flexibility in the now-mature IIB’s 
approach to its curriculum and instructional responsibilities as changing domestic and 
international developments appeared to demand that modifications and adjustments to 
instruction at the institute be made. 
 This flexibility was on clear display in 1976/77, when the training program of the 
IIB was again overhauled. With the climax of the détente process having been attained in 
1975 with the signing of the Helsinki accords, which simultaneously served as the high 
point in the normalization of the GDR’s foreign relations (by 1973 the GDR had become 
a full member of the United Nations Organization and had established diplomatic 
relations with 118 countries), the GDR and, indeed, the entire Soviet Bloc were faced 
with a qualitatively new foreign policy situation. The XXV Party Congress of the CPSU 
and IX Party Congress of the SED, both held in 1976, presented a foreign policy vision in 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
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line with the changed conditions of the new situation. The congresses emphasized the 
imperative to stabilize and expand upon East-West détente (“the results of the policy of 
peaceful coexistence”), particularly in Europe, where it had had its greatest impact and 
had brought the greatest benefit to the interests of the Soviet Bloc. The importance of 
“anti-imperialist solidarity” was correspondingly given greater emphasis since, with the 
Soviet Bloc more than content to maintain the statu q o of “peaceful coexistence” in 
Europe, the developing world took on heightened significance within the framework of 
the inexorable “international class struggle,” which, Soviet and East German 
propagandists never tired asserting, did not abate in the least despite the achievements of 
East-West rapprochement. 
 In order to ensure that foreign policy training kept pace with the changed 
international situation, a joint IIB-MfAA commission in the second half of 1976 began 
working on a “comprehensive revision of the instrucional and educational conception” 
of the five-year course of foreign policy study based on “evaluation of the resolutions of 
the IX Party Congress of the SED and the XXV Party Congress of the CPSU, of the 
experiences of communist and workers’ parties in the struggle for peace, security, 
cooperation, and social progress, and the experiences the GDR has gained in the realm of 
foreign policy.”22 New Deputy Director for Instruction Helmut Matthes, previously GDR 
ambassador to Tanzania, took the lead on the initiat ve nd the IIB, working in close 
cooperation with the Cadres and Instruction Division of the MfAA, presented the 
revamped conception in February 1977.23 The basic format of instruction at the IIB 
remained the same (Marxist-Leninist fundamentals, general foreign policy study, 
                                                 
22 PA AA, MfAA, C 5830. 
23 The conception was preceded by an “orientational” document, completed by the joint commission, that 
lay out the guiding principles for the revision. UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13305.  
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specialized foreign policy study plus foreign langua e instruction) and the dual emphasis 
on ideological education and specialist training maintained its absolute centrality (“The 
[course of] study in all its phases must be shaped as a unity of class-based education and 
specialist (fachlich) training”);24 the main innovations came rather in the form of greater 
systematization of instruction to better realize th “unity of class-based education and 
specialist training” and modification of curricular content to conform to the re-formulated 
foreign policy priorities of the GDR and the Soviet Bloc. The units on the developing 
world (centered around “the anti-imperialist alliance between socialism and the anti-
imperialist national liberation movement and the strategy of the community of socialist 
states, particularly the Soviet Union and the GDR, toward the national liberation 
movement and developing countries”) and détente in Europe (“the Leninist policy of 
peace and peaceful coexistence between states of different social orders and its successful 
realization,” including “the main stages in the history of changes in the international 
constellation of forces in favor of socialism and peace”) were accordingly refined.25 New 
emphasis was placed on one further area that was rapidly increasing in significance for 
the GDR: international economics. The increasingly fachlich orientation of East German 
foreign policy expertise was reflect in a growing con ern with economics, which earlier 
would have hardly registered: “the increasing importance of international economic 
relations, particularly issues in the development of ec nomic and scientific-technical 
relations between socialist and capitalist states and in the struggle of developing countries 
                                                 
24 The stated goal of instruction at the broadest level was identified as “the education and training of party 
functionaries who are willing and able to fulfill the goals of the German Democratic Republic in the area of 
international relations.” PA AA, MfAA, C 5830. 
25 Ibid. 
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for new, equitable economic relations with capitalist states.”26 Although economic 
considerations represented one area of instruction among many others in the IIB’s new 
conception, the greater attention paid to them foreshadowed the steady increase in 
importance they would enjoy in subsequent years, both in the GDR’s foreign relations 
and in expert analysis thereof. 
 The extensive revamping of the IIB’s curriculum in 1976/77, after a 
thoroughgoing revision had already been carried out in 1973, demonstrated the flexibility 
at the core of the training of foreign policy cadres in the GDR. Since the goal of foreign 
policy training—the production of Marxist-Leninist cadres simultaneously capable of 
contributing to the furtherance of the GDR’s concrete foreign policy goals—necessitated 
not only intense ideological schooling but also thoroughgoing expert instruction, 
modifications to cadre education had to be made in r sponse to political-ideological 
injunctions from above as well as the changing practic l challenges facing the GDR. In 
this way, a pressing concern with the concrete interes s of the GDR, which, however, 
could still be perceived through an ideological lens of variable strength, provided a 
counterweight of sorts to extreme ideological dogmatism in the crucial area of foreign 
policy training, which in turn molded the outlook and work of innumerable East German 
foreign policy cadres. 
 And it was only in the 1970s that, following earlie  rationalization and 
systematization efforts, the institutional prerequisites were in place to allow full 
realization of the dual mission of foreign policy training at the IIB. Foreign policy 
training by the 1970s had become thoroughly professionalized and specialized within a 
highly centralized and coordinated system based around the IIB as central institute. 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
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Evidence indeed abounded in the first half of the deca e that the IIB had once and for all 
overcome its most tempestuous period of development and had attained full institutional 
maturity. In 1972-1973, a ten-month special course of foreign policy study for ten 
students from Czechoslovakia was convened at the IIB in what was the first instance of 
the IIB training foreign students.27 Courses for foreign students subsequently became a 
semi-regular feature at the IIB, which throughout the 1970s and 1980s would train 
foreign policy cadres from other socialist or socialist-oriented countries such as Angola, 
Mozambique, and Cambodia.28 The IIB likewise continued and strengthened its 
instructional offerings for Leitungskader (leading cadres).29 These Kurzlehrgänge 
(condensed courses of study) typically lasted for ab ut a month and served a vital 
purpose: ensuring that higher-ranking personnel from the MfAA and other organs of 
party and state dealing in some capacity with foreign policy were kept up-to-date on the 
changing political-ideological and practical priorities of the SED in international 
relations. Foreign policy cadres simultaneously faith ul to Marxism-Leninism and trained 
as specialists were viewed as indispensable for the successful conduct of East German 
foreign policy and these condensed courses of study were designed to guarantee that 
cadres who had significant practical experience retain d those characteristics. Such an 
outcome, it was believed, would bolster the desired symbiosis between foreign policy 
expertise and practice in the GDR and ultimately guarantee that the East German foreign 
policy apparatus as a whole would continue to work smoothly and efficiently toward the 
singular end of furthering the foreign policy vision and goals of the SED leadership. 
                                                 
27 The ten cadres were trained to become specialists for German-speaking countries. SAPMO-BArch, DY 
30/J IV 2/3A/2204. 
28 Helmuth Busch, “Ausländerstudium,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für 
Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 97-103. 
29 For curricula and assessments of the courses in the 1970s, see PA AA, MfAA, C 5811, C 5812, C 5813. 
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Sometimes the condensed offerings were general “refresher” courses, meant to keep 
participants up-to-date on the latest developments, sometimes they were dedicated to a 
specific theme. In 1972, for instance, a special one-year non-residential condensed 
course30 was held to prepare East German cadres for the GDR’s looming membership in 
the UN.31 Similarly, “questions of socialist economic integration” and other economic 
issues became more prominent in the curricula of the condensed courses for leading 
cadres as economic issues themselves took on increasing importance in the foreign 
relations of the GDR.32 
 The efficacy, professionalism, and centrality of the IIB in foreign policy training 
in the GDR were further underscored by the fact that t e practice of employing 
Quereinsteiger (cadres following non-foreign policy career trajectories) at the MfAA all 
but ceased by the 1970s.33 Whereas hiring specialists from other fields who had limited 
experience in foreign policy had been common practice in the 1950s and into the 1960s 
in order to compensate for the acute shortage of qualified cadres prevalent throughout the 
East German foreign policy apparatus, the advances made in organization and instruction 
at the IIB in the same period, combined with a lesssevere shortage of cadres in general, 
now rendered the practice largely superfluous. From the start of the decade onward, the 
                                                 
30 The course consisted in one lecture held each month so as not to draw away participants from their 
primary area of responsibility. 
31 The initiative came from the highest levels with a Politburo resolution initiating the process in July 1971 
(SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/2A/1528), two Council ofMinisters resolutions, one from September 1971 
(BArch, DC 20/I/4/2542) and one from February 1972 (BArch, DC 20/I/4/2600), and a Secretariat 
resolution providing final approval in April 1972 (DY 30/J IV 2/3A/2154). The rationale for offering the 
course was clear: “The imminent acceptance of the GDR into the UN, the participation of the GDR in 
several sub-areas of the UN system that has already taken place as well as the indivisibly connected, 
qualitatively higher demands placed on foreign policy cadres require the corresponding preparation of 
cadres for the various areas of operation of the UN system.” For the citation and rather detailed coverag  of 
the course itself, see PA AA, MfAA, C 54/76. 
32 PA AA, MfAA, C 5811. 
33 Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 387. 
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demand for qualified foreign policy cadres at the MfAA and throughout the East German 
foreign policy apparatus was satisfied almost exclusively by cadres who went through the 
rigors of the IIB’s specialized training process.34 And the general consensus held that the 
IIB excelled in fulfilling its central mission of producing faithful Marxist-Leninist cadres 
who were simultaneously trained as specialists and c pable of ably identifying and 
promoting the foreign policy interests of the GDR. An evaluation of the training provided 
in 1978/79 within the framework of the IIB’s five-year course of study, for instance, was 
interested in measuring the efficacy of instruction f llowing the overhauling of the IIB’s 
curriculum in 1977. The report, whose tenor was overwh lmingly positive, testified to the 
success of the IIB in making the necessary changes to nsure continued fulfillment of its 
central mission: “Owing to implementation of the curricular revisions following the IX 
Party Congress, the students were increasingly equipped with thorough and politically 
efficacious knowledge that conforms to latest scientific findings and the demands of 
foreign policy practice. With few exceptions, the students were successfully educated and 
qualified as party functionaries in the realm of foreign policy.”35 
 The importance and reputation the IIB had built up as the GDR’s central foreign 
policy “cadre forge” and its indispensability to the East German foreign policy apparatus 
received unambiguous acknowledgment in 1974 when th director of the IIB, Gerhard 
Hahn, was made a member of the Collegium of the MfAA, that institution’s highest-
ranking deliberative body, as well as the Foreign Policy Commission (APK). He took 
over those positions in addition to his day-to-day responsibilities as head of the IIB as 
                                                 
34 East German foreign policy cadres continued to receiv  specialized training at MGIMO in Moscow in the 
1970s and 1980s, but their number declined in proportion to cadres trained at the IIB. 
35 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13093. The average cohort at the IIB in the late 1970s numbered approximately 
120 students. 
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well as those stemming from his position as chairman of the Council for Foreign Policy 
Research, which was led by the IIB. Furthermore, Hahn was named in 1976 president of 
the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), a prominent if largely honorary 
position.36 These distinctions and the general rise of the dirctor of the IIB to become an 
outstanding figure in East German foreign policy expertise symbolically crowned the 
long development of the IIB and its predecessor institutions into the highly professional 
and highly capable cadre forge at the center of a true system of foreign policy training it 
had become. On the basis of the numerous alterations to organization and instruction that 
had been made in the process of rationalization and systematization, the IIB successfully 
transformed cadre production into a science. Foreign policy training at the IIB proved 
efficient and effective in turning out the “party functionaries in the realm of foreign 
policy” demanded by the SED leadership and viewed as indispensable to the success of 
East German foreign policy. With a stock of foreign policy cadres who were both 
schooled in Marxism-Leninism and trained as true specialists guaranteed, the dynamic of 
tension between ideology and specialist knowledge within the orientation and work of 
East German experts became firmly established and the la ter element began its gradual 
ascent over the former. 
 
The IPW as “Instrument in the Class Struggle” 
The cadre situation at the Institute for International Politics and Economics (IPW) in the 
1970s, despite some important differences, echoed that a  the IIB. The IPW, which had 
been created in 1971 by the fusion of the German Economic Institute (DWI), the German 
                                                 
36 “Zeittafel IIB,” in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für Internationale Beziehungen der 
DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009), 227. 
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Institute for Contemporary History (DIZ), and the State Secretariat for West German 
Questions, was the GDR’s central institute for “Imperialismusforschung” (imperialism 
research) and formed, alongside the IIB, one of the GDR’s main sites for foreign policy-
related expertise. The IPW, unlike the IIB, was not oriented explicitly or exclusively 
toward international relations—the “West expertise” in which the IPW was engaged had 
taken its own discrete path of institutional and care development—yet the focus of the 
IPW’s imperialism research on West Germany in particular and the capitalist West in 
general necessarily entailed significant contact with foreign policy issues. The IPW in 
fact continued to fulfill most of the responsibilities previously performed by its 
predecessor institutions, which meant it performed an array of tasks, ranging from the 
completion of studies for internal consumption and the publication of works for 
propagandistic purposes to serving as the “scientifc” face of the GDR in the capitalist 
West and to compilation and documentation of materils from the West. The IPW also 
had an important coordinating role to play as Leitinstitut (central institute) for 
imperialism research, which included leadership of the Council for Imperialism Research, 
which was chaired by Max Schmidt, director of the IPW. The common denominator of 
all these tasks performed by the IPW, parallel to the situation with the IIB, was strict 
subordination to the political-ideological mandates and operative needs of the SED 
leadership in order to contribute to the furtherance of party goals in the highly sensitive 
area of relations with the FRG and the capitalist West. The IPW had “an essential 
contribution to make” on the basis of “scientific ahievements of great partisanship and 
on a high theoretical level, well-grounded political-scientific analyses and briefings, [and] 
practice-bound implementation of the results of its work.”37 
                                                 
37 BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 6326. 
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The position of the IPW as a “brain trust” for the SED leadership and its focus on 
the comparatively narrow area of contemporary developments in the capitalist West both 
lent the institute a more elite character and enmeshed it more closely with operative 
issues than the IIB, which was focused on internatio l relations in their entirety. The 
IPW was further distinguished from the IIB by Director Schmidt’s “line” to the Central 
Committee (the IPW was subordinate to the West Division of the CC), which gave the 
institute a number of practical advantages vis-à-vis the IIB, with which it sometimes had 
to compete for resources and influence.38 The IPW’s closer connection with the SED 
leadership and its greater involvement in operative issues created a more acute concern 
with the immediate, practical utility of the institute’s work than existed at the IIB. While 
the work of the IPW was thus very much concerned with more immediate, operative 
issues and oriented toward advancing the day-to-day interests of the GDR in its relations 
with the West, there still existed a strong ideological element in its work since perception 
of the GDR’s interests themselves, whether long- or sh rt-term, was filtered through a 
Marxist-Leninist prism. For this reason, it would be mistaken in this case to speak of an 
absolute dichotomy between “real” interests and chimerical ideology. The strong 
correlation that existed between the interests of the GDR and the division of the world 
into two hostile blocs in accord with the Marxist-Leninist understanding of foreign 
relations before the 1970s was indeed attenuated by the détente process and foreign 
policy normalization, but ideological retrenchment was initiated in response in order to 
deflect the risk of international relations developments undermining the ideological 
legitimacy of the GDR as a separate, socialist EastGerman state. This is also the reason 
why the cadre situation at the IPW significantly echoed that at the IIB, where the issues 
                                                 
38 Siegfried Schwarz, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, 9 June 2009. 
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of basic competency confronted in 1950s and 1960s were left far behind and were 
replaced by concerted attention aimed at achieving ever-higher levels of skill and 
specialization, though without weakening the centrality of “political-ideological” 
compliance. This sort of complex interplay between xpertise and ideology was on 
display at the IPW, where, however, the unique combination of operative and scientific 
responsibilities stemming from the IPW’s position as central institute in the highly 
sensitive and strategically important area of “imperialism research” also raised concern 
with a number of issues otherwise absent at the IIB. 
 Cadre questions at the IPW were of particular importance since the political and 
scientific demands placed on researchers there, in accord with the institute’s elite status, 
were exceptionally high. In the mid-1970s, when the modus operandi of the newly 
created institute was still being fleshed out, inter al documentation clearly reflected this 
concern: “Cadre-political questions at the IPW currently have and in the immediate future 
will have particular importance—they have to occupy an important and paramount place 
in the work of the party organization [i.e., the SED party cell at the IPW] and all state 
leaders [i.e., leading cadres at the institute, which formally was a state, not a party, 
institution].”39 The ultimate goal of such efforts was identified as “the quickest-possible 
and simultaneously enduring political-ideological consolidation of the work collective 
[italics in original]” as well as “elevating the eff ctiveness and quality of work in all 
areas.”40 Many of the cadres at the IPW were quite young, but, unlike the situation at the 
IIB, there was no uniform training program in which they all took part. As a result of its 
development out of the field of “West expertise,” imperialism research was a discipline 
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unto itself with its own discrete trajectory that placed it outside the fold of the IIB’s 
general foreign policy expertise. The IPW accordingly drew on a set of cadres that 
differed significantly from those at the IIB—instead of the “Außenpolitiker” trained in 
Potsdam-Babelsberg, the IPW predominantly employed cadres with a background in the 
social sciences, such as economics, philosophy, sociology, and political economy. IPW 
cadres therefore shared no uniform professional training, which meant that the qualities 
and characteristics of the institute’s ideal “West xpert” had to be inculcated in 
employees above all on the job rather than beforehand in a specially tailored course of 
study.41 
Despite this important difference, the demands placed on the IPW’s cadres 
nevertheless had much in common with those placed on the IIB-trained “party 
functionaries in the realm of foreign policy” who would go on to work at the MfAA or 
the IV Division or would remain at the IIB. With three broadly ranging divisions 
(economy, politics, ideology, which were joined by another large division dedicated to 
information and documentation), the “political function” of the IPW was unambiguously 
identified as advancing the goals of the SED: “[The IPW] is an instrument in [the class] 
struggle (Kampfinstrument) of the leadership of party and state that with the tools of our 
Marxist-Leninist science has a key contribution to make to the realization of party 
policies.”42 The political and scientific functions of the IPW, it is important to note, were 
understood as two separate, albeit overlapping, areas, whereby the institute’s scientific 
function was clearly subordinated to its political function: “The value of our scientific 
                                                 
41 Both in order to address the diversity of employees’ ducational background and in order to promote 
talent among its many young cadres, the IPW gained i  1975 the right to grant Promotion degrees and in 
1981 the right to grant Habilitation degrees. 
42 BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 6326. 
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work is measured by its benefit for the party.” This was the framework within which the 
role of the individual employee at the IPW was understood: “The struggle for the 
resolution of this task is the unequivocal class duty (Klassenauftrag) of every comrade 
and employee of the IPW.… In this, at issue is not verbal avowals, but rather a partisan, 
inner disposition toward work at the institute.”43 
The political-ideological and scientific demands placed in particular on 
“nomenklatura cadres” at the IPW were especially demanding. Due to the large size of 
the IPW, which by the mid-1970s employed approximately 450 individuals,44 a 
significant number of specialists were nomenklatura cadres, including the heads of not 
only all four main divisions, but also the heads of all sub-divisions and even of all 
working groups with more than three or more members, among other positions. Such 
leading cadres were expected both to manage their subordinates to ensure compliance 
with the demands placed upon all employees of the IPW and to set an example 
themselves so that “every comrade acts as a genuine communist, that the party duty of the 
institute becomes the party duty of every comrade, that every comrade, wherever he 
might work, operates politically first and foremost a  a party functionary.”45 The IPW’s 
1978 guidelines for cadre work highlighted the responsibilities of nomenklatura cadres 
and described the ideal set of traits to be possessed by every leading cadre: 
The highest principle in the selection and assignment of cadres is that the leading role of 
the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party is guaranteed. Nomenklatura cadres of 
the institute should be distinguished in particular by the following characteristics and 
skills: unconditional loyalty to the working class, its party, and Marxism-





Leninism…pride in the achievements of socialism, love f the socialist homeland, 
unshakeable friendship with the CPSU, the Soviet Union, and the other countries of the 
socialist community, loyalty to proletarian internationalism…consistent fulfillment of the 
main task in its unity of economic and social policy as the main motivation for thought 
and behavior…partisanship and great specialist knowledge…high political and expert 
knowledge in order to achieve the best-possible work results, the correct relationship 
between collective leadership and personal responsibility.46 
 While the IPW’s “political function” certainly enjoyed priority over its “scientific 
function” and thus exercised the strongest influence on the orientation and output of the 
institute, the scientific element was still viewed as extraordinarily important. In fact, 
achieving and maintaining a high level of specialization and expert knowledge was seen 
as indispensable for the fulfillment of the IPW’s “class duty.” Its cadres were expected to 
act as faithful Marxist-Leninists with realization f SED policy their highest goal, yet to 
do so required cadres capable of ably identifying ad working to advance the GDR’s 
interests vis-à-vis the capitalist West. For this reason, the IPW’s cadre program for the 
period 1976-1980, drafted in January 1976, highlighted as required characteristics for 
cadres not only political-ideological loyalty but also a high level of competency and skill. 
For instance, while “a clear political disposition toward work at the institute and its 
mission of conducting scientific work with the great st benefit for the implementation of 
the policies of our Marxist-Leninist party” was described as indispensable, so was “a high 
level of knowledge corresponding to one’s area of expertise in sufficient breath in the 
scientific disciplines: political economy, philosophy, scientific communism or the study 
of state and law, and sociology.”47 Similarly, “the ability for independent scientific work 
                                                 
46 BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 6385. 
47 BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 6326. 
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in analysis and research for the creative response to and resolution of new questions and 
for collective work” was demanded of all employees, whether nomenklatura cadres or 
not.48 Finally, cadres at the IPW, as at the IIB, were expected continually to work to 
refine and improve the level of expertise they had already gained in order to ensure the 
highest possible level of quality and efficiency in their work and to keep abreast of new 
developments. The 1976-1980 cadre program identified as vital “the constant pursuit of 
political and specialist qualification and full utilization of the existing level of 
qualification” as well as “the constant effort to increase the effectiveness of scientific 
work in research, observation, and information.”49 
 The IPW was indeed understood as the SED’s Kampfinstrument in its (class) 
struggle with West Germany and the rest of the capitalist West, yet fulfillment of this 
unquestionably political function simultaneously required a high level of specialist 
knowledge and competency on the part of cadres. Similar to the situation with the IIB’s 
“party functionaries in the realm of foreign policy,” the IPW’s designated mission of 
contributing to the furtherance of the party’s goals through scientific analysis resulted in 
the fusion of the ideological and expert elements i their work, where a tension yet no 
absolute dichotomy existed between the two. 
 While the demands placed upon cadres at the specializ d IPW thus generally 
corresponded to those placed upon cadres at the all-inclusive IIB, the former’s position as 
the GDR’s central “West” institute introduced a heightened concern with security and 
“ideological contamination” that was not present in as acute a form at the latter 
institution. Success in the IPW’s “offensive engagement with imperialism” required a 




familiarity and clarity of knowledge of the “non-socialist world“ (often simply 
abbreviated as “NSW” for nichtsozialistische Welt) hat was unattainable for the average 
citizen of the GDR on account of government censorship and propaganda. Employees of 
the IPW enjoyed special privileges in respect to contact with the west, whether direct or 
indirect, in order to carry out their “class mission.” First, an abundance of materials from 
and about the capitalist West were available to analysts at the IPW, which maintained a 
massive collection of books and newspapers from the West in its function as 
“documentation center.”50 Access to such otherwise inaccessible materials was the most 
common way employees at the West came into contact with the so-called class enemy in 
the West. A more select group, comprising mainly nomenklatura cadres, maintained 
personal contact with individuals at research institutes in the non-socialist world, such as 
the German Institute for Economic Research in West B rlin, the Kiel Institute for the 
World Economy, the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the University of 
Hamburg, the Cologne Institute of Economic Research, and the German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs in Ebenhausen near Munich.51 An even more select 
group of cadres, comprising the institute director, deputy director, and division heads, 
regularly traveled to the West to meet with their counterparts, to take part in scholarly 
conferences, or to hold presentations on their work. The official designation for the 
members of this exclusive group was “travel cadres” (Reisekader), who, however, were 
permitted to travel to the non-socialist world exclusively on official business, not as 
                                                 
50 The IPW was also a UN depository library. 
51 Lexikon der Institutionen und Organisationen, s. v. “Institut für Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft,” in 
Enzyklopädie der DDR, CD-ROM (Berlin: Directmedia, 2004). While such contacts existed previously, 
they increased dramatically following rapprochement with West Germany and foreign policy 
normalization. See the following chapter for a more detailed account of the topic. 
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private individuals.52 As was the case with contacts with individuals andinstitutions in 
the non-socialist world more generally, most such trips took place in West Germany, but 
visits to other capitalist countries were also fairly common and would increase in the 
1980s. 
 These types of contacts with the West presented a serious dilemma: they were 
absolutely necessary for the success of the IPW given its mission and designated 
functions, yet extensive contact with the capitalis world, whether through the written 
word or personal interaction, threatened to contamin te the worldview of IPW cadres 
with “bourgeois” elements and thus to undermine the ideological integrity that had only 
gained in importance for the SED leadership in the era of foreign policy normalization 
and ideological Abgrenzung from the West. The response to this dilemma was a rigorous 
set of measures intended to allow the required level of ngagement with the West while 
preventing dilution of a “firm Marxist-Leninist perspective” at the IPW. To begin with, 
IPW employees were obligated to sign a commitment (Verpflichtung) in which they 
agreed “to maintain the strictest silence on official matters” in accord with “the norms of 
socialist vigilance as well as the protection of state and official secrets.”53 IPW 
employees also had to pledge they would inform the Cadres and Education Division of 
the institute of any changes in their personal life and that of close relatives as well as any 
attempts made by third parties to gain personal or official information from them. All 
visitors and non-official relationships with person from “the non-socialist abroad as well 
as West Berlin” likewise had to be reported—“[All private contacts with citizens of the 
                                                 
52 BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 6326. 
53 Ibid. 
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non-socialist abroad as well as West Berlin] are altogether to be reduced to a minimum 
and to be strictly regulated.”54 
 The GDR’s meticulous system regulating access to confidential documents was 
also in place at the IPW in order to control who had access to materials from the West 
that could potentially have a pernicious effect on ideological cohesion at the institute. In 
the second half of the 1970s, twenty IPW employees held the highest-level security 
clearance (GVS for Geheime Verschlußsache); 64 the intermediate-level security 
clearance (VVS for Vertrauliche Verschlußsache); and 69 the lowest-level security 
clearance55 (VD for Vertrauliche Dienstsache).56 The IPW, however, not only made use 
of this system to regulate access to classified material but also used it as the basis to 
regulate all contacts of IPW employees with the non-s cialist world. A discrete set of 
rules and regulations was attached to each security clearance so that members of the 
highest-level clearance group were forbidden to receive private visitors while members of 
the two other groups could do so but were required either to gain approval beforehand 
(genehmigungspflichtig for VVS cadres) or to report the visit (meldepflichtig for VD 
cadres).57 The situation was parallel in the maintenance of postal or any other sort of 
indirect contact with private persons from the non-s cialist world. GVS cadres had to 
gain approval for all such contacts, VVS cadres had either to report such contacts (for 
family members) or to gain approval for them (all others), and VD cadres simply had to 
report all such contacts.58 Clearly, the higher up one was in the hierarchy at the IPW—
where one’s position corresponded to the security clearance one possessed—the less 
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57 BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 6326. 
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unregulated contact with private individuals from the non-socialist world one was 
supposed to have. It is important to keep in mind that a significant number of the 
approximately 450 employees at the IPW in the second half of the 1970s were not 
included in this system whatsoever. Even the lowest-level security clearance group was 
rather exclusive, including mainly directors and deputy directors of sub-divisions, not 
rank-and-file researchers. The latter presumably had to concern themselves less with the 
onerous regulations to which other cadres were subjected, but also had much less 
exposure to sensitive materials from and about the West, which could potentially hinder 
fulfillment of their scientific function in service of the IPW’s larger political goal. 
 A number of other important measures were in place at the IPW in order to 
bolster the “class-based outlook” of cadres susceptibl  to the pernicious ideological 
influence of the West. Chief among these measures were the activities of the Ministry for 
State Security (MfS, or “Stasi”).59 The MfS had a constant presence in the IPW in the 
form of unofficial collaborators (IMs) who reported on their colleagues’ activities,60 but 
the ministry’s most intrusive and far-reaching activities at the IPW came in the form of 
periodic operations of “political-operative safeguarding” (politisch-operative Sicherung). 
The purpose of such operations was to “case” (erfassen) individual cadres at the IPW in 
order to ensure strict loyalty to the political-ideological and operative injunctions of the 
SED among a constituency under high risk for ideological deviation because of its 
elevated exposure to materials from the West. A “political-operative safeguarding” 
operation was carried out at the IPW, for instance, in the second half of 1976, as a result 
                                                 
59 David Childs and Richard Popplewell have described how the MfS was “even more necessary to the 
maintenance of the SED’s power” in the post-normalization era to counter the potentially pernicious effects 
of the end of isolation. David Childs and Richard Popplewell, The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and 
Security Service (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 175. 
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of which 18 persons with “negative-operative-relevant characteristics” were removed 
from the institute and five others were subjected to greater scrutiny by the Operative 
Personenaufklärung division of the MfS.61 The list of “negative-operative-relevant 
characteristics” was wide-ranging, including consideration of both the professional 
performance and personal life of employees. Elements from the latter category that could 
arouse the suspicion of the MfS included consumption of alcohol, contact with 
foreigners, contact with former members of the IPW “who in the past as in the present are 
tainted with negative characteristics,” having relatives who had fled the GDR, and an 
amorphously defined “morality.”62 The overriding criterion by which employees’ 
professional performance was judged was correct understanding and internalization of the 
eminently political role the IPW was to play, i.e., complete subordination to the 
ideological and operative priorities of the SED. 
 Concern with ideological contamination overlapped with concern that research at 
the IPW could be conducted as an autonomous Wis enschaft rather than Kampfinstrument 
of the SED—one wanted to avoid at all costs a return to the situation in the first half of 
the 1960s, before the “leading role” of the SED hadbeen established at the DWI and 
DIZ, two of the predecessor institutions of the IPW. A head of one of the IPW’s large 
sub-divisions, for instance, was removed from his po ition by the party organization at 
the institute for “a deficient political and ideological understanding of his responsibilities 
and role as political leader and educator of a colle tive” and “a lack of clarity in 
fundamental questions of the relationship between politics and science at the IPW.”63 
Similarly, a joint report from the Central Party Control Commission and the West 
                                                 




Division of the CC, following two cases of “Republikverrat” (i.e. fleeing the GDR)64 and 
“a cluster of party [disciplinary] proceedings,” described the institute’s “insufficient 
political-ideological work”: “Too little is done so that all comrades have a correct 
relationship to the party and to democratic centralism [italics in original].”65 This 
situation, however, owed little to the leadership of the institute, which was said to 
cooperate fully with the MfS in its “political-operative safeguarding” operations, as the 
ministry’s own report on the 1976 operation noted: “It can be assessed that Director Prof. 
Schmidt, his deputies Prof. Meyer and Prof. Doernberg, and head of cadres Comrade 
Schlafke in particular fully support the essential interests of the MfS in all questions.”66 
 Alongside the MfS, the party cell of the SED at the IPW played the role of 
enforcer of political-ideological orthodoxy at the institute, which made up one of its main 
responsibilities. In its efforts to do so, the party cell in a sense could exercise an even 
more effective and uniform, if less draconian, influence than the MfS because the 
presence of its members at the IPW (the rank-and-file o  the party cell was comprised of 
IPW employees) allowed both constant supervision and incessant meddling. The top 
priority of the party cell at the IPW, very similar to that of the MfS, was to ensure that 
cadres’ performance and outlook conformed to a certain profile: “our institute’s model of 
the politically engaged scientific employee.”67 The party cell’s most effective method of 
guaranteeing conformity to the desired profile was the “cadre interview” 
(Kadergespräch), which made up part of a type of general performance review that took 
place on a regular basis (every two years on average) to measure cadres’ compliance with 
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the model of “the politically engaged scientific employee.” Assessments of cadres 
naturally paid great attention to their behavior frm the “political-ideological” 
perspective and did not fail to identify a series of negative characteristics. A small sample 
would include “lacking in political-ideological constancy and unstable behavior, 
insufficient qualifications for political and scientific work at the IPW;” “political 
blindness when confronted by a foreign agent” and “careerist tendencies;” “politically 
neutral;” and one employee, whose father occupied a prominent position in the military, 
which complicated the matter, drew the ire of the party cell for holding regular meetings 
of a discussion group in her apartment.68 Although the assessments of the party cell, some 
of which led to dismissal, some of which merely resulted in closer observation of the 
individual in question, clearly attached great importance to “correct” political-ideological 
behavior, they also demonstrated a pronounced concern with the specialist skills and 
professional competency of IPW cadres. Perhaps as a result of its members’ hands-on 
familiarity with day-to-day operations at the IPW, the party cell demonstrated 
understanding for the fact that the presence of competent specialists was indispensable to 
the success of the institute’s broader political mission and thus that both elements had to 
be taken into consideration. This was the case, for instance, with the IPW employee 
identified above as “politically neutral.” The same employee’s industriousness and talent 
as well as his membership in the IPW’s Kampfgruppe were evaluated positively. The 
party cell’s report speculated that his political impartiality might be due to the fact that he 
had not been sufficiently challenged in his work and concluded that further inquiry into 
the reasons for his apolitical outlook was needed.69 




 The ultimate impact of the battery of measures in place at the IPW to address the 
dilemma stemming from the institute’s intimate involvement with persons, institutions, 
and materials from the West was ambiguous. A hyper-concern with maintenance of a 
resolute Marxist-Leninist approach in the face of ptential ideological contamination 
from the West, a concern which was not present in qu te as acute a form at the IIB, 
underlay a strict system that meticulously regulated cadres’ exposure to the West’s 
dangerous influence, whether in the form of personal contacts or printed materials. The 
existence at the IPW of such a stringent system highlights the dilemma of conducting 
wissenschaftlich research on a spectrum of topics that by their very nature were 
considered a threat to the ideological presuppositions on which researchers were 
supposed to be operating. The inherent tendency of the SED, whose legitimacy and 
operative efficacy rested upon maintenance of a cohesive worldview, toward ideological 
Abgrenzung and retrenchment, however, was tempered by the need for specialist 
knowledge and professional competency among scientific cadres at the IPW, which 
replicated the situation at the IIB. The mission of the IPW after all was an eminently 
practical-political one: providing scientific analysis on the capitalist West on which the 
SED leadership could draw in the process of policy formulation. In this, adherence to the 
Marxist-Leninist worldview that lay at the very cent r of the SED’s self-understanding 
was naturally indispensable, yet identification and furtherance of the interests of the GDR 
required expertly trained cadres as much if not more s  than ideologically schooled ones. 
Furthermore, ideology and expertise at the IPW did not stand in total opposition to one 
another—ideology informed experts’ perception of the GDR’s interests just as expertise 
shaped ideology. There thus existed at the IPW the tension between ideological and 
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expert imperatives, not an absolute dichotomy, that was present in East German foreign 
policy expertise more generally. 
 The complex interplay that characterized the relationship between ideology and 
expertise was shaped by multiple factors. The increasing emphasis in the 1970s on 
attaining ever-higher levels of skill and specializt on favored the expert side of the 
equation while renewed emphasis on the “class mission” of expert cadres in the same 
time period provided a counterweight; similarly, détente and foreign policy normalization 
raised the prospect of weakening ideological dogmatis  among experts through 
multifaceted contact with the capitalist West while th  response of ideological 
Abgrenzung and retrenchment paired with strict regulation of contact with the West was 
aimed at counteracting such a development. East German foreign policy expertise in the 
era of foreign policy normalization was at a crossrads where the further course 
developments would take was open. The monumental international relations triumphs of 
the GDR and the entire Soviet Bloc in the détente era r inforced among East German 
experts the perceived correlation between the interes s of the GDR and the Marxist-
Leninist paradigm in international relations. It was only later—at the turn of the decade—
that they would begin to realize that the new interational position of the GDR 
engendered by foreign policy normalization and the state of international relations 
developments in general no longer conformed to the established class-based framework. 
 
The Zenith of the Marxist-Leninist Paradigm in East German Foreign Policy Expertise 
The outstanding feature of expert output in the 1960s had been the formulation of a 
comprehensive conception of international relations within which the place and interests 
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of the GDR were clearly identified and which provided a cohesive framework for all 
analytical activity. As East German experts analyzed th  most pressing foreign policy 
issues facing the GDR—the relationship between the sup rpowers and the international 
Kräfteverhältnis, the dynamics of Soviet Bloc unity, the complexities of the German 
question, East Germany’s prospects to “break through” the Hallstein Doctrine, the 
“objectively anti-imperialist” movement for national liberation—they merged 
identification of the GDR’s specific interests in each of these areas into the interpretive 
framework provided by Marxism-Leninism, which viewed the “clash of systems” 
between socialism and capitalism as the defining characteristic of international relations, 
and created a GDR-specific foreign policy conception in the process. As a result of the 
peculiar strategic situation faced by East Germany—ational division, lack of diplomatic 
recognition, dependency on the Soviet Union, reliance on the Soviet Bloc’s unity of 
action—the GDR’s concrete foreign policy interests were uniquely compatible, to a 
degree unmatched in other Soviet satellite states, with the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of foreign policy, which meant experts’ newly formulated conception in 
fact rested upon strong objective foundations. The combined influence of the institutional 
configuration of East German foreign policy expertise, which set the parameters in which 
analysis was conducted, and the highly circumscribed range of foreign policy options 
available to the GDR, which delivered the object of analysis, all but precluded alternative 
understandings of international relations. 
 In the 1970s, however, the situation changed dramatically. There was great 
continuity in the institutional development of foreign policy expertise as the process of 
“systematization” continued and completed the rationalization in service of 
 373
synchronization that had preceded it in order to create a comprehensive system of foreign 
policy expertise fully synchronized with the political-ideological requirements and 
operative needs of the larger East German foreign policy apparatus. In the process, the 
key features of East German foreign policy expertis underwent a change in degree rather 
than kind. Marxism-Leninism retained its centrality as the framework within which 
expert analysis was conducted, but increasing importance was placed upon specialist 
knowledge and professional expertise in order to keep pace with the new, more complex 
challenges of the détente era. 
 Immense change came rather in the realm of the GDR’s foreign relations 
themselves. Indeed, from this point on, with the key characteristics of expertise 
essentially fixed, changes in expert output would occur principally in response to the 
development of the foreign relations East German experts were charged with analyzing. 
And in the 1970s, the epoch-making international rel tions developments of the détente 
era represented the key events to be analyzed by East German experts. Fulfillment of the 
GDR’s most fervently sought foreign policy goal—full diplomatic recognition and 
normalization of its international relations—fundamentally altered the conditions in 
which the GDR had to conduct foreign policy and represented what would be the greatest 
foreign relations achievement in the GDR’s entire hstory. Whereas the range of inquiry 
available in the 1960s to foreign policy expertise had perforce remained limited by the 
narrow horizons of East German foreign policy in the pre-normalization era, the GDR’s 
foreign policy “breakthrough” in the first half of the 1970s correspondingly—and 
dramatically—broadened the spectrum of issues to be addressed. The GDR took on all 
the trappings of a “status quo” state—an internation l actor nominally like any other in 
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the international arena. While the GDR in concert with the USSR would still actively 
seek to shape the “constellation of forces” in favor of international socialism, particularly 
through supporting revolutionary movement in the developing world, the GDR now had a 
vested interest in preservation of the new détente-ra status quo in Europe between the 
two superpowers and was accordingly wary of radical ch nges that could undermine that 
status quo and the benefits it carried for the GDR. 
 Integration into the international order and the se ming transformation of the 
GDR into a status quo state, however, would not immediately engender a corresponding 
weakening of experts’ Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations, as one 
might have reasonably expected. On the contrary, to East German experts, the course of 
events only confirmed the correctness of their class-based understanding of international 
relations. In time, the fact of foreign policy normalization—and the extensive 
engagement with the outside world it brought with it—would eventually allow for a more 
critical stance among experts, but the immense gains made by “international socialism” 
in the first half of the 1970s meant that reinvigoration of experts’ GDR-specific Marxist-
Leninist conception of international relations became the dominant feature of expert 
output in the period. Thus, despite the fact that foreign policy normalization undermined 
the strong correlation between the actual conditions n which the GDR had to conduct 
foreign policy and the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding of international 
relations, experts’ GDR-specific foreign policy coneption that fused East Germany’s 
realpolitical interests with the Marxist-Leninist, class-based understanding of 
international relations reached its zenith in the détente era. 
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 Given the strict orientation of East German expertis  toward advancing the 
practical foreign policy goals of the GDR, which had become firmly entrenched by the 
1970s, the most pressing issues in the operative realm were at once the most important 
questions addressed in the expert realm. At the dawn of the 1970s, breaching the 
Hallstein Doctrine remained the GDR’s supreme foreign policy objective, but, with the 
linked processes of détente between East and West and the FRG’s “new Ostpolitik”70 
beginning to move forward, it was becoming less a distant goal than a plausible target 
that could realistically be met in the short term. Even before Walter Ulbricht was 
removed from power in May 1971—that is, before Honecker abandoned Ulbricht’s rather 
dilatory position in favor of a purely constructive role for the GDR in the nascent détente 
process—acute concern with international diplomatic recognition in the context of 
détente provided the overarching orientation for foreign policy expertise. In January 
1971, the MfAA drafted a report for the Foreign Policy Commission (APK) on “The 
Chief Foreign Policy Goals of the GDR in the Near Future” which underscored the 
identity of the GDR’s interests with those of the Soviet Union and the broader Soviet 
Bloc and infused its analysis with a pronounced ideological element, demonstrating the 
mutually reinforcing relationship between interests and ideology in East German foreign 
policy at the time. The report took the recent signin  of the Treaties of Moscow (August 
1970) and Warsaw (December 1970) as the starting point of its analysis and saw them as 
evidence of “the further transformation of the constellation of forces in Europe in favor 
[of the fraternal socialist states of the Warsaw Pact],” which had brought about this 
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positive development through “joint and coordinated action.”71 In response, however, 
“the most aggressive imperialist forces, particularly those in the US,” were attempting to 
combat this development “through activation of NATO policies hostile to détente and 
peace” and “to prevent the resolution of existing problems in Europe.”72 In light of the 
resulting “intensification of the international class struggle on European soil,” there arose 
a need for “greater efforts” on the part of all socialist states, including the GDR: “The 
energies of GDR foreign policy are also concentrated on strengthening the offensive of 
socialist policies for peace and security under the leadership of the USSR.”73 The report 
further described in no uncertain terms the relationship of the GDR to the USSR in 
respect to strategic orientation: “The sustained development of the alliance and the 
community of action with the USSR determines the for ign policy strategy of the GDR in 
all areas.”74 
 Most importantly, however, the report’s authors demonstrated clear understanding 
of the fact that the GDR’s particular interests could only be advanced in concert with the 
rest of the Soviet Bloc in the framework of the evolving détente process. The ratification 
of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw by the West German Bundestag was identified as 
the next “link in the struggle for the realization f the policy of peace of the community 
of socialist states,” which was simultaneously identified as a key precondition for 
fulfillment of the GDR’s central objectives: “[Ratification] will create new points of 
contact for the GDR’s establishment of diplomatic relations with more states as well as 
                                                 





the GDR’s membership in the UN system.”75 The attainment of a cross-bloc settlement 
acknowledging the status quo in Europe was likewise identified as crucial for advancing 
and maintaining the interests of the GDR in particular and the Soviet Bloc in general: 
“Immediate preparation for a European security conference and the creation of stable, 
contractual foundations for a system of peaceful coexistence between European states of 
differing social orders stand at the center of the struggle for European security. The 
establishment of normal diplomatic relations between the GDR and the capitalist states of 
Europe, including the FRG, has become a central question in the normalization of the 
situation in Europe.”76 Thus, in this early stage of the détente process, ju t as fulfillment 
of the supreme goal of normalization of its foreign relations was becoming more 
plausible, if still uncertain, for the GDR, the MfAA report provided clear indication of 
how East German experts would handle the momentous international relations 
developments unfolding in the first half of the 1970s. Owing to the nature of the détente 
process, in which gains made by the GDR were inconceivable apart from the gains made 
by its superpower patron and the entire Soviet Bloc, the qualitatively new situation that 
would emerge would not challenge but would rather be incorporated into experts’ pre-
existing interpretive framework and would bolster the perceived strong correlation 
between the particular realpolitical interests of the GDR and a strict black-and-white, 
class-based understanding of international relations among East German experts. A report 
on the FRG completed in 1970/1971 by a special strategic working group under the 
leadership of Hermann Axen clearly revealed this dynamic at work: “In respect to the 
establishment of equal relations between the GDR and the FRG on the basis of 




international, the exchange of ambassadors, and the acceptance of the GDR and the FRG 
into the UN, all of which is quite likely in the coming years, this would decisively 
contribute to consolidation of the international positi n of the GDR and to pushing back 
the imperialism of the FRG. By no means, however, would it be equivalent to attenuation 
of the clash of systems between socialism and imperialism in the form of the socialist 
GDR and the imperialist FRG.”77 
 At the VIII Party Congress of the SED in June 1971, Erich Honecker, who just 
one month earlier had replaced Walter Ulbricht as prty head, presented foreign policy 
normalization as the centerpiece of an ambitious program that included establishment of 
diplomatic relations with states outside the Soviet sphere of influence (including with 
West Germany on equal terms), entry into the UN and all its special organizations, and 
participation in a Europe-wide conference recognizing the postwar status quo on the 
continent. As had been the case in the past, fulfillment of this program would not depend 
on the GDR’s own actions as much as on broader ColdWar developments, but the 
measures comprising the détente process between East and West would indeed entail 
fulfillment of this ambitious program: the Four Power Agreement on Berlin in 1971, 
West Germany’s ratification of the Treaties of Moscw and Warsaw in 1972, the signing 
of the SALT I Treaty between the US and the USSR in 1972, the conclusion of the Basic 
Treaty between the GDR and the FRG in 1972, the entry of both German states to the UN 
in 1973, and the passage of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
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in Europe (the Helsinki Accords) in 197578 marked realization of the GDR’s most 
zealously pursued foreign policy objectives. 
 The expert response to these epochal events followed the analytical approach that 
had been applied just as substantive progress was starting to be made in the détente 
process: welcome acknowledgement of the changes to the international situation 
engendered by détente matched with integration of the new situation into experts’ pre-
existing interpretive framework. The analysis provided in an IIB study from September 
1974, even before the culmination of détente had been r ached with the Helsinki 
Accords, was exemplary as it displayed the key featur s that were more generally 
characteristic of the expert response to East-West rapprochement. For the report’s 
authors, the substantial, if incomplete, East-West rapprochement at the heart of détente 
was not a sign that the international conflict between socialism and capitalism might be 
waning; instead, conciliation between East and West wa  understood as a development 
within the inexorable “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism, which 
continued unabated: 
The détente process, which has become the decisive tend ncy of the present, has ushered 
in a profound change of course (Wende) in international relations. As a result of the 
coordinated foreign policy of the socialist states and in realization of the peace offensive 
announced at the XXIV Party Congress of the CPSU, détente is advancing on the 
foundation of an international constellation of forces that has changed in favor of 
socialism. Détente is, in its essence, a far-reaching political and social process of 
transformation of the international situation. It reflects—directly or indirectly—the 
changes, which have set in on the level of state relations and international life and in the 
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situation of classes but also of nations, which find visible expression in the safeguarding 
of world peace and avoidance of an all-destroying world war, and which at once have led 
to a new situation in the class struggle between capitalism and socialism. In the 
transitional phase from capitalism to socialism, the international constellation of forces 
has experienced a new qualitative change. The détente process reflects the unfolding of 
that historical stage in which, although imperialism till possesses considerable positions 
of power, the conditions of the class struggle are imposed upon it by socialism, a 
socialism which is becoming the determining factor of international development.79 
Fulfillment of the GDR’s greatest foreign policy goal and the strengthening of the 
international position of its Soviet Bloc allies brought about by détente not only 
represented an international relations triumph that significantly advanced the interests of 
the GDR but marked the forward march of international socialism as well—détente’s 
significance consisted above all in the shift in favor of socialism it engendered in the 
international constellation of forces in the ongoing, ineluctable clash of systems. The 
clash between capitalism and socialism was viewed as a zero-sum game, where the 
strengthening of the socialist side necessarily entailed a corresponding weakening of the 
capitalist side, as an analysis from the IPW underscored: “The coordinated and concerted 
foreign policy of the states of the socialist community compels the imperialist states 
toward gradual acceptance of the principles of peaceful oexistence and pushes them into 
a historic defensive position. The compulsion emanating from socialism toward 
adaptation to the changing situation is one of the essential characteristics of the 
imperialism of the present.”80 
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 The great foreign policy triumph represented by normalization and détente for the 
GDR and for international socialism was able to be int grated so seamlessly into experts’ 
existing understanding of international relations, which saw an ascendant and monolithic 
socialism locked in an inexorable struggle with a decrepit and equally monolithic 
capitalism, because developments seemed to be playing out in complete accord with the 
main tenets of that very understanding. Since it had first been fully formulated in the 
1960s, the central characteristic of experts’ GDR-specific conception of international 
relations was the fusion of the clearly delineated realpolitical interests of the GDR with 
the Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as the class struggle in the international 
arena. This particular conception was facilitated by the unusually strong correlation 
between, on the one hand, the GDR’s strategic interes s and, on the other, the division of 
the world into two antagonistic blocs locked in existential struggle—national division and 
wide-ranging international isolation made the exposed GDR deeply dependent on the 
USSR, the superpower guarantor of its existence, and reliant on the Soviet Bloc’s unity of 
action. The GDR’s strategic situation, unique among states in the Soviet Bloc, thus 
rendered advancement of the interests of the GDR as a state all but fully contingent on 
advancement of the interests of the Soviet Bloc as a whole and thereby promoted 
identification of the GDR’s interests with those of the Soviet Bloc, understood as the 
real-world embodiment of the abstract cause of “inter ational socialism.” When the GDR 
fulfilled its central objective of full foreign policy normalization in the context of 
détente—the triumph of the GDR being inseparable from the broader triumph of 
“international socialism” in the period—it facilitated the reification of experts’ 
ideologized understanding of international relations since the entire process appeared to 
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play out in conformity with the defining feature of that understanding, the fusion of the 
GDR’s realpolitical interests with the Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as a form 
of the class struggle. 
 The assessment of normalization and détente in the analysis of the IV Division of 
demonstrated just how much those events confirmed for East German experts the validity 
of the dichotomous conceptual framework they had built up over the previous 30 years. 
In December 1975, only four months after the crowning achievement of détente had 
taken place—the signing of the Helsinki Accords by the GDR, the FRG, and 33 other 
states—the IV Division issued a top-secret report appr ising the results of East German 
foreign policy since the VIII Party Congress of theSED in June 1971, when the 
ambitious goal of foreign policy normalization had first been declared. The IV Division’s 
overwhelmingly positive assessment clearly interpreted the momentous international 
relations developments of the first half of the decade as evidence of the success of the 
GDR but also and more importantly of international socialism in its struggle with 
capitalism: 
The period since the XXIV Party Congress of the CPSU and the VIII Party Congress of 
the SED occupies a special position in postwar history in its entirety. In these years, the 
international constellation of forces continued to m ve significantly in favor of the forces 
of peace, national independence, and socialism. The struggle of the states that have 
closed ranks around the Soviet Union and other progressive forces has resulted in the 
development of a new international situation. It finds most visible expression in the 
transition from ‘cold war’ to détente and the peaceful coexistence of states of differing 
social orders, which commenced at the start of the 1970s. The process of international 
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détente, which is furthest-advanced on the European continent, has become the main 
tendency of international development.81 
From the perspective of East German experts, the détente process was not simply the 
prosaic balancing of interests between different state  on the international stage, but 
rather represented a key step in the ongoing clash of ystems between socialism and 
capitalism.82 Within the ongoing clash of systems, the interests of he GDR and of 
international socialism were seen as essentially ident cal. The IV Division’s summary 
report underscored this and highlighted how realization of practical foreign policy goals 
in the détente process facilitated the reification of an ideologized understanding of 
international relations by unambiguously linking the advancement of the GDR’s interests 
with advancement of those of the Soviet Bloc as a whole and, therefore, with the progress 
of socialism: 
While the GDR in the nearly 22 years of its existence up to the VIII Party Congress was 
able to establish diplomatic relations with only 30 states, it presently maintains 
diplomatic relations with 118 states. This is striking proof of the increased international 
standing of the socialist German state. As a consequence, the position of international 
socialism has also been fortified. The qualitatively new position of the GDR is result and 
reflection of the strength of socialism…. Never befor  has so much been achieved in the 
struggle for peace—a fundamental concern of all peoples—as in the period since the 
XXIV Party Congress of the CPSU and the VIII Party Congress of the SED. Détente and 
peaceful coexistence are no longer just the programm tic goals of the socialist states and 
all progressive forces, but are increasingly becoming practical reality.83 
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In East German experts’ analysis of détente, the interests of the GDR were not simply the 
interests of a state like any other but rather manifestations of socialism’s progress on the 
world stage. 
 Thus despite East German experts’ assertions that détente had brought about a 
“qualitatively new situation” in international relations, no qualitative changes to the 
existing interpretive framework could be discerned in their analytical response to the 
great foreign policy success of the GDR and the entire Soviet Bloc in the first half of the 
1970s. Allowance was made for the dramatically altered conditions that obtained at mid-
decade versus the start of the 1970s, but the qualitatively new situation which had arisen 
was integrated into experts’ GDR-specific conception of foreign policy without the 
conception itself being substantially modified. Indee , this trend applied more or less 
uniformly to the entire range of foreign policy issues faced by East German experts in the 
1970s. 
 The context of détente was crucial to expert output in general in the 1970s since 
as consideration of the détente process reinforced experts’ existing interpretive 
framework for international relations, it in turn set the tone for analysis and interpretation 
of other outstanding foreign policy issues. On thisbackdrop, expert analysis in the 
détente era was distinguished by two key elements that were neither fully compatible nor 
fully contradictory. On the one hand, analysis was conducted on the basis of the existing 
Marxist-Leninist conceptual framework and largely with the aim of strengthening it and 
extending its applicability; on the other hand, analysis more and more reflected the high 
level of competency and specialization of the GDR’s foreign policy cadres and 
correspondingly was becoming increasingly incisive on a growing range of topics. This 
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set of contrasting, if not contradictory, features would in later years allow for a more self-
critical approach in respect to the interpretive framework employed by experts, but, in the 
context of ideological intoxication and reification e gendered by foreign policy 
normalization, the seemingly triumphant Marxist-Leninist paradigm retained its 
centrality. 
 The conceptual triumphalism facilitated by the highly favorable results of détente 
for the GDR was only further bolstered by another contemporaneous development that 
unambiguously redounded to the benefit of “international socialism”: US defeat in 
Vietnam. North Vietnam’s final victory over the South Vietnamese regime in Saigon 
occurred almost simultaneously with the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. A 
report completed in December of that year by the Fundamental Questions and Planning 
Division of the MfAA, signed off on by foreign minister Fischer and submitted to the 
APK, provided detailed analysis of the situation in “Asia after the Victory of the Peoples 
of Indochina.” The report’s analysis was consistent with the pattern found in other 
analysis of the period—rather differentiated treatment of the various and complex 
questions connected with the issue firmly located in the prevailing class-based 
interpretive framework. The ideological element was clear in the report’s general 
assessment of the event’s significance:  
The victory of the peoples of Indochina over the aggressor US is of strategic importance. 
It reflects the profound changes to the internationl constellation of forces in favor of the 
forces of socialism and national liberation that are currently taking place. It was made 
possible above all through the political, military, economic, and diplomatic support of the 
Soviet Union and the other socialist states. With modern weapons at their disposal, the 
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Vietnamese people were able to withstand the US military machine. This victory is an 
outstanding example of the power of international solidarity.84 
While interpreting the victory of the North Vietnamese and the defeat of the US and the 
South Vietnamese with pronounced concern for the effect on the “constellation of forces” 
in the region, which was called “a focal point of the international class struggle,” the 
report also drew a clear link between events in Vietnam and the GDR’s immediate 
interests in Europe, particularly peaceful coexistence and continuation of the détente 
process: “With the cessation of the Vietnam War, one f the most dangerous sources of 
war and tension since the Second World War has been eliminated. Just as international 
détente significantly contributed to the cessation of US aggression, the elimination of this 
source of war and tension will exercise a positive influence on the process of 
international détente.”85 
  As was the case with analysis of détente itself, the favorable conclusion of the 
Vietnam War bolstered the already-strong association among East German experts 
between the GDR’s interests and those of the cause of international socialism and thereby 
reinforced the existing class-based approach to foreign relations. The report, however, 
also contained a great deal of hard-nosed examination of how communist victory in 
Vietnam might affect the region more broadly. The report’s authors, for instance, 
predicted US defeat would embolden members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
States to steer a more independent foreign policy course vis-à-vis the US, which 
culminated in the dissolution of SEATO in 1977 after a long period of dormancy. India, 
which maintained close relations with the Soviet Union, was also portrayed as a 
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beneficiary of the Vietnam War: “India endeavors to use the more favorable conditions 
resulting from the altered constellation of forces for realization of its national interests 
against imperialism and particularly against the grat power-chauvinist and hegemonic 
policies of the rulers in Beijing.”86 Furthermore, the report’s authors also recognized that 
the positive change to the “international constellaion of forces” brought about by North 
Vietnamese victory could prove short-lived and that an all too-triumphalist interpretation 
of the event was correspondingly out of place. The goals of “imperialism” in the region, 
the report claimed, remained unchanged and the US, in collaboration with its allies, could 
bring its still-considerable resources to bear in order to influence development in the 
region: “Despite the worsening of its military-strategic position on the Asian continent, 
the US maintains considerable political and economic capacities in Asia and will 
continue its policy of encirclement of the Soviet Union. It endeavors to create new jump-
off points for an offensive strategy adapted to the new conditions and is expanding its 
chain of bases from South Korea over Japan (Okinawa), Taiwan, the Philippines, and 
Guam to Diego Garcia…. The US also endeavors more strongly than before to 
incorporate EC countries into the defense of imperialism’s positions in Asia.”87 Finally, 
the report considered the continued role in the region of China, the bête noire of the 
Soviet socialist world ever since consummation of the Sino-Soviet schism in the 1960s.88 
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While the communist victory in Vietnam was described as a “serious setback to the great 
power-chauvinist policy of the Chinese leaders,” the report’s authors were certain that the 
“fundamentally anti-Soviet disposition” of Chinese leaders would mean that policy 
emanating from Beijing would continually seek to opp se Soviet interests at every turn, 
whether in calls for a greater US presence on the Asian continent, overtures toward Japan 
to cooperate on an anti-Soviet basis, or support for Maoist guerillas in Thailand, 
Malaysia, and Burma. In respect to the main topic of the report, continued friction 
between Vietnam and China appeared inevitable to the report’s authors: “The great 
power-chauvinist policy of the Chinese leaders after th  victory of the peoples of 
Indochina led to an intensification of tensions between the People’s Republic of China 
and Vietnam, a tendency that in light of the continuing clash of interests will continue to 
grow in strength.”89 
 At mid-decade, the coincidence of the GDR’s foreign policy normalization and 
the North Vietnamese communists’ triumph over the leading “imperialist” power, the US, 
exercised an immense impact on East German foreign policy expertise. Real-world 
events seemed to confirm the most fundamental elements of East German experts’ 
understanding of international relations. The progress of the GDR and the progress of 
“international socialism” appeared to be one and the same, and, from the perspective of 
East German experts, the “international constellation of forces” seemed to be shifting 
decisively and enduringly in favor of socialism. Asa result, the ideological element in 
expert output in the 1970s maintained the central position it had enjoyed in the 1960s. 
The strength of the ideological element in each period, however, was the result of two 
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different processes. The seeming confirmation of the Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
foreign policy provided by developments like détente, normalization, and US defeat in 
Vietnam stood in start contrast to the situation in the 1960s, when the ideological element 
in East German foreign policy expertise stemmed in large part from absence of 
substantive engagement with the outside world on the part of the GDR. The GDR’s 
isolation outside the Soviet Bloc enforced by the Hallstein Doctrine favored a strictly 
dichotomous and dogmatic view of foreign relations. I  the 1970s, as the GDR was in the 
process overcoming its diplomatic isolation, the idological element in foreign policy 
expertise remained strong, yet now not due to the abs nce of substantive engagement 
with the outside world, but rather to the manner in which the GDR realized its supreme 
objective of foreign normalization, which occurred just as “international socialism” was 
making great gains in Europe and Asia. 
 Yet the imperative to produce sound analysis was also present in both decades, 
and it only grew stronger in the 1970s. While the immediate impact of détente and 
foreign policy normalization heavily favored reinforcement of the ideological element in 
East German foreign policy expertise, the results of he very same process, since 
diplomatic isolation could no longer serve as an ideological shelter in light of the 
complexities brought by the GDR’s full engagement with the outside world, 
simultaneously allowed movement toward a less dogmatic approach, where the expert 
element paid less attention to ideological articles of faith than to issues tied to the 
concrete interests of the GDR. 
 One area in which this dynamic was particularly apparent was analysis of unity in 
the Soviet Bloc. In the pre-normalization era, the exposed and isolated GDR was acutely 
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dependent on the willingness and ability of the memb r-states of the Warsaw Pact to act 
in unison on the international stage in order to promote interests the GDR was incapable 
of realizing on its own. The GDR’s dependency on the Soviet Bloc’s unity of action 
likewise was a key contributing factor to the strong correlation that existed between the 
GDR’s foreign policy interests and the dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
international relations. Following foreign policy normalization, when the GDR took on 
all the trappings of a status quo foreign policy actor, the GDR’s dependency on the Soviet 
Bloc was greatly reduced, although not completely eliminated, yet “proletarian 
internationalism” retained its importance for GDR foreign policy both in practice and in 
theory. The Foreign Policy of Socialist States Division of the IIB addressed the topic in a 
1977 report for the Council for Foreign Policy Research entitled “Main Directions and 
Tendencies in the Convergence Process between States of the Socialist Community. The 
Influence of the Formation of Commonalities in the International Development of 
Socialist States on the Deepening of the Convergence Process.” The report identified 
convergence (Annäherung) as the central characteristic in the development of relations 
between socialist states in the 1970s: “At the start of the 1970s, convergence as a new 
step in the societal development and the cooperation of the countries of the community of 
socialist states became the decisive developmental tendency in their mutual relations. 
Convergence means the ever-closer joint action of idependent socialist states, their 
growing alignment, and their complementarity in respect both to internal political, 
economic, and social structures and the main directions of their cooperation. 
Convergence is based on the objective process of the in ernationalization of the economic 
and societal life of socialism in its entirety.”90 
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 Whereas unity of actions among states of the socialist community in the pre-
normalization era was tried rather specifically to breaking through the Hallstein Doctrine 
and preventing the total isolation of the GDR, in the post-normalization era it was 
understood not so much in reference to a single, ovrriding goal as aimed at bolstering 
the strength of “international socialism” more generally in its continual clash with 
capitalism: “Convergence is taking place under conditions of bitter class struggle with 
imperialism. It reveals itself already today as the decisive factor of the joint action of [the 
states of the socialist community] in the struggle for peace and international cooperation 
for the freedom and independence of nations. The turn in international relations from 
‘cold war’ to détente is inseparably bound to the unfolding of convergence as historically 
determined development. The continued strengthening of the influence of the socialist 
community in the international class struggle demands the deepening of the convergence 
process.”91 The IV Division’s comprehensive report on the GDR’s foreign relations at 
mid-decade echoed the same sentiment: “The changed i ternational political situation 
creates manifold new, complex tasks for the socialist states, whose resolution demands 
united efforts more than ever.”92 
 Despite the pronounced tendency of East German experts in the era of foreign 
policy normalization to depict the “international constellation of forces” as moving 
continually in favor of socialism, their penchant for heavily ideologized analysis was 
consistently tempered by the need to provide a credible and accurate account of a given 
topic. The IIB’s analysts demonstrated cognizance of the fact that, despite the great gains 
made by “international socialism” in the first half of the decade, the situation both among 
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socialist states and between the Soviet Bloc and the capitalist world remained fraught and 
susceptible to abrupt change, which could very wellunfold to the detriment of the GDR 
and other socialist states. The IIB report on the convergence process expressed just this 
kind of circumspection in its otherwise positive account of the topic: “On the whole, 
development in recent years shows that the central contradiction of our epoch shapes the 
convergence of socialist nations and states in varying ways, some of which are directly 
contradictory. Certain aspects and elements of convergence—conditioned by the 
demands of the intensifying class struggle with imperialism—are being accelerated. On 
the other hand, the policies of imperialism and its efforts to use existing possibilities to 
influence affairs in certain areas complicates the convergence process and creates 
additional difficulties.”93 The analysis demonstrated awareness of the potential friction 
that could arise between socialist states in response to incentives and/or pressure from the 
West, just as would be the case in the 1980s when the “second Cold War” would flare up. 
The IIB report on convergence in fact exhibited onef the central characteristics of 
expert output in the wake of détente and normalization: he articulation of critical 
analysis in ideological terms, that is, without departing from the established conceptual 
framework. The notion that the international constellation of forces moved continually in 
favor of socialism could not be directly challenged, but when developments that appeared 
to run counter to the notion appeared, they still had to be described. Thus in the case of 
the convergence process of socialist states, setbacks in the process were framed as the 
result of temporary “contradictions” in international relations that, however, did not 
affect the continual movement of the international constellation of forces in favor of 
socialism. At the height of the conceptual self-confidence engendered by détente and 
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normalization, East German experts recognized the danger a breakdown of bloc unity 
could represent for a GDR that was still not completely master of its own fate in the 
context of the ongoing East-West conflict. 
 A similar process played out in respect to experts’ approach to the developing 
world, where the capacity for critical analysis continued to advance even as the triumphs 
of détente and normalization bolstered the conceptual self-confidence of East German 
experts. And just as the dramatically different conditions of détente had been seamlessly 
incorporated into the preexisting theoretical construct of peaceful coexistence, whose 
central supposition of the inexorable struggle betwe n socialism and capitalism remained 
unchanged, the considerably different situation prevalent in the developing world in the 
1970s versus the 1960s appeared to provide evidence of th  continued “objectively anti-
imperial” character of the national liberation movement and indeed of the entire 
developing world. Although events in the developing world in the 1970s were not as 
uniformly positive as détente and normalization in Europe (communist victory in 
Vietnam stood essentially as the lone example that could potentially be interpreted as 
unambiguous evidence of the further movement of the “int rnational constellation of 
forces” in favor of socialism), the dynamic of expert output on the developing world 
mirrored that of expert output on the situation in Europe. Favorable developments were 
portrayed as consistent with the continual movement of the international constellation of 
forces in favor of socialism and thus bolstered experts’ class-based conception of 
international relations while unfavorable developments could be written off as temporary 
setbacks without affecting the fundamental integrity of the existing interpretive 
framework. In the IV Division’s comprehensive report n the GDR’s foreign relations at 
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mid-decade, for instance, promising developments in Africa were not only viewed as 
beneficial to the interests of the Soviet Bloc but were also taken as confirmation of the 
continuing struggle between socialism and “imperialism”: “The national liberation 
movement as one of the main revolutionary currents of our era made significant progress 
in the period under review [1971-1975]. The last imperialistic colonial empire, the 
Portuguese empire, collapsed. Ethiopia embarked upon the path of independence and 
non-capitalist development following the fall of the feudal-capitalistic monarchy. The 
republic of Madagascar asserts its newly gained independence. The nationally liberated 
states achieved important results in the struggle for the attainment and consolidation of 
their political independence…. The crisis in the system of relations with the imperialist 
powers deepens.”94 Owing to the continued centrality of the dichotomous Marxist-
Leninist understanding of international relations that equated the interests of the GDR as 
a state with the advancement of “international socialism,” the situation in the developing 
world was analyzed within that framework, where the “objectively anti-imperialist” 
character of national liberation remained axiomatic. Given this understanding, in which 
specific significance was ascribed to the developing world in the larger conflict between 
socialism and capitalism, advances in national liberation necessarily redounded to the 
benefit of socialism and to the detriment of capitalism in what amounted to a zero-sum 
game between the two protagonists. The IV Division report continued: “The nationally 
liberated states—despite the intensified process of differentiation—have become an 
important factor in world politics that promotes the progressive tendencies in the 
world.… The GDR as socialist state consistently stood and stands on the side of all 
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peoples and states, parties and movements, which fight for national and social liberation 
and against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and racism.”95 
 At the same time, however, the general ideological significance ascribed to the 
developing world within East German experts’ conception of international relations in the 
1970s did not preclude sober, critical assessment cl arly focused on how the GDR’s 
interests might be affected. Indeed, the high level of professionalism and specialist 
knowledge achieved through the systematization of East German foreign policy expertise 
promoted this critical, expert element. And a certain balance, albeit uneasy, was able to 
exist between the ideological and expert element in foreign policy expert output since 
Marxist-Leninist notions set the general framework within which expert analysis was 
conducted, which however left abundant room for critical, differentiated analysis within 
that framework. 
 The uneasy balance between the ideological and the exp rt in output in the 1970s 
was on display in analysis of another key region of the developing world: the Middle 
East. In a 1976 report on “Current Issues in the Struggle for a Political Solution to the 
Crisis in the Middle East” drafted by the MfAA and submitted to the APK, an 
unmistakable concern with the topic’s significance for the international class struggle 
provided the general framework for what was otherwise rather deft analysis of the 
complexities of the situation. The report portrayed the Middle East as a key venue in the 
broader clash between socialism and capitalism and as an area where “imperialism” had 
been able to make significant gains: “Imperialism rapidly adapted to the constellation of 
forces, which had patently changed during the Yom Kippur War, and exploited the 
intensified process of class differentiation within a d between the Arab states in order to 
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proceed actively against progressive forces. The gap th t Nasser’s death left and his 
successor’s shift to openly pro-imperialist positions gave imperialism the opportunity, in 
league with the Arab reaction, to go on the offensive and to expand its weakened 
position. This is supposed simultaneously to compensate for the strategic defeats in 
Europe and Indochina and to forestall further defeats.”96 The gains of “imperialism” in 
the region compelled the report’s authors, who in accord with their ideologized 
understanding of foreign relations viewed the competition between socialism and 
capitalism as a zero-sum game, to concede that the situation in the Middle East was 
developing contrary to the general movement of the “int rnational constellation of 
forces” in favor of socialism: “The policies of imperialism have heretofore impeded a 
political solution of the Middle East conflict and have aggravated tensions in the region. 
The explosive situation in the Middle East could not be rectified. This development, 
which stands in sharp contrast to the basic tendency of international development, 
exercises an enormous influence on the worldwide class struggle for détente and 
disarmament. The just and lasting resolution of the Middle East conflict—as the peace 
program of the XXV Party Congress of CPSU formulated—is one of the most pressing 
tasks in the continued struggle for peace, freedom, and national independence.”97  
 The GDR naturally adopted the position of its superpower patron on the issue as 
its own—support for Arab states’ demands for territo ial concessions from Israel, support 
for the PLO,98 and opposition to Israel as the main ally of “imperialism” in the region—
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and the report clearly reflected this fact by making no distinction between the interests of 
the Soviet Union and those of the “community of socialist states” in the Middle East. East 
German diplomatic engagement with the states of the region following foreign policy 
normalization, however, brought with it cognizance of the complexity of the situation on 
the ground, for which an overly dogmatic approach centered around the simplistic notion 
of an “anti-imperial alliance between international socialism and the Arab movement for 
national liberation” was a poor fit. While the MfAA report employed a considerable 
amount of ideological terminology, it did so while providing a differentiated account of 
the complexities of the situation. The situation in the Arab world, the report described, 
was volatile owing both to internal processes and external developments: “The movement 
for national liberation of the Arab peoples is currently passing through a complicated 
stage. In nearly all Arab states, increasing class differentiation and polarization under the 
conditions of the intensification of the struggle against imperialism, Israeli aggression, 
and neo-colonial exploitation is producing a gradual re-grouping of political forces. 
Social questions are coming ever more to the fore al ngside national questions. In many 
states (Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, et al.), sharp clashes over the further path of 
development are emerging.”99 The complex situation in individual Arab states were 
manifested for the report’s authors in an equally complex situation between Arab states: 
“The social processes within Arab states lead likews  to a growth in the social-political 
differences between them. The political contradictions and clashes that are riling and 
dividing the Arab world in previously unknown measure and that hold nearly every Arab 
state in their grip are unmistakable. The progressiv , anti-imperial Arab states and forces 
(Iraq, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen, Lebanon, and PLO) currently face a larger group of 
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reactionary monarcho-feudal and right-nationalist capitalist states led by Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt.”100 
 The analytical approach applied to the situation in and between Arab states—a 
differentiated account sensitive to existing complexiti s paired with the continued use of 
ideological terminology—was also applied to the policies of the US and other capitalist 
states in the Middle East.101 “Imperialism” was handled as a monolithic bloc that stood in 
absolute opposition to an equally monolithic “interational socialism.” The ongoing class 
struggle set the essential context for the clash of interests between socialism and 
capitalism in the Middle East, which meant “imperialist” aims consisted exclusively in 
promoting its own interests at the expense of the Arab movement for national liberation 
and, by extension, international socialism: “The goals of imperialism in the Middle East 
lie in comprehensively securing its political, economic, and military interests in the 
region. The rule of imperialism and the Arab reaction is to be fully re-established in new, 
neo-colonial forms and is to be safeguarded by the consolidation of exploitative relations 
in the individual Arab states.”102 While describing the “imperialist” approach to resolving 
the situation in the Middle East, the report again deployed ideological language to 
provide what was essentially an accurate, differentiated reading of the situation. It 
described the US approach to securing peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors by 
brokering compromise settlements between moderate elements on a country-by-country 
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the imperialistic struggle against the movement for national liberation and the young national states.” 
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basis, a process which had already begun with Henry Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy 
between Israel and Egypt to bring about a cease-fire in the Yom Kippur War and to 
initiate the peace process that would culminate in the 1978 Camp David Accords. The 
process of class differentiation analyzed above had a key role to play since, according to 
the report’s authors, the presence of a “national bourgeoisie” willing to negotiate and 
make peace with Israel was an indispensable element for any type of agreement: 
[T]he imperialist approach toward resolution of theMiddle East conflict aims at a 
balancing of interests between the Israeli monopoly b urgeoisie and the Arab 
bourgeoisie, whereby Israel will remain the central imperialist base in the region. In this 
process, the legitimate, fundamental demands for resolution of the Middle East conflict 
cannot be ignored. In particular, the return of Arab territory occupied by Israel is an 
essential condition for the Arab bourgeoisie in a solution that would also have to open the 
possibility of satisfying the interests of the Palestinian bourgeoisie. The continued 
strengthening of the Arab bourgeoisie, particularly its most reactionary elements, and the 
weakening of the anti-imperialist, democratic elements represent the decisive prerequisite 
for coming closer to the realization of such a soluti n. The fundamental method for the 
prosecution of this objective is the policy of parti l steps. Imperialism thereby has to 
ensure that each concrete step vis-à-vis its Arab partners does not comprise the 
preeminence of Israel in the area.103 
East German experts in their approach to the thorny situation in the Middle East thus 
continued to apply the GDR-specific Marxist-Leninist conception of international 
relations to provide the general framework within which analysis was conducted, but this 
did not prevent them from clearly recognizing the complexity of a situation where 
“international socialism” appeared to be on the defensive. The MfAA report on the 
Middle East likewise tacitly acknowledged by its repeated statements of support for a 
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“complex political solution” to the problem that the interests of the Soviet Bloc and the 
interests of the diverse panoply of Arab states with a stake in the Middle East crisis were 
by no means as compatible as the theoretical postulate of a close objective alliance 
between international socialism and national liberation would have it. East German 
experts’ confidence in the fundamental soundness of their basic approach was 
unshaken—the report claimed for instance that “the process of intensified class 
differentiation and polarization does not nullify the contradiction between the Arab 
movement for national liberation and imperialism in league with the ruling circles of 
Israel and the Arab reaction”104—but their conceptual certainty was tempered by 
recognition of the complexity of a situation that did not mesh well with a rigid, dogmatic 
approach. In its concluding section, the report underscored the continuing volatility and 
unpredictability the situation in the Middle East would present in the future: “The 
struggle for resolution of the Middle East conflict will continue to be protracted and will 
not be free of manifestations of stagnation or of setbacks. One must anticipate new 
maneuvers on the part of imperialism and Israel as well as pronounced manifestations of 
differentiation among the Arab states and the PLO.”105 The situation surrounding the 
Middle East conflict, the report acknowledged while simultaneously never straying too 
far from stock ideological terminology, could very well continue to develop in a manner 
contrary to the concrete interests of the Soviet-led community of socialist states and 
thereby to the detriment of international socialism. 
 




 Even while analysis was becoming more differentiated and refined in the 1970s, 
the continued adherence to class-based analytical categories at times clearly hindered an 
accurate reading of international events. The Fundamental Questions Division of the 
MfAA, for instance, completed a report on Iran just months before the regime of the shah 
was overthrown and replaced by a theocracy under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The 
report attributed the strikes and demonstrations that paralyzed the country in 1978 to 
“intensification of the contradictions that derive from the accelerated capitalist 
development of Iran paired with maintenance of the autocratic regime.”106 While it was 
acknowledged that “the opposition finds a relatively broad resonance among the 
population,” the application of class-based analysis resulted in a woefully inaccurate 
assessment of the situation: “Yet [the opposition] thus far does not represent an 
alternative to the existing regime. On the basis of its divergent social and political 
interests and goals, [the opposition] is not in a position to seriously threaten the power of 
the regime.”107 In April 1979, the Iranian Islamic Republic was declared, fundamentally 
altering the geo-strategic situation in the Middle East. 
 If certain situations in the developing world such as events in the Middle East 
appeared to play to the disadvantage of socialism, East German experts generally 
remained loathe to interpret such events—which were p ceived as isolated setbacks and 
thus exceptions to the rule—as evidence of the fallibility of their broader understanding 
of international relations, in which socialism and the developing world were viewed as 
“objective” allies against the common imperialist enemy. One area that allowed East 
German experts in the second half of the 1970s to maintain their ideologically inspired 
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belief in the fundamental compatibility, if not identity, of interests between the two 
movements despite a significant amount of evidence to the contrary was the realm of 
international economic policy. The efforts of developing countries to restructure 
international economic relations in order to obtain  more favorable position vis-à-vis 
industrialized states gained steam after the General Assembly of the UN passed the 
“Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order” in May 
1974. The demands of developing countries now took shape around a comprehensive 
program, which focused above all on raw materials and international trade, intensified 
industrialization, debt relief, the international currency system, developmental aid, and 
maritime law. 
 The concerted push on the part of developing countries in the 1970s to establish a 
“new international economic order” (NIEO) provided another case where a seemingly 
strong correlation between concrete international rel tions developments and the class-
based Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations facilitated an ideologized 
reading of the GDR’s foreign policy interests. As an attempt to place international 
economic relations on a more favorable basis for developing countries, the push for a 
NIEO was directed above all at the capitalist world. East German experts in the second 
half of the 1970s seized upon this opening as a chance for socialist states to work together 
with developing countries at the expense of “imperialism” and consciously integrated the 
issue into their existing conceptual framework of international relations, where the 
theoretical postulate of an “objective” anti-imperialist alliance between socialism and the 
developing world remained central. The IIB-led Council for Foreign Policy Research 
dealt with the issue repeatedly, as in its meeting o  27 April 1978, when a paper on 
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“Conceptual Questions in the Restructuring of Interational Economic Relations on a 
Democratic Basis,” presented by Wolfgang Spröte, was discussed. The paper assigned no 
independent value to developing countries’ push for a NIEO, but rather unambiguously 
subordinated it to the inexorable clash between socialism and capitalism, which retained 
its absolute primacy: “The democratic restructuring of international economic relations is 
a component part of the struggle for the democratic estructuring of international relations 
and the class struggle between socialism and capitalism under the conditions of the ever-
stronger realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between states of 
differing social and political orders.”108 Discussion of the paper at the council’s meeting, 
which was attended by 26 leading experts from the IIB and the IPW as well as other 
institutions, revealed the complex balance between voluntaristic and deterministic 
elements at play in the process of infusing internatio l relations developments with 
specific ideological significance at the GDR’s expert institutions. Although experts’ basic 
understanding of international relations stipulated that the developing world was 
“objectively” anti-imperial, scientific analysis was required, first, to elaborate the specific 
anti-imperial content of individual initiatives emanating from the developing world and, 
second, to bring about the actualization of the specific anti-imperialist character of the 
undertaking. In other words, East German experts were not content with simply asserting 
the objectively anti-imperialist character of the push for a NIEO, but were obligated by 
the very nature of their duty as “party functionaries n the realm of foreign policy” to 
ground it in both theoretical and practical-political terms. The meeting of the Council for 
Foreign Policy Research at which the paper was discussed highlighted for instance “the 
necessity of further working out the concept of a NIEO from the perspective of Marxism-
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Leninism and the interests of socialism.”109 The meeting similarly underscored the need 
for the GDR and the socialist world to take action in order to ensure full realization of the 
anti-imperialist character of the undertaking: “At the heart of the struggle for a NIEO…is 
the abolition of unequal capitalist international economic relations, i.e. restructuring with 
an overall democratic character. The struggle for a NIEO is therefore a key element of the 
anti-imperialist struggle of the present and raises th  possibility of correspondingly broad 
anti-imperialist alliances.”110 
 Expert analysis of the push for establishment of a NIEO was at a relatively early 
stage, where the issue required further attention to become fully grounded in both 
theoretical and practical-political terms. The case is revealing because it demonstrates 
how East German experts seized upon the ostensible corr lation between concrete 
international relations developments and the Marxist-Leninist reading of them both to 
promote cooperation between “international socialism” and the developing world at the 
expense of “imperialism” and to integrate the issue into the existing conceptual 
framework, where the theoretical postulate of an “objective” anti-imperialist alliance 
between socialism and the developing world remained central. Whereas the Soviet Bloc 
appeared to be losing ground in the 1970s in some key areas of the developing world, 
such as the Middle East, the NIEO allowed East German experts to maintain their 
ideologically inspired belief in the fundamental compatibility, if not identity, of interests 
between the developing world and international socialism. 
 





The 1970s were a crucial decade for East German foreign policy expertise in terms of 
both institutional development and analytical output. The process of rationalization in 
service of synchronization that had advanced unevenly though continually from the very 
creation of the SED in 1946 culminated in the full systematization of East German 
foreign policy expertise in the early 1970s. A disparate set of institutions oftentimes 
working at cross-purposes or inefficiently duplicatng one another’s output had been 
transformed into a full-fledged system of foreign policy expertise welded together by the 
dictatorial rule of the SED and the unity of purpose in foreign policy expertise it 
imparted. The clear flow of authority from top to bttom within a uniform and centralized 
hierarchal structure effectively brought about the long-desired union of “theory with 
practice,” or subordination to the political, ideological, and operational goals of the 
GDR’s foreign policy apparatus. In the Institute for International Relations (IIB) and the 
Institute for International Politics and Economics (IPW), the two branches of foreign 
policy research, general foreign policy expertise and West expertise, were respectively 
centralized around a single institution responsible for molding its own research and that 
of subordinate institutions to meet the practical goals and political-ideological 
requirements of the respective operative institutions to which each was in turn 
subordinate. The training of foreign policy cadres was likewise systematized to produce 
the “party functionaries in the realm of foreign policy” demanded by the SED leadership 
and viewed as indispensable to the success of East German foreign policy. Such cadres 
were expected to be capable of adroitly identifying a d advancing the foreign policy 
interests of the GDR, and doing so from a firm Marxist-Leninist perspective.  
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 The institutional completion brought about by systematization in the 1970s 
ultimately had an ambiguous effect on the central ch racteristic of East German foreign 
policy expertise, the tension between intellectual s bordination and autonomy. On the 
one hand, systematization brought with it ever-greater demands for professional 
competency and specialist knowledge on the part of East German experts, whose ultimate 
mission remained furtherance of the GDR’s concrete for ign policy goals; on the other 
hand, Marxism-Leninism retained its central position as definitive theoretical template of 
East German foreign policy, particularly as ideological retrenchment played a pivotal role 
in the systematization effort in response to the perceived threat of ideological dilution 
emanating from wide-ranging East German engagement with the world in the era of 
foreign policy normalization. Institutional completion as sealed by systematization in the 
1970s thus did not alter the fundamental character of East German foreign policy 
expertise—typified by a dual emphasis on Marxism-Leninism and specialist 
knowledge—but rather represented the continuation and completion of a process that had 
been initiated in the 1950s: creation of a comprehensiv  system of foreign policy 
expertise fully synchronized with the political-ideological requirements and operative 
needs of the larger East German foreign policy apparatus. The high level of 
systematization and professionalization attained by the 1970s matched with ever-greater 
emphasis on moving beyond basic competency to attain a h gher levels of specialization 
tended to favor the expert side of the equation, but this was an adjustment within rather 
than to the established framework of foreign policy expertis . The importance of 
specialist knowledge and professional expertise in East German foreign policy was 
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steadily increasing, and this trend would only be bolstered by the effects of foreign policy 
normalization. 
 With the institutional framework of East German foreign policy expertise 
essentially fixed by the early 1970s, it was rather  other main element in the 
equation—the international relations themselves East German experts were charged with 
analyzing—that would henceforth prove the more dynamic element in the mix shaping 
the output of East German foreign policy experts. And in the 1970s, the epoch-making 
foreign policy gains of the GDR and the entire Soviet Bloc in the détente era appeared 
dramatically to alter the basic features comprising the GDR’s geo-strategic situation. Full 
diplomatic recognition and normalization of its international relations represented the 
greatest foreign policy achievement in the GDR’s history and marked fulfillment of the 
one foreign policy goal most fervently pursued since the very inception of the East 
German state. The GDR now faced the international community on the same terms, in 
theory, as every other state and thus took on all the trappings of a “status quo” actor on 
the international stage. Broad engagement with the outside world following the imposed 
isolation of the preceding 20 years did not, however, result in actualization of the inherent 
tension between intellectual subordination and autonomy, as one could have perhaps 
expected. On the contrary, the manner in which the GDR achieved foreign policy 
normalization, where the attainment of normalization was inconceivable without and 
inseparable from the gains of the GDR’s superpower patron and the entire Soviet Bloc, 
the qualitatively new situation that emerged at the end of the détente process did not 
challenge but rather reinforced experts’ GDR-specific onception of international 
relations that fused the clearly delineated realpolitica  interests of the GDR with the 
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Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as a form of the class struggle. The GDR’s 
interests were understood as one and the same with the cause of international socialism. 
When the GDR fulfilled its central objective of full foreign policy normalization in the 
context of détente, it facilitated the reification f experts’ ideologized understanding of 
international relations since the entire process appe red to play out in conformity with the 
notion that the interests of the GDR and “international socialism” were essentially 
identical, which itself derived from the view that saw the “clash of systems” between 
socialism and capitalism as the defining feature of international relations. At a time when 
the strategic situation in which the no longer-isolated GDR found itself began to 
correspond less and less to a dichotomous class-based understanding of international 
relations, the ostensible shift in the “international constellation of forces” in favor of 
socialism represented by détente brought about the highpoint of East German experts’ 
comprehensive foreign policy conception. The perception of fundamental agreement 
between the GDR’s strategic interests and the foreign policy precepts of Marxism-
Leninism attained its apogee in the GDR’s attainment of foreign policy normalization. 
While extensive engagement with the outside world fo lowing foreign policy 
normalization did not result in immediate actualization of the tension between the 
ideological and the expert in East German foreign policy expertise, it nevertheless lay the 
necessary groundwork for a more critical stance toward the existing Marxist-Leninist 
conception of international relations. Following foreign policy normalization, the GDR 
became fully exposed to the vagaries of internationl relations and East German experts 
accordingly had to analyze and illuminate the GDR’s increasingly complex foreign 
relations without being able to retreat to the type of ideological dogmatism that had 
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served as the natural default under the conditions of imposed isolation. In an era marked 
by the supreme conceptual self-confidence engendered by détente and normalization, 
international relations developments that appeared to run contrary to the postulate of the 
continual movement of the “international constellation of forces” in favor socialism could 
be dismissed as ephemeral phenomena that did not affec the fundamental integrity of the 
existing interpretive framework. But just as the foreign policy triumphs of the 1970s led 
to confirmation of the existing understanding of inter ational relations, adverse 
developments could now have the opposite effect, challenging the established interpretive 
framework in a GDR now fully integrated into the international order and divested for 
good or ill of the insularity borne of diplomatic isolation. 
What is more, there were already indications in the 1970s that the conception of 
international relations fusing the GDR’s realpolitical interests with the Marxist-Leninist 
notion of foreign policy as a form of the class struggle was not impervious to revision 
even at the apex of East German experts’ conceptual self-confidence. In 1975, at the 
height of détente, the IV Division warned: 
Imperialism remains a dangerous and strong adversary. Its aggressive character has not 
changed. The most aggressive imperialist circles—openly supported by the leadership in 
Beijing—are redoubling their efforts to arrest or even undo the positive changes in the 
world. Imperialism’s quest to block the effects of the détente process detrimental to itself  
and to exploit détente for realization of its anti-socialist goals is unmistakable. There still 
exist potential sources of acute conflict in different areas of the world. Setbacks in the 
international class struggle and abrupt turns in the international situation therefore cannot 
be ruled out.111 
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With the importance of specialist knowledge and professional competency on the rise 
following “systematization” and with the GDR now thoroughly integrated into the 
international order, reversals in the foreign policy fortunes of the GDR such as those 
presaged here by the IV Division would not lead to conceptual change within but rather 













The “Second Cold War” and the Crisis of the Soviet Bloc: The Eclipse of the Marxist-













East German Foreign Policy Expertise and the “Second Cold War”: The Marxist-Leninist 
Paradigm under Stress 
 
Introduction 
The “systematization” of foreign policy expertise in the GDR in the 1970s brought about 
the completion of a process of institutional development that had proceeded unevenly but 
continually since the very founding of the GDR. The absolute “joining of theory with 
practice” accomplished by systematization entailed the thoroughgoing politicization of 
foreign policy expertise and the suppression of any l st remnants of operational 
autonomy, but also brought with it far-reaching professionalization and specialization. 
The profile of the “party functionaries in the realm of foreign policy” produced by and 
populating the GDR’s foreign policy organs was correspondingly marked by a dual 
emphasis: strict adherence to Marxism-Leninism as the theoretical template for 
investigation of international relations paired with great stress on specialist knowledge 
and professional competency. Furtherance of the GDR’s foreign policy interests 
represented the superordinate objective in which the two elements were ostensibly 
unified, yet a continual tension existed between the ideological and the expert, between 
intellectual subordination and autonomy, in the mission of East German foreign policy 
experts. With the institutional development of foreign policy expertise essentially 
complete, this tension became entrenched. Yet the effects of foreign policy 
normalization, both by integrating the GDR (and its experts) into the international order 
and by further augmenting the demand for sound, specialist analysis of the GDR’s 
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increasingly complex foreign relations, facilitated the continual growth of the critical 
tendency in East German foreign policy expertise. 
 One aspect of normalization would have a particularly important effect on the 
work of East German experts: their integration intoa transnational network of foreign 
policy experts. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the states of the capitalist 
West in turn permitted East German foreign policy experts to establish and maintain 
fairly intensive contact with their counterparts in the capitalist West. As East German 
experts engaged in a dialog with their numerous and diverse Western partners, the bonds 
of the rigid, dogmatic understanding of international relations as the unfolding of the 
class struggle on the international stage that had been inherited from the pre-
normalization era perforce slackened. East German experts recognized that the 
complexities of contemporary international relations, of which they were now gaining 
first-hand knowledge, were a poor fit for that same understanding. This development 
represented a key element in what was now becoming the preponderance of the expert 
over the ideological element in East German foreign policy expertise, where Marxism-
Leninism continued to serve as the basic framework in which international relations were 
generally understood, but it was increasingly relegat d to this position alone, i.e. of 
intellectual framing device, while the essential focus of expertise shifted emphatically 
toward expert analysis of individual issues on the basis of specialist knowledge 
 Yet the GDR’s achievement of foreign policy normaliz tion in the first half of the 
1970s—its greatest foreign policy triumph bar none, even if it owed little to the GDR’s 
own efforts—had led not to the weakening of the experts’ GDR-specific class-based 
understanding of international relations, as one might have plausibly expected, but rather 
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to its reinforcement. For the manner in which normalization was achieved—as part and 
parcel of the broader gains made by “international socialism” in the period—confirmed in 
the eyes of East German experts the purported identity of interests between the GDR and 
an abstract international socialism, a notion that itself derived from the view that saw “the 
clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism a  the defining characteristic of 
international relations. With the GDR and the Soviet Bloc seemingly stronger than ever, 
the “international constellation of forces,” all contrary development notwithstanding, 
appeared to be moving continually and inexorably in favor of socialism. At the same 
time, however, normalization altered the basic conditions in which the GDR had to 
conduct foreign policy. With the diplomatic isolation imposed by the Hallstein Doctrine a 
thing of the past, the GDR now became fully integrated into the international order as a 
seemingly normal, “status quo” actor on the international stage. As such, the GDR could 
no longer retreat to the type of rigid dogmatism and ideological maximalism that had 
been possible in the conditions of enforced isolatin in the pre-normalization period. Just 
at the time that analysis of the highly favorable developments of the détente era, from 
which no Soviet Bloc state gained more than East Germany, facilitated reification of 
experts’ GDR-specific class-based conception of international relations, the conditions 
which created the strong correlation between the specific interests of the GDR and the 
dichotomous Marxist-Leninist understanding of interational relations and which in turn 
facilitated their fusion into a comprehensive conception in the first place thus grew 
weaker and weaker. 
 The result was that, with engagement with the world an irreversible fact, the 
foreign policy fortunes of the GDR were now subject to he vacillations of international 
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relations as never before. The main foreign policy events of the 1970s had indeed been 
very favorable for the GDR, which had resulted in the reinforcement of the prevailing 
conceptual paradigm among experts, but, with the option of complete ideological 
retrenchment and retreat into insularity no longer available, unfavorable developments 
likewise could—and almost necessarily had to—elicit critical re-assessment of that same 
understanding, which claimed to explain not only individual events but also international 
relations in their entirety. And this is indeed what took place at the turn of the decade. A 
series of foreign policy challenges—chief among them the outbreak of the “second Cold 
War”—paired with domestic difficulties throughout the Soviet Bloc provoked a turn 
away from the conceptual confidence present in the output of East German experts in the 
1970s. In the first half of the 1980s, the results of expert analysis in individual areas 
unambiguously pointed to the incongruence of the existing interpretive framework with 
the existing state of international relations and the GDR’s place therein. In the process, 
the Marxist-Leninist façade of East German expertis remained largely intact— the 
existing paradigm was neither completely rejected nor was a comprehensive alternative 
to it fully enunciated—yet critical views based on expert analysis multiplied beneath the 
surface. As a result, some of the central pillars of the prevailing conception of 
international relations—the class nature of foreign policy, the inexorable movement of 
the “international constellation of forces” in favor f socialism, the one-to-one 
correspondence between the interests of the GDR and those of an abstractly understood 
“international socialism”—appeared less and less capable of offering true insight into the 
complexities of contemporary international relations. The process represented a natural 
outgrowth of East Germany’s system of foreign policy expertise, in which specialist 
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knowledge and professional competency were in the asc ndancy, and would only 
intensify in the second half of the 1980s, when the for ign policy challenges facing the 
GDR and the Soviet Bloc became no less serious and when Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to 
power in the Soviet Union would provide further impulse to innovation in foreign policy 
thought. 
 
Exposure to the Capitalist West and Experts’ “Convergence with Reality” 
The extensive engagement with the outside world that replaced the imposed isolation of 
the pre-normalization era represented the key featur  of East German foreign policy in 
the post-normalization era. The basic constellation of foreign issues facing the GDR had 
changed dramatically—the singe-minded pursuit of diplomatic recognition conducted in 
the conditions of acute dependency on the Soviet Union and heavy reliance on the unity 
of action of the Soviet Bloc gave way to a state of relative foreign policy normalcy where 
the GDR nominally enjoyed the same status as any other sovereign state in the 
international arena and took on all the trappings of a “status quo” power. Aside from the 
general importance of this sea change in the basic framework of GDR foreign policy, 
foreign policy normalization and the engagement it brought with it also had a crucial 
impact on East German foreign policy expertise in another, much more tangible manner, 
by facilitating the explosive growth of contacts betw en East German foreign policy 
experts and their counterparts in the capitalist West. 
 Contacts on the part of East German expert institutions with scholarly institutions 
in the capitalist West in fact existed in some form or another nearly from the very 
inception of the GDR. And as far back as the GDR’s scholarly contacts with the West 
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went back, so too did instrumentalization of those contacts to serve the political goals of 
the SED leadership. Thus in the early 1950s, an institution like the German Economic 
Institute (DWI), one of the predecessor institutions of the IPW, had an important role to 
play in representing the public face of East German foreign policy scholarship to the 
outside world. Jürgen Kuczynski and Siegbert Kahn, respectively president and director 
of the DWI in the early 1950s, were specialists with PhDs in economics who, on the basis 
of the standing imparted by their scholarly credentials, could provide an invaluable 
service to the SED by bolstering the legitimacy of the young GDR in the eyes of the West 
German and foreign public and advancing the specific, ideologically inflected perspective 
of the SED on a host of issues without appearing as simple shills for party propaganda.1 
Contacts on the part of such institutions as the DWI with scholarly institutions in the 
West or with international organizations in fact possessed particular importance in the 
pre-normalization era because they allowed the GDR to expand its involvement and 
influence in the world despite the lack of official diplomatic recognition imposed by the 
Hallstein Doctrine. This was the case for example wh n the Institute for International 
Relations (IIB), after its creation out of the Prorectorate for the Training of Leading 
Foreign Service Employees in 1964, took over sole responsibility for official 
correspondence with all the peace research institutes of the world. Research institutes 
dedicated to the general cause of peace were proliferating widely at the time and offered 
a promising venue for the newly formed IIB to represent the position of the GDR on the 
range of questions connected to the topic. Jürgen Kuczynski, director of the Institute for 
Economic History of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR and previously president of 
the DWI, indicated as much in a letter to Herbert Kröger, director of the IIB at the time, 
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in September 1964: “This movement has taken on extremely large dimensions in recent 
years and we are going to become more thoroughly involved in it.”2 
 While such contacts could help to alleviate the negative aspects of diplomatic 
isolation, they were incapable of overcoming it altogether. And as long as the diplomatic 
isolation of the GDR remained in place, the number of opportunities for contacts with the 
West remained limited. The limited number of such contacts combined with the 
underdeveloped state of East German foreign policy expertise prevalent in the 1950s and 
into the 1960s meant that those contacts that did exist were not always handled adeptly 
and in a manner fully conducive to the political goals of the GDR. In April 1970, for 
instance, Wolfgang Spröte, a specialist at the IIB, attended a conference of the European 
Center of the Carnegie Foundation on the topic of “International Organizations in Europe 
and the Changing European System.” On the one hand, is report on the conference 
highlighted the value of such conferences for the GDR and even the necessity of East 
German participation given “imperialism’s” exploitat on of such events to serve its own 
political goals: “The GDR’s participation proved expedient and useful in light of both the 
involvement of all European socialist states except Albania and the participation of 
representatives of the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Such conferences provide us the 
opportunity to present our own views and to substantiate them while offensively 
engaging the views of the representatives of imperialist states.… The conference 
confirmed that the imperialist side intensively uses instruments and methods of various 
types to gather information, to ascertain differences within the socialist camp, and to test 
political and economic activities in the realm of theory.”3 On the other hand, Spröte’s 
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report made clear that the GDR lagged behind its socialist allies in its preparedness for 
such conferences and that steps needed to be taken in order to bring the GDR’s foreign 
policy experts up to snuff: “The future participation [of the GDR] requires more thorough 
preparation on our part and particularly coordination with the other socialist states…. The 
membership and participation of the GDR in international organizations presents the 
GDR with several new and complicated problems and tsks, for whose resolution a 
particular approach in the area of research and the area of cadres must be created. It is 
necessary to organize and to continue to develop our research potential and research 
profile in even greater accord with the rapidly growing demands of the future.”4 
 But just as the broader condition of underdevelopment within East German 
foreign policy expertise was finally overcome in the early 1970s, so too were 
shortcomings in the specific area of scholarly contacts with the West. The thoroughgoing 
systematization which brought about the institutional completion of East German foreign 
policy expertise in the late 1960s and early 1970s simultaneously resolved the two 
largest, interconnected issues hampering the progress of the GDR’s scholarly contacts 
with the West. First, the process of systematization secured the cadres needed to take full 
advantage of the opportunities presented by West conta ts—those “party functionaries in 
the realm of foreign policy” who were well-trained xperts with regional specializations 
simultaneously capable of representing the viewpoint of the GDR from a firm Marxist-
Leninist perspective. Second, any vagueness remaining i  the official position on 
scholarly contacts with the West and what purpose they were to serve was finally 
dispelled. The politicization of such contacts was a given—an IIB memorandum on 
foreign travel, for instance, stated bluntly that such trips “serve fulfillment of the goals set 
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by party and state”5—but in what that politicization precisely consisted now became 
unambiguously formulated. First and most importantly, the cultivation of contacts with 
leading foreign policy research institutes in the Wst provided the opportunity to gain 
information and insight into important issues that weighed heavily on international 
relations that was otherwise unavailable. In this respect, the Western counterparts of East 
German foreign policy experts also had something to gain since they too could gain 
insight, however limited, into the inner workings of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus and its position on a range of important issues. Secondly, the cultivation of 
contacts with Western scholars and participation in i ternational scholarly conferences 
afforded East German foreign policy experts the opportunity to present and defend the 
position of the GDR on a given topic under discussion, which ideally would help 
facilitate implementation of East German foreign policy. Or as one former leading US 
expert at the IIB put it, scholarly contacts with the West afforded East German experts 
the opportunity “to sell the GDR” abroad.6 This twofold purpose—gaining valuable 
information otherwise unavailable and aggressively r presenting the viewpoint and 
interests of the GDR—became enshrined as the official guiding principle behind all 
scholarly contacts with the West on the part of East German foreign policy experts. 
 This orientation was unmistakable, for instance, in February 1975, at the height of 
détente and a few short years after the GDR achieved diplomatic recognition, when East 
German representatives from the IIB took part in the annual conference of the 
International Studies Association in Washington DC, where a special conference group 
met for the first time to discuss US-GDR relations. The resolution presented to the 
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Secretariat for approval underscored the value attached to East German involvement in 
such events: “Participation in this congress offers the opportunity to analyze the views of 
American scholars and foreign policy experts on the qu stion of the further development 
of relations between the US and the GDR and constructively and offensively to expound 
within the framework of the congress the position of the GDR on this set of issues. Since 
representatives of US research centers who are heavily involved in the process of foreign 
policy formulation of the US administration and Congress will be present at the ISA 
congress, participation in the congress offers promising opportunities to become more 
closely acquainted with and to analyze new developmental tendencies in US foreign 
policy, particularly in regard to the further course of action of the Ford administration 
toward the states of the socialist community and its position toward the détente process in 
Europe.”7 From the perspective of the SED leadership, scholarly contacts with the West 
afforded an opportunity from which they only stood t  gain. Through such contacts, the 
Marxist-Leninist foreign policy experts trained and working within a system of expertise 
designed to match the exact specifications of the SED leadership could make an 
important contribution to fulfillment of the GDR’s foreign policy goals. By acquiring 
valuable information from their Western partners they enriched analysis and aided in the 
process of foreign policy formulation. Scholarly contacts with the West also served as a 
one-way conduit for influencing Western opinion and policy, where East German experts 
could work to gain acceptance for East German foreign policy through offensive 
representation of the GDR’s position on the most important questions of the day without, 
nominally, themselves being influenced. 
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 Normalization provided the context in which the blossoming of East Germany’s 
scholarly contacts with the West of took place and represented the key factor in the 
explosive growth of such contacts starting in the early 1970s. With diplomatic isolation a 
thing of the past, there emerged manifold opportunities for contact with foreign policy 
institutions in the West that previously had not existed. The vigorous scholarly exchange 
with Western institutions that the IPW and the IIB then engaged in as the GDR’s leading 
foreign policy research institutes demonstrated that, while such contacts were never 
completely free of politicization within the contex of the Cold War “clash of systems” 
between East and West, a scholarly or expert element was also never completely absent. 
The numerous scholarly contacts with the West made an  maintained by the IPW and IIB 
took on a variety of forms. The most regular form was direct, sustained contact with an 
analogous institute in the West. Regular or semi-regular consultations took place between 
experts from the IPW and their counterparts, for insta ce, from the Cologne Institute of 
Economic Research, the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the French Institute for 
International Relations, the International Institute for Peace in Vienna, the Research 
Institute of the Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn, the Council on Foreign Relations,8 the 
Institute for East-West Security Studies,9 the German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs in Ebenhausen near Munich, the American Institute for Contemporary 
German Studies,10 and the Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft in 
Heidelberg,11 among others.12 Starting in the late 1970s, the IPW cultivated a particularly 
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close relationship with the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the 
University of Hamburg. The two institutes engaged in an “intensive scholarly exchange 
of opinions” on the most pressing security-related issues of the day, whereby several joint 
consultations took place between Director Max Schmidt and other leading experts from 
the IPW on the one hand and Director Egon Bahr and other leading personnel from the 
IFSH on the other.13 In 1986, Schmidt even became a member of the International 
Scientific Advisory Council of the IFSH.14 For its part, the IIB stood in contact with a 
number of Western institutions, including the Institute for Political Science of the 
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, the Center for European Studies in Aachen, the 
International Institute for Peace in Vienna, the College of Economics and Politics in 
Hamburg, and the Institute for International Law of the University of Kiel.15  
Such scholarly contacts with the West were cultivated by the IPW and IIB in a 
professional and cordial manner where both concerned parties stood to gain by engaging 
in a comparatively open and candid exchange of opini ns and information. The IPW and 
IIB’s contacts with Western foreign policy research institutions often extended to include 
mutual visits between institute directors and other high-ranking personnel. The IPW in 
particular in its capacity as the GDR’s elite institution for West expertise often hosted the 
heads of foreign institutes and other leading personnel as guest researchers or visiting 
scholars. This was the case with the IPW visits of, for instance, William Diebold of the 
Council of Foreign Relations,16 Karl Ritter of the German Institute for International and 
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Security Affairs in Ebenhausen,17 John Mroz of the Institute for East-West Security 
Studies in New York,18 Jasjit Singh of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in 
New Delhi, Gianni Bonvicini and Marco Carnocale of the Institute for International 
Relations in Rome,19 and Thierry de Montbrial of the Institute for International Relations 
in Paris.20 The IPW’s wide-ranging contacts with the West included one other high-level 
target group, namely those politicians who actively had a hand in the formulation of 
foreign policy. The IPW cultivated contacts with ind vidual representatives from the 
West German Bundestag from both the SPD and CDU-CSU21 and with fractions of the 
European Parliament22 as well as the respective foundations of the West G rman political 
parties such as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (SPD)23 and the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation (FDP).24 Contact with foreign politicians was sought and obtained as well, 
such as when IPW Director Schmidt met with the head of the planning department of the 
British Foreign Office or a meeting was held with Edward Ifft, the deputy head of the US 
delegation to negotiations on nuclear and space-basd weapons in Geneva in 1988.25 The 
mission of both the IPW and the IIB also entailed the participation of the two institutes in 
a wide range of international scholarly conferences on foreign policy-relevant topics, the 
frequency of which increased sharply following normalization. Some of the better-known 
conferences at which East German experts pursued their twofold goal of information 
gathering and offensive representation of the GDR’s position included those held by the 
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Aspen Institute,26 the Pugwash Organization, the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London, the assembled European Institutes for International Relations,27 the 
European Community, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
International Political Science Association, the Organization for Economic Development 
and Cooperation, and the assembled Directors and Representatives of Institutes for 
International Relations of Europe, the US, and Canad .28 
 The IPW and IIB’s scholarly contacts with the West were rounded out by trips 
abroad undertaken to conduct research on location. SuchStudienaufenthalte or 
Studienreisen typically lasted from a week to a month, during which time the local GDR 
embassy would commonly serve as the base for an East German expert to examine local 
sources and conduct consultations with local scholars and politicians in order to complete 
a study on a discrete topic. The IIB was particularly ctive in this area, dispatching its 
specialists to Western capitals and metropolises lik  London, Washington, Madrid, Paris, 
Rome, and Zurich.29 Such research trips to the capitalist West afforded th  valuable 
opportunity to gain firsthand access to privileged information on pressing foreign 
relations issues while often working in close cooperation with local institutions and 
individuals. Walter Stock, an expert at the IIB, for example, sojourned in Vienna in 
winter 1978, where the objective of his trip was decribed in the following manner: “The 
purpose of the research trip consisted in conducting research and consultations at the 
Austrian Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations and the Vienna Institute 
for International Economic Studies in order a) to illuminate the position of Austria and 
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neutral states as well as current issues in the context of East-West relations (CSCE and 
MBFR) and in relevant areas of ‘North-South’ negotiations and to make them usable for 
current research at the IIB and b) to take up beneficial relations with the designated 
Austrian institutions and to clarify the possibility of further contacts.”30 In the important 
area of Studienaufenthalte, however, the IPW did not at all lag behind the IIB as it too 
sent its experts out on short-term research trips across Western Europe and North 
America. In June 1986, for example, IPW Director Max Schmidt, upon invitation of the 
Institute for Contemporary German Studies of Johns Hopkins University and in accord 
with a Secretariat resolution on the matter, undertook a lecture and research trip to the 
US. The subsequent report on his trip evinced the successful completion of the twofold 
guiding principle behind all scholarly contacts with the West on the part of East German 
foreign policy expert institutions: “The goals set forth in the directive [of the Secretariat] 
were completed in full. At several events, the foreign policy, economic policy, and social 
policy of the GDR could be presented in detail on the basis of the materials of the XI 
Party Congress. Meetings with a number of leading US politicians, scholars, and 
publicists yielded additional information on various aspects of US policy, particularly on 
questions of foreign policy and security policy.”31 
 As valuable as such scholarly contacts with the West could be, whether in the 
form of regular contact with analogous institutes, cultivation of personal relationships 
with foreign specialists, meetings with politicians, participation in international 
conferences, or research trips, they also representd a certain dilemma for the SED 
leadership. On the one hand, they were acknowledged as indispensable tools of East 
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German foreign policy, particularly in the post-normalization era, since they yielded both 
an internal and external benefit; an internal benefit b cause they contributed to a more 
accurate, refined picture of the complexities of contemporary international relations of 
which the SED leadership could make use in its formulation of foreign policy, an external 
benefit because they facilitated the successful impe entation of GDR foreign policy by 
increasing acceptance for it abroad through offensive propagation and substantiation of 
the East German position on outstanding internationl relations issues. On the other hand, 
cultivation of such contacts raised the specter of the baleful effect unadulterated exposure 
to the West and Western ideas could have on the ideological integrity of the GDR’s 
foreign policy cadres involved in the maintenance of th se same contacts. The threat of 
ideological dilution was viewed with great concern si ce a “firm Marxist-Leninist 
perspective” maintained its centrality as the defining characteristic of the GDR’s “party 
functionaries in the realm of foreign policy,” the same Marxist-Leninist perspective that 
provided the basic ideological legitimacy of a separate, socialist German state vis-à-vis 
its capitalist rival across the border. And although the flow of influence in the context of 
scholarly contacts with the West was only supposed to go one way—from East to West—
the danger of the opposite taking place was seen as acute enough to warrant maintenance 
of a thoroughgoing system of controls, accompanied by an atmosphere of elevated 
sensitivity and suspicion, to prevent that outcome from coming to pass. 
 Correspondingly, only a select group of cadres at the IPW and the IIB had any 
type of substantial, direct exposure to the West and Western ideas, either through 
personal contacts or access to materials from the West. The meticulous system in place at 
the IPW regulating access to classified material from and about the West through three 
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different levels of security clearance (GVS for Geheime Verschlußsache, VVS for 
Vertrauliche Verschlußsache, VD for Vertrauliche Dienstsache) was also in force at the 
IIB. Those cadres from each institute who were approved for travel abroad (Reisekader) 
represented an even more exclusive group.32 Although officially designated Reisekader 
were approved for travel to the capitalist West on official business, for individual trips 
they sometimes required the explicit approval of the Secretariat, which would then 
typically issue a directive outlining tasks tailored to each specific trip. This was often the 
case, for instance, with the Studienaufenthalte, or research trips, undertaken by IPW and 
IIB cadres in the West, where explicit political activities such as establishing contact with 
local politicians accompanied activities of a “purely scholarly” nature. 
 By virtue of the very nature of their occupation as foreign policy experts, cadres 
at the IPW and IIB necessarily adhered to a greater or lesser degree to the GDR’s core 
political and ideological principles, which had been inculcated in them during their 
training, and took furtherance of the GDR’s foreign policy goals as the basis for their 
actions. As a former graduate and employee of the IIB put it, there existed among the 
personnel of the GDR’s elite foreign policy expert institutions a Grundkonsensus, or 
basic consensus, on the fundamental character and goals of East German foreign policy, 
any differences of opinion on individual issues notwithstanding.33 This fact, however, in 
no way lessened the sensitivity with which scholarly contacts with the West were viewed 
and the assiduousness with which they were administered. The smallest suspicion on the 
part of SED higher-ups of the perceived unsuitability of Reisekader to meet the demands 
and risks of travel to the West could swiftly result in nullification of that status. This was 
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the case, for instance, with Klaus Bollinger, a leading expert on the US at the IIB. 
Bollinger belonged to that generation of East German foreign policy cadres that came up 
in the rather muddled conditions which prevailed within the GDR’s still-underdeveloped 
system of foreign policy expertise in the 1950s, when the SED was scrambling to train 
the new “socialist foreign policy cadres” it so sorely needed to staff its young foreign 
policy apparatus. Bollinger began studying foreign policy at the University of Leipzig in 
the late 1940s and concluded his study at the DVA, one of the forerunner institutions of 
the IIB, in the early 1950s after the entire course was transferred there from Leipzig. He 
subsequently worked his way up within East German foreign policy expertise, dividing 
his time between the PAMaD (the successor of the DVA and the direct forerunner of the 
IIB) and the MfAA, though not without clashing with SED officials. As detailed above, 
Bollinger was disciplined in the wake of the Babelsrg Conference at the DASR in 1958 
because his dissertation on the “Negro problem” in the US was cited as a failure to join 
“theory with practice” at a time when such shortcomings were considered not only 
negligent but also borderline-treasonous. Yet the episode proved only a temporary 
setback for Bollinger’s career as by the start of the 1970s he had risen to become editor-
in-chief of the journal Deutsche Außenpolitik, a member of the Collegium of the MfAA, 
full professor at the IIB, and head of the institute’s Division for the Foreign Policy of the 
US and Japan. As the GDR in the early 1970s then began to build up contacts with the 
US, including scholarly contacts, Bollinger, as one f the GDR’s foremost experts on the 
US, was therefore set to play an important role. He in fact made several research trips to 
the US in the time period and apparently even held meetings with representatives from 
the Rand Corporation, MIT, and the Council on Foreign Relations,34 during which time 
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he typically traveled together with Claus Montag, another US expert at the IIB and 
Bollinger’s deputy at the time, who likewise played a key role in establishing the GDR’s 
first scholarly contacts with the US in the first half of the 1970s.35 In 1975, Bollinger and 
Montag were slated to attend a conference of the International Studies Association at 
which a special conference group dedicated exclusively to the topic of GDR-US relations 
was to meet for the first time. The trip was also intended to allow “the scholarly contacts, 
which the IIB in recent years has built up, to be de pened und more purposefully to be 
made useful for foreign policy information and analysis.”36 
 Bollinger, however, was suddenly forbidden from making the trip at the behest of 
Hermann Axen, the Central Committee’s secretary for international relations and head of 
the APK. A handwritten note from Axen attached to the Secretariat resolution on the trip, 
which originally foresaw the participation of both Montag and Bollinger, stated tersely: 
“Objection to dispatching Comrade Bollinger. Comrade Bollinger’s work and behavior 
have been subjected to the sharpest criticism. He should be replaced. Inexpedient to send 
him to the US.”37 Bollinger himself never received an explanation for his abrupt 
exclusion from the trip, but has speculated that it could have been due to one of two 
reasons. The first potential explanation was of a personal-political nature. After an earlier 
trip to the US, Bollinger had criticized East Germany’s USA-GDR Friendship Society, 
arguing that the resources invested in it could be better used elsewhere since, in his 
opinion, the society had had little success in propagating a positive image of the GDR in 
the US. Bollinger’s criticism may have been taken as direct criticism of a member of the 
Politburo since the USA-GDR Friendship Society fellunder the authority of Manfred 
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Feist, head of the Foreign Propaganda Division of the Central Committee and, perhaps 
decisively in this case, brother-in-law of Erich Honecker. The second explanation, which 
Bollinger viewed as more plausible, was of a rather scholarly-political nature. At a 
meeting of the Scientific Council of the IIB in 1974 or 1975, Bollinger apparently 
presented the thesis that the US viewed the USSR as an equal in terms of strategic 
military capacity, but not as a political or economic power. Bollinger further argued that 
the US would likely increase military spending in order to establish superiority in that 
area as well. Bollinger’s thesis apparently met with disapproval from Axen and other 
leading operative foreign policy figures, who viewed the episode as a Wissenschaftler 
exceeding his station and inappropriately interpolating himself in a matter of high foreign 
policy where his input was neither welcome nor desired. Whatever the exact reason(s) for 
Axen’s intervention to exclude Bollinger from the trip, the subsequent consequences 
were devastating—Bollinger was stripped of all his po itions and was downgraded from 
head of the IIB’s Division for Foreign Policy of the US and Japan to researcher in the 
Division for the History of International Relations. Not surprisingly, Bollinger was never 
again allowed to leave the country.38 The 1975 Bollinger episode demonstrated not only 
the extreme sensitivity and vigilance with which scolarly contacts with the West were 
administered but also that the much-invoked symbiotic relationship between foreign 
policy expertise and operative policy, between “theory and practice,” by no means 
entailed an equal partnership between operative and research institutions. The case of a 
leading expert being penalized because his views on a t pic falling within his area of 
specialization—views which coincidentally would prove accurate in light of later 
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developments—found disapproval among his superiors made patent that political and 
ideological concerns trumped expert concerns. 
 Despite the unambiguous politicization of East German foreign policy experts’ 
scholarly contacts with the West, the scholarly aspect of such contacts and their impact 
on the views of East German experts should neverthel ss not be underestimated. From 
the perspective of the SED leadership, such contacts were supposed to function as a one-
way conduit of influence from East to West, but the very act of engaging in a dialog with 
Western partners—the political goals accompanying such contacts notwithstanding—
perforce led to a broadening of perspective that otherwise could not have taken place. 
When Michael Klein argues that the maintenance of such contacts by experts at the IPW 
served the exclusive purpose of propagating a positive image of the GDR and East 
German foreign policy among their credulous Western partners,39 he correctly highlights 
the fundamental politicization of such contacts, but his account also oversimplifies the 
situation by overlooking the fact that, even if such contacts were indeed used to ease 
implementation of East German foreign policy by “selling the GDR” in the capitalist 
West, the other half of the twofold mission guiding the cultivation and maintenance of all 
such scholarly contacts consisted in gaining a fuller and more nuanced understanding of 
the West. As East German experts then engaged in a ialog with their numerous and 
diverse Western partners, the bonds of the rigid, dogmatic understanding of international 
relations as the unfolding of the class struggle on the international stage that had been 
inherited from the pre-normalization era perforce slackened as East German experts came 
to recognize that the complexities of contemporary international relations, of which they 
were now gaining first-hand and often intimate knowledge, were a poor fit for that same 
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understanding. As Claus Montag, the leading US expert at the IIB who personally 
oversaw the institute’s establishment of wide-ranging contacts with US partners in the 
1970s, has put it, the resulting dialog represented “an enormous enrichment for research 
on the US” and promoted “a convergence with reality (Annäherung an die 
Wirklichkeit).”40 In short, the essential politicization, to which East German experts’ 
scholarly contacts with the West were unmistakably subjected, was ultimately incapable 
of producing the one-way flow of influence from East to West desired by the SED 
leadership since the very purpose of such contacts entailed learning from and about the 
West, where a realistic assessment of the situation clashed with the strict ideological 
approach with which East German experts were supposed t  enter upon contacts with 
Western partners and to which the SED leadership expected its foreign policy experts to 
adhere. 
 The same tension present within East German foreign policy expertise more 
broadly between the ideological and the expert was thu also present in the specific realm 
of scholarly contacts with the West as East German experts became integrated into a 
transnational network of foreign policy specialists. A  such contacts experienced 
explosive growth, the twin goals of gaining valuable information from the West in order 
to produce a more accurate, refined picture of the complexities of contemporary 
international relations and offensively representing a d substantiating the East German 
position on outstanding international relations issues became another element in the 
Spannungsverhältnis between those two elements which fundamentally shaped East 
German foreign policy expertise. The essential characte  of East German foreign policy 
expertise—the persistent tension between the ideological and the expert— thereby 
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remained unchanged as the twofold mission guiding cultivation of scholarly contacts did 
not entail a fundamental departure from that characte istic tension. Yet the dialog with 
Western partners such contacts involved—part and parcel of the broader engagement 
engendered by normalization—favored the professional, expert side of the equation to the 
detriment of extreme ideologization and decisively contributed to the former’s growing 
preponderance over the latter within East German foreign policy expertise. 
 
The Expert Element Ascendant 
The “convergence with reality” fostered by direct exposure to the West and Western 
ideas, particularly in the form of scholarly contacts, did not alter the fundamental 
character of East German foreign policy expertise—the dynamic of tension between 
ideology and specialist knowledge remained in place. What it did rather was shift the 
balance further in favor of the specialist element at the expense of adherence to 
unsophisticated ideological precepts. This took place on the backdrop of the successful 
“systematization” of East German foreign policy exprtise, complete by the mid-1970s, 
which had placed renewed emphasis on the importance of specialist knowledge and 
professional competency in foreign policy expertise. At the same time, the ideological 
retrenchment that had taken place in the GDR in respon e to the perceived threat of 
ideological dilution stemming from post-normalization engagement manifested itself in a 
renewed emphasis on ideological Abgrenzung and the fortification of Marxism-Leninism 
as the theoretical bedrock of foreign policy expertis . Thus, the uneasy balance between 
ideology and specialist knowledge in East German foreign policy expertise persisted in 
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the 1980s, yet the latter element gained more and more in importance vis-à-vis the 
former. 
 This trend was also present in that key component part of foreign policy expertise: 
the training of foreign policy cadres. Here, Marxism-Leninism’s position as the essential 
framework in which international relations were understood and as the putative guide for 
practical foreign policy activity was maintained, but increasingly greater emphasis was 
placed on attainment of ever-higher levels of qualific tion and skill as well as 
strengthening the orientation of expertise toward keeping pace with the outstanding 
practical challenges facing East German foreign policy. The high level of specialization 
and “expertification” and the strengthened orientation oward practical challenges would 
both play an important role in East German experts’ c itical re-assessment of the Marxist-
Leninist paradigm in the 1980s as the former element provided the necessary cognitive 
tools and the latter element provided the venue to identify the decreasing applicability of 
Marxist-Leninist precepts to the GDR’s foreign relations. 
 The continuing centrality of Marxism-Leninism as the nominal theoretical 
foundation of East German foreign policy expertise paired with a strong focus on 
specialization and keeping pace with outstanding practical foreign policy issues 
ultimately represented a continuation of the essential features of foreign policy training 
from the 1970s, which had been fully established with the systematization of East 
German foreign policy expertise in the late 1960s/early 1970s. Continuation in this case, 
however, was not equivalent to stasis since the thoroughgoing subordination of expertise 
to operative foreign policy, or the much-invoked “joining of theory with practice,” meant 
that training was continually updated in accord with the changing needs and demands of 
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the dictatorially controlled East German foreign policy apparatus. In fact, as a result of 
the specific configuration of East German foreign policy expertise, ideological schooling 
represented the more static element and specialist education the more dynamic element in 
foreign policy training. The approach to foreign policy training at the Institute for 
International Relations (IIB), well established by this time as the GDR’s unrivaled 
foreign policy “cadre forge,” bore this relationship out in the first half of the 1980s. 
 The curriculum at the IIB had been thoroughly overhauled multiple times in the 
1970s in order to meet the changing needs, both practical and political-ideological, of 
operative East German foreign policy, so it was consistent that the initiative for renewed 
revision of the IIB’s approach to the training of freign policy cadres at the start of the 
1980s once again came from the operative side of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus. A brigade comprised of members of both the MfAA and the IV Division—the 
GDR’s two most important operative foreign policy institutions which for this reason had 
a keen interest in the training of foreign policy cadres at the subordinate IIB, whence the 
vast majority of their employees came—visited the IIB in 1979 to inspect the institute’s 
training program first-hand.41 The brigade’s assessment in turn initiated a revision of the 
IIB’s entire curriculum for its five-year course of foreign policy study, which by this 
point was firmly established as the IIB’s main vehicle of foreign policy training. One of 
the main goals of the revision, which saw the IIB working in close cooperation with both 
the MfAA and the IV Division, was the strengthening of “the bond between training and 
practice, in particular the demands of foreign policy-diplomatic practice.”42 While the 
revision, thus aimed above all at updating foreign policy training in order to improve 
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cadres’ later performance in operative positions, was being worked on in the first few 
months of 1980, the Politburo passed a resolution that decisively changed the tone of the 
revision process that was already underway. The resolution on “the tasks of secondary 
schools and universities in developed socialist society” from 18 March 1980 declared, “a 
high level of specialist (fachlich) knowledge and ability, consistent partisanship for 
socialism, and well-founded ideological education are among the most important 
conditions for creative labor and the formation of s cialist personalities, which develop 
and employ their knowledge, capabilities, and talents for the benefit of socialist 
society.”43 Despite the resolution’s general nature, its particular emphasis on “ideological 
education” demanded inclusion or at least acknowledgement in the IIB’s overhauled 
curriculum. An IIB memorandum on the resolution from April 1981, just weeks before 
the revision was completed, acknowledged as much with its assertion that “[t]he 
resolution…requires that conclusions be made in respect to education and instruction in 
the five-year course of foreign policy study,”44 and Helmut Matthes, deputy director at 
the IIB responsible for instruction, at a meeting of the institute’s Scientific Council in 
June 1980 underscored the relevance of the resolution for the work of the institute: “The 
resolution unconditionally applies to [the IIB]. It determines the basic orientation, the 
fundamental elements of our work in its totality, i.e. research, training and continuing 
education, cadre work, etc.”45 While the revision of the curriculum of the IIB’s five-year 
course of study had initially been oriented above all toward keeping foreign policy 
training up to date with the changing needs of the GDR’s two leading operative foreign 
policy institutions, the intervening Politburo resolution on higher education in March 
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1980 and the ensuing Fifth Higher Education Conferece in September of the same year 
effected an accentuation of the ideological element in the ongoing efforts, where 
language found in the Politburo resolution was adopted and served as the theoretical 
motivation and framework for the revision. 
 The “intensification of the ideological struggle” between the socialist and 
capitalist worlds announced at the X Party Congress of the SED in April 1981 in 
response to the outbreak of the “second Cold War” provided a further orientation point 
around which foreign policy instruction at the IIB in the early 1980s had to be oriented. 
The official party line on the prevailing international situation required acknowledgment 
at the GDR’s leading site for foreign policy instruction, and the IIB’s response to the 
announcement was prompt, as a June 1981 letter from IIB Director Stefan Doernberg46 to 
Manfred Feist, head of the Foreign Propaganda Division of the Central Committee, 
another institution that employed a fair number of IIB graduates, revealed. The substance 
of Doernberg’s letter was aimed at ensuring Feist that the new party line would gain due 
recognition in the IIB’s curriculum. He wrote: “An essential component of the changes in 
contemporary international relations, which are of long-term significance, is the 
intensification of the ideological struggle. Ideological issues are increasingly becoming 
the object of foreign policy and pervade foreign policy activity, also foreign policy-
diplomatic activity…. It is therefore necessary to orient training in all areas of instruction 
in accord with the capabilities of the respective field much more closely toward the 
acquisition of knowledge and skills for direct offensive engagement with the enemy 
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ideology.”47 While Doernberg’s letter highlighted the importance of incorporation of the 
party’s specific foreign policy line into instruction at the IIB, the institute’s internal report 
“Conclusions and Foci of Education and Instruction at the IIB in Academic Year 
1980/81” underscored the centrality that adherence to Marxist-Leninist precepts 
continued to occupy in general in the training of foreign policy cadres: “Decisive is the 
ideological fortification of the class perspective of students, which is expressed in an 
unwavering position toward the policies of the party.”48 
 The final outcome of the curricular revision of the IIB’s five-year course of study 
clearly reflected the two main, incongruous influenc s shaping the process—redoubling 
the ideological element in foreign policy training on the one hand and renewed emphasis 
on meeting the practical needs of the GDR’s operative foreign policy institutions on the 
other, or, as the IIB’s re-worked education and instruction conception from November 
1981 would have it, “the unity of class-based education and practice-oriented specialist 
instruction.”49 The fundamental orientation of the new curriculum was unambiguously 
centered on politicization and ideologization of foreign policy expertise within the 
framework of complete subordination to the demands of the broader East German foreign 
policy apparatus, an orientation which was fully consistent with that of previous 
curricula: “The goal of training consists in the education and instruction of party 
functionaries who are prepared and capable of fulfilling the tasks entrusted to them by 
party and state at any time and under all conditions.”50 The basic tripartite division of 
instruction in the five-year course of study, where th  fundamentals of Marxism-
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Leninism, general instruction in foreign policy, and regional specialization were taught 
alongside obligatory study of Russian and one other for ign language, was preserved. 
Under the conditions of “intensified ideological struggle,” an attempt was indeed made to 
incorporate Marxism-Leninism more thoroughly into the other areas of instruction rather 
than to treat it in isolation as a separate field: “The curricula for general and specialized 
fields of instruction have been more closely concentrated on deepening fundamental 
knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and on the continuation of the study of the foundations 
of Marxism-Leninism within the general and specialized fields of instruction. The 
curricular content of the general and specialized fi l s of instruction has been better 
harmonized with the content of instruction in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism.”51 
 Despite the clear attempt to redouble the ideological element in the IIB’s new 
curriculum, however, the place of Marxism-Leninism could only remain limited in “the 
unity of class-based education and practice-oriented specialist instruction” that made up 
foreign policy instruction at the IIB since the needs of the East German foreign policy 
apparatus dictated that just as much, if not more, att ntion be paid to imparting the skills 
required to produce sound analysis of international rel tions based on specialist 
knowledge than on cultivating a “firm Marxist-Leninist perspective” among the IIB’s 
charges. Hans Maretzki of the IIB’s Diplomatic Practice Division acknowledged as much 
as the revision process was still ongoing when he actually cautioned against orienting 
instruction at the IIB all too much around the one-sidedly understood demands of 
“practical” foreign policy: “[One must realize] that instruction in the fields of foreign 
policy—the conveying of a great wealth of theoretical knowledge and specific specialist 
knowledge—is likewise preparation for foreign policy practice. The increased practical 
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orientation (Praxisbezogenheit) must not be placed in opposition to the scientific 
character (Wissenschaftlichkeit) of instruction. The goal is introducing in appropiate 
proportion more pedagogical elements aimed at preparing students for foreign policy 
practice into an instructional method that is theoretically guaranteed and organized 
according to specialized fields.”52 What Maretzki was defending here was not inculcation 
of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism at the IIB, but rather the “scientific” 
instruction the institute provided in order to create foreign policy experts and, above all, 
regional specialists, the type of instruction which he thought could potentially be 
displaced by an all too one-sided emphasis on preparing cadres for “practical” foreign 
policy work such as diplomatic protocol. The specialist/wissenschaftlich element in 
foreign policy training at the IIB remained strong and never became drowned out by a 
fixation on diplomatic practice, but Maretki’s admonition highlighted the strength of the 
imperative at the IIB to provide instruction tailored toward the practical challenges of 
operative foreign policy, not inculcation of ideological maxims detached from reality. 
The first point in the IIB’s assessment of instruction in academic year 1980/1981 
underscored this fact: “At all times, we must be engaged in critical analysis to ensure that 
the demands of foreign policy practice represent in all areas the measure for assessment 
of the quality of education and instruction. It must be guaranteed that graduates leave the 
institute who are capable of fulfilling their tasks in foreign policy service after a short 
period of familiarization with high quality and efficacy in the new conditions of the 
international class struggle and the struggle to secure peace…. The training of the next 
generation of foreign policy cadres is the most pressing task of the institute.”53 
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 This orientation was manifest in the IIB’s revised curriculum for 1980/1981, 
where “the bond between training and practice, in particular the demands of foreign 
policy-diplomatic practice,” was reinforced.54 And it is in this area where the greater 
dynamism of the specialist element in foreign policy training in comparison with the 
greater stasis of the ideological element received cl arest expression. Students were 
explicitly prepared for “the demands of the foreign policy of the GDR as part of the 
socialist community in the 1980s,” where a continuous flow of new information had to be 
present in order to ensure that instruction kept pace with the shifting challenges facing the 
GDR such as “continuation of the détente process, it  completion through military 
détente, and offensive engagement with the most aggressive imperialist circles’ 
adventurist policy of confrontation.”55 Of those issues with which foreign policy 
instruction had to keep abreast, economics became one of the most important—and with 
good reason. At the start of the 1980s, due to a stagnating domestic economy and a more 
aggressive trade policy on the part of the West (including an embargo on advanced 
technology), economic considerations began to possess increasingly greater weight 
within East German foreign policy and the IIB’s new curriculum correspondingly 
“accounted more extensively for the unity of economics and politics and the interaction 
of foreign policy and foreign trade in accord with the growing significance of 
international economic processes within international relations and the new foreign trade 
tasks of the GDR.”56 As the Soviet Bloc’s situation in respect to foreign trade would 
worsen and the importance of economic considerations f r foreign policy would 
correspondingly increase in the course of the 1980s, the IIB would revisit the issue time 
                                                 




and time again to fine-tune instruction on the topic. This was the case, for example, in 
December 1982 when Wolfgang Spröte presented a report to the IIB’s Scientific Council 
containing a series of measures “for the more effectiv  organization of economic 
instruction” in the institute’s five-year course of study to ensure that “concrete 
knowledge, background information, and experiences” would be conveyed to students.57 
The greater emphasis on instruction in economics at the IIB and the resulting greater 
familiarity of the institute’s graduates with economic issues would prove crucial to the 
critical re-assessment of the prevailing understanding of international relations in the 
1980s since international trade relations would become one of the main issues on the 
example of which East German experts would perceive a growing gap between the 
postulates of Marxism-Leninism and the reality of the international situation. 
 Finally, one of the modifications to the IIB’s curriculum in 1980/1981 clearly 
favoring the expert element in foreign policy training was further strengthening language 
instruction. Language instruction was in fact a crucial element in the training of experts at 
the IIB since specialization in a given region or cuntry depended upon it—one could not 
hope to gain a nuanced understanding of a given region’s history, culture, and 
international relations without knowledge of the relevant language(s). This fact did not go 
unnoticed at the IIB and the 1980/1981 revision accordingly fine-tuned the language 
program to meet the institute’s updated pedagogical o s. The basic format of language 
instruction remained unchanged—the study of two foreign languages remained 
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obligatory, one of which was required to be Russian while the other of which was 
determined by one’s specialization. But an attempt was made to tie language instruction, 
which enjoyed great continuity of leadership under Ha ald Czenkusch (division head 
1959-1990),58 more closely to one’s given specialization by strengthening the 
“orientation toward subject-specific training in accord with the demands of foreign 
policy-diplomatic practice” and “the correlation with the content of the general and 
specialized fields of instruction.”59 The IIB only provided instruction in Russian, English, 
French, Spanish, and Arabic, so students whose specialization demanded study of a 
different foreign language typically did so at MGIMO in Moscow. 
 While the IIB’s five-year course of study remained the main vehicle for training 
the next generation of East German foreign policy cadres—“the most pressing task of the 
institute”—the IIB continued to offer a range of other courses of study consonant with its 
pedagogical mission of training “party functionaries n the realm of foreign policy” and 
its standing as highly professional, capable, and effective cadre forge. The IIB’s other 
offerings broke down into two main categories: the continuing education of East German 
cadres and the training of cadres from other socialist or socialist-oriented countries. In the 
former category, condensed courses of study for leading and mid-level cadres from the 
MfAA maintained the importance they had gained in the 1970s. Such courses were 
intended to qualify mid-level cadres for leading positi ns and to provide leading cadres 
with the most up-to-date training in order to keep pace with the changing foreign policy 
challenges facing the GDR. The condensed course of tudy for leading and mid-level 
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cadres underwent a re-founding of sorts in 1980, when t e stated goal became imparting 
“deepened theoretical and practical knowledge…that find expression in higher quality 
and effectiveness in the resolution of the new state and political-ideological tasks 
entrusted to cadres.”60 The revamped courses were to have 20 to 25 participants, to be 
convened bi-annually, and to last for two to three months.61 At about the same time, a 
new two-and-a-half year course of study was introduce , which however bore a 
resemblance to the two-year course of study from the 1960s that had been abolished in 
1970 to make way for the five-year course of study. The new two-and-a-half year course, 
in contrast to the five-year course of study, was a supplementary, not a stand-alone 
course, and was intended to train cadres who had gotten a degree in a different field and 
were active in another area of the East German party and state apparatus for a foreign 
policy position. Unlike the five-year course of study, where multiple cohorts were trained 
at once, only one cohort was trained per two-and-a-half years, with the first course 
starting in academic year 1980/198162 and the second in 1984/1985.63 At approximately 
the same time, the IIB also began training East German cadres to serve as advisors to the 
governments of developing countries like Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia, where the 
GDR was actively engaged in supporting socialist-oriented “avant-garde” parties. Course 
participants were to be “thoroughly familiarized with the foreign policy and foreign trade 
relations of the GDR with developing countries, particularly with the focus countries of 
Africa, as well as with the problems, requirements, and perspectives of these relations” 
and, on the whole, the course was intended “to better nable the selected cadres to 
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contribute in their capacity as advisor to strengthening the GDR’s allied relations with 
these states, to fortifying the political and economic independence of these states from 
imperialism, and to effectively shaping the political and economic relations of the GDR 
with these states in the interest of socialism and peace.”64 The first such course appears to 
have been held in 1979/1980, but it remains unclear whether or how often subsequent 
courses were held.65 Within the category of training East German cadres, the IIB’s 
rounded out its offerings in the 1980s by continued the tradition started in the early 1970s 
of holding semi-regular condensed courses to train “UN cadres,” as was the case in early 
1985.66 
 In respect to training non-East German foreign policy cadres, the IIB continued 
and accelerated the engagement in this area it had begun in the early 1970s. Starting in 
1972, the IIB began training foreign policy cadres from “both socialist states and 
national-liberated states” with a specialized focus on German-speaking countries 
(typically for the former group) or oriented toward general foreign policy training 
(typically for the latter group), but such courses r mained of a one-off, provisional 
nature.67 In late 1978, the Secretariat, in response both to e success of such courses and 
the growing demand for them, passed a series of measur s intended to turn the training of 
foreign cadres at the IIB from an ad hoc undertaking into a “permanent task.”68 Alone at 
the time of the resolution’s passage, courses were ongoing or preparations were 
underway for the instruction of foreign policy cadres from Yemen, Ethiopia, 
                                                 
64 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13101. 
65 While East German advisors of various types were active throughout the 1980s, the involvement of the 
IIB in their training seems to have remained quite limited. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/3245. 
66 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13033. 
67 Though initial steps toward systematizing them were being considered. SAPMO-Barch, DY 30/J IV 
2/3A/2321. 
68 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/3210. 
 447
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Cuba, Mongolia, Congo, and Chad.69 The Secretariat 
therefore decided that the time was ripe “systematically to create the necessary 
prerequisites for the designated qualification measures and to organize their 
implementation according to uniform principles.”70 Although courses for non-East 
German foreign policy cadres were not held as frequently and did not possess the weight 
of, for instance, the IIB’s five-year course of study for East German cadres, they became 
a regular feature of training at the IIB and served the important function of bolstering 
relations between the GDR and friendly states, particularly in the developing world. For 
example, during a December 1977 trip to Yemen, Ethiopia, and Libya, Werner Lamberz 
met with Ethiopian ruler Mengistu and made special arrangements for 25 Ethiopian 
diplomats to be trained at the IIB in 1978.71 In addition to the countries named above, 
courses for participants from Cambodia, Laos, and Bulgaria were also held at the IIB in 
the 1980s.72 
 The IIB was likewise engaged in the training of non-East German foreign policy 
cadres in their respective countries of origin. The exact extent is unclear, but already in 
the 1970s, individual instructors from the IIB and the Academy for the Study of State and 
Law (ASR), where the IIB was housed, were dispatched to “several national-liberated 
states to support the training of state cadres in the realm of domestic and foreign 
policy.”73 Similar to the development of the instruction of freigners at the IIB, such 
activities subsequently expanded and took on a new quality and regularity in the 1980s. 
In 1984, for instance, a Secretariat resolution was passed that guaranteed “continuation of 
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the support for the People’s Republic of Mozambique in the field of training cadres” 
through the end of the decade.74 The initiative stemmed from the express request directed 
at GDR foreign minister Oskar Fischer by Mozambican foreign minister Joaquim 
Chissano,75 who “highly praised” the training and support provided up to that point by 
instructors from the IIB. The resolution foresaw that the IIB would have an average of 
three instructors active in Mozambique each year through 1989.76 The GDR stood alone 
in providing this service to Mozambique, which was viewed as a guarantee for close 
relations between the two states on a Marxist-Leninist basis, as the resolution 
highlighted: “This training, which represents a strategic position, has up to this point 
occurred exclusively through the support of the GDR. It is an expression of trust in the 
GDR and simultaneously contributes to the Marxist-Leninist instruction and education of 
the country’s foreign policy cadres.”77 
 In light of the multitude and depth of training courses it administered, the IIB 
more than lived up to its billing as the GDR’s premi r foreign policy cadre forge. The 
“systematization” of East German foreign policy exprtise completed in the early 1970s 
had seen the final transformation of the IIB into a highly professional, capable, and 
effective training site that occupied a crucial positi n within East Germany’s foreign 
policy apparatus, a position which only became more c nsequential and influential in the 
1980s. Through its role in training non-East German foreign policy cadres, whether at 
home in the GDR or abroad in participants’ countries of origin, the IIB helped to 
strengthen relations between the GDR and its socialist al ies and “national-liberated” 
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states and to spread the GDR’s Marxist-Leninist-inflected understanding and vision of 
international relations, all in the context of the ongoing class struggle with the capitalist 
West. As important as the IIB’s training of non-East German foreign policy cadres was, 
the importance of the institute’s internal function—the training of cadres for the GDR’s 
own foreign policy apparatus—possessed even greater significance. Starting in the early 
1970s, when the underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy apparatus had 
been conclusively overcome, and continuing on into the 1980s, an enormous number of 
the cadres employed at the MfAA and the IV Division, the GDR’s most important 
operative foreign policy institutions of state and party respectively, and a smaller, though 
still substantial, number at other state and party institutions like the Ministry for Foreign 
Trade and the Foreign Propaganda Division were graduates of the IIB. And it was upon 
those IIB graduates with the knowledge and disposition mparted to them through their 
training at the IIB that the day-to-day functioning and performance of the GDR’s foreign 
policy apparatus rested. 
 The characteristic tension between ideology and specialist knowledge remained 
present in training at the IIB in the 1980s. Marxism-Leninism as the essential framework 
in which international relations were understood ans the putative guide for practical 
foreign policy activity was paired with a strong focus on specialization and a pronounced 
orientation toward expert analysis of individual questions. Yet ideological schooling 
remained the static, even stagnating, element in instruction at the IIB while 
specialization, fostered by the imperative to produce true experts capable of mastering the 
complex and changing foreign policy challenges facing the GDR, increasingly became 
the more dynamic, essential element, and the distance between the two elements 
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increased. A 1979 graduate and former employee of the IIB has described the situation at 
the institute in the 1980s as one where experts viewed the ideological element of their 
work as a sort of empty ritual since they recognized that the analytical value of Marxism-
Leninism was dwindling in light of the actual foreign policy issues facing the GDR, 
leading them to focus more and more on the concrete sta  interests of the GDR.78 
Marxism-Leninism is unlikely to have sunk to the level of irrelevance alluded to here 
other than in exceptional cases considering that the self-understanding and self-
legitimacy of the GDR were based upon it, but the comment is helpful in underscoring 
the shifting balance in the Spannungsverhältnis between the ideological and the expert in 
foreign policy training at the IIB and in East German foreign policy expertise as a whole 
in the 1980s. Despite continual efforts to promote a “firm Marxist-Leninist perspective” 
as the defining characteristic of the GDR’s “party functionaries in the realm of foreign 
policy,” Marxism-Leninism became increasingly relegated to the position of intellectual 
framing device while beneath the Marxist-Leninist veneer the focus shifted emphatically 
toward expert analysis of individual issues on the basis of specialist knowledge and a 
pronounced orientation toward keeping pace with the outstanding practical challenges 
facing East German foreign policy. Marxism-Leninism till maintained a strong presence 
as the basic framework in which international relations were ostensibly understood, but 
the actual content of foreign policy training in the 1980s increasingly centered on the 
expert element. For this reason, it would be mistaken to speak of an absolute dichotomy 
between the ideological and the expert element since they could co-exist by functioning 
on different levels of abstraction, where thoroughgoin  specialist analysis of a given 
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issue could (and did) occur on the backdrop of a Marxist-Leninist approach to 
international relations. The key change in the 1980s was that the importance of Marxism-
Leninism in training and its explanatory capacity in general steadily was steadily 
decreasing in light of the increasingly complex foreign policy issues facing the GDR. As 
the IIB’s 1983 profile of the ideal foreign policy adre “for the next two decades” 
detailed: “Steadfastness in principles, assured knowledge, and positive experiences are to 
be joined correctly with flexibility, new knowledge, and the perfection of methods of 
working.”79 Just as was the case with East German experts’ exposure to and contacts with 
the West, the baseline politicized character of foreign policy training would never 
disappear—an uneasy balance between the ideological and the expert would continue—
but developments tended to favor the professional, expert side of the equation to the 
detriment of extreme politicization and ideologizaton, promoting a type of “convergence 
with reality” and making a key contribution to East German experts’ critical re-
assessment of the prevailing Marxist-Leninist understanding of international relations in 
the 1980s. 
 
The Second Cold War’s Challenge to the Marxist-Leninist Paradigm 
The shifting balance within East German foreign policy expertise away from the 
ideological and toward the expert element exercised a crucial influence on the output of 
East German experts in the 1980s, but ultimately onl  represented one half of the picture. 
The other half was comprised of the GDR’s foreign relations themselves, which provided 
the object of East German experts’ analysis. 
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 In this respect, international relations developments in the 1970s formed the 
crucial backdrop for expert output in the 1980s. The results of the détente process both as 
they directly affected the GDR (foreign policy normalization) and as they affected the 
position of “international socialism” in its entirety (final acknowledgment on the part of 
the West of the postwar status quo in Europe and de faction recognition of the Soviet 
Union as the rough equal of the United States) served to bolster belief in the correctness 
of the prevailing Marxist-Leninist paradigm among East German experts. Fulfillment of 
the GDR’s central objective of full foreign policy normalization in the context of 
détente—the triumph of the GDR being inseparable from the broader triumph of 
“international socialism” in the period—facilitated the reification of experts’ GDR-
specific conception of international relations that fused the clearly delineated realpolitical 
interests of the GDR with the Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as a form of the 
class struggle since the entire process appeared to confirm the identification of the GDR’s 
interests with those of the Soviet Bloc, understood as the real-world embodiment of the 
abstract cause of “international socialism.” 
 Foreign policy normalization in the context of détente, however, also brought 
with it extensive engagement with the outside world, engagement that dramatically and 
irrevocably changed the basic outlines of East Germany’ strategic situation. The foreign 
policy isolation imposed by the Hallstein Doctrine was now a thing of the past and the 
GDR took on all the trappings of a “status quo” state, gaining a position theoretically 
equal to that of any other state actor in the international arena. Ironically, just as the key 
features of the pre-normalization era (diplomatic isolation, acute dependency on the 
Soviet Union, heavy reliance on the Soviet Bloc’s unity of action) that guaranteed a 
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strong correlation between the realpolitical interests of the GDR and a strict black-and-
white, class-based understanding of international rel tions began to weaken, experts’ 
Marxist-Leninist-based understanding of international relations reached its apogee. But 
this was not mainly due, as in the past, to absence of substantive engagement with the 
outside world, but rather to the manner in which the GDR “broke through” the Hallstein 
Doctrine and realized its supreme objective of foreign normalization. The ideological 
refuge provided by diplomatic isolation, however, was now gone and never to return and 
expert analysis of the GDR’s foreign relations had to eal with the vagaries of 
international relations in all their complexity as experienced by a status quo state. 
Therefore, just as the foreign policy triumphs of the 1970s could lead to confirmation of 
the existing understanding of international relations, adverse developments in the 1980s 
could have the opposite effect, challenging the establi hed interpretive framework in a 
GDR now fully and irreversibly integrated into the international order. 
 Thus the outbreak of the “second Cold War” at the turn of the decade and the 
serious challenges to the position of the GDR and the Soviet Bloc it brought with it 
almost necessarily had to elicit critical awareness of the decreasing applicability of 
Marxist-Leninist precepts to the current situation. A d since the challenges of the second 
Cold War bore directly upon relations between socialist East and capitalist West—which 
occupied the central position in experts’ conception of international relations—they could 
not easily be portrayed as temporary setbacks in the ot erwise still-constant movement of 
the “international constellation of forces” in favor f socialism, as unfavorable events in 
the developing world at the height of East-West rapp ochement had been. 
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 The so-called second Cold War did in fact dramatically change the content and 
tenor of relations between the two superpowers and their respective allied blocs from the 
comparative amity that had existed during the détente period. The unraveling of East-
West rapprochement came in the one area where no real détente had been achieved—
military affairs. The extent of the arms limitation measures in place—the Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty, SALT I—was limited, but the substantial progress achieved in political 
détente between East and West had overshadowed the lack of progress achieved in the 
military realm. However, NATO’s double-track decision in December 1979, issued in 
response to deployment of the new Soviet middle-range RSD-10 missiles in Central 
Europe made it abundantly clear, in once again making confrontation the key feature of 
relations between East and West, that the modest achievements of détente had at best 
represented a temporary break from the Cold War’s otherwise unabated dynamic of 
“systemic” rivalry between the Soviet-led socialist bloc and the US-led capitalist bloc. 
The double-track decision and the renewed confrontati l stance of the West vis-à-vis 
the Soviet Bloc it inaugurated combined with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979, the climax of the Soviet-led “socialist offensive” in the developing 
world in the 1970s, to hammer the final nail into the coffin of détente. The Reagan 
administration, after taking office in January 1981, took up and intensified the 
confrontational stance toward the Soviet Union adopted by the Carter administration near 
the end of its term and initiated a series of measures aimed at directly challenging the 
Soviet Union internationally as well as domestically: a strict trade embargo through 
COCOM aimed at preventing Soviet Bloc countries from attaining advanced 
technologies, a “counter-offensive” against socialist and/or Soviet-backed governments 
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and movements in the developing world (Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola), the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (“star wars”), and an arms build-up that fueled a full-fledged arms race 
between the US and the USSR, all of which was accompanied and made all the more 
threatening by the sometimes-bellicose rhetoric of the Reagan administration (e.g. 
Reagan’s characterization of the USSR as an evil empir ). 
 Meanwhile, the individual member-states of the Soviet Bloc were faced with 
increasing difficulties on the domestic front. Economic growth was limited and was 
lagging far behind the West in terms of productivity and quality of items produced80 and 
growing segments of the population were unconvinced by the ideological legitimacy 
offered by Marxism-Leninism and chafed under the dictatorial rule of “the party of the 
working class.” The Soviet Union’s decision in 1981 to reduce crude oil deliveries to its 
client states in Eastern Europe hit the GDR particularly hard, which feared the reduction 
would further worsen the GDR’s position vis-à-vis West Germany.81 The clearest 
expression of seething discontent in the Soviet Bloc was the emergence of Solidarność in 
Poland in 1980/81, which highlighted the bankruptcy of communist rule in that country 
and demonstrated how a localized crisis behind the iron curtain could potentially throw 
the entire Soviet Bloc into turmoil.82 Détente and the foreign policy triumph it 
represented had overshadowed such problems, but the s art of the second Cold War cast 
the situation in a new, unforgiving light and exacerbated it through such measures as 
restrictive trade and debt policy and insistence on the observation of human rights in the 
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Soviet Bloc as outlined in basket three of the Helsinki Accords. The second Cold War 
therefore not only represented a great foreign policy challenge for the GDR and the entire 
Soviet Bloc but also aggravated an already-problematic domestic situation as well. It was 
in light of the problems created by this double predicament that East German foreign 
policy experts engaged in a critical re-assessment of the understanding of international 
relations they had built up in the previous 30 years. 
 A basic awareness of the weighty international and domestic challenges facing the 
GDR, which represented a prerequisite for critical re-assessment of the conceptual 
cornerstones of East German policy, was already in place and well-developed among 
segments of the GDR’s foreign policy expert community at the start of the 1980s. 
Clearest and most unabashed expression of this awareness was found in a top-secret 
report completed in 1980 by a special working group f the Foreign Policy Commission 
(APK) under the leadership of Hermann Axen, Central Committee secretary for 
international relations and longtime head of the commission. The working group was 
comprised of 30 leading East German foreign policy professionals—including Oskar 
Fischer, minister of foreign affairs, Egon Winkelmann, head of the IV Division, Manfred 
Feist, head of the Foreign Propaganda Division, Stefan Doernberg, director of the IIB, 
and Max Schmidt, director of the IPW—and was specially convened to draft a detailed 
internal analysis of the “international constellation of forces” as the basis for the party’s 
report on foreign policy at the upcoming X Party Congress of the SED and “for the 
international work of the leadership of party and state.”83 Axen, in a letter to General 
Secretary Erich Honecker delineating the character and goals of the report, was sure to 
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emphasize the confidential nature of its potentially explosive findings: “In this version, 
which we present to you, an attempt is made to draw attention to several new questions 
and problems in the development of socialism, imperialism, the movement for national 
liberation, and the international class struggle. The material serves the purpose of internal 
self-edification. For this reason, we intentionally formulated some views and conclusions 
that doubtlessly require further discussion and clarific tion. Of course, this material in 
content and form is in no way the draft for the inter ational section of the party’s report 
[at the upcoming congress], but rather, as mentioned, an internal analysis…. Only the 
comrades of the small working group84 are familiar with this version of the material. We 
are handing over this material to you for review and judgment.”85 
 The report completed by the working group was remarkable for the frankness of 
its analysis and the minimal ideological gloss it contained. In exhaustive detail—the 
report numbered over 200 pages—the working group unflinchingly identified the main 
foreign policy challenges facing the GDR at the dawn of the 1980s as well as the 
shortcomings and weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc in its continued competition with the 
capitalist West. The working group took as the starting point of its analysis the position 
of the Soviet Bloc resulting from “socialism’s increase in power” in the course of the 
1970s. The report—correctly—identified how the achievements of détente had lent the 
Soviet Bloc a previously unmatched level of international influence at the start of the 
1980s: “The coordinated strategy of peace und the coordinated foreign policy action of 
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85 Ibid. 
 458
the states of the socialist community have become an increasingly weightier and 
increasingly more independent factor for changes in international politics and 
consequently in the international constellation of forces as well…. The 1970s proved to 
be the most successful period heretofore in the struggle of the fraternal parties for the 
continued development of the social system of socialism and the unfolding of its potential 
and its benefits.”86 The political weight of the Soviet Bloc in the international arena by 
the start of the 1980s had indeed reached a previously unparalleled level and this fact 
represented the point of departure for the working group’s study, yet, as the report would 
go on to detail, the international standing of the Soviet Bloc was only part of the picture 
and other, key elements—economic development within the Soviet Bloc, the strength and 
strategy of the capitalist adversary, the state of the international communist movement, 
and the place of the developing world in socialist foreign policy—presaged earnest 
problems for the GDR and the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s. 
 The report’s analysis of the Soviet Bloc’s economic development in the 1970s 
was rather dismal and its analysis of prospects for the 1980s not much better. According 
to the report’s authors, the main economic task facing the bloc was making the shift from 
the extensive economic production which had predominated in the 1950s and 1960s and 
in which the state-controlled command economies of the Soviet Bloc had performed 
rather well87 to intensive economic production, i.e. the improvement of the existing 
productive base through implementation of new, more efficient processes and advanced 
technology: “[The fraternal parties] face the task—even if with varying levels of urgency 
in individual fraternal countries—of ensuring the dynamic growth necessary to satisfy the 
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growing and complex social needs by increasingly and primarily relying upon qualitative 
factors to increase production, by shifting their economies to intensive, expanded 
reproduction, and by increasing productivity and efficiency, particularly by joining 
scientific-technical progress with the advantages of the societal order of socialism.”88 The 
transition from extensive to intensive economic production, however, could not be 
achieved mechanically—it required a different approach to labor and production on a 
societal level. Here, the report’s authors seized upon one of the key issues facing the 
Soviet Bloc in the 1980s—the relationship between production and society—and, in 
discussing the types of changes that would have to b  made in order to ensure success, 
even endorsed a type of proto-perestroika approach to the problem. They called for “the 
more consistent und differentiated implementation of the performance principle and 
abolition of instances of leveling that hinder stimulation of economic initiative for the 
achievement of greater efficiency and quality on the part of economic enterprises and 
workers” and highlighted the necessity of “securing conditions to increase the 
mobilization of workers’ activities, to unlock their creative power, and to include still 
broader segments of the population in resolution of the tasks.”89 Economic policy 
naturally fell outside the authority of the APK working group, yet candid examination of 
the economic situation in the Soviet Bloc in light of foreign policy considerations 
impressed upon the report’s authors the seriousness of the situation and led them to 
propose solutions to the problem that remarkably anticipated certain elements of 
Gorbachev’s radical reform program of the second half of the 1980s. East German 
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foreign policy experts were becoming increasingly aware that all was not right in the 
Soviet Bloc. 
 While the report offered a tepidly favorable assesment of Soviet Bloc countries’ 
success in making the transition from extensive to intensive economic production—“the 
socialist countries, to varying degrees, achieved significant results in increasing the 
efficiency and the rationalization of their socialist economies and in the mastering of 
scientific-technical progress”—it nevertheless attested to a lack of progress in the most 
important area, in comparison with the West’s economic development: “[T]he lag vis-à-
vis the developed capitalist countries in decisive qualitative indicators could scarcely be 
reduced in the 1970s and socialism’s share in the production of products that are decisive 
for advancing productivity and, consequently, socialism’s overall share in international 
industrial production could not be significantly increased.”90 In accord with the 
designated task of the APK’s working group—and indeed of East German foreign policy 
expertise in its entirety—the economic development of the GDR and the Soviet Bloc 
possessed for the report’s authors no value in and of itself, but rather only as it related to 
and impacted the prevailing “international constellation of forces.” And despite the more 
favorable international political position held by the Soviet Bloc at the start of the 1980s, 
the ongoing economic challenges faced by the bloc, the report’s authors clearly 
recognized, exercised a critical influence on the Soviet Bloc’s broader foreign policy 
fortunes and, most importantly, its rivalry with the capitalist West. As the report put it, 
Soviet Bloc countries needed “to resolve the existing contradiction between socialism’s 
massive and growing international political influenc  and its still-limited and 
ineffectively utilized economic and scientific-technical base” in order “to attain further 
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qualitative progress in the transformation of the constellation of forces.”91 From a 
perspective that identified the international “clash of systems” as the defining feature of 
contemporary international relations, the relative economic strength of the Soviet Bloc 
possessed immediate strategic relevance. Consideration of economic issues and their 
impact therefore prompted the report’s authors to speak extraordinarily openly about the 
Soviet Bloc’s relative economic weakness and, on that basis, to draw conclusions directly 
touching on East German foreign policy: “Doubtlessly, the goal of changing the 
constellation of forces between socialism and capitalism in the economic realm will 
require a period of several five-year plans. This highlights the continued priority that 
securing the necessary defensive capacity for the socialist countries and further 
implementation of their coordinated foreign policy offensive will continue to demand in 
order to ensure the most favorable external conditions necessary for resolution of the 
designated long-term goal.”92 
 The special working group’s report also devoted a significant amount of attention 
to analyzing “imperialism” at the start of the 1980s. As the report attested that the 1970s 
had brought socialism a historically unparalleled lvel of political influence 
internationally, the reverse was true for capitalism: “The advance of the forces of 
socialism and national and social liberation and the successes in the struggle for the 
implementation of Leninist principles in international relations in the 1970s 
fundamentally changed the capitalist system’s inner a d outer conditions of existence. 
Even more than previously, proof was delivered thatevery subsequent decade in the 
peaceful upwards development of real socialism more lastingly undermines the 




existential foundations of the last exploitative order in the history of mankind.”93 
Socialism’s gains in the 1970s, the report’s authors claimed, had only intensified “the 
general crisis of capitalism,” which unerringly drove the capitalist world ever closer 
toward the edge of the abyss.  
 Such bombastic declarations of capitalism’s certain doom, however, belied the 
report’s subsequent clear-eyed analysis of the topic, which ascribed to capitalism 
enduring strength and dynamism and superiority oversocialism in nearly every 
quantitative measure. Capitalism namely was forging ahead in the one key area where 
socialism was stumbling: the transition to extensive economic production based on 
advanced technology. The report’s account enumerated the associated benefits and 
purported problems of the process: “In the clash wit  socialism, in the competitive 
struggle among capitalist countries, and particularly in the realm of armament, 
imperialism makes heavy use of scientific-technical progress. This leads on the one hand 
to a qualitative increase of its productivity and to greater effectiveness in numerous areas 
of the capitalist economy. At the same time, it is precisely this acceleration of scientific-
technical progress that serves as the source of an enormous intensification of existing 
contradictions and the unleashing of new contradictions.”94 By the report’s own account, 
however, such “contradictions” represented no real threat to the capitalist system since 
capitalist states were quite capable of ably defusing them. Under the cover of Marxist-
Leninist language, the report attested to the integrative potential of capitalist political 
economy: “The intensification of political instability, however, is a highly contradictory 
process: in no capitalist country does it entail actu l ‘ungovernability’ or paralysis of the 




state system of rule. It is still capable of dampening contradictions and keeping social 
conflicts within limits. Ruling circles answer disruptions in the functioning mechanism 
by redoubling efforts for the expansion and raising the efficacy of the state power 
apparatus. Imperialism still possesses considerable powers of socio-political appeasement 
and concessions…. A revolutionary situation does not obtain in any imperialist 
country.”95 In fact, the report even tacitly acknowledged thate constant stream of 
“contradictions” within and between capitalist states actually represented a crucial source 
of capitalism’s dynamism, inventiveness, and economic productivity. This view was 
expressed particularly clearly in analysis of the diverging economic and political interests 
of capitalist states, which flowed naturally from the competitive nature of a free market 
economy and therefore represented in no way an extraordinary phenomenon, yet which 
were understood by the report’s authors as “contradictions” in the Marxist-Leninist sense: 
“The internationalization of science and technology stimulates unevenness and rivalry 
between the imperialist centers [meant here are the US, Western Europe, and Japan—the 
“three imperialist centers”]. On the other hand, this phenomenon continually produces 
new driving forces for the utilization of science and technology, to close gaps in the 
competitive struggle, etc., all of which accelerates the tempo of scientific-technological 
progress.”96 In the crucial area of economic productivity and growth, where the report’s 
authors depicted the Soviet Bloc as merely treading water, capitalism in contrast was 
portrayed as thriving and capable of resolving its inherent “contradictions,” which in fact 
represented a crucial source of its continued dynamism and growth. 




 Yet the key issue revolved not around simply providing a descriptive account of 
the economic vigor of capitalist states, but rather analyzing how “imperialism” would 
bring this superior strength to bear in its policy toward the Soviet Bloc. The report’s 
overall conclusion on the strength and strategy of “imperialism” at the start of the 1980s 
did not give East German leaders much reason for optimism. The West’s frontal 
challenge to the Soviet Bloc was described in unsparing terms as was the immense 
pressure under which it placed the GDR and the Soviet Bloc, whose foreign policy 
latitude was dramatically restricted and whose international position was directly 
threatened as a result. In respect the internal strength of the capitalist states of the West, 
the obligatory allusion to capitalism’s “increased susceptibility to crises” was made, yet 
the special working group’s report unequivocally highlighted the dynamism and potency 
of the capitalist mode of socio-economic organization, which showed no signs of 
abatement but rather appeared to be increasing at the start of the 1980s. The report’s 
authors accordingly made the case that the gravity of the challenge presented by the West 
in the 1980s needed to be taken very seriously: “The imperialist system includes the most 
advanced industrialized countries of the world with the highest labor productivity,” had 
an enormous lead over the Soviet Bloc in the critical area of microelectronics and other 
advanced technologies and was determined not to lethe Soviet Bloc catch up, was in 
possession of “an aggressive military alliance outfitted with the most modern weapons of 
destruction” (and the US had erected a “nearly comprehensive system of military bases 
around the socialist camp”), and had at its disposal “a technically outstanding, 
experienced, worldwide system for ideologically influencing the masses.”97 In the face of 
the grave challenge represented by the second Cold War, the report’s authors therefore 
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tacitly broke with one of the central conceptual pillars of the existing understanding of 
international relations, namely that the international constellation of forces moved 
continually and inexorably in favor of socialism. 
 Faced with the West’s frontal challenge to socialism’s international position in the 
1980s, the question of how the international communist movement would respond to the 
“imperialist” onslaught took on particular relevance for the report’s authors. Both within 
and outside the Soviet Bloc, the report’s examination of the fragmented state of the 
international communist movement struck few positive notes. The measuring stick for 
unity remained, as before, ideological and political alliance with the Soviet Union, and 
the report’s authors therefore viewed with particular concern the development of a kind 
of “non-aligned movement” within the communist movement “under the slogan of the 
legitimacy of different paths to socialism.”98 Whether emanating from a “left sectarian” 
or “right revisionist” orientation within the communist movement, instances of 
fragmentation appeared to be multiplying at the start of the 1980s. China was accused of 
not only betraying Marxism-Leninism but now also openly working together with 
imperialist powers against the Soviet Bloc: “[T]he leadership in Beijing no longer, as in 
the 1960s, aims to subvert communist parties but rathe  to stimulate all possible 
tendencies of nationalism and the third path among individual fraternal parties.” 
Countries like Yugoslavia, North Korea, and Romania, the report claimed, were 
particularly susceptible to fits of nationalism and, as a result, continually vacillated in 
their orientation between the Soviet Union and China. On the flip side of the coin, the 
report’s authors also attested to a particular vulnerability within the communist 
movement to Western efforts to undermine communist unity: “At the turn of the decade, 
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there exist rather considerable points of contact for he divisive and subversive activities 
of imperialism.”99 The affect of consumer culture imported through Western mass media 
into socialist states was depicted as particularly pernicious, especially in the face of 
persistent shortages of consumer goods and inadequate and ineffective propagation of 
alternative socialist ideals, which bred discontent and apathy among the population. In 
respect to questions of party ideology and organization, “imperialism” was said to have 
scored a victory with the success of Eurocommunism. Faced with a deeply fractured 
international communist movement and with little hope of rectifying the situation, the 
report’s authors stressed the need for a pragmatic approach to the situation that placed 
practical cooperation over ideological dogmatism: “In the struggle for the fortification of 
the unity of the communist movement, the increasing diversity of the conditions of 
struggle, the growing differences in the political and ideological maturity of individual 
fraternal parties, and their varying objective and subjective possibilities must be taken 
into account. This is an objective necessity bound p with the growth of the communist 
movement’s influence. It is also a question of employing more flexible forms that make it 
possible, the divergent opinions and differences exi ting between the fraternal parties 
notwithstanding, to secure a maximal amount of joint practical action against 
imperialism.” 
 The report’s analysis of the state of the internation l communist movement at the 
dawn of the 1980s was thus consistent with the report’s analysis in other areas insofar as 
it examined the question in a critical light and with minimal ideological spin. Contrary to 
the stock Marxist-Leninist understanding, the unity of the international communist 
movement actually appeared to be decreasing, not increasing, with time. The report’s 
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authors, eschewing such high-flown declarations of the historically determined unity and 
forward movement of the international communist movement in favor of a hardnosed 
focus on the tangible interests of the GDR and the Soviet Bloc, underscored the need to 
ensure practical cooperation with other Communist par ies wherever the opportunity 
presented itself in light of the difficult conditions created by the West’s frontal challenge 
to the Soviet Bloc’s international position in the initial years of the second Cold War. 
Ideologically inspired plans and concerns thereby took a back seat to a pragmatic focus 
on what was possible, not what was postulated by Marxism-Leninism. 
 Given the not particularly confidence-inspiring state of the international 
communist movement in the face of a newly assertive and combative West, the role of 
the developing world as the great variable element in the ongoing “clash of systems” 
between socialism and capitalism possessed great importance, which represented the final 
question examined by the APK’s special working group. The pattern of analysis here 
followed that found in the other sections of the report: rather tepid, superficial optimism 
heavily tempered by critical analysis of the compatibility of the developing world with 
the foreign policy strategy of the GDR and the Soviet Bloc. The developing world was no 
longer “a direct political reserve for imperialism,” yet “most liberated states after 20 or 
more years of political sovereignty are still economically dependent on imperialism, 
remain integrated into the international capitalist economy, and occupy therein a 
subordinate, economically unequal, and disadvantaged position. This also applies to 
states with a socialist orientation.”100 The internal development of individual countries, 
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the report’s authors continued, was not producing the type of steadfast “anti-imperialist” 
allies the GDR and the Soviet Union would have hoped for. Developments were instead 
trending in the opposite direction, reducing the developing world’s “objective” 
opposition to “imperialism” and thereby narrowing the basis for joint action with the 
Soviet Bloc. The report expounded this view by once again utilizing Marxist-Leninist 
terminology: “Although [the developing world’s] contradiction to imperialism persists, it 
is beginning to take on new features on the backdrop of inner class antagonisms. This 
‘anti-imperialism’—circumscribed, fickle, willing to make compromises, inconsistent—
in particular revolves around the struggle for economic independence. Its limits become 
particularly clear when existing social and political power relations are directly 
threatened.”101 The type of anti-imperialism described here, which the authors put in 
quotation marks to highlight its pseudo character, was a far cry from the traditional 
Marxist-Leninist conception that viewed the anti-imperialism of the developing world as 
an objective phenomenon that sprung necessarily and automatically from the law-bound 
forward movement of history. The states of the developing world were seeking to gain 
economic independence from the economically advanced states of the West, not from the 
capitalist system altogether. There existed, as the Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
international relations held, no absolute contradiction between the developing world and 
the West, but rather a complex set of discrete questions on which the interests of 
individual states, either of the West or the developing world, could potentially converge 
or could potentially diverge. 
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 The strategic significance of this rejection of an absolute, “objective” anti-
imperialism meant that the GDR and the Soviet Union had to seek to identify and 
promote shared interests with states of the developing world issue by issue rather than 
maintaining belief in the automatic and total overlap of interests between the Soviet Bloc 
and the developing world. The report’s authors were well aware of this fact and, as was 
the case with their analysis of the international communist movement, advocated 
adoption of a corresponding approach to ensure maxial practical cooperation with 
developing states: “This will place high demands on the fraternal socialist states’ 
formulation of a simultaneously principled and flexible foreign policy vis-à-vis the non-
aligned movement in order to keep the majority of these states in positions on 
fundamental questions of international politics that m tch the strategic conception of 
socialism.”102 The report enumerated the GDR’s central policies intended to fulfill these 
requirements103 and particularly emphasized the ongoing efforts of tates of the 
developing world to establish a “New International Economic Order” as a crucial 
“foundation for the unity of action between the socialist and non-aligned states.” 104 In the 
report’s analysis of the developing world, then, as in its analysis of the international 
communist movement, realism carried the day, a realism borne of rejection of Marxist-
Leninist axioms—in this case, the “objectively” anti-imperialist character of the 
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developing world—in favor of straightforward concern with the tangible foreign policy 
goals and interests of the GDR and the Soviet Bloc. The gravity of the challenge 
presented by the West’s renewed combative stance toward the Soviet Bloc militated 
against adherence to ideological platitudes and pushed the GDR to pragmatically seek out 
and promote its common interests with the developing world. 
 On the whole, the top-secret report of the APK’s special working group under 
Axen’s leadership marked a key moment in the broader development of expert output in 
East Germany in the first half of the 1980s. The repo t’s analysis focused on those issues 
that had been at the heart of expert analysis for the previous three decades—economic 
development within the Soviet Bloc, the strength and strategy of the capitalist adversary, 
the state of the international communist movement, a d the place of the developing world 
in socialist foreign policy—but contained hardly a tr ce of the ideological triumphalism 
characteristic of output in the mid-1970s at the heig t of détente. The West’s frontal 
challenge to the international position of the Soviet Bloc (i.e. the “second Cold War”) 
was the decisive factor in this change. In contrast to the situation in the 1970s, when 
foreign policy defeats in the developing world could rather easily be dismissed as mere 
temporary setbacks in the otherwise still-constant movement of the “international 
constellation of forces” in favor of socialism, the v ry real foreign policy difficulties now 
facing the Soviet Bloc demanded critical, forthright analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the international position of the GDR and its socialist allies, for now the 
immediate relationship between socialism and capitalism was at issue. And critical 
analysis, as was made plain in the report, revealed th  seriousness of the challenges 
facing the Soviet Bloc. This awareness in turn entailed a critical stance toward some of 
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the central conceptual pillars of the prevailing Marxist-Leninist-based understanding of 
international relations since the reality of each situation under examination diverged from 
what theory predicted ought to be the case. At the same time, the special working group’s 
report by no means contained an outright rejection of the prevalent understanding of 
international relations. The basic opposition betwen socialism and capitalism was 
maintained and the competition between the two system  of social organization remained 
the defining characteristic of international relations in their totality. The notion of the 
international constellation of forces correspondingly maintained its centrality, but all 
these conceptions now retained their currency less as a result of ideological dictates than 
of hardnosed consideration of the tangible realpolitica  interests and prospects of the 
GDR, as was clearly evident in the report. It is difficult to say to what extent such views 
existed throughout the GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise at the start of the 1980s, 
but the model of analysis present in the special working group’s report would repeatedly 
be found in expert output in the first half of the 1980s. As East German specialists would 
bring their expertise to bear on the individual foreign policy questions discussed in the 
report as well as others, consideration of the weighty challenges facing the GDR as a 
result of the second Cold War would foster critical awareness of the growing distance 
between the complex reality of East German foreign relations and Marxist-Leninist 
presuppositions. 
 One such issue was the so-called peace problematic, or he concern with 
maintaining peace between socialist East and capitalist West paired with a focus on arms 
limitation and disarmament in the renewed antagonistic atmosphere of the second Cold 
War. The peace problematic would play a major role in fostering a critical re-assessment 
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of the prevalent Marxist-Leninist-based understanding of international relations in the 
1980s and was one area where the official position of the SED leadership provided a 
strong impulse for expertise on the topic. Faced with the renewed East-West antagonism 
of the second Cold War, from which the GDR only stood to lose, the SED leadership 
followed a course of de-escalation and dialog. The for ign policy program announced at 
the X Party Congress of the SED in April 1981, which in its turn was oriented toward the 
XXVI Party Congress of the CPSU, centered on preservation of peace between East and 
West in the hothouse atmosphere prevailing internatio lly.105 The SED emphasis on 
preserving peace was in full accord with the Soviet lin  on the issue, but Honecker’s 
subsequent push for a “coalition of reason” for peace (Koalition der Vernunft) exceeded 
the bounds of the Soviet approach and provoked Moscow’  ire.106 Honecker’s call “for all 
those, who wish to prevent humanity’s glide into a nuclear catastrophe, to join forces in a 
coalition of reason”107 initially was aimed primarily at preventing the West German 
Bundestag’s final approval of NATO’s double-track decision, but it remained in force 
even after the new CDU-FDP coalition under Helmut Kohl gave its final approval to the 
stationing of the mid-range Pershing II missiles in the FRG in November 1983. The SED 
leadership was caught between a rock and a hard place because the policy of ideological 
demarcation from West Germany retained its centrality, but maintenance of good 
relations with the FRG was becoming increasingly indispensable because the financial 
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viability of the GDR depended in large part upon credits from the FRG,108 and this at a 
time when the international climate was worsening dramatically. Faced with this 
dilemma, where fundamental strategic imperatives were pushing the GDR in opposite 
directions, the SED leadership set a course for de-escalation between East and West and 
for continued good relations with West Germany while maintaining a policy of strict 
demarcation from the FRG and the West founded on redoubled cooperation with the 
Soviet Bloc and renewed ideological retrenchment. The SED leadership’s call for a 
coalition of reason and the associated policy aimed at promoting peace and 
rapprochement between East and West possessed crucial significance for expert output in 
the first half of the 1980s since experts oriented their work on the topic around the line 
issued by the party leadership. By its very nature, th  peace problematic fostered critical 
awareness of the growing distance between the complex reality of East German foreign 
relations and Marxist-Leninist presuppositions because it highlighted how a problem of 
such gravity as preventing nuclear war might transce d ostensible class lines and class 
interests and might demand a new approach to outstanding international relations 
problems. The issue therefore provided another question on which expert analysis 
increasingly moved toward a critical re-assessment of the prevalent Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of international relations.  
 Even before the outbreak of the second Cold War had brought the détente era to 
an abrupt end, East German experts were aware of how easily progress made in East-
West rapprochement could be reversed. A January 1978 report for the GDR’s IIB-led 
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Council for Foreign Policy Research underscored the “obvious deficit in military détente” 
between East and West and demonstrated significant prescience in discussing the path 
future developments could take. The report warned that, “even under the conditions of 
political détente, NATO strives to make effective and maximal use of the military factor 
in the struggle against socialism,” which was manifest in attempts both to attain “military 
advantages or predominance” and “to weaken the socialist states economically with a 
sustained and augmented arms race.”109 The lack of military détente to complement the 
political détente that had been achieved, the report’s conclusion cautioned, could very 
easily lead to the unraveling of the whole process: “Although the possibilities of political 
détente and mutually beneficial cooperation have not yet been exhausted, in the longer 
term there exists the danger that the détente process might stagnate and recede if progress 
in the realm of military détente fails to materialize.”110 
 The unraveling of détente played out almost exactly along those lines as an 
uncompromising and combative attitude and antagonistic political measures directed 
toward the Soviet Bloc accompanied the United States’ initiation of an arms race with the 
Soviet Union in the first half of the 1980s. With the second Cold War in full swing, the 
SED’s foreign policy orientation toward keeping thepeace between East and West 
became a key focus at the GDR’s foreign policy research institutes. “It is now essential to 
depict in research and instruction the relationship between securing peace and social 
progress in the world and to emphasize the significance of securing international peace in 
this interdependent relationship,” as the IIB’s Division on the Foreign Policy of the States 
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of Asia, Africa, and Latin America highlighted.111 And the SED leadership’s adoption of 
a “more realistic” line that eschewed a class struggle-inspired, simplistic friend-enemy 
perspective resonated among experts at the IIB.112 The 1981 response of the IIB’s 
division on the foreign policy of imperialist states to the XXVI Party Congress of the 
CPSU and the X Party Congress of the SED, where the preservation of peace between 
East and West attained programmatic status, foreshadowed how analysis of the issue 
would not simply be able to resort to the same ideological maxims in response to an issue 
that had now become a central practical goal of East German foreign policy. While still 
employing ideological terminology and concepts, the response also spoke of “the 
dialectical link between unavoidable struggle and vital (lebensnotwendig) cooperation 
between the two systems.”113 The initial expert response to the newly acquired c ntrality 
of the peace problematic bespoke awareness of the necessity of cross-system 
collaboration which extended beyond the narrow bounds delineated by “peaceful 
coexistence” to include lasting cooperation that trnscended the ostensible class character 
of a given state’s foreign policy in order to resolve the pressing and unique problem of 
keeping the peace between East and West, an awareness that began to set in among East 
German foreign policy experts. 
 The peace problematic in the first half of the 1980s introduced another element 
into the analytical calculus of East German experts that favored a critical approach to the 
issue and militated against simple reapplication of inherited ideological maxims. The 
active peace movement that sprung up in Western Europe and the US in response to 
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NATO’s double-track decision114 contributed to broadening the perspective of East 
German specialists on the peace issue in particular and East-West relations in general. As 
a 1984/85 report from a special analytical group of the APK, which in purpose and 
composition closely resembled the special working group convened in 1980 for the X 
Party Congress,115 framed the issue: “The emergence of a new type of mass movement 
for peace and disarmament and its continued explosive development is a new 
phenomenon in international politics.”116 In the group’s eyes, the threat of nuclear war 
represented an unprecedented challenge that called for an unprecedented response. Not 
without continuing to employ ideological terminology and concepts, the group’s 
identification of the peace movement as a new element in international politics pointed in 
the direction of a qualitatively new understanding of international relations, one where 
the existence of two large blocs and a certain antago ism between them would continue 
to exist, but where the class character of foreign policy might take on a secondary role in 
favor of “general human” concerns: 
In the conditions of the international constellation of forces today, it is of fundamental 
significance for the struggle to maintain peace that, alongside real socialism, the main 
power for the preservation of peace, the likelihood f peace is considerably strengthened 
by a politically broad and worldwide movement against a nuclear world war. In the form 
of this movement, a broad social barrier against an atomic world war has taken shape 
that, although it is not yet impervious to the aggressive forces of imperialism, possesses 
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an influence that is already having a real effect and that continues to grow. The 
emergence and development of this movement makes it part cularly clear that the 
worldwide contradiction no longer runs only between r volutionary and imperialist forces 
but rather between all forces interested in the preservation of peace, all humans who want 
to live and the most aggressive wing of monopoly capital…. Although it draws on 
traditions of earlier peace movements, the mass move ent that has developed since the 
start of the 1980s has taken on qualitatively new characteristics. In accord with its 
character as an anti-atomic war and anti-atomic rocket movement, i.e. a general human 
goal (eine allgemein menschliche Zielsetzung), it has a dimension that transcends class, 
party, and country (eine klassen-, parteien- und länderübergreifende Dimension).117 
The experts of the APK’s analytical group spoke here of the character of the peace 
movement itself, not necessarily their own perspectiv . Nevertheless, simple 
acknowledgment in this case of the possibility of mving beyond class, party, and 
country represented a key conceptual innovation in the context of East German foreign 
policy expertise, where the traditional understanding of international relations 
underscored the class character of all foreign policy and did not permit alternative 
conceptualizations. What is more, an ascendant pragmatism that assigned secondary 
importance to ostensible class interests in foreign policy would in fact characterize the 
perspective of East German foreign policy experts particularly in the second half of the 
1980s, as the serious challenges facing the Soviet Bloc continued unabated and the Soviet 
Union itself would adopt a new approach to international relations. 
 The peace problematic was seen as an issue that was qualitatively different than 
others and one where the stakes were much higher. T fact that all states, whether 
socialist or capitalist or oriented toward a “third way” (which according to orthodox 
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Marxist-Leninist theory was an impossibility), were equally threatened by nuclear 
holocaust—and the GDR particularly so as a result of its position on the front line of the 
Cold War division of Europe—demanded a more pragmatic approach, where ostensible 
class interests tended to recede into the background. East German experts knew a nuclear 
war could not be won and correspondingly explored ways to secure peace with the 
capitalist world. As a former graduate and employee of the IIB has noted, acknowledging 
the plausibility (and necessity) of durable peace with capitalism also entailed serious 
consequences for experts’ inherited understanding of international relations since 
recognition of capitalism’s “capacity for peace” and the possibility of lasting conciliation 
with socialism clashed with the notion that the inter ational constellation of forces 
necessarily moved in favor of socialism, that socialism was innately superior, and that 
capitalism was doomed to wind up in the dustbin of history.118 
 At the same time, the pronounced ideological element within East German foreign 
policy expertise did not simply collapse under the weight of the challenges brought on by 
the second Cold War. The peace problematic was still largely considered from the 
perspective that viewed “imperialism’s” bellicose bhavior as a symptomatic 
characteristic and a natural result of capitalism’s inherently aggressive nature. And not 
surprisingly considering that the West’s frontal challenge to the Soviet Bloc in the first 
half of the 1980s was just as likely to elicit knee-j rk ideological retrenchment as serious 
consideration of alternative approaches. A report for a conference held by the Scientific 
Council of the IIB on “Requirements and Problems of Military Détente and Arms 
Limitation in Europe” in late 1982, for instance, demonstrated the continued sway of the 
class-based approach to the topic: “Rooted in the social character of imperialism, this 
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threat [i.e. the general military threat emanating from the West], as a result of the 
transition of the most aggressive powers, particularly in the US, to a course of 
confrontation and arms build-up, has taken on a new dimension whose emergence is 
inseparably connected to the development of modern w apons technologies.”119 An 
August 1982 report on the first third of Ronald Reagan’s first term as president of the US 
compiled by the APK for the Politburo adopted a similar approach. The report clearly 
identified the serious challenges facing the Soviet Bloc as a result of Reagan’s aggressive 
policies while falling back on ideological explanations for the underlying motives: “[The 
Regan administration] is conducting a comprehensive trengthening and expansion of the 
military might of US imperialism on an international scale and has initiated a new phase 
of global confrontation with the USSR and the other countries of the community of 
socialist states that represents a global-strategic counterrevolutionary attack on real 
socialism and the national-revolutionary movement, o  the workers’ movement.”120 On 
the one hand, the US was trying to expand its sphere of influence and make up for past 
defeats; on the other, “the new phase in the intensification of the general crisis of 
capitalism and the enduring, severe cyclical economic crisis” meant that “international 
monopoly capital in the interest of preserving its rule” sought “in expansion and 
aggression a way out of the enormously sharpened int rnal and external 
contradictions.”121 
 While the peace problematic and issues connected with it favored the 
foregrounding of concrete, realpolitical concerns i expert output and a corresponding 
softening of the strict class-based approach to international relations (despite the existing 
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tendency toward knee-jerk ideological retrenchment) precisely because the SED 
leadership had identified them as areas of vital concern that warranted comparatively 
unsparing examination, relative disinterest on the part of party leadership could also 
produce a similar effect. After attracting a great amount of attention in the second half of 
the 1970s, the developing world—Africa in particular—lost in the first half of the 1980s 
a considerable amount of the significance it had earlier held for the SED leadership, 
whose primary attention was now focused on addressing the challenges stemming from 
the second Cold War as well as foreign trade issues in light of a dire domestic economic 
situation. Benno-Eide Siebs has drawn attention to this important development: “In the 
case of peace policy and security policy, such latitude emerged as a result of the state and 
party leadership’s need for argumentation while in policy on the third world it reflected 
the fact that interest in the third world had decreased in light of the ‘socialist orientation’ 
model’s failure.”122 The emergence of a different set of foreign policy priorities at the 
turn of the decade thus created conditions for expert analysis of the developing world 
that, as with the peace problematic and related issues—though for different reasons—
facilitated prioritization of concrete realpolitical interests over unbending ideological 
maxims. 
 Détente and in particular the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 marked 
attainment of historic rapprochement between socialist East and capitalist West. From the 
perspective of Soviet Bloc leaders, however, détente did not entail cessation of the 
international class struggle but rather meant that i  would simply be waged by different 
means and in other areas. The developing world in particular appeared as a promising 
area for the further advancement of the “international constellation of forces” in favor of 
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socialism for both political reasons—the status quoin Europe, for which the Soviet Bloc 
had striven so long to gain recognition, was now viewed as sacrosanct—and ideological 
reasons—the continued belief in the “objectively” anti-imperialist character of the 
national liberation movement augured success. On this backdrop, concrete international 
relations developments in the 1970s—the collapse of the Portuguese empire and 
Mengistu Haile Mariam’s adoption of a socialist-oriented course in Ethiopia—then 
provided the opening needed for the direct and at times massive involvement of the 
Soviet Union, the GDR, and other Soviet Bloc states in Africa in the second half of that 
decade. The GDR’s involvement in Africa—principally Mozambique, Angola, and 
Ethiopia—was promoted in particular by Werner Lamberz,123 the energetic Politburo 
member considered to be next in line to succeed Honecker before his death in 1978. 
Lamberz’s framing of the situation in Africa drew heavily on ideological concepts and 
expert output on the subject correspondingly displayed a pronounced class-based 
approach to the subject. A report for the Politburo from 1979—the year which witnessed 
the zenith of East German engagement in Africa—Erich Honecker’s visit to Angola, 
Zambia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia—depicted the situation in the following manner: 
“The struggle of the peoples of Africa for freedom, independence, and social progress is 
an indivisible and ever-more important component of the worldwide struggle. The 
historic transition of peoples from the order of exploiters to socialism has now seized 
Africa as well.”124 At the height of the GDR’s involvement in Africa, the predominant 
understanding of the situation was unambiguously based on the classic Marxist-Leninist 
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conception that national liberation was “objectively anti-imperialist” and that the “clash 
of systems” between socialism and capitalism represent d the defining characteristic and 
framework for all international relations developments. 
 This understanding, however, would change substantially in the considerably 
different conditions that obtained in the first half of the 1980s. The ideologically inspired 
“socialist offensive” in Africa experienced a precipitous decrease in importance as the 
Euro-centric challenges stemming from the second Col War took center stage alongside 
a growing focus on international trade as the result of an increasingly acute domestic 
economic situation. The shift of attention away from Africa was further promoted “by an 
increasingly sobered view of the situation in Africa, by the failure of socialist models of 
development, and by disillusionment over opportunities for economic cooperation.”125 
On this backdrop of relative disinterest on the part of the SED leadership toward Africa 
and partial ideological disillusionment, expertise on the topic markedly moved away from 
a rigid class-based understanding of the topic.126 Following a 1983 visit to the GDR by 
Sam Nujoma, president of the Angolan liberation organization SWAPO, the IV Division 
completed an assessment of the situation in southern Africa that, in light of the enduring, 
complex problems affecting the region, clearly distanced itself from the paradigm of 
international class struggle. The IV Division’s report acknowledged that the serious 
challenges facing Angola and Mozambique—civil war and severe economic 
underdevelopment—were not simply the result of Western interference, but also 
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stemmed in part from the model of socialist development adopted by those countries and 
actively promoted by the states of the Soviet Bloc in their single-minded concern with 
advancing the cause of “international socialism.”127 A large part of the “sobering” of 
experts’ views on southern Africa in the first half of the 1980s indeed consisted in 
questioning the appropriateness of the notion of the “clash of systems” between socialism 
and capitalism as the exclusive measuring stick for international relations. Other issues, 
in this case economic development, came to possess value in and of themselves and not 
only in relation to the “international constellation f forces.” This sentiment was clearly 
expressed to Hans-Georg Schleicher by Günther Sieber, head of the IV Division, before 
the former was dispatched in 1983 to his ambassadorial post in Zimbabwe. Schleicher 
received explicit instructions not to push for a greater socialist economic orientation in 
Zimbabwe: “No more failed experiments in socialism!” 128 Schleicher himself has written 
that “the failure of socialist experiments” in Africa “was acknowledged in segments of 
the foreign policy apparatus of the GDR” in the first half of the 1980s and that sole 
responsibility was not ascribed to “aggression and destabilization by the West and its 
allies in Africa;” rather, the very concept of a “socialist orientation” as a fitting and 
effective model of economic development for countries in southern Africa was 
questioned.129 
 A November 1984 report from the MfAA on “Current Developments in the 
Region of Southern Africa and Conclusions for the Foreign Policy of the GDR” likewise 
displayed elements of a new approach to the region. While its assessment was placed in a 
Marxist-Leninist framework, the report’s essential content placed a much greater 
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emphasis on pragmatic solutions to outstanding problems. The report’s authors 
recognized the extreme precariousness of the situation in Soviet Bloc allies Angola and 
Mozambique and that the success of the socialist-oriented avant-garde parties in each 
country required stability and economic development. Correspondingly, the Lusaka 
Accords and the Nkomati Accords, concluded in early 1984 between South Africa and 
Angola and Mozambique respectively, were considered a positive step toward stabilizing 
the region through constructive engagement with South Africa even if South Africa’s 
continued attempts at destabilization were viewed critically.130 For the GDR’s policies in 
the region, a premium was placed on peace and engagment, which corresponded to the 
GDR’s broader foreign policy goals in the first half of the 1980s: “Together with the 
independent African states and the national liberation movements, [the community of 
socialist states] strives for the suspension of the policies of military violence and 
destabilization against the states and peoples in southern Africa and for the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts in the region. This position is a component part of the peace policy 
of the socialist states and contributes to maintaining the independent African states as an 
important force in the struggle for peace and to thwart the confrontation course of 
imperialism. The defense of the progressive course in Mozambique and Angola remains 
the principal goal of the revolutionary struggle in the region.”131 With the focus of GDR 
foreign policy now squarely directed toward East-West issues connected with the peace 
problematic and in light of the disappointing development of Angola and Mozambique in 
the time since each country had adopted a “socialist orientation,” the report adopted a 
more pragmatic approach to the situation. Gone was the heavily ideologically inspired 
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emphasis on offensive expansion in order to gain further victories for “international 
socialism,” which had predominated in the second half of the 1970s; in its place was an 
orientation toward providing realistic solutions to regional problems while supporting the 
Soviet Bloc’s allies there as the situation allowed—“The dominant concern was 
preventing an escalation of the conflict and restoring peace and security to the region as 
conditions for its future development.”132 As was the case with the peace problematic, the 
second Cold War and the shift of foreign policy priorit es that accompanied it favored the 
foregrounding of concrete, realpolitical concerns i expert output on southern Africa and 
a corresponding decrease in the influence of ideological considerations. And as the 
applicability of ideological precepts appeared to decrease, so too did belief in the notion 
that the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism represented the defining 
characteristic of international relations, to which all other phenomena were subordinate. 
 The prioritization within expert output in the first half of the 1980s of concrete 
realpolitical interests over rigid Marxist-Leninist precepts was in evidence not only in 
respect to individual countries but also in respect to the developing world as a whole, 
where the notion of the “objectively anti-imperialist” character of national liberation had 
long reigned supreme. A report from Günter Sieber’s IV Division submitted to the APK 
in October 1984 captured the essence of experts’ changing approach to the topic, where 
realpolitical considerations clearly took absolute priority over ideological criteria. The 
orientation of GDR foreign policy, the report argued, could no longer be on offensive 
expansion and continual movement of the internationl constellation of forces in favor of 
socialism; instead a more pragmatic approach to the dev loping world was needed, where 
the focus lay on consolidation of the existing positi n of Soviet Bloc allies and 
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harmonization with the GDR’s broader foreign policy goals in the era of the second Cold 
War: “In the current constellation of forces and in the foreseeable future, the socialist 
countries will not be in a position to provide decisive material support on a larger scale 
for the consolidation of revolutionary developments. Therefore, it is now more essential 
than ever to aid revolutionary forces in the formulation of realistic plans with which 
they—on the basis of the developmental level of productive forces and societal 
consciousness, primarily reliant upon their own powers, and with the aid of unavoidable 
compromises—can achieve the goals of their struggle and guarantee gradual economic 
progress and stability.”133 The GDR’s allies and partners in the developing world were 
called upon to exercise restraint and to focus on fundamental problems of development 
over ideologically inspired maximalist goals—what one again might call the  “global 
problems” perspective trumping a strict Marxist-Leninist perspective. The increasingly 
“complicated” situation in the developing world (a euphemism indicating a situation was 
neither especially promising for the GDR nor particularly amenable to ideological 
analysis) required adaptation not only on the part of “revolutionary forces” in the 
developing world but also on the part of the GDR. As the report put it: “One may assume 
that the situation of developing countries in the near future will continue to unfold in a 
complicated manner. In the future, real socialism will nevertheless have diverse 
opportunities to work together with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, 
even if with various gradations from country to country. Greater cooperation with these 
countries, however, demands that we better adjust to the new conditions.”134 
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 The report all but acknowledged the bankruptcy of the GDR’s heavily 
ideologically inspired approach to the developing world in the 1970s and made the case 
for foreign policy realism in the “new conditions” of the 1980s. Terms like “international 
constellation of forces” were still employed, but they were largely drained of their 
ideological content; instead of a simplified, black-and-white understanding of the “clash 
of systems” between socialism and capitalism as the defining characteristic of 
international relations, the term rather denoted above all the actual, complex 
configuration of power and interests that comprised the international relations system in 
which the GDR had to conduct foreign policy. Finally, the IV Division’s report was much 
more than an ephemeral change of approach toward the eveloping world, it rather 
possessed direct and lasting significance for the future orientation of analysis of the topic. 
The report made it clear that expertise on the topic had to adjust to match the new reality 
of the situation in the developing world it had described: “The far-reaching political, 
economic, and social changes in developing countries in the 1970s and at the start of the 
1980s and [developing countries’] greater role in international politics require that inner 
processes in these countries be even more thoroughly examined. The results of these 
analyses should provide further insight into the potential and perspectives of these 
countries in the international class struggle, in the struggle for peace and social progress, 
and should produce concrete ideas for political-dipomatic practice and for corresponding 
societal organizations in the GDR.”135 After events in the developing world had not 
played out according to the expectations of the heavily ideological approach to the topic 
prevalent in the 1970s, a growing trend toward foreign policy realism among East 
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German experts had emerged in the dramatically different conditions of the first half of 
the 1980s and was having a substantial and lasting impact on expertise. 
 
Conclusion 
The pronounced tendency within expert output in the first half of the 1980s toward a 
pragmatic emphasis on realpolitical considerations and away from a rigid class-based 
approach was the natural result of developments taking place both within and outside of 
the GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise. The system’s defining characteristic—the 
persistent tension between ideological and expert el ments—remained present, yet the 
center of gravity within East German foreign policy expertise was unambiguously 
shifting more and more toward the expert side of the equation. The high level of 
professionalization and “systematization” achieved in the 1970s, the ever-greater 
emphasis on specialization in foreign policy training, and increasing exposure to the 
West, including through direct scholarly contacts, provided a type of “convergence with 
reality” that counterbalanced persistent efforts to preserve a “firm Marxist-Leninist 
perspective” as the defining characteristic of East German experts. The complete 
subordination of foreign policy expertise to the operative needs and political-ideological 
requirements of foreign policy practice as defined by the SED leadership remained 
thereby the decisive element, yet the imperative to produce factual analysis of 
international relations based on specialist knowledge increasingly gained priority over the 
imperative for ideological purity. Marxism-Leninism undoubtedly maintained a strong 
presence as the basic framework in which internatiol relations were understood, but 
was increasingly relegated to this position alone, i.e. of intellectual framing device, while 
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beneath the Marxist-Leninist veneer the focus shifted emphatically toward expert analysis 
of individual issues on the basis of specialist knowledge and a pronounced orientation 
toward keeping pace with the outstanding practical ch lenges facing East German 
foreign policy. 
 It was upon this institutional basis that earnest consideration of concrete foreign 
policy events in the first half of the 1980s elicited a critical re-assessment of the 
prevailing Marxist-Leninist-based understanding of international relations. With 
extensive foreign policy engagement having long ago replaced the diplomatic isolation 
imposed by the Hallstein Doctrine and having transformed the GDR into a “status quo” 
state theoretically equal to all other sovereign states in the international arena, the West’s 
frontal challenge to the Soviet Bloc in the so-called second Cold War confronted East 
German experts with a series of problems where class-b ed analysis proved lacking. The 
shifting foreign policy priorities of the SED leadership created conditions—whether 
through its renewed focus on East-West issues or its relative neglect of the developing 
world—in which sober analysis conducted by experts time and time again revealed a 
growing incongruence between the existing interpretive framework and the existing state 
of the GDR’s foreign relations. On some of the most central questions facing the GDR—
the peace problematic, the strength of “imperialism” and socialism in the ongoing 
international “clash of systems,” economic development in the Soviet Bloc, relations with 
the developing world—experts often dispensed with application of ideologically derived 
axioms and instead adopted a pragmatic approach focused on the concrete realpolitical 
interests of the GDR. In the context of this greater nalytical refinement and 
differentiation, the basic Marxist-Leninist categories were maintained, but they provided 
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above all the general framework or façade, beneath the surface of which expertise 
became single-mindedly focused on how best to advance East German interests. As 
Marxism-Leninism’s value as an analytical tool appeared to decrease, the currency of the 
hallowed Marxist-Leninist principles of the prevailing understanding of international 
relations diminished as well. It was conceded that perhaps not all international relations 
events fit into the Marxist-Leninist framework, where the “clash of systems” between 
socialism and capitalism represented the defining characteristic of international relations. 
Issues like the preservation of peace, cooperation w th non-communist states and parties, 
and economic development and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the developing 
world, it was acknowledged, could transcend ostensible class interests and class 
boundaries and could correspondingly possess value in and of themselves, not only 
insofar as they related to and impacted the “internatio al constellation of forces.” 
Schleicher and Engel have even described expert output on southern Africa in the early 
1980s as a form of East German “New Thinking” according to the following definition: 
“Processes of ‘the New Thinking’ were defined by the break-down of confrontational 
conceptual schemata and simplified notions of socio-e onomic models for Africa, by a 
greater emphasis on global problems, by no longer fixing the foci of bilateral relations 
primarily according to ideological criteria, and bysupporting political resolution of 
regional conflicts.”136 
 The critical re-assessment of the prevailing understanding of international 
relations in the first half of the 1980s, however, proceeded piecemeal and unevenly. In 
some quarters, the serious problems provoked by the West’s frontal challenge to the 
international position of the Soviet Bloc was as likely to lead to ideological retrenchment 
                                                 
136 Engel and Schleicher, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika, 124. 
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as to a re-thinking of existing postulates. Even more important, when critical re-
assessment did take place, it entailed more an implicit than an explicit challenge to the 
status quo understanding—the conceptual paradigm that had been built up by experts 
over the previous thirty years neither was completely rejected nor was a comprehensive 
alternative to it fully enunciated. Rather, as the Marxist-Leninist façade remained in 
place, the results of expert analysis in individual areas tacitly yet with increasing clarity 
pointed to a mounting discrepancy between the reality of international relations and how 
Marxism-Leninism claimed that reality should look. For this reason, it would be difficult 
to label the disparate strands which emerged in East German foreign policy expertise in 
the first half of the 1980s that ran counter to the pr vailing understanding of international 
relations as “New Thinking” since they lacked the cohesion of a unified body of thought 
that stood in direct opposition to the established paradigm. The tendency toward 
pragmatic emphasis on realpolitical considerations nevertheless flowed naturally from the 
process of East German foreign policy expertise, in its specific institutional 
configuration, being brought to bear on the outstanding international relations issues the 
GDR faced in the first half of the 1980s. In this process, the output of East German 
experts, logically, reflected the internal development of the GDR’s system of foreign 
policy expertise, where the expert increasingly outweighed the ideological element in the 
1980s. And while it developed gradually and unevenly in the first half of the decade, the 
tendency toward a pragmatic emphasis on realpolitical considerations and away from a 
rigid class-based approach in East German foreign policy expertise would become even 
more pronounced and more comprehensive in the second half of the decade, when the 
emergence of an entire corpus of reformist foreign policy thought in the Soviet Union, 
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East German New Thinking? 
 
Introduction 
In the first half of the 1980s, East German foreign policy experts engaged in a critical re-
assessment of the Marxist-Leninist-based understanding of international relations 
prevalent in the GDR. Both the specific institutional configuration of East German 
foreign policy expertise and concrete foreign policy developments had proven 
indispensable for the critical re-assessment. First, the decisive feature of East German 
foreign policy expertise remained complete subordinatio  to the operative needs and 
political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership, from which stemmed the 
persistent tension between the ideological and expert elements, yet the center of gravity 
within East German foreign policy expertise was unambiguously shifting more and more 
toward the expert side of the equation as the imperativ  to produce factual, specialist-
based analysis of international relations increasingly gained priority over the imperative 
for ideological purity. The impact of developments like the high level of 
professionalization and “systematization” achieved in the 1970s, the ever-greater 
emphasis on specialization in foreign policy training, and increasing exposure to the 
West, including integration into a transnational network of specialists, provided a type of 
“convergence with reality” that counterbalanced persistent efforts to preserve a “firm 
Marxist-Leninist perspective” as the defining characteristic of East German experts. 
Marxism-Leninism was increasingly relegated to the position of general framework for 
expertise beneath the surface of which expert analysis of individual issues on the basis of 
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specialist knowledge and a pronounced orientation toward keeping pace with the 
outstanding practical challenges facing East German foreign policy dominated. 
 The West’s serious challenge to the international position of the GDR and the 
Soviet Bloc in the first half of the 1980s (i.e. the second Cold War) represented the key 
catalyst for East German experts’ critical re-assesment. Parallel to the situation in the 
1970s, when the extremely favorable developments of he détente era had facilitated 
reinforcement of experts’ GDR-specific Marxist-Leninist conception of international 
relations, earnest consideration of the adverse devlopments of the first half of the 1980s 
elicited a critical re-assessment of that same understanding. On the most central questions 
facing the GDR in the second Cold War—the peace problematic, the strength of 
“imperialism” and socialism in the ongoing international “clash of systems,” economic 
development in the Soviet Bloc, relations with the developing world—experts often 
dispensed with Marxist-Leninist categories, which seemed less and less applicable to the 
complex problems facing the GDR and the Soviet Bloc, and instead adopted a pragmatic 
approach focused on the concrete realpolitical interes s of the GDR. The sum total of 
such analyses in turn made some of the central pillrs of the prevailing conception of 
international relations—the class nature of foreign policy, the inexorable movement of 
the “international constellation of forces” in favor f socialism, the one-to-one 
correspondence between the interests of the GDR and those of an abstractly understood 
“international socialism”—appear less and less capable of offering true insight into the 
complexities of contemporary international relations. Expert output on the adverse 
developments of the first half of the 1980 stood in increasingly sharp contrast to the 
class-based approach to foreign policy. 
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 The challenge to the class-based understanding of international relations, 
however, was more implicit than explicit—the existing paradigm was neither completely 
rejected nor was a comprehensive alternative to it fully enunciated. Rather, as the 
Marxist-Leninist façade remained in place, the results of expert analysis in individual 
areas tacitly yet with increasing clarity pointed to a mounting discrepancy between the 
reality of international relations and how Marxism-Leninism dictated that reality should 
look. The tendency toward a pragmatic emphasis on realpolitical considerations and away 
from a rigid class-based approach in East German foreign policy expertise thus proceeded 
gradually and unevenly in the first half of the 1980s. Under the considerably different 
circumstances of the second half of the decade, however, this tendency would grow even 
more pronounced and more comprehensive. The two key elements that had fostered the 
critical re-assessment of the first half of the decade were still in place. First, amid 
persistent tension between the ideological and the exp rt element in East Germany’s 
highly professional and highly specialized system of foreign policy expertise, the expert 
element increasingly displaced the ideological elemnt and a hardnosed focus on 
realpolitical issues predominated. Second, the serious foreign policy challenges facing the 
GDR and the entire Soviet Bloc likewise showed no signs of abatement at the mid-decade 
mark. Despite some superficial foreign policy successes, like Erich Honecker’s trip to 
Bonn in 1987, adverse conditions continued to decisively shape the environment in which 
the GDR had to conduct foreign policy and correspondingly demanded sober analysis 
from experts. 
 The key new development in the second half of the 1980s was Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s accession to power in the Soviet Union and his promulgation of the New 
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Thinking in foreign policy. Gorbachev’s enunciation f a comprehensive foreign policy 
vision that stood in stark contrast to inherited foreign policy dogma served to accelerate 
the preexisting critical tendency in East German foreign policy expertise. The emergence 
of the New Thinking in the Soviet Union namely catalyzed the critical tendency in East 
German foreign policy expertise both by providing a favorable environment for its 
continued and intensified development and by offering an alternative conceptual model 
on the example of which previously disparate critical tendencies could be bound together 
into a cohesive whole. With the crucial impulse provided by Gorbachev’s enunciation of 
the New Thinking, East German experts would carry on the critical re-assessment begun 
in the first half of the decade, but would do so in a more explicit manner. They would 
break with a strict class-based approach to internaio l relations and would develop a 
body of non-dogmatic foreign policy thought with striking similarities to the Soviet New 
Thinking without, however, matching its cohesive character and conscious rejection of 
inherited foreign policy postulates. 
 
The Preponderance of the Expert over the Ideological 
The institutional configuration and the general character of East German foreign policy 
expertise in the second half of the 1980s were characte ized not by a radical break, but by 
the continuation of trends from the first half of the decade. The decisive element 
remained, as before, full subordination to the practic l needs and political-ideological 
requirements of the SED leadership; this relationship of subordination, however, 
contained not only the ideological imperative to maintain a “firm Marxist-Leninist 
perspective” but also the expert imperative to produce factual analysis of international 
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relations based on specialist knowledge. Out of this two-fold mission sprung the defining 
characteristic of East German foreign policy expertis , the persistent tension between the 
ideological and the expert element. This tension, as the result of the very raison d’être of 
East German foreign policy expertise, was and would always be present to one degree or 
another, with the center of gravity tacking back and forth between the two poles, yet the 
expert element grew dramatically in importance in the 1970s and particularly the first 
half of the 1980s, displacing the ideological element to a considerable degree. This 
outcome was produced by the combined impact of a number of factors over an extended 
period of time: most prominently the GDR’s extensive engagement with the outside 
world following foreign policy normalization, which eliminated the type of ideological 
insularity possible in the conditions of imposed diplomatic isolation and which demanded 
sober analysis of contemporary international relations events; the high level of 
professionalism and specialization achieved in the wake of the “systematization” of East 
German foreign policy expertise; and a sharp increase in exposure to the West, including 
in the form of direct scholarly contacts, which fostered a “convergence with reality” and 
which revealed the incongruity of a highly ideological, class-based approach to the 
complexities of international relations. The sum effect of these and other developments 
facilitated, with the basic Marxist-Leninist framework largely remaining intact, the 
increasing preponderance of the expert over the ideological element in East German 
foreign policy expertise, which became manifest in the first half of the 1980s in the 
critical re-assessment of the prevailing Marxist-Leninist-based understanding of 
international relations. It was namely in the continuation of this trend—the growing 
preponderance of the expert over the ideological in East German foreign policy expertise 
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in the unchanged context of persistent tension—in which the importance of the 
institutional development of East German foreign policy expertise for experts’ 
enunciation of a body of non-dogmatic foreign policy thought in the second half of the 
1980s lay. 
 The need to continually refine working processes in order to ensure that research 
produced by the Institute for International Relations (IIB) and the Institute for 
International Politics and Economics (IPW), the GDR’s two main foreign policy research 
institutes, would keep pace with the practical foreign policy challenges facing the GDR 
was already firmly established.1 In the second half of the 1980s, a series of measur s 
aimed at further increasing the orientation of expertis  toward the outstanding practical 
challenges facing East German foreign policy created favorable conditions for experts’ 
continuing movement away from a strict class-based approach to international relations 
since the central international relations developments of the period largely revolved 
around breaking down the opposition between socialist East and capitalist West. Efforts 
aimed at “improving the quality and effectiveness of research” at the two institutes were 
near constant, with the Scientific Council of each institute often deliberating over one or 
another piece dedicated to the topic.2 A particularly common refrain highlighted the 
necessity of responding to “new, higher scientific and political demands.” Such 
shibboleths, however, were not just empty phrases; th y typically produced concrete 
action aimed at bringing about the desired results, whether related directly to research or 
to the role and function of research within the context of the GDR’s broader foreign 
                                                 
1 For insider accounts of the research conducted by the different topical and region-based divisions at the 
IIB into the 1980s, see the various relevant articles in Die Babelsberger Diplomatenschule. Das Institut für 
Internationale Beziehungen der DDR, ed. Erhard Crome (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 2009). 
2 See, for instance: UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13034 and 13135. 
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policy apparatus. Such was the case in 1984, when an i ternal report on research 
conducted in the previous year at the IIB demonstrated the link between the two 
elements, calling for an adjustment to research in order for the IIB to better fulfill its 
mission. The report called for “a closer connection between the high analytical quality of 
many research projects and the formulation of conclusions and suggestions for foreign 
policy practice” and saw this goal best served by “development and concentration of 
[research] capacities and projects on key issues of strategic issues in the international 
class struggle on the basis of the interests of the GDR.”3 The IIB could only satisfactorily 
fulfill its mission by keeping pace with the practical foreign policy challenges faced by 
the GDR’s operative foreign policy institutions. 
 The same report also called for “a clearer concentration on and a precise scientific 
reaction to new developments and processes,”4 which highlighted a key component of 
what keeping pace consisted in for research institutes like the IIB and the IPW. As the 
GDR’s two leading foreign policy research institutes, the IIB and the IPW were expected 
to continually provide “scientific” analysis of new foreign policy developments as they 
emerged to aid the work of operative foreign policy institutions and thereby to contribute 
to realization of the GDR’s foreign policy goals. In the second half of the 1980s, many of 
the “new developments and processes” that demanded the analytical attention of the IIB 
and the IPW—the peace problematic, the “internationl constellation of forces” between 
socialism and capitalism, international trade, events in the developing world—did not 
lend themselves particularly well to class-based analysis. The imperative for the IIB and 
the IPW to subject such complex issues to scientific analysis in an atmosphere that was 
                                                 
3 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13037. 
4 Ibid. 
 500
increasingly unfavorable for “international socialism” pushed East German foreign policy 
experts to foreground realpolitical considerations ver simplistic adherence to inherited 
ideological axioms that now appeared out-dated. 
 And this tendency was reflected in the research orientation of each institute in the 
second half of the decade. The introduction to the IPW’s Perspektivplan for 1986-1990, 
while employing ideological terminology, once again h ghlighted the institute’s strict 
orientation toward the most important realpolitical issues facing the GDR: “Research is 
oriented above all toward those strategic issues that are connected with securing peace, 
the global clash between socialism and imperialism, and the deepening of the general 
crisis of capitalism in the conditions of the scient fic-technical revolution and its 
consequences.”5 While this general orientation indeed suggested a strict orientation 
toward pressing practical foreign policy issues, but not a particular readiness to dispense 
with an inflexible, Marxist-Leninist approach, the body of the research plan, which 
expounded upon the IPW’s research orientation in much greater detail, revealed how the 
operative priority of maintaining peace and advancing disarmament created a favorable 
environment for elements of New Thinking to take hold: “At the center of our designated 
task stands the necessity of continuing to increase science’s contribution to the struggle to 
secure world peace and for disarmament. This requirs substantial contributions to the 
formulation and implementation of a new thinking and behavior, a new approach to the 
questions of peace and security in the nuclear-cosmic age.”6 
 The absolute operative priority given to securing peace in the second half of the 
1980s, which with the Warsaw Pact’s Sofia Declaration of October 1985 began to take on 
                                                 
5 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/7367. 
6 Ibid. 
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a New Thinking coloration,7 opened the door for experts at the IPW to move away from a 
strict ideological approach to the issue. And the same was true of the situation at the IIB. 
As the Soviet Bloc pushed its post-Sofia “peace offnsive,” the IIB followed suit, 
modifying its research orientation on the issue in accord with the new official line.8 A 
run-down of measures to increase cooperation between the institute’s Socialist Countries 
Division and the MfAA from December 1985 underscored the centrality acquired by the 
new, New Thinking-friendly approach to the issue: “Analysis and prognostication of new 
developmental tendencies in fundamental strategic questions of the international class 
struggle must be strengthened in order to create the prerequisites for a turn (Wende) in 
international relations in realization of the concept and the recommendations of the Sofia 
Declaration of the member-states of the Warsaw Pact.”9 Not only did the research plans 
of the IIB and the IPW for the second half of the 1980s display a strict orientation toward 
the outstanding practical challenges facing East German foreign policy in that period, but 
the imperative to subject “new developments and processes” in international relations—
the peace problematic being just one such issue—to scientific analysis also created 
favorable conditions for the unfolding of the existing critical tendency in East German 
foreign policy expertise. 
  The tendency toward a pragmatic emphasis on pressing realpolitical 
considerations to the detriment of a strict ideological approach was present in one final 
area of the organization of foreign policy research in the second half of the 1980s. As 
certain issues came to occupy a more and more prominent position in East German 
                                                 
7 Frank Umbach, Das rote Bündnis. Entwicklung und Zerfall des Warschauer Paktes 1955-1991 (Berlin: 
Ch. Links, 2005), 431. 
8 For further discussion of this dynamic, see Benno-Eide Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR 1976-1989. 
Strategien und Grenzen (Paderborn: Schönigh, 1999), 338-340. 
9 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13227. 
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foreign policy considerations in the 1980s, an attempt was made to concentrate the 
GDR’s research capacities around these discrete issu s in order to provide more grounded 
and focused wissenschaftlich analysis of them. This was part and parcel of “raising the 
specific security interests of the GDR out of general subsumption into the Warsaw Pact, 
which was set by the Soviet Union,” as IIB Director Max Schmidt put it.10 Thus, the 
Secretariat in November 1982 passed a resolution in rder to expand and better 
coordinate research on socialist states, a topic whose importance grew in tandem with the 
need for coordinated action, particularly in the economic realm, between socialist states.11 
The staff of the Institute for the Economy of the International Socialist System at the 
GDR’s Academy of Social Sciences, which had been fou ded by resolution of the 
Secretariat in 1978,12 was expanded and its name changed to Institute for Ec nomy and 
Politics of Socialist Countries and a corresponding Scientific Council, a coordinating 
body akin to the scientific councils on foreign policy and imperialism research headed 
respectively by the IIB and the IPW, was established under its leadership. The Institute 
for Economy and Politics of Socialist Countries above all employed economists, 
historians, and other social scientists and focused on omestic developments more than 
foreign policy, although the re-founded institute cooperated much more with the IIB than 
its predecessor institution had and three IIB employees—Werner Hänisch (as a deputy 
chairman), Siegmar Quilitzsch, and Helmut Matthes—were members of the newly 
established Scientific Council for Economy and Politics of Socialist Countries,13 which 
                                                 
10 Cited in Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, 339. 
11 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/3867. 
12 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/J IV 2/3A/3100. 
13 UP, UA, Bestand ASR, 13035. 
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evinced the seriousness (and success) with which the at empt to better coordinate 
research on socialist states was undertaken. 
 The drive to concentrate scientific research on indiv dual foreign policy issues at 
the center of the GDR’s attention likewise led to the expansion and improved 
coordination of research on the US, whose importance for international relations was 
self-evident given its position as the leader of the capitalist world and superpower rival of 
the Soviet Union. A Secretariat resolution from February 1986 asserted that, “in light of 
continually increasing foreign policy demands, conditions must be created that allow a 
more complex analysis of domestic and foreign policy developments in US imperialism 
and that better expose the interactions between ecoomy, politics, and ideology in the 
strategy of the US and in its relations with its allies.”14 The resolution tellingly noted how 
the success of East German policy toward the US, the entire capitalist world, and parts of 
the developing world as well depended in large parton the penetrating specialist analysis 
that only experts could provide: “Realization of the foreign policy and foreign trade 
interests of the GDR vis-à-vis industrialized capitlist states and large segments of the 
developing world demands exact analysis of the effects of US foreign, military, and 
economic policy on the interests and positions of these countries and of the level of 
commonalities and contradictions with the US.”15 What is more, the Secretariat 
resolution explicitly demanded that this be “realistic and sober analysis of longer-term 
developmental tendencies.”16 In order to achieve the goal of more refined, nuanced 
analysis of the US, coordination of research on the topic was entrusted to the US Division 
                                                 
14 The resolution was prepared in close cooperation with the IV Division (Joachim Böhm, deputy director 





of the IIB, a function that was fulfilled by a newly created Problem Council (Problemrat) 
assigned to the IIB-led Scientific Council for Foreign Policy Research. The council was 
headed by Claus Montag, longtime US expert at the IIB, with Gerhard Basler of the IPW 
as deputy. The council brought together members of other institutions as well, such as the 
Academy of Social Sciences and the “Bruno Leuschner” College for Economics, and was 
to work in close cooperation with the IPW-led Scientific Council for Imperialism 
Research, which attested to the type of cross-institutional coordinating function the 
Problem Council was supposed to fulfill, bringing to ether the GDR’s leading US 
specialists in order to achieve the designated goal of “realistic and sober analysis.” The 
council was also made responsible for coordinating contacts with scholarly and political 
institutions and individuals in the US “with the goal of influencing emerging research in 
the US on GDR topics in favor of our policies…and to gain information,”17 a task that 
was wholly consistent with the dual purpose of East German experts’ scholarly contacts 
with the West as generally practiced. According to Claus Montag, chairman of the 
council, its members took very seriously the charge of dispensing with ideological dogma 
in order to produce more nuanced and more accurate an lysis of the US and took Georgii 
Arbatov’s USA and Canada Institute in Moscow, the leading Soviet research institute that 
made an essential contribution to the formulation of Soviet New Thinking,18 as a type of 
model for their own work.19 In the short period of its existence, the Problem Council, by 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold 
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 125-127. 
19 Claus Montag, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, 7 May 2008. 
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Montag’s own admission, did not completely fulfill this ambitious goal, yet nevertheless 
achieved partial success.20 
 The final area in which the drive to concentrate sci ntific research on individual 
foreign policy issues at the center of the GDR’s foreign policy attention produced 
concrete results was the peace problematic. The issu had of course been a, if not the, 
major foreign policy issue for the GDR starting in the late 1970s with the winding down 
of détente and the flaring up of the second Cold War and had correspondingly been the 
object of voluminous analysis since that time. Yet it was only in 1987 that a concerted 
effort was made to centrally coordinate research on the topic. The charge was led by Max 
Schmidt, head of the IPW, and resulted in the creation of the Scientific Council for Peace 
Research, chaired by Schmidt himself.21 In the first half of the 1980s, the peace 
problematic—and the looming specter of indiscriminate nuclear devastation inherently 
connected with it—was one of the issues most likely to elicit acknowledgment that an 
approach focused exclusively on ostensible class interests was not sufficient to illuminate 
foreign policy and that the “international constellation of forces” did not represent the 
most appropriate tool by which to measure international relations. In the second half of 
the 1980s, with the topic now the subject of even greater, more concentrated scientific 
scrutiny, the complexities of the peace problematic would continue to play a crucial role 
in combating dogmatism and promoting the critical re-thinking of inherited foreign 
policy dogma.22 
                                                 
20 For an overview of the council’s activities with a p rticular focus on “scientific exchanges” with the US 
during the first one and a half years of its existence, see BStU, MfS, HA XX Nr. 14138. 
21 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/IV 2/2.115/29. 
22 Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, 106. 
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 The continuation and intensification of the existing trend toward prioritization of 
realpolitical over ideological considerations the inst tutional development of East German 
foreign policy expertise in the second half of the 1980s was unmistakable. As before, the 
decisive element remained full subordination to the practical needs and political-
ideological requirements of the SED leadership, yet this relationship of subordination 
contained not only the ideological imperative to maintain a “firm Marxist-Leninist 
perspective” and generally toe the party line but also the expert imperative to produce 
accurate analysis of international relations based on specialist knowledge that was of use 
to the party leadership. From this two-fold mission sprung the defining characteristic of 
East German foreign policy expertise, the persistent tension between the ideological and 
the expert element. Simple political-ideological compliance remained essential—tension 
between the ideological and the expert was built into the very DNA of East German 
foreign policy expertise and correspondingly would never disappear—but the expert 
element gained increasing predominance. The training of East German foreign policy 
cadres, focused on imparting ever-higher levels of skill and specialization, wide-ranging 
and intensive scholarly contacts with the West, which played a crucial role in loosing 
ideological bonds by providing a “convergence with reality,” and an orientation in 
foreign policy research aimed at providing trenchant, realistic analysis of the complex 
problems facing the GDR all contributed to shifting the center of gravity within East 
German foreign policy expertise decisively toward the expert side of the equation, toward 
the prioritization of realpolitical over ideological considerations. In the first half of the 
1980s, this institutional configuration provided the crucial backdrop for the tentative yet 
unmistakable critical re-assessment of the prevailing understanding of international 
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relations undertaken by East German experts in light of the serious challenges facing the 
GDR. In tandem with the rise of a comprehensive body of reformist foreign policy 
thought in the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1980s, as the pragmatic, realistic 
tendency within East German foreign policy expertis only continued to grow and the 
GDR faced a no less difficult and no less complex set of foreign policy issues, East 
German experts would distance themselves ever more from the strict class-based 
approach to international relations. 
 
Soviet New Thinking; East German New Thinking? 
When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union in 1985, the USSR was beset by a set of serious interlocking domestic and 
international problems. The West’s frontal challeng to the Soviet Union’s international 
position (i.e. the second Cold War) placed a heavy strain on domestic politics, 
particularly as the arms race between the US and the USSR taxed the stagnating Soviet 
economy, which in its turn limited the Soviet Union’s latitude in foreign affairs. 
Gorbachev’s ambitious perestroika program of reform intended to improve the 
performance of the Soviet Economy was announced at the XXVII Party Congress of the 
CPSU in March 1986 and joined in 1988 by the implementation of glasnost’, the wide-
ranging democratization of Soviet public life viewed as a necessary corollary for the 
success on the ongoing perestroika program.23 Gorbachev recognized that the success of 
the domestic reform program depended in no small measur  on achieving substantive 
détente between East and West, which, by reducing or eliminating the chronic 
                                                 
23 Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 69-134. 
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antagonism between the USSR and the US and their respective blocs, would allow the re-
structuring of social and economic life in the Soviet Union upon a more solid foundation. 
The intellectual blueprint for Gorbachev’s attempt to fundamentally change the nature of 
the relationship between socialist East and capitalist West was provided by the so-called 
New Thinking. 
 Soviet New Thinking was not the invention of Gorbachev himself; rather, it 
evolved gradually within the Soviet foreign policy establishment, particularly at the 
USSR’s leading research institutions dealing with international relations, like the Institute 
of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the US and Canada 
Institute, headed by Nikolai Inozemtsev24 and Georgii Arbatov respectively.25 
Gorbachev’s crucial role lay in formulating and attempting to implement a foreign policy 
program based upon New Thinking principles, that is, transforming the New Thinking 
from inoperative theory into practical policy and thereby lending the CPSU’s stamp of 
approval to a body of foreign policy thought that stood in sharp contrast to the approach 
that had prevailed up to that point. The essence of the Soviet New Thinking consisted in 
rejection of the applicability of strict Marxist-Leninist axioms to foreign policy—foreign 
policy was no longer viewed as simply a form of the class struggle, no inherent 
contradiction existed between states of a socialist nd of a capitalist socio-economic 
order, the very notion of socialism and capitalism as abstract world-historical forces was 
questioned, and, correspondingly, the “international constellation of forces,” insofar as it 
could be said to exist at all, did not move inexorably in favor of “international socialism.” 
All of this amounted to “a conceptual revolution” tha  effectively marked “the demise of 
                                                 
24 Alexander Yakovlev (1983-1985) and Yevgeny Primakov (1985-1989) headed IMEMO after 
Inozemtsev’s departure in 1982. 
25 English, Russia and the Idea of the West, see particularly 159-192. 
 509
Marxism-Leninism” in the Soviet Union.26 Gorbachev’s adoption of the New Thinking in 
foreign policy found expression in a series of bold initiatives, pertaining mainly to arms 
reduction and disarmament as well as renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, aimed at 
achieving permanent détente between the USSR and the US and their respective blocs 
and overcoming the condition of Cold War tout court. 
 After the Warsaw Pact’s Sofia Declaration of October 1985, which in its call for 
thoroughgoing arms reduction already pointed in the dir ction the foreign policy program 
of the new Soviet leader would take, the New Thinking received more detailed 
enunciation at the XXVII Party Congress of the CPSU in March 1986, whose highlight 
was the announcement of the sweeping perestroika program. From this point, and 
increasing in tandem with each new Soviet initiative aimed at achieving substantive 
détente, the New Thinking became the official line of the Soviet Union in foreign policy 
and was established as a cohesive body of foreign policy thought placed in overt contrast, 
as the name suggests, to the “old” class-based understanding of international relations. 
Gorbachev’s radical break with the established foreign policy paradigm, which in the 
Soviet Union itself found its fair share of opponents, could not but have tremendous 
significance for the GDR and its system of foreign policy expertise. The bloc leader and 
ultimate guarantor of the GDR’s existence not only embarked upon a program that 
departed from the basic principles guiding Soviet foreign policy from at least the end of 
the Second World War but did so on the basis of a cohesive body of alternate foreign 
policy thought. On the one hand, Gorbachev’s promulgation of the New Thinking, both 
by the specific example it offered and by promotion of innovation in foreign policy 
                                                 
26 Archie Brown, “Introduction,” in The Demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia, ed. Archie Brown 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 1-11. 
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thought in general, provided a key impulse to the existing critical tendency within East 
German foreign policy expertise. East German experts f lt emboldened and encouraged 
to continue on with the type of analysis that had amounted to a critical re-assessment of 
the prevailing understanding of international relations in the first half of the 1980s and to 
carry it even further.27 The value of Marxism-Leninism as an analytical tool was not 
increasing in the second half of the 1980s and the complex challenges facing the GDR 
and the entire Soviet Bloc continued to demand sober analysis, not ideological 
dogmatism, from East German experts, a tendency which was only bolstered by the 
Soviet Union’s espousal of the New Thinking. On the other hand, the SED leadership, 
General Secretary Erich Honecker above all, believed—correctly in retrospect—that the 
Soviet New Thinking as practical policy but perhaps even more so as body of thought 
represented a grave threat to the interests and even the existence of the GDR. The SED 
leadership favored a lessening of tensions with the West, particularly in the realm of arms 
reduction, but held the dramatic decline or even complete abolition of the basic 
opposition between socialist East and capitalist West, which the New Thinking 
envisaged, as going decidedly too far. Whether explicitly or implicitly, the SED 
leadership was cognizant that the complete cessation of cold war would directly 
undermine the very foundations of the GDR’s existence since it threatened to wipe out 
the SED’s meticulously constructed and maintained dmarcation from West Germany, 
the central pillar propping up East Germany’s legitimacy. As a result, the SED leadership 
by early 1987 placed itself in opposition to the Soviet New Thinking, not to mention the 
                                                 
27 Helmut Matthes, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, 29 April 2008. 
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USSR’s efforts for internal democratization.28 The GDR’s prohibition of the Soviet news 
digest Sputnik in 1988 dispelled any hopes that the SED leadership might still follow the 
CPSU along the path of reform. 
 In the second half of the 1980s, then, Gorbachev’s promulgation of the New 
Thinking catalyzed the existing critical tendency within East German foreign policy 
expertise, which continued to move away from a class-based approach to international 
relations toward foreign policy realism, while opposition to the Soviet New Thinking in 
the highest levels of the SED, which naturally became the binding position within the 
entire East German foreign policy apparatus, in turserved to dampen this catalyzing 
effect.29 As a result of the SED leadership’s rejection of the New Thinking, but not only 
for this reason—other institutional and conceptual barriers will be subsequently 
examined—a full-fledged “East German New Thinking” tailored specifically to the 
interests and concerns of the GDR failed to develop. However, while East German 
experts did not develop a comprehensive, alternative body of foreign policy thought 
parallel to the Soviet New Thinking, the critical re-assessment of the prevailing 
understanding of international relations undertaken in the first half of the 1980s was 
continued and intensified in the comparatively more favorable conditions of the second 
half of the decade. The SED’s opposition to the New Thinking could not alone stanch the 
critical tendency within East German foreign policy expertise since the latter derived 
from the specific conditions that prevailed within the GDR’s system of foreign policy 
expertise, where the growing preponderance of the exp rt over the ideological element 
more than ever favored prioritization of concrete realpolitical interests over Marxist-
                                                 
28 Hermann Wentker, Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949-1989 
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 487-492. 
29 Siegfried Bock, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, 21 July 2009. 
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Leninist precepts in foreign policy analysis. In the second half of the 1980s, right up to 
the very dissolution of the GDR, East German experts ngaged in an intensified re-
thinking of international relations that, while lacking the comprehensive, cohesive 
character and the overt rejection of inherited foreign policy postulates characteristic of 
the Soviet New Thinking, discarded ideologically deriv d axioms in favor of a pragmatic 
approach focused on the concrete realpolitical interes s of the GDR.30 
 The enthusiasm with which the New Thinking was received in some quarters of 
the East German foreign policy apparatus evinced its supreme compatibility with the 
existing critical tendency within East German foreign policy expertise as well as the 
desire among some East German experts to shape their own work in accord with its 
central precepts. Günther Sieber, since 1980 head of the International Relations (IV) 
Division of the Central Committee, the party’s leading operative foreign policy institution 
which since the time of Paul Markowski’s tenure as head had had the reputation of being 
a bastion of independent, non-dogmatic foreign policy thought, became a particularly 
zealous proponent of the New Thinking and pushed for its application to the international 
relations of East German as well. In spring 1986, in the immediate wake of the XXVII 
Party Congress of the CPSU and before the SED leadership set itself in clear opposition 
to the New Thinking, Sieber, whose approach to international relations was described by 
one contemporary as unobstructed by ideological “blinders,”31 actively promoted 
thoroughgoing adoption of the central tenets of the New Thinking within the GDR. 
                                                 
30 The fact that East German experts’ conception of iternational relations might be changing did not 
escape certain astute Western observers. Wilhelm Bruns, “Gibt es in der DDR eine neue Theorie der 
internationalen Beziehungen?,” DDR-Report 3 (1988): 129-132. 
31 Montag, interview. Montag, who as one of the IIB’s leading experts on the US had frequent contact with
Sieber’s IV Division, has also described the relationship between the two institutions as “one of the most 
productive contacts that we had.” 
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 On 25 March 1986, Sieber held a presentation at the Ministry of State Security of 
all places evaluating the significance of the XXVII Party Congress of the CPSU for the 
GDR (such presentations were routine and were typically held in various party and state 
institutions after important events likes party congresses and conferences in order to 
ensure conformity with the newly announced position of the party on a range of 
questions; in this case, it was rather the content of the presentation that was 
extraordinary). While expounding upon the main conclusions of the congress, Sieber 
made the case for their adoption in the GDR: “Interational questions must be rethought. 
New assessments are necessary. All evaluations, analyses, and conceptions made after the 
XXVII Party Congress must contain this type of new valuation and new approaches. The 
sources for this are found in the XXVII Party Congress…. It must be most intimately 
joined with our positions and our struggle. Creative conclusions must be drawn…. The 
party congress demands from us too a process of re-thinking (Umdenken), a new 
approach, creative work, and inventiveness.”32 Sieber demonstrated what he understood 
under “re-thinking” by drawing—tellingly—a parallel between the perestroika program 
of domestic economic reform and the new approach in foreign policy. Just as the 
transition from extensive to intensive production was decisive in the economic realm, a 
similar shift had to occur in the realm of foreign policy—counterproductive attempts to 
spread the socialist socio-economic model around the globe and to increase the number 
                                                                                                                                      
Erhard Crome, a graduate of the IIB’s five-year course of study in 1971-1976 who stayed on in the 
institute’s Division for Socialist States, has likewise characterized Sieber as a proponent of the New 
Thinking. Crome, interview. 
32 BStU, MfS, HA IX Nr. 5282. The transcript of Sieber’s presentation at the MfS is in fact a Mitschrift, 
which is more of a condensed summary than a protocol hat exactly reproduces the speech being held. 
Given the absence of quotation marks as well as the German subjunctive 1 in the Mitschrift, it is therefore 
unclear which segments of the transcript, if any, represent direct quotations and which segments repres nt 
condensed summaries of Sieber’s remarks. The curtness of many individual remarks suggest that most fall 
into the latter category. 
 514
of socialist-oriented countries—“or however one might like to call them,” as Sieber 
added dismissively—had to be abandoned in favor of improving the quality and 
efficiency of the international relations of the Soviet Bloc in their existing configuration. 
Achieving far-reaching, substantive cooperation betwe n socialist East and capitalist 
West was the centerpiece of this desired improvement (and a key plank of the New 
Thinking) and was viewed as absolutely necessary in order to address the most pressing 
problems of contemporary international relations, particularly war and peace, an idea 
behind which Sieber threw his full support. Particularly in light of the continued strength 
of “imperialism,” which demonstrated “no absolute sagnation despite all crises,” the 
resolution of “cross-system questions” (ystemübergreifende Fragen) demanded cross-
system cooperation: “The party congress clarified that hese questions must be solved not 
after the worldwide victory of socialism, but rather beforehand—now. The old position 
can no longer be maintained. The development and worsening of problems, e.g. 
ecological problems, may proceed more quickly than socialism triumphs. Therefore, the 
international communist movement requires a new strategy and new tactics.”33  
 In his presentation at the MfS, Sieber called for a new approach in relations with 
the developing world as well. It had too often been the case in the past, he bemoaned, that 
the socialist world had approached the developing world in a dogmatic manner, expecting 
reality to conform to theory. It was now time, he asserted, to take the opposite approach, 
to demonstrate awareness to the immense variety of cultural traditions and customs 
present in the developing world: “We have to learn to be at home in the history of these 
peoples, to think in their categories of thought, and to feel within their cultural traditions. 
One example of this is the Englishman Lawrence, whoas an agent of British imperialism 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
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became leader of the Arabs in their struggle against the Turks and achieved great success 
because he was capable of thinking and feeling in Arab categories.”34 Sieber finally 
attempted to highlight the applicability of the New Thinking (a phrase which incidentally 
was not used in the speech) to the GDR by tracing its lineage back to East German 
support for a “coalition of reason” in the initial years of the second Cold War: “Our 
assessment of the [international] situation, which was promulgated in 1983 for the first 
time by Comrade Honecker at the Karl Marx Conference, can be sustained in its entirety. 
The notion of a coalition of reason, which he substantiated at that time for the first time 
ever, played—without being named directly—an important role at the [XXVII Party 
Congress of the CPSU].”35 By linking Gorbachev’s push for a new approach in foreign 
policy, which went considerably further than Honeckr’s limited coalition of reason 
initiative had, to a policy of the SED leadership, Siebert hoped to demonstrate the 
compatibility of the two positions and to facilitate acceptance of the former among an 
East German leadership extremely wary of diluting its policy of strict demarcation from 
the capitalist West. 
 Just a month later, Sieber presented his emphatically pro-New Thinking views to 
an audience for whose work the topic possessed even more direct and greater 
significance—the assembled foreign policy elite of the GDR. Sieber, as head of the IV 
Division, held an address at the joint consultation of the GDR’s ambassadors and party 
secretaries held in Kleinmachnow just outside Berlin f om 22 to 28 April, which, in 
addition to 87 East German ambassadors, nearly 100 other leading and mid-level foreign 




policy cadres, mainly though not exclusively from the MfAA, attended.36 Before this 
audience responsible for the day-to-day conduct of East German foreign policy, Sieber 
issued a clarion call for the application of the Soviet New Thinking as presented at the 
XXVII Party Congress of the CPSU to East German foreign policy and did so even more 
explicitly and forcefully than he had in his presentation at the Ministry for State Security. 
 As in his speech a month earlier, Sieber took pains to portray the New Thinking 
as in line with and essentially an extension of the GDR’s earlier coalition of reason 
initiative. Sieber argued that if the rationale behind that initiative had been correct, which 
certainly no one in attendance at the consultation w uld dispute, it followed that the call 
to re-think the prevailing foreign policy paradigm issued at the XXVII Party Congress of 
the CPSU was also justified: “The central idea of the Karl Marx Conference was that the 
maintenance of peace has become a question of the survival of mankind and that, as a 
result, far-reaching strategic questions of our struggle must be re-thought and must be 
made the foundation of our action.”37 Sieber continued on with this line of argumentation 
by approvingly citing the address delivered by Adalberto Minucci, a member of the 
Secretariat of the Italian Communist Party and a proponent of the Eurocommunist 
tendency favored by Italian General Secretary Enrico Berlinguer, at the XI Party 
Congress of the SED, which had been held just days e rlier: “Today, no political power, 
no grouping, however large it may be, can by itself prevent war. Consciousness of this 
fact demands that many analytical paradigms and ways of thinking must be changed. We 
should want, [Minucci] continued, to advocate for renewed rapprochement between the 
great currents in which the workers’ movement has long been divided in order to beat 
                                                 
36 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11355. 
37 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11356. 
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back the neo-conservative offensive in the capitalist West, in order to provide new 
answers to the great challenge to peace, development, and the restructuring of 
production.”38 It was namely the XXVII Party Congress of the CPSU, ieber averred, 
that delivered those new answers, that “undertook th se urgently needed evaluations of 
fundamental issues and generalizations for which the communist movement has long 
waited.”39 
 In line with the position presented at the XXVII Party Congress and echoing his 
earlier speech at the MfS, Sieber ascertained no signs of absolute stagnation in the 
capitalist world and ascribed to capitalism as socio-economic system a remarkable 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances and to master successive challenges. Sieber 
still characterized the transition from capitalism to socialism as gesetzmäßig, or a 
necessary result of the laws of historical development, but immediately downplayed the 
importance of the notion by claiming that said transition would take place “in a long-
lasting process, longer as has been generally assumed” and that, “if we soberly assess the 
conditions of the constellation of forces as they actu lly exist in the world and in the main 
capitalist countries, we see that abolition of the rul of monopoly capital cannot be the 
immediate and decisive task that determines the strategy of Communist parties.”40 Thus 
while not in principle rejecting the notion that the emergence, spread, and ultimate 
victory of socialism were guaranteed by the laws of historical development—a position in 
full accord with Gorbachev’s exposition of the New Thinking at the XXVII Party 
Congress—Sieber rejected it in practical terms by denying the notion’s applicability to 
contemporary international relations. 





 While distancing himself in this manner from the notion of the Gesetzmäßigkeit of 
socialism’s victory in its “world-historical clash” with capitalism, which as a central 
theoretical axiom had long served as a main conceptual wellspring for the socialist 
world’s antagonistic position toward the capitalist world, Sieber created the foundation to 
advance a new set of foreign policy priorities. If the socialist world could not simply sit 
idly by and wait for realization of the laws of history to bring about capitalism’s historic 
end, Sieber argued, material progress, particularly in the realm of science and technology, 
took on the decisive role in the continued development of socialism—an insight which 
both had far-reaching consequences for practical foreign policy and simultaneously built 
upon and fostered further conceptual innovation: 
Among the criteria that influence the constellation of forces between the two social 
systems as also the relationship between capitalist countries and their international 
organizations, the capability and the opportunity to achieve outstanding results in the 
realm of science and technology and to apply them in production occupy a primary, a 
decisive position. Today, the processes of the scientific-technical revolution and their 
mastery are not a factor for the transformation of the world per se. They have become the 
key question in the continued clash of systems. This fact alone, comrades, prompts us to 
move away from simplified, from sterile, from self-satisfied views on the continual, 
automatic, and invariable movement of the international constellation of forces in our 
favor. The ability to guarantee military-strategic equilibr um with imperialism, with 
NATO, increasingly depends, like all other fundamental issues, upon to what degree 
socialism succeeds in mastering the challenges of our era through sweeping 
intensification of the reproduction process, through raising productivity in the breadth of 
the entire economy…. The upshot of all this is thatpeaceful coexistence between the two 
social systems has transformed from a form of the class struggle, as we used to say, to the 
sine qua non of humanity’s existence for which there is no alternative. Here, we thus are 
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witnessing a transformational process within the strategic-tactical arsenal, where a 
tactical element in the course of time has become a strategic element of policy in its 
entirety, indeed of continued development in general. At the same time, however, this 
means that the a military clash as the result of imperialism’s instigation of a new world 
war would in no way facilitate social revolution—as fter the First or Second World 
War—due to the destruction of our planet [italics added].41 
Sieber here boldly aligned himself with some of the central tenets of the New Thinking 
and argued for their universal applicability within the socialist world. He disputed the 
notion that the international constellation of forces moved always and automatically in 
favor of socialism and, as was the case with his treatment of the Gesetzmäßigkeit of 
socialism’s ultimate victory, essentially rejected he concept itself by denying its 
applicability to contemporary international relations; he portrayed peaceful coexistence 
between socialism and capitalism not as a mere tactical element in the otherwise 
unabated, inexorable clash between the two social systems but as a permanent feature of 
international relations of strategic importance andin oing so sought to replace 
ideologically inspired antagonism and rivalry between socialism and capitalism with a 
pragmatic focus on substantive détente, which again took on the status of a permanent 
and strategic, not an ephemeral and tactical element;42 fi ally, Sieber highlighted how 
this new approach to foreign policy, which clearly broke with the hallowed notion that 
viewed the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism as the defining 
characteristic of international relations, was indispensable so that socialist states could 
devote their attention to the urgent task of mastering the pressing economic and structural 
problems they faced in order to better realize the pot ntial of socialism. 
                                                 
41 Ibid.  
42 This corresponded to the broader change in the GDRwhere the class element of peaceful coexistence 
became increasingly less important. Siebs, Die Außenpolitik der DDR, 340. 
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 Sieber in turn built upon this basis of theoretical nnovation to further develop his 
line of argumentation in support of the New Thinking. If, in Sieber’s portrayal, the notion 
that saw the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism as the defining 
characteristic of international relations was quietly discarded, the question then became: 
What would take its place? What issue or set of issue  would take over its function as 
exclusive point of orientation for the foreign policy of the socialist world? The answer 
was that there was no single answer. Logically, Sieber, whose entire presentation was 
aimed at moving away from ideological dogmatism in foreign policy, did not advocate 
for the establishment of any single consideration to provide the overarching orientation 
for all of East German foreign policy just as rigidly and cumbersomely as the notion of 
the “clash of systems” previously had, but rather favored a pragmatic approach that 
would deal with the outstanding international relations problems of the day on an issue-
to-issue basis in accord with the existing, tangible foreign policy interests and capacities 
of the GDR and the socialist world. With material progress having displaced the 
Gesetzmäßigkeit of socialism’s victory and with the entire concept of he international 
constellation of forces relegated to a position of minor importance, Sieber identified a 
series of outstanding international relations issue that clearly evinced his non-dogmatic 
approach to foreign policy: 
As a result of the general development of economy, science, and technology in the world, 
the global problems that pertain to civilization’s actual existential foundations gain new 
weight and new significance. Preservation of humanity, protection of the environment, 
safeguarding the inhabitability of the planet, and the rational use of natural resources 
have become as a result of scientific-technical development a problem whose resolution 
objectively and indispensably must be begun jointly under existing societal relations 
without imperialism as the main initiator of these problems being replaced by a new 
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social order, as we believed to be the case in the past…. The acute danger of the 
destruction of the globe, the threat to the manifold general fundaments of life on our 
planet, the emergence of so-called all-encompassing (ganzheitlich) problems is the first, 
the decisive, and the essential element of our era, which bears upon the strategy and 
tactics of the international communist movement and each individual party.43 
After denying the applicability of the concept of the “international constellation of 
forces” to contemporary international relations andrejecting the notion that the “clash of 
systems” between socialism and capitalism representd the defining characteristic of 
international relations, Sieber presented here the logical extension of his argument. He 
argued that objective developments, fueled by growing international interdependency, 
had led to the emergence of a set of “global problems” that by their very nature 
concerned all humanity and transcended ostensible class interests or boundaries.44 The 
existence of such “global problems” highlighted theneed for a decisive turn in 
international relations away from permanent antagonism and rivalry and toward 
substantive détente and cooperation between socialism nd capitalism. Identification and 
cognizance of the situation as such represented another key element in the paradigm shift 
in foreign policy thought aspired to by the New Thinking and promoted here by Sieber. 
 Sieber completed his address to the assembled foreign policy elite of the GDR 
with an appeal to realize the essential thrust of the New Thinking, the rejection of 
ideological dogmatism in foreign policy in favor of prioritization of realpolitical 
considerations, in their own work. Sieber maintained: “It is necessary to plumb the 
rational core of this or that point of view and impartially to assess what best fits 
contemporary conditions and requirements. We need, as Comrade Gorbachev said, 
                                                 
43 SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11356. 
44 In this, Sieber borrowed his terminology from Gorbachev. 
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inventiveness, innovativeness, the ability to go beyond the limits of familiar yet already 
obsolete ideas. We are less than ever in need of dogmatism and sectarianism.”45 To what 
extent the GDR’s leading foreign policy professionals would heed Sieber’s call following 
his emphatically pro-New Thinking presentation was still an open question just one short 
month after Gorbachev had laid out his bold new foreign policy vision at the XXVII 
Party Congress of the CPSU and before the SED leadership conclusively positioned itself 
in opposition to it. Gorbachev’s espousal of the New Thinking had the potential to 
exercise a key catalyzing effect on the existing critical tendency within East German 
foreign policy expertise, but decisive for the further course of developments would 
ultimately be prevailing conditions and dynamics within the GDR itself. 
 Sieber’s enthusiastic and vocal advocacy for the New Thinking was an 
exceptional case—the addresses held by the other speakers at the consultation in 
Kleinmachnow clearly demonstrated that the New Thinking was received considerably 
less warmly by other leading East German foreign policy figures, whose thought largely 
remained caught up in the “old,” class-based categori s.46 Indeed, the response to the 
New Thinking in the broader East German foreign policy apparatus, not only in the most 
elite circles, was divided, just as was the response i  the Soviet Union itself. Some East 
German experts, based on their own experiences and ow  views, fully supported the New 
Thinking as the only viable option given existing conditions and viewed it, as Sieber had 
put it, as the solution “for which the communist movement ha[d] long waited;” others 
                                                 
45 Sieber continued: “For us, it cannot be enough to classify some as good just because they portray 
themselves as more class-oriented and to classify others as bad because they pose new questions and inthe 
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not even to take the trouble to look at the specifics of the situation because one has heard that that is no  
approved of at home.” SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11356. 
46 Günter Mittag, Oskar Fischer, Gerhard Beil, and Manfred Feist also held speeches at the consultation. 
Hermann Axen delivered the closing remarks. SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/11355. 
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saw the New Thinking’s de-emphasis of ideological postulates in foreign policy and its 
goal of thoroughgoing and permanent détente with the capitalist world as a serious 
danger given the importance of strict demarcation between socialism and capitalism for 
the GDR, and adopted a correspondingly critical position. One former expert who was 
active in the Socialist States Division of the IIB has detailed the emergence of informal 
factions within the division as well as throughout the institute according to one’s opinion 
on the New Thinking and its applicability to East German foreign policy, which 
interestingly coincided with an increased window at the institute to voice internal 
criticism of foreign policy.47 IIB Director Gerhard Hahn, who returned to the positi n of 
institute director in 1982 after a five-year hiatus as ambassador to Yugoslavia,48 is said to 
have been a proponent of the New Thinking, if not necessarily with the same zeal as 
Sieber,49 as was Max Schmidt, longtime director of the IPW.50 Foreign Minister Oskar 
Fischer, in contrast, was not considered a serious supporter51 nor was Hermann Axen, 
longtime head of the Foreign Policy Commission (APK), whose capacity for critical 
analysis was constrained by his obsequiousness toward the SED leadership, Honecker in 
particular.52 
 In terms of the East German foreign policy apparatus s a whole, one’s 
generational cohort often had a significant impact on one’s reception of the New 
Thinking. Individuals who came up within the GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise 
from the time of its rationalization (starting in the late 1950s) and onward and for whom 
                                                 
47 Jochen Franzke, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, 16 July 2008. 
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50 Siegfried Schwarz, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, 9 June 2008. 
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the GDR’s post-normalization position as a “status q o” actor on the international stage 
appeared self-evident were much more likely to greet the New Thinking as not only 
desirable but necessary. In contrast, individuals who experienced the first two decades of 
the Cold War and the GDR’s struggle to break through the Hallstein Doctrine firsthand as 
employees within the East German foreign policy apparatus were conversely much more 
likely to maintain allegiance to the “old,” class-based approach to international 
relations,53 though generational cohort alone did not determine one’s view toward the 
New Thinking. Determining who within the East German foreign policy apparatus could 
be considered a full-fledged proponent of the New Thinking and who could not be, 
however, does not ultimately get to the heart of the matter. After the SED leadership by 
early 1987 had placed itself in opposition to the Soviet New Thinking, openly voicing 
support for its tenets as vociferously as Sieber had in the immediate wake of the XXVII 
Party Congress amounted to defying the wishes of party leadership, which naturally was 
not a viable option for anyone working within the GDR’s system of foreign policy 
expertise, whether in an operative institution liketh  MfAA or the IV Division or a 
research institution like the IIB or IPW. Gerhard Herder, for instance, received a 
reprimand for suggesting that an infusion of New Thinking could benefit East German 
diplomacy. After the end of the Cold War, Herder, who had held a number of high-
ranking positions within the East German foreign policy apparatus (including head of the 
GDR trade representation in Lebanon and ambassador to the US), attributed his servility 
toward the party in large part to a fear of ultimately harming the GDR’s interests: “What 
really kept me from openly criticizing several aspects of the GDR leadership’s policies 
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was the fear of ultimately aiding the class enemy. So, I wanted changes in the GDR, but 
not at any price, not by causing damage to the party and the state in the process.”54 
 Prior to Gorbachev’s espousal of the New Thinking, East German experts had 
already engaged in a significant, if largely tacit, ritical re-assessment of the prevailing 
class-based understanding of international relations. Sieber in his landmark presentations 
in March and April of 1986, where he enthusiastically proclaimed his support for the 
New Thinking and advocated for its adoption in the GDR, to a considerable extent did 
little more than give expression to theoretical conclusions already verified by the results 
of numerous studies on individual issues in the first half of the 1980s (on economic 
development within the Soviet Bloc, on the strength and strategy of the capitalist West, 
on the state of the international communist movement, on the place of the developing 
world in the foreign policy of the Soviet Bloc, etc.), whose conceptual import—the 
challenge to the Marxist-Leninist paradigm in East German foreign policy thought—had, 
however, remained implicit rather than explicit. In the second half of the 1980s, propelled 
by the growing preponderance of the expert over the ideological element within East 
German foreign policy expertise, which more than ever favored prioritization of concrete 
realpolitical interests over Marxist-Leninist precepts in foreign policy analysis, and still 
faced with a complex set of serious international relations challenges for which Marxism-
Leninism proved a poor analytical tool, East German experts continued to engage in a 
critical re-assessment of the prevailing class-based understanding of international 
relations and did so with even greater emphasis than in the first half of the decade. In 
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doing so, East German experts, whether fully cognizant and willful or not, de facto 
heeded Sieber’s call “to go beyond the limits of familiar yet already obsolete ideas.” 
 One of the key characteristics that distinguished expert output in the second half 
of the 1980s from expert output in the first half of the decade was fairly direct treatment 
of conceptual issues alongside empirical ones. The greater attention paid to conceptual 
issues in the second half of the 1980s, a tendency to which the simple act of promulgation 
of the New Thinking naturally provided an important impulse, was on display in a special 
report from September 1986, which addressed a number of the empirical and conceptual 
issues that would subsequently be at the heart of East German experts’ critical re-
assessment in the period. The report was drafted by a five-person working group that 
brought together leading figures drawn from the GDR’s most important operative and 
research foreign policy institutions: Bruno Mahlow, deputy head of the IV Division, 
Joachim Böhm, also of the IV Division, Ernst Krabatsch, head of the Fundamental 
Questions Division of the MfAA,55 Gerhard Hahn, head of the IIB, and Harald Neubert, 
director of the Institute for the International Worke s’ Movement of the Academy of 
Social Sciences. The group provided “Considerations on the New Approach to Problems 
of International Politics” in light of an article published by Anatolii Dobrynin in the June 
issue of the Soviet periodical Kommunist.56 Dobrynin took over from Boris Ponomarev 
the powerful International Division of the Central Committee of the CPSU under 
Gorbachev after serving for nearly a quarter-century as Soviet ambassador to the US. The 
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report of the working group, which notably displayed considerable personnel overlap 
with the special working group of the APK that had produced the unsparing overview of 
the SED’s international relations before the X Party Congress in 1980, reiterated the 
animating idea behind the New Thinking, namely that“a new approach to the problems 
of international politics” was necessary because “th realities of the nuclear-cosmic era, 
in particular the consequences of the scientific-technical revolution in the military sphere, 
have made the self-destruction of humanity a real danger.”57 In light of the scope and 
seriousness of the problem, the report’s authors underscored that only cooperation 
between the socialist and capitalist world could ensure a satisfactory resolution to the 
issue: “It is evident that socialism and other revoluti nary and anti-imperialist forces are 
not in a position to guarantee peace and to defuse other pressing global problems alone. 
For this, corresponding behavior and cooperation on the part of states of both systems as 
well as the active involvement of broader forces of the masses are required [italics in 
original].”58 For the report’s authors, however, the necessity of securing peace and the 
cross-bloc cooperation it demanded possessed neither xtraordinary nor ephemeral 
significance; the peace problematic represented, rather, simply the issue which made it 
most clear, on account of the undeniable gravity and magnitude of the problem, that a 
new approach to international relations was needed. The key underlying characteristic of 
contemporary international relations linking together the peace problematic and all other 
issues that demanded cross-bloc cooperation was the rapid growth in international 
interdependence. The report’s highlighting of interdependence demonstrated the 
importance the concept possessed within the framework of a new approach to 
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international relations: “The interdependence of states and peoples has taken on a 
qualitatively new dimension. This is evidenced not only in the mutual dependency 
needed to ensure the survival of humanity [from the risk of nuclear war]; other problems 
as well have obtained global dimensions and carry the danger of ‘creeping catastrophes’ 
[quoting Dobrynin] that undermine the existential foundation of humanity and the 
inhabitability of the planet.”59 The “global problems” named in the report include s  of 
natural resources, environmental degradation, sustenance of the world’s population, and 
the “catastrophic” situation in some developing countries. 
 The fact of international interdependence and the resulting global problems, in the 
portrayal of the report’s authors, potentially had f r-reaching consequences for the 
practical foreign policy of the socialist world as well as its conceptualization. While 
maintaining that the notion of the “contradiction” between socialism and capitalism 
retained its position as the defining characteristic of international relations—as even the 
most zealous adherents of the New Thinking did—the report’s authors, on the basis of the 
qualitatively different international situation they had outlined, downplayed both the 
conceptual and practical importance of the notion, nearly to the level of disavowing it 
altogether: “Today, given that we are dealing with all-embracing questions of humanity 
(übergreifende Menschheitsfragen), our policies may less than ever simply confine 
realities to manifestations and forms of movement of the fundamental contradiction of the 
epoch. This contradiction, the prime contradiction f r the entire epoch of the transition 
from capitalism to socialism, is being increasingly displaced by the more acute and 
politically more extensive worldwide contradiction between forces interested in peace—
extending into the monopoly bourgeoisie—on the one hand and the most aggressive wing 
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of monopoly bourgeoisie, particularly that of the US, on the other.”60 In the context of a 
qualitatively different international situation, where increasing international 
interdependency had given rise to a set of “global problems” transcending narrow class 
bounds, the report’s authors demonstrated the need for a new outlook that radically 
distanced itself from the notion that the “contradiction” between socialism and capitalism 
represented the defining, determinative element of international relations, going so far in 
this case as to include a call for cooperation with “the monopoly bourgeoisie,” the 
traditional, implacable nemesis within the Marxist-Leninist foreign policy paradigm. 
 The successful realization of this drastic shift in approach to international 
relations required a corresponding adjustment to foreign policy analysis. The report’s 
authors highlighted what Dobrynin’s treatment of the opic meant for East German 
expertise: “Current international political conditions demand that Communist and other 
anti-imperialist, revolutionary parties recognize and reassess (überdenken) the new 
situation and engage in sober, precise analysis of the conditions of their struggle for 
social progress and of the constellation of forces in their countries and internationally…. 
An important aspect of the article is the appeal to scientists (Wissenschaftler) for more 
exact and more accurate analysis of societal reality. The continual qualification of foreign 
policy analysis, its continual substantiation is an important demand on us as well. 
Shortcomings in our work are in large part the result of analyses not being made or not 
being sufficiently grounded.”61 The report’s authors had drawn the logical conclusion 
from their exposition of the topic: the qualitatively different international situation 
sketched out in the report, which gave rise to a new type of cross-system international 




relations problem, in turn demanded a new type of foreign policy analysis, one that 
eschewed rigid dogmatism in favor of sober, impartial analysis. 
 The report, drafted by selected leading figures from the GDR’s most important 
foreign policy institutions, addressed some of the key issues raised by the New Thinking 
and did so in an outwardly sympathetic, if not fervently affirmative, manner; yet the 
report’s contents should not be understood as a statement of unequivocal support for the 
New Thinking. Its character was not so much prescriptive as descriptive and, given the 
authors’ stated objective of presenting an exposition of “the new approach to problems of 
international politics” in light of Dobrynin’s recent article in Kommunist, which 
vigorously presented the case in support of the NewThinking, it is impossible to fully 
differentiate between the authors’ own views and those of the individual whose position 
they explored. Furthermore, the report was drafted in the interim period when the SED 
leadership had not yet decisively positioned itself in opposition to the New Thinking, 
which doubtlessly contributed to the inconclusive tone and rather descriptive approach 
adopted by its authors, who maintained a guarded, ambivalent position throughout the 
report. They cited, for instance, on multiple occasion  statements made by Erich 
Honecker in order to demonstrate the supposed compatibility of East German foreign 
policy with the new Soviet line, a compatibility that in reality was completely absent, 
which, however, would only become fully apparent in the course of the next few months. 
Even if the special report from September 1986 therefore cannot be read as a statement of 
unequivocal support for the New Thinking and its adoption in the GDR, its ultimate 
significance for East German foreign policy expertise in the second half of the 1980s 
should nevertheless not be discounted for it displayed key features that would become 
 531
characteristic of foreign policy analysis more generally for the rest of the 1980s. Its overt 
handling of conceptual issues alongside empirical ones would become the decisive 
quality distinguishing expert output in the second half of the 1980s from expert output in 
the first half of the 1980s. Furthermore, the specific onceptual issues addressed in the 
group’s exploration of the New Thinking—international interdependence, the primacy of 
peace, cross-system global problems, realism in foreign policy analysis—would come up 
time and time again in expert analysis of individual empirical issues, and critical 
treatment of the same conceptual issues would form the essential content of East German 
experts’ move away from a class-based understanding of international relations in the 
second half of the 1980s. 
 Indeed, the same general practical issues that had been at the center of East 
German experts’ attention in the first half of the 1980s—East-West relations, the peace 
problematic, economic development in socialism and capitalism and its consequences for 
the strength of each bloc, the developing world—were also at the center of the intensified 
critical re-assessment of the second half of the 1980s since they had retained their 
importance, if not grown more acute, in the course of the decade. Gorbachev’s reform-
friendly volte-face in Soviet foreign policy and aninstitutional configuration within East 
German foreign policy expertise that was inclined more than ever toward professional 
analysis based upon specialist knowledge represented the decisive contextual factors 
shaping East German experts’ output in the period. In this framework, the outstanding 
international relations challenges facing the GDR and the socialist world, less amenable 
than ever to unbending class-based analysis, called for a sober, pragmatic approach. The 
capitalist West’s frontal challenge to the international position of the Soviet Bloc in the 
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first half of the 1980s (i.e. the second Cold War) had demonstrated that socialism had 
little, if anything, to gain from the orientation toward inexorable, irreconcilable conflict 
with capitalism that up to that point had been the central element in the socialist world’s 
attitude toward the West. “International socialism” was unmistakably falling behind in its 
competition with “imperialism,” which threw into question the very sustainability of the 
socialist socio-economic order in the Soviet Bloc under the conditions of unremitting, 
systemic antagonism. As a result, East German experts increasingly recognized the 
necessity of overcoming the condition of cold war altogether in order to gain greater 
latitude to address socialism’s pressing domestic problems, a position which 
corresponded to the basic rationale adopted by Soviet proponents of the New Thinking, 
who described this relationship as a dialectical one between foreign and domestic policy. 
 One of the areas in which socialism’s lag behind the capitalist West was most 
apparent was economic development.62 Already in the first half of the 1980s, analyses 
conducted by East German experts highlighted the comparative economic weakness of 
the Soviet Bloc vis-à-vis the states of the advanced capitalist West and drew attention to 
the economic problems that would plague the GDR and the rest of the Soviet Bloc for the 
entire decade and that would contribute greatly to the crisis and final collapse of the 
Soviet Bloc. Thus a study assessing the development of i ernational socialism in the 
1970s completed by Siegmar Quilitzsch of the IIB pointed to “a series of complicated 
problems that emerged in the economic development of the majority of socialist countries 
in the second half of the 1970s.”63 The transition to intensive economic growth “had 
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proven more difficult than expected,” the goals of “scientific-technical progress, of 
raising the effectiveness of investments and production, as well as improving the quality 
of goods” had not been fulfilled “to the necessary extent,”64 obtaining the required 
amount of raw materials and energy sources had becom  increasingly difficult and 
complicated, growth rates in production had “decreased considerably,” and economic 
plan targets had gone unfulfilled “almost without exc ption.”65 Furthermore, the growing 
indebtedness of socialist states was becoming an omi ous problem: “The utilization of 
external sources (credit) to square payment balances and to balance internal economic 
forces has created foreign trade liabilities for future economic development without 
contributing in equal measure to the development of the foundations of production.”66 
While the report offered the consolation that “the plans to raise national welfare were 
better fulfilled than the production plans,”67 the broader conclusion could not be escaped: 
the states of the Soviet Bloc were living on borrowed time. 
 Studies on economics and international trade in the second half of the 1980s 
carried this line of analysis forward. The greatest problem was not so much the absolute 
economic strength of the Soviet Bloc, but rather how it stacked up against its capitalist 
antagonist, whose economic potency, as numerous reports attested, remained robust. In 
mid-1987, the IPW began issuing semi-annual reports f  the party leadership on the 
economic development of “the most important industrialized capitalist countries and the 
economic effects of scientific-technical advancement.” The reports, which possessed a 
                                                 
64 The report bleakly noted: “In the realm of labor productivity and the development of those branches of 
production that are of particular significance for scientific-technical advancement, the lag [behind the 





rather matter-of-fact, descriptive character that avoided policy recommendations, 
continually depicted formidable economic growth in the advanced capitalist West that by 
no means corresponded to the traditional, ideologically derived image of a decrepit 
capitalism beset by a general crisis. The IPW’s first report of this type in June 1987 
highlighted how capitalism’s inherent dynamism allowed it to overcome cyclical 
economic crises and even to fortify the capitalist socio-economic system in the process: 
“The uniqueness of industrialized capitalist states’ economic development in the present 
consists in the fact that, the continuation of crises in various areas notwithstanding, 
certain adaptive forces in the state-monopoly system have emerged since the start of the 
1980s. They privilege qualitative changes in economic potential and can also open new 
space for economic development.”68 The report identified two developmental tendencies 
that accounted for capitalism’s ability to adapt and to grow stronger in the process of 
overcoming cyclical crises: “a decided acceleration of the process of scientific-technical 
advancement, measured according to the tempo by which innovation in products and 
processes proliferates, and a marked intensification of the capitalist process of 
reproduction as a result of scientific-technical advancement.”69 What is more, the 
application of scientific and technical innovations to industrial processes ensured for the 
leading capitalist countries an economic dynamism that had the potential to continue to 
expand exponentially: “The scientific-technical potential of the strongest monopolies and 
the leading imperialist powers is growing extraordinar ly quickly and is rigorously being 
used to realize, respectively, specific profits andthe expansion of interests. These 
processes generally open up new markets and spaces for expansion. As these 
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revolutionary changes in science and technology are only just beginning, it cannot be 
ruled out in the longer term that capital’s opportunities for accumulation in the process 
will receive impulses that in turn lead to greater economic growth, as an important 
condition to expand the economic and social latitude of the monopoly bourgeoisie.”70 In 
short, the leading capitalist states were succeeding in exactly those crucial areas where 
socialist states were failing. Advances in science and technological and their 
implementation in processes of production bestowed a dynamism upon capitalist states 
that promised robust future growth, a dynamism that was sorely lacking among socialist 
states.71 
 The unmistakable strength of the capitalist adversary in the economic realm and 
socialist states’ relative weakness in comparison represented a major factor that 
facilitated East German experts’ decisive move away from a class-based approach to 
international relations in favor of hardheaded prioritization of realpolitical interests in the 
second half of the 1980s—if the historical end of capitalism as postulated by Marxism-
Leninism was postponed indefinitely, then immediate, tangible foreign policy interests 
took on much greater importance. And, as a report fr m 1986 demonstrated, East German 
experts knew that the capitalist West, despite occasion l disagreements, quarrels, and 
divergent interests, would continued to present the Soviet Bloc with a united front on the 
most important questions: “It cannot be expected that t e consensus between the 
fundamental military, economic, and political interests of the US and its West European 
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NATO allies can be breached.”72 Finding itself in such a constrictive situation, the Soviet 
Bloc was in no position to pursue a policy of unremitting antagonism toward the West. 
Cognizance of the implausibility of unremitting antgonism, however, did not directly 
flow from socialist states’ general economic lag behind the capitalist world, whose 
impact on international relations could after all be attenuated by other factors, such as 
was the case with approximate military parity and political rapprochement between the 
two blocs in the détente era; a concrete issue was needed upon which that implausibility 
could become unmistakably apparent, and that issue in the 1980s was the peace 
problematic. The very tangible consideration of not being able to keep up economically 
with the West in a prolonged arms race and the less tangible though no less germane 
consideration of avoiding the nuclear annihilation that would result from a military 
conflict between the two blocs combined to make the peace problematic the single most 
forceful factor motivating critical re-assessment of he Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
international relations both in terms of practical foreign policy (aimed at achieving 
substantive, lasting détente with the West) and in the conceptualization of foreign policy 
(centered around prioritizing common, cross-bloc interests over ostensible class 
interests), with both elements being intertwined anmutually reinforcing one another. 
 The peace problematic proved such a forceful factor motivating critical re-
assessment of the prevailing class-based understanding of international relations in the 
GDR because the policy of thoroughgoing military rapprochement with the West adopted 
by the Soviet Bloc in the second half of the 1980s—a change of strategy, not just 
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tactics—rested upon at least partial rejection of the traditional Marxist-Leninist notion of 
an inherent, unbridgeable contradiction between state  of a socialist and a capitalist 
socio-economic order. As East German experts analyzed the peace problematic and 
assessed the success of the Soviet Bloc’s efforts to achieve substantive, lasting détente 
with the West, they therefore necessarily also engaged in a re-thinking of the conceptual 
underpinnings of that policy which, while gaining an important initial impulse from the 
constellation of issues surrounding the peace problematic, ultimately went far beyond that 
single topic to affect East German experts’ understanding of international relations in its 
entirety. 
 This dynamic was particularly apparent in a pamphlet published by the IIB in 
1988 entitled Europe: How many Weapons are Enough? T e pamphlet was authored by 
André Brie, an enigmatic figure who was simultaneously one of the most vocal 
proponents of the New Thinking at the IIB and a know  informant of the Ministry of 
State Security,73 and Manfred Müller, head of the IIB’s Fundamental Questions Division. 
Brie and Müller hailed the signing in December 1987 of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty between the USSR and the US,74 which essentially resolved all the 
issues borne of the Soviet Union’s deployment of RSD-10 missiles in Central Europe in 
the mid-1970s (including NATO’s response in the form of the Double-Track Decision), 
and recent progress made in negotiations on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START) as important arms reduction steps within the broader process of improving 
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relations between the two superpowers and their respective blocs. Brie and Müller, 
however, asserted that these steps represented just a start and that a fundamental 
paradigm shift was required to facilitate continued progress: “Yet [these measures] were 
possible, in contrast to far-reaching disarmament in Europe, without fundamentally 
changing the policies and strategy of any state. Thy are in accord with the arms build-up 
policy that the US continues to pursue, the quest for military advantages, and adherence 
to the anachronistic doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Substantial disarmament in Europe 
demands, in contrast, fundamental changes to states’ security policies and military 
strategies and joint political assurance of security.”75 Brie and Müller, taking up 
Gorbachev’s notion of a “common European house,” maintained that technological 
advances in weapons systems, both in the nuclear and conventional realm, had rendered 
modern war too destructive to be waged: “War in Europe would make the continent 
uninhabitable, would know neither victors nor vanquished, and would no longer be the 
continuation but rather the end of politics.”76 The ultimate goal of arms reductions 
therefore had to be the “mutual incapacity for attack”: “At issue is no less than declaring 
war in Europe (and worldwide of course) impossible. The world has become too small, 
too vulnerable for arms races, confrontation, and war.”77 
 According to Brie and Müller, however, this goal could not be achieved in willy-
nilly fashion, as a series of disjointed steps lacking an underlying, cohesive rationale and 
a clear vision for the future. In short, a decisive br ak with the logic currently governing 
international relations had to occur and a new approach had to take its place: 
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Armament is an expression of politics. If a war were to take place in Europe today, even 
“accidentally” as the result of technical or human f ilure, it would be a continuation of a 
politics oriented toward deterrence, military advantages and superiority, and the profits of 
the arms industry (and of course simultaneously the end of this and all other politics). 
This is why it is necessary to eliminate the political roots of the arms race as well and 
especially to turn away from current conceptions of nuclear and conventional deterrence. 
Joint assurance of security, cooperation in all areas—political, economic, scientific-
technical-ecological, cultural, humanitarian—make an essential contribution to the 
creation and strengthening of the trust, political st bility, and material basis necessary for 
the disarmament process. Steps toward arms limitation nd disarmament as well as 
military confidence-building in Europe have an effect on the political climate that is as 
enduring as it is positive. As our experiences in the 1970s showed, political détente and 
cooperation rest on unstable foundations without disarmament.78 
Having established the impermissibility of war and the primacy of maintaining peace, 
Brie and Müller here argued for the need to adopt a radical new approach to international 
relations. In their portrayal, there was not a trace of the “old” class-based approach that 
viewed “imperialism” as the implacable adversary of “international socialism” and that 
posited an inexorable, fundamental contradiction betwe n the two competing systems of 
socio-economic organization; instead, comprehensive, enduring cooperation between 
socialist and capitalist states gained priority so that a goal that was larger than either 
system—preventing the outbreak of war—could be fulfilled. Rapprochement between the 
socialist and capitalist worlds had to extend beyond the superficial, ephemeral 
agreements of the détente era to change the very nature of the relationship between East 
and West, to overcome the baseline antagonism characteristic of cold war. In Brie and 
Müller’s analysis of the issue, it was clear how consideration of a single issue—the peace 
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problematic in this case—could have far-reaching consequences for East German 
experts’ understanding of international relations in its entirety by prompting 
thoroughgoing re-consideration of the conceptual foundations of the GDR’s foreign 
policy. 
 The conceptual fallout of East German experts’ consideration of the peace 
problematic extended to some of the central pillars of the class-based understanding of 
international relations. In particular, the emphasis placed on cooperation and substantive 
rapprochement with the West fostered analyses of capitalism that diverged sharply from 
the traditional image of “imperialism” promulgated by the Marxist-Leninist approach to 
international relations. For many East German experts, capitalist states were no longer the 
sworn enemy but rather a potential partner with which socialist states could work 
together in order to resolve global problems that transcended class interests, the issue of 
war and peace being just one. A September 1988 study on “Securing Peace, International 
Security, and Peaceful Coexistence in the Policies of Socialist Countries” completed by 
Harald Neubert, director of the Institute for the International Workers’ Movement of the 
Academy of Social Sciences, for instance, espoused this position. In his study, which 
highlighted the importance of peaceful coexistence as the guiding vision of the foreign 
policy of socialist states, Neubert stressed the Leninist lineage of the concept only to 
simultaneously intimate that his discussion would reveal a peaceful coexistence 
significantly different than the early Soviet version of the 1920s: “In recent decades, the 
substance [of peaceful coexistence] has of course exp ri nced a process of 
transformation, of enrichment. The struggle for its realization brought with it useful 
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insights.”79 Consistent with this approach, Neubert offered the routine, requisite caveat 
that peaceful coexistence did not mark the cessation of the class struggle—“peaceful 
coexistence cannot represent the end or negation of the historic clash between socialism 
and capitalism because social contradictions and ideological differences of opinion 
persist”80—yet such assertions came across as little more than lip service with minimal 
relevance in light of the actual substance of Neubert’s subsequent exposition of the issue, 
which painted a picture of peaceful coexistence—and the capitalist “adversary” therein—
far removed from any of its previous manifestations. 
 Neubert began his analysis by noting, in line with ot er proponents of a more 
New Thinking-oriented approach in East German foreign policy, how a qualitatively new 
international situation had emerged in the 1980s as the result of technological advance 
and growing interdependence across the board—in miltary affairs, politics, economics, 
ecology, and communications. Such global problems, the threat of nuclear annihilation 
chief among them, could not be resolved by the socialist community or any other 
grouping on its own; their resolution demanded cooperation without regard to socio-
economic order or political allegiance: “As the alternative to the destruction of 
civilization (in the case of an atomic war), one must gain on both sides the ability to live 
with one another. The concept of peaceful coexistence as it is understood today includes 
recognition of the legitimate security interests of b th sides and the notion of common 
security. In this way, the basic idea of a security partnership, i.e. attaining peace and 
security only with one another and no longer against o e another, is contained in peaceful 
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coexistence.”81 Cooperating with the capitalist West in a security partnership, however, 
entailed departure from the Marxist-Leninist belief that capitalism was an inherently 
bellicose form of social organization that had reached its highest stage—aggressive 
imperialism—in anticipation of its final exit from the historical stage. East German 
experts had already acknowledged the continued strength and dynamism and potential for 
future growth of capitalism as a form of socio-economic organization and Neubert now 
also rejected the idea of capitalism’s intrinsic bellicosity: “Peaceful coexistence includes 
the idea that each of the two sides attributes to the o her the basic aptitude for peaceful 
coexistence (and does not deny it by demonizing the other system as an evil empire). The 
position of the socialist states in this is clear and unambiguous: they consider the 
armament and war policies of imperialist states as resident in the [capitalist] system, yet 
not as necessary for it, i.e., not as an existential ecessity for the capitalist system. Seen 
in this way, the capitalist system can be adapted to the requirements of peaceful 
coexistence; the NATO powers’ renewed abandonment of their confrontation course is 
thus by all means attainable [italics in original].” 82  
 An understanding of capitalism not as the mortal enemy of socialism but as 
capable of peaceful existence allowed cooperation between the two social system on the 
most important issue of the day—maintaining peace. It is important to note, however, that 
Neubert’s formulation of peaceful coexistence, which no longer promulgated the idea of 
an inexorable “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism, also opened the door 
for cross-system cooperation on the entire range of global problems that had emerged by 
the 1980s and that, like the peace problematic, demanded cooperation between socialism 




and capitalism: “The counterposed social orders’ cooperation is a necessary and 
stabilizing element of peaceful coexistence. The opportunities, substance, and prospects 
for peaceful coexistence result from both sides’ constellation of interests, in which there 
are manifold parallels and points of contact, and from growing accountability toward the 
serious cross-system problems facing humanity (systemübergreifende 
Menschheitsprobleme).”83 Neubert’s analysis of peaceful existence as the guiding vision 
for the foreign policy of socialist states on the backdrop of the qualitatively new 
international situation that had arisen in the 1980s thus promulgated an image of 
capitalism that diverged sharply from the traditional image espoused in Marxist-Leninist 
theory and previously adhered to among East German experts. While Neubert offered the 
de rigueur affirmation that peaceful coexistence did not mark the cessation of the “clash 
of systems” between socialism and capitalism, the actual substance of his exposition 
essentially endorsed the opposite position—that no fu damental, unavoidable 
contradiction between socialism and capitalism exist d. Neubert’s capitalism was not 
inherently aggressive and possessed the basic aptitude o coexist peacefully with 
socialism for an indefinite period of time. The attribution of such features to capitalism, 
however, not only permitted passive coexistence but also promoted active cooperation 
between the two social systems, which Neubert described as an absolute necessity in 
order to address the pressing cross-system international relations challenges facing a 
world that was growing increasingly interdependent. 
 The views expressed in Neubert’s analysis were not exceptional; on the contrary, 
they were becoming more and more widespread within East German foreign policy 
expertise as real progress was made between the USSR and the US in arms reduction 
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negotiations and as substantive and wide-ranging rapprochement between East and West 
appeared more and more plausible, in a sense confirmi g East German experts’ 
increasingly less dogmatic understanding of internatio l relations that dispensed with 
the application of rigid Marxist-Leninist categories to foreign policy. A study completed 
by the IPW in August 1989, for instance, powerfully echoed the conclusions found in 
Neubert’s analysis. The report’s authors noted how “altered external and internal 
conditions have led to changes not only in the apperance but also in the character of 
[capitalism’s] development.”84 Increasing international dependence and in particular the 
“new quality of the peace question” meant that the capitalist world recognized as well as 
the socialist world the necessity of “coming to a new, cooperative relationship not only 
with states of its own system but also with the state  of the world with a different social 
structure.”85 The report’s authors in turn described how the qualitatively new situation 
demanded a new understanding of capitalism and incorporation of that understanding into 
the socialist world’s strategic approach: 
The determination of our prospects and strategic goals cannot—as has become 
apparent—be based upon expectation of the ineluctable demise of capitalism in the sense 
of absolute bounds of its development. In light of his, our understanding of the general 
crisis of capitalism must also be critically examined. The principal issue is that we more 
cogently grasp the place and developmental tendencies of capitalism in the fundamental 
processes of our epoch. The notion of the constant intensification of the general crisis, 
which necessarily leads through successive stages to the downfall of capitalism, not only 
does not take into account its innate potential to develop and ability to adapt but also 
obstructs our understanding of the possibility of the development of a capitalism that is 
peaceful and open to reform as a historical bridge for future transitions to socialism. Our 
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analysis and our strategy must therefore account for new transformational processes in 
capitalism, establish a link with them, and make us of growing opportunities to 
influence them.86 
The report’s authors, like Neubert before them, affirmed that capitalism as a socio-
economic order was indeed capable of making peace. Although they asserted that “we 
have a long way to go before reaching a ‘civil’ capit lism”—“this goal cannot be 
achieved immediately, rather only as the result of many individual steps and multiple 
stages”—the report’s authors believed that it nevertheless could be ultimately achieved, 
as recent progress in negotiations between the USSR and US had demonstrated: “The 
continuation of the process of disarmament and rapprochement, preservation of the 
respective results achieved in these areas are the best evidence that a peaceable capitalism 
is an attainable goal.”87 The report’s authors concluded that capitalism had qualitatively 
changed in tandem with the qualitatively new international situation of the 1980s. In an 
increasingly interdependent world where cross-system problems rendered the erstwhile 
“contradiction” between socialism and capitalism secondary and correspondingly 
demanded cooperation between the two opposed social ystems, capitalism was no longer 
seen as inherently bellicose or doomed by the laws of historical development to exit from 
the historical stage, but rather as moving in the dir ction of a capitalism that was “capable 
of peace (friedensfähig) and compatible with civilization ( zivilizationsverträglich).”88 
 The international entanglements of East German foreign policy experts only 
contributed to the spread and fortification of such New Thinking-oriented views. The 
general moderating effect had by integration into a ransnational network of foreign 





policy experts has been described above—entering into a dialog with their Western 
counterparts perforce led to a broadening of perspective and a “convergence with reality” 
that otherwise could not have taken place—yet tangible scholarly engagements in the 
second half of the 1980s specifically bolstered East German experts’ ongoing critical 
move away from a class-based approach to international relations. East German experts 
namely took part in this era in a series of conferences and exchanges revolving around 
arms reduction negotiations between the US and the USSR and the broader issue of 
general rapprochement between socialist East and capitalist West. Since the Soviet New 
Thinking provided the decisive impulse for the diplomatic initiatives at the heart of East-
West rapprochement, its central tenets featured prominently in discussions at such 
conferences, where East German experts were bolstered in their repudiatory stance 
toward the application of rigid Marxist-Leninist tenets to international relations. 
Beginning in early 1988, Harry Wünsche, head of the IIB’s International Law Division, 
began—with special approval of the Secretariat89— aking part in the consultations of the 
Working Group for European Cooperation-Political Club (Arbeitskreis für Europäische 
Zusammenarbeit-Politischer Club) based in West Berlin and headed by Hans-Jürgen von 
Kries. The consultations brought together leading political, economic, and scholarly 
figures from both East and West to discuss outstanding issues of contemporary politics in 
monthly meetings at varying locations on both sides of the iron curtain. The theme for the 
group’s consultations in 1988—“Initiatives for the Stabilization of Peace in Europe”—
perfectly matched Gorbachev’s New Thinking-based diplomatic offensive aimed at East-
West rapprochement. Wünsche’s report on the meeting of the club held in Moscow in 
September 1988, at which representatives from 12 European socialist and capitalist states 
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were present, demonstrated how participation in such consultations could help catalyze 
East German experts’ ongoing critical move away from a class-based approach to 
international relations: 
The entire debate on this complex of themes [i.e. determinative political factors for 
Europe’s future] was conducted in the first part of he discussion in accord with the 
metaphor of “a common European house.” The representatives of the socialist states 
made it clear that the essential issue is jointly fu filling on the basis of the New Political 
Thinking the objective’s contours plotted out by this metaphor. In particular, the 
fundamental transformation of the conceptual vision of Soviet foreign policy 
accomplished in recent years makes it henceforth possible to give expression to and bring 
to bear integrative factors more than contradictions between East and West in East-West 
relations in their entirety. Maintaining security in Europe is a political task that is first an 
intellectual, then a material process in which a new order of cooperative security must be 
created.90 
Even with the SED leadership obstinately opposed to the dual program of domestic and 
foreign policy reform undertaken by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, East German 
foreign policy experts on occasions such as these gained exposure to the full breadth and 
depth of the Soviet New Thinking and the pragmatism at its core.  
 In their eyes, furthermore, the accuracy of the vision of international relations 
presented by the New Thinking was confirmed as substantive progress was made in 
practical realization of the East-West rapprochement envisaged by the New Thinking, 
that is, that its theoretical content rested on solid objective foundations. The SED 
leadership’s opposition to the official line of itspatron and head of the Soviet Bloc 
appeared all the more anachronistic and out-of-touch on this backdrop, a fact which East 
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German experts recognized at the time and found highly problematic.91 As the SED 
positioned itself against substantive East-West rapprochement and thereby appeared to be 
swimming against the tide of history, East German experts’ growing cognizance of the 
inapplicability of rigid Marxist-Leninist tenets tohe complexities of East-West relations 
and contemporary international relations in general was bolstered by their ongoing 
scholarly engagement with the world outside the GDR’s borders. 
 Another such occasion was a conference held by the In ernational Studies 
Association in August 1988 in Williamsburg, Virginia, on the topic “Research on 
Continuity and Change in Global Affairs: On the Way to a Transnational Community of 
Scholars.” A delegation of East German experts tookpart, including Gerhard Hahn, head 
of the IIB, Walter Stock, a US expert at the IIB, and Peter Klein, a division head at the 
IPW. Their presentation depicted an explicitly favorable orientation toward the New 
Thinking in East German foreign policy expertise: 
A characteristic feature in the current development of international studies in the GDR is 
the intensive effort to illuminate on an interdisciplinary basis those factors and processes, 
sources and driving forces through which a new typeof international relations is 
beginning to form—relations of common security and cooperation between the most 
varied states of the international community in order to resolve global problems paired 
with the simultaneous persistence of the contest of ocial systems. At issue here is 
discernment of the new quality of dependence of one’s own existence and interests on the 
condition of the ‘totality of the world,’ including substantiating the priority of general 
human values and interests (allgemein menschliche Werte und Interessen) above that of 
individual classes and states. Penetrating the dialct c of the totality of the world and, on 
the one hand, necessary cross-system cooperation in the general interest of humanity and, 
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on the other, the continuing contest of social system  is understood as an urgent necessity 
in the philosophical, worldview, and ethical substanti tion of the principles of the New 
Political Thinking and in the formulation of new conceptual approaches in foreign policy 
and international relations on the basis and in the framework of peaceful coexistence.92 
While the institutional prerequisites for the formulation and adoption of a full-fledged  
“East German New Thinking” were lacking in the GDR (above all a party leadership 
open to reform), East German experts still articulated a series of positions that were fully 
congruent with the essential thrust of the Soviet Nw Thinking, the liberation of foreign 
policy thought from the strictures of Marxist-Leninist dogma. Similarly, while the re-
conceptualization of foreign policy engaged in by East German experts in the second half 
of the 1980s did not possess the same comprehensivene s as the Soviet New Thinking, 
their move away from a class-based approach to international relations did not simply 
consist in investigation of disparate individual empirical problems whose broader 
conceptual import was not fully articulated (as was largely the case in the first half of the 
decade), but rather displayed a certain cohesiveness where the issues considered were 
seen as interrelated with one another and where that very interrelatedness occasioned and 
included a re-thinking of the conceptual foundations f experts’ understanding of 
international relations. 
 Indeed, East German experts’ move away from a class-b ed approach in their 
work was predicated upon viewing international relations as interconnected in a manner 
that was foreign to the traditional Marxist-Leninist paradigm. While the latter established 
the supposed contradiction between socialism and capitalism and the class character of 
foreign policy as the definitive features of international relations, in relation to which the 
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significance of all developments was to be measured, th  “qualitatively new situation” 
described by East German and Soviet experts in the second half of the 1980s rested upon 
a dynamic view of the interconnectedness of the world that in terms of theory prioritized 
realpolitical considerations over ostensible class interests and in terms of practice placed 
international rapprochement above unremitting antagonism. Capitalism’s unbroken 
dynamism as well as its capacity for peace, the grave weaknesses of the socialist world 
(especially in the economic realm), the primacy of maintaining peace and the emergence 
of other cross-system “global” problems that displaced the alleged intrinsic antagonism 
between socialism and capitalism, and the need for a new orientation that took these 
findings into account were all component parts of an approach to international relations 
that broke with the Marxist-Leninist understanding and by virtue of their interrelatedness 
mutually reinforced one another. The implications of one issue already contained the 
seeds for substantiation of the next. A major issue that, by linking all the other elements 
together, played a crucial role in experts’ turn away from a class-based understanding of 
international relations was the notion of the totality (Ganzheitlichkeit) of the world. This 
concept and the “global problems” it brought with it were explicitly theorized by East 
German experts alongside the other key issues of the second half of the 1980s. 
 In the view of East German experts, the internatiol interdependence given rise 
to by the new, historically unparalleled situation of the 1980s had permanently changed 
the character of international relations. Exclusive class interests had been supplanted by a 
new supra-class “totality” that had arisen as the result of advances in the realm of science 
and technology, as a September 1988 report by Gerhard Powik of the Institute for the 
International Workers’ Movement of the Academy of Scial Sciences argued: “The 
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formation of the totality of a world that in itself is contradictory and socially 
heterogeneous is proceeding on the basis of the scientific-technical revolution to which 
the tendency toward universal revolutionary reconfiguration (Umgestaltung) of the 
material-objective conditions of society’s existenc and development is unique.”93 Powik, 
as others before him had done, offered the routine affirmation that the fundamental 
opposition between the two social systems would continue unabated, but the essence of 
his presentation, again similar to others, rendered such statements of little to no practical 
consequence. Powik’s understanding of the “totality of the world” unmistakably elevated 
cross-class issues above class interests: 
The capitalist system by its very essence  is not in a position to successfully deal with 
global problems by itself. Yet socialism is also incapable of rectifying global threats on 
its own. Marxist-Leninist forces had never anticipated that such a constellation would 
ever arise, where the two contradictory systems are dep ndent upon one another in such a 
way so as, under penalty of joint physical destruction, to have to work together, 
purposefully to unify their efforts so that they may continue to exist as antipodes. 
The challenge today lies in creating a conscious totali y of the world by jointly addressing 
problems. Socialism and imperialism must join together to become a uniformly acting 
human subject, namely through state relations. The entire system of inter-state 
international relations must therefore be re-oriented around the unity of the world and 
cooperation, even between social adversaries. Our inhe ited views on international affairs 
were almost exclusively oriented toward the social division of the world and fixated upon 
resolution of problems through conflict with the other side. For the more complex tasks 
of today, for taking into consideration the elements of totality, interdependence, and the 
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necessity for certain cross-class (klassenübergreifend) cooperation, a great amount of 
theoretical grounding is still lacking.94 
Powik by no means denied the existence of discrete lass interests or of the alleged 
fundamental contradiction between socialism and capitalism yet in his portrayal these 
elements were overlaid by a stratum of supra-class interests borne of a historically 
unparalleled totality of the world. These supra-class interests, by virtue of the fact that 
they by their very nature touched upon the interests of all mankind and not just individual 
classes, transcended and took priority over narrow class interests, a condition which in 
turn demanded the re-orientation of East-West relations away from unremitting 
antagonism toward substantive cooperation. 
 The IPW’s report from August 1989 (discussed above) lik wise highlighted how 
supra-class interests to a significant degree displaced exclusive class interests. The 
report’s authors asserted that in an increasingly interdependent world both socialism and 
capitalism had to abandon singe-minded pursuit of their respective class interests and had 
to do so out of their own self-interest since the two social systems were equally 
threatened by global problems that transcended class. As with Powik’s assessment, 
overcoming chronic antagonism and attaining substantive rapprochement/cooperation 
consequently became imperative: 
The pursuit of specific, mutually exclusive interests now occurs under fundamentally 
changed conditions. Their essence consists in the fact that all classes are affected by 
global problems and that the resolution of these problems is impossible on a unilateral 
basis and instead demands cross-class and cross-system cooperation (klassen- und 
systemübergreifende Kooperation). This establishes new interest-constellations for all 
classes. A new ‘type’ of shared interests that can be characterized as the interests of 
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humanity in its totality (gesamtmenschheitliche Interessen) is developing. [These 
interests] make clear that the coordinated action of varying social subjects, above all 
classes, is a precondition for the continued development of humanity as a whole.95 
The position expressed here echoed that of Powik and indeed had already become the 
characteristic view among those East German foreign policy experts who distanced 
themselves from the strict class-based approach to international relations. Socialism and 
capitalism remained opposed social systems, each with its own set of discrete class 
interests, yet the importance of these conclusions was greatly diluted by the emergence of 
global problems that affected both systems equally and that transcended class.  
 Ostensible class interests were in effect eclipsed in light of the unparalleled 
“totality” of the world that resulted from international interdependence. This notion of the 
totality of the world served as a key binding element that linked together all the other 
component parts of East German experts’ critical re- ssessment of the traditional 
Marxist-Leninist approach to international relations i  the second half of the 1980s. The 
idea of the fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction between socialism and 
capitalism lost its centrality and was replaced by the imperative for East-West 
rapprochement and cross-system cooperation. On this foundation, issues that might have 
otherwise been seen as unrelated and whose conceptual import could have therefore been 
overlooked were recognized as intrinsically connected with one another. The perceived 
interrelatedness of the most important foreign policy issues facing the GDR and the 
Soviet Bloc in the second half of the 1980s, when co sidered within the matrix of the 
“totality” of the world, allowed the agglomeration f perspectives critical toward not only 
disparate empirical issues but also the conceptual underpinnings of the understanding of 
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international relations prevalent in the GDR as a whole and created a situation where the 
critical conclusions reached on one issue reinforced those reached on others. This 
dynamic comprised the essential content of experts’ rejection of the traditional class-
based approach to international relations. 
 The perceived interrelatedness of the issues at the center of East German experts’ 
critical re-assessment of the class-based understanding of international relations extended 
beyond the realm of mere theory, finding highest expr ssion in calls for the 
implementation of practical foreign policy based upon the conclusions of their conceptual 
re-thinking. East German experts, as demonstrated above, individually highlighted the 
importance of general East-West rapprochement and of discrete policy initiatives, 
particularly in the realm of arms limitation/reduction, yet some, drawing the practical 
consequences of the notion of the totality of the world, also issued calls for 
comprehensive cooperation between East and West. The IPW, as the GDR’s leading 
research institute on “imperialism,” was particularly active in this respect. And this was 
another area in which the IPW’s scholarly contacts wi h the West played an important 
role in fostering a turn away from rigid Marxist-Leninist axioms. Since the late 1970s the 
IPW had maintained close contact with the Institute for Peace Research and Security 
Policy (IFSH) of the University of Hamburg, headed by Egon Bahr, the architect of the 
FRG’s “new Ostpolitik” under Willy Brandt aimed at “change through rapprochement.” 
Then starting in 1985, the two institutes engaged in an “intensive scientific exchange of 
opinions” in the form of a series of consultations centered around “the problems of a new 
and expanded understanding of security in Europe.”96 The IPW’s May 1988 report on the 
consultations, where high-level delegations from the two institutes, headed by the 
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respective directors, met, underscored the primacy of maintaining peace with the type of 
statements that had become standard for the time, such as: “The basic idea of joint 
security is viewing the adversary in the East-West conflict as partner in one’s own 
security.”97 The IPW’s report, however, proceeded significantly further than the standard 
declarations of the time. Given the qualitatively new situation of the 1980s, the 
representatives of the IPW in their consultations with their counterparts from the IFSH 
made the case for sweeping cooperation between sociali m and capitalism: “The mutual 
dependence of peoples and states in the existing contradictory world must be shaped into 
a network of reciprocal interdependencies that exclusively serves peaceful competition 
for the resolution of humanity’s problems. The representatives of the IPW explained 
further that peaceful coexistence aims at the creation of an all-encompassing 
(allumfassend) system of international security in which all core areas of international 
relations are included. Through the inclusion of political, military, economic, and 
humanitarian problems in the process of strengthening security, it must be achieved that 
none of these areas is neglected and thereby becomes an obstacle to the progress of the 
process in its entirety.”98 
 A commentary99 from the same month penned by IPW Director Max Schmidt and 
Deputy Director Lutz Maier expressed the same sentiment—affirming the desirability 
and even necessity of ever greater international interdependence and comprehensive 
cooperation between East and West—while focusing in particular on the economic and 
international trade aspects of the situation: “If the compulsion toward a balance of 
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interests, sustained by military means, particularly military-strategic equilibrium, is to be 
reduced step by step, the connected, desired lowering of the military factor’s weight must 
be compensated for and completed by other, non-military means and in other areas. 
Without an increasingly broader and deeper mutual interweaving of interests 
(gegenseitige Interessenverflechtung) among states, above all between East and West, for 
which first and foremost the economy and material interests with their essentially 
unlimited potential for expansion are available, thinternational security of states and the 
advancement of the disarmament process ultimately have no real chance in the world of 
today [italics in original].”100 Schmidt and Maier, both of whom were specialists in 
economics, believed that international trade relations and economic interactions could not 
be excluded from the increasingly interdependent character of international relations, but 
rather represented a key element that promoted cross-bl c cooperation and bolstered 
peace and security. Schmidt and Maier expounded their rationale: “Out of mutual 
economic dependence grows a certain mutual interest in the economic development of 
the respective other and in the stability of the int r ational economy as a whole while the 
continuation of or regression into old ‘beggar you neighbour’ [sic] practices in effect 
exacerbates one’s own problems [italics in original].” 101 With growing interdependence 
identified as the key characteristic of the era, Schmidt and Maier asserted that 
advancement of the process in the economic realm as well had a key role to play in 
promoting rapprochement and the convergence of interests between East and West. 
 The IPW’s position as expressed here and above went far beyond simply 
advocating East-West cooperation in individual areas or limited rapprochement between 
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socialism and capitalism. Leading figures at the GDR’s central institute for research on 
“imperialism,” including the director and deputy director, rather presented a vision of the 
definitive convalescence of relations between the two blocs through attainment of 
substantive, enduring rapprochement. The IPW’s call for comprehensive cooperation 
between socialist East and capitalist West in effect was a call to overcome the condition 
of “cold war” once and for all, to overcome the basic and chronic antagonism between 
socialism and capitalism that had defined East-West rela ions since the conclusion of the 
Second World War. 
 Relations between East and West represented the focal p int of East German 
foreign policy in the 1980s and, correspondingly, of East German foreign policy expertise 
in the period as well. East German experts’ turn away from a strict class-based approach 
to international relations, however, also extended to the topic that had traditionally been 
viewed as a vital area in the struggle against imperialism and that still retained great, 
albeit reduced, importance in the 1980s: the developing world. Already in the early 
1980s, the ideological edge of expert output on the developing world had been 
significantly dulled following the decidedly mixed results of the Soviet Bloc’s “socialist 
offensive” in Africa and other areas of the developing world and after the second Cold 
War had flared up, which prompted the SED leadership once again to direct its primary 
attention squarely at Europe and East-West relations.102 In this context of ideological 
disillusionment and relative neglect on the part of the party leadership, East German 
experts came to prioritize realpolitical interests over unbending ideological maxims in 
their output on the developing world as Marxism-Leninism’s utility as an analytical tool 
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appeared to wane in the first half of the 1980s. As the applicability of ideological 
precepts appeared to decrease, so too did belief in the otion that the “clash of systems” 
between socialism and capitalism represented the defining characteristic of international 
relations, to which all other phenomena were subordinate, and that the developing world 
was “objectively” anti-imperialist. 
 This movement away from the Marxist-Leninist paradigm in expert analysis on 
the developing world was continued and intensified in the second half of the 1980s. In the 
second half of the decade, the two factors that had been most important in facilitating this 
trend in the first half of the decade were still in place—events in the developing world 
were no more amenable to ideological analysis than previously and more than ever called 
for sober analysis and, with the attention of the SED leadership still directed squarely at 
East-West issues, official interest in the developing world was comparatively low—but 
now a new factor was added to the mix. As was the cas  with expert output on East-West 
issues, Gorbachev’s promulgation of the New Thinking, both by the specific example it 
offered and by promotion of innovative analysis in general, provided a key impulse to the 
existing critical tendency within East German foreign policy expertise on the developing 
world, which displayed a more explicit and far-reaching break with a strict class-based 
approach to the topic that paralleled the situation in expert analysis of East-West 
relations. Indeed, experts’ critical approach to the developing world in the second half of 
the 1980s often started from the same point of departure as expert analysis of East-West 
relations, namely that a qualitatively new international situation characterized by 
unparalleled and irreversible international interdependence had emerged in the 1980s. 
The new situation in turn demanded a new approach to relations with the developing 
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world, as a think piece composed in February 1988 by Gerhard Thole and Klaus Schmidt 
of the IIB’s International Economy division asserted: “Growing interdependence in 
international relations not only demands a new approach to inter-system relations but also 
compels imperialism to re-conceptualize its interests and policies toward [the developing 
world].”103 In establishing “imperialism’s” interests and policies toward the developing 
world as the object of their analysis, Thole and Schmidt set up their piece to examine the 
character of each socio-economic grouping and the relationship between the two in the 
changed conditions of the 1980s, which naturally possessed great import both for experts’ 
understanding of contemporary international relations in general and the place of the 
GDR and the socialist world therein in particular. And while still employing ideological 
concepts like “imperialism” and “neo-colonialism” to frame their analysis, the substance 
of Thole and Schmidt’s piece presented a picture of their chosen topic that sharply 
diverged from the strict Marxist-Leninist view. The relationship between the advanced 
capitalist West and the developing world, Thole andSchmidt pointed out, had not 
proceeded along the lines of pure exploitation, where the benefit to the former issued 
exclusively from the cost of the latter. Instead of this scenario, which accorded with the 
Marxist-Leninist position on the issue, economic relations between the capitalist West 
and the developing world, which provided the focus of examinations of “neo-
colonialism” after the direct political domination f the colonial era had receded, had 
proven mutually beneficial on multiple occasions. Thole and Schmidt even suggested that 
the intrinsic dynamic of capitalist economic expansio  precluded attempts on the part of 
“imperialism” to keep countries of the developing world in a state of underdevelopment 
and abject poverty; it rather lay in the best interest of advanced industrialized states to 
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promote economic growth, the establishment of an industrial infrastructure, the 
maintenance of viable states based upon the rule of law, and the resolution of 
environmental problems in countries of the developing world in order to secure their own 
economic interests. The result was a situation where both advanced capitalist states and 
states of the developing world possessed opportunities to adapt to the changing 
conditions and demands of the relationship between th  two socio-economic formations: 
“…[These opportunities] can contribute to the intermittent mitigation of existential 
problems in [the developing world] and the international capitalist economy. It therefore 
lies within the potential capacities and possibilities of the economic laws of capitalism 
under the conditions of state monopolyism to mitigate these problems in the interest of 
long-term capital investment.”104 Just as analysts of East-West relations had employed 
intricate argumentation to present conclusions on the topic that ran contrary to orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist theory while still maintaining a Marxist-Leninist façade, Thole and 
Schmidt utilized ideological terms and concepts to arrive at a decidedly heterodox 
conclusion: that the relationship between advanced industrialized states and states of the 
developing world was not necessarily antagonistic and even had the potential to be 
mutually beneficial. 
 This type of non-dogmatic approach to analysis of the developing world was also 
present in expert output on specific regions and countries in the second half of the 1980s. 
The trend was particularly apparent in expertise on Africa, where the corner toward 
prioritization of concrete realpolitical interests over unbending ideological maxims had 
already been turned in the early 1980s. No single ass ssment better epitomized this trend 
than the MfAA’s landmark February/March 1989 report on “Africa’s Significance in 
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International Relations at the End of the Twentieth Century. Tendencies of Political, 
Economic, and Social Development.” The report’s strikingly sober, clear-eyed appraisal 
of the topic hardly contained a trace of the ideologically inspired analysis characteristic 
of the “old” thinking. Instead, the realpolitical interests of the GDR and those of 
respective African states, whose concerns and challenges, it was now fully 
acknowledged, possessed significance in and of themselves, not merely insofar as they 
related to and impacted the so-called international constellation of forces, took center 
stage. The report’s theoretical point of departure echoed that of other reform-oriented 
output produced by East German experts in the second half of the 1980s, namely, that the 
dramatic increase in international interdependence had created a situation where the 
greatest international relations challenges facing the world were interconnected and 
where progress on one issue correspondingly required progress on all others. Africa 
consequently had a crucial role to play in the most pressing international relations issue 
of the era—the struggle to preserve peace—because the prevention of armed conflict in 
the world, which could easily degenerate into nuclear war, depended upon a strong Africa 
that could take active part in the peace process following the idea that the states of the 
world could only achieve lasting security in cooperation with one another, not against one 
another. The report explained its approach to the issue:  
The struggle for peace in the world and for the enduri g convalescence of international 
relations requires the active participation of the peoples and states of Africa, particularly 
to guarantee peace, security, and development in Afr ca itself. A reciprocal relationship 
exists between the situation on this continent located on the southern flank of Europe, 
with which it is linked by manifold connections, and the struggle for European security 
and cooperation as well as between development in Afr ca and the Middle East, the 
Indian Ocean, and the South Atlantic, important for international peace as they are…. At 
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the end of the twentieth century, Africa with its potential and its problems occupies an 
important position in the international community and is becoming an increasingly active 
partner in the resolution of global questions of humanity (globale Menschheitsfragen).105  
This statement on the African continent’s broader significance for international relations 
in turn provided the basis for the report’s authors t  consider the challenges facing Africa 
as important in their own right, not simply as a corollary to the broader “clash of 
systems” between socialism and capitalism, and to evaluate within this framework how 
those challenges could best be resolved, not how Africa could best be instrumentalized to 
serve the purposes of “international socialism.” 
 The list of challenges plaguing Africa identified in the MfAA report was long and 
daunting, including “the elimination of hunger, guaranteeing a humane existence for the 
dramatically increasing population, preservation of atural wealth, and overcoming 
backward economic and social structures that impede the development of productive 
forces.”106 Just as the report’s authors decoupled their approch to Africa’s international 
relations significance from the notion of a “clash of systems,” their consideration of 
avenues to resolve the challenges facing the continent likewise dispensed with 
ideologically inspired considerations in favor of pragmatic ones: “These challenges, 
which are ever more urgently joined with the struggle for peace, international security, 
and disarmament, demand above all a greater indepennt contribution from Africa as 
well as international, cross-system cooperation.”107 Given that development in Africa was 
identified as the continent’s paramount concern and that a non-dogmatic approach 
foregrounding Africa’s own interests, not those of the socialist East or the capitalist West, 
                                                 




was acknowledged as best, the report’s authors pulled no punches in their discussion of 
the continent’s prospects to meet this challenge. Th y conceded that, when viewed from 
the perspective of the new priorities outlined above, the socialist experiment in Africa 
had fared poorly: “The objective and subjective prerequisites for the creation of the 
foundations of socialism in Africa today do not exist. Some countries that proclaimed 
progressive development [i.e. adopted elements of socialism (e.g. Ethiopia, Mozambique, 
Angola)] have hitherto resisted the brunt of imperialism’s offensive in Africa directed 
against them only with great support from the socialist states. Development in these 
countries is proceeding in an extraordinarily complex manner and remains reversible. For 
far-reaching changes, in the course of which the living conditions of the people’s masses 
would have to improve, a much longer period of time s required.”108 With scoring points 
against the “imperialist” adversary displaced by socio-economic development as the 
paramount concern in Africa, the report’s authors acknowledged socialism’s poor 
showing in helping African states to meet this challenge. The formulation of government 
policy (particularly in the economic realm) on the basis of unbending ideological axioms 
rather than pragmatic analysis of a state’s concrete possibilities and prospects had likely 
played a role in actually retarding development in those African states that had adopted a 
socialist orientation. Capitalism, in contrast, although its track record in Africa was by no 
means flawless, had proven itself as a system of socio-economic organization with the 
potential to facilitate the economic growth and development sorely needed in Africa. The 
authors of the MfAA report, while offering the obligatory caveat on the contradictions it 
could produce, portrayed capitalism as the system of socio-economic organization on the 
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basis of which “opportunities for social progress in Africa can be unlocked over a 
lengthier period of time.”109 
 The analysis presented in the MfAA’s March 1989 report on the significance of 
Africa in international relations at the end of thewentieth century was extraordinary in 
its abandonment of the class-based approach to its t pic. It went far beyond simply 
challenging the notion that an objective antagonism existed between the advanced 
industrialized states of the capitalist west and the developing world to reject the primacy 
of the “clash of systems” paradigm in Soviet Bloc-Africa relations outright. This 
dramatic shift in priorities entailed the prioritization of economic growth and 
development in Africa over advancement of the “inter ational constellation of forces” on 
the continent in favor of socialism. The new orientation even entailed admission that a 
path of capitalist rather than socialist socio-economic development was likely better 
suited to fulfill the newly identified set of priorities. The non-dogmatic, pragmatic 
approach adopted in the report, which was signed off on by Foreign Minister Oskar 
Fischer and submitted to Hermann Axen’s APK,110 represented a vision of East German 
foreign policy toward Africa and the broader developing world that all but completely 
excised class-based ideological considerations fromits calculus. The report itself put it 
best: 
From changed global political priorities, from new demands stemming from societal 
development in the socialist states, and from the fact that socio-economic development in 
Africa is proceeding differently than had been expected after the collapse of the 
imperialist colonial system, there emerges a series of new considerations for the 
structuring of relations between the socialist and African states. In the future, relations 
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will be conducted independently of African states’ developmental path and will be 
characterized above all by political dialog and mutually beneficial economic cooperation. 
For the societal progress and the economic development of African states, correct 
policies on the part of political leaders and the work of their peoples are first and 
foremost decisive.111 
 With this bold rejection of the applicability of the Marxist-Leninist paradigm to 
the place of the developing world in international relations, East German experts’ critical 
re-assessment of the class-based approach to foreign policy was complete. On the basis of 
examination of the most pressing practical foreign policy issues facing the GDR and the 
Soviet Bloc, East German experts time and time again c me to the conclusion that the 
reality of the foreign relations they were charged with analyzing sharply diverged from 
the Marxist-Leninist postulates they were expected to apply. In an atmosphere made 
generally more receptive to innovation in foreign policy thought by Gorbachev’s 
promulgation of the New Thinking and in accord with the growing predominance of the 
expert over the ideological within East German foreign policy expertise, sober analysis 
conducted by experts repeatedly revealed an unbridgeable gap between the existing class-
based interpretive model and the existing state of he GDR’s foreign relations. The value 
of the Marxist-Leninist paradigm as an analytical tool had been in steep decline since at 
least the era of foreign policy normalization and its inability to make sense of 
international relations developments now prompted East German experts to re-think its 
conceptual underpinnings. One by one, the hallowed principles propping up the GDR-
specific conception of foreign policy that fused the clearly delineated realpolitical 
interests of the GDR with a class-based understanding of international relations were 
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overturned—the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism no longer 
represented the defining characteristic of internatio l relations; the “international 
constellation of forces,” which no longer moved continuously and inexorably in favor of 
socialism, was drained of its ideological content to refer simply to the complex 
constellation of forces, actors, and interests shaping the system of contemporary 
international relations; the concept of a monolithic “international socialism” proceeding 
steadily toward certain victory lost all currency as the severity of the Soviet Bloc’s 
domestic and international problems was acknowledged; correspondingly, recognition of 
the strength, dynamism, and ultimate sustainability of capitalism led to abandonment of 
the notion of a “general crisis” that would in due course result in capitalism’s final exit 
from the historical stage; finally, the developing world was no longer viewed as 
“objectively anti-imperialist” and its interests and problems were acknowledged as 
important in their own right, not only insofar as they as they related to and impacted the 
international constellation of forces. Taken together, East German experts’ re-
conceptualization of East German foreign policy represented a body of non-dogmatic 
foreign policy thought that largely carried out thecentral premise of the Soviet New 
Thinking—the rejection of ideological dogmatism in foreign policy thought in favor of 
prioritization of realpolitical considerations. Yet East German experts’ re-
conceptualization failed to take on the comprehensive, cohesive character of Soviet New 
Thinking on the resistance of an SED leadership determined to uphold the fundamental 
opposition between East and West at the heart of the Marxist-Leninist foreign policy 
paradigm, which meant that East German experts’ reformist views also found limited 
implementation in foreign policy practice. 
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Coda: After the Fall 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989 and the broader democratization of 
the GDR that accompanied it, the main obstacle impeding development of a body of full-
fledged reformist East German foreign policy thought akin to the Soviet New Thinking—
a dictatorial SED leadership unwilling to countenance the slightest divergence from its 
anti-reform position—was removed. In the short period of time between the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the first (and last) democratic elections to the East German 
Volkskammer on 18 March 1990, at which point it became clear that a union of one sort 
or another between the two German states was all but certain, the IIB and the IPW, now 
free from the compulsion to conform to the party line, produced a flood of materials 
oriented toward establishing East German foreign policy n a completely new, non-
Marxist-Leninist basis112—the “renewal of East German foreign policy” was seen as 
necessary to complement and support the “renewal of socialism” taking place within the 
GDR itself. A think piece from Claus Montag’s USA Division at the IIB issued in late 
November 1989 identified the re-orientation of East German foreign policy as 
imperative: “The processes of reform that have begun in the GDR make it necessary to 
re-define the country’s constellation of foreign policy interests. The starting point of all 
considerations must be [the realization] that the GDR will only emerge from its deep 
societal crisis if it succeeds in bringing its foreign relations into agreement with the 
societal processes of renewal.”113 A study on the GDR’s relations with the developing 
world drafted by Renate Wünsche and Raimund Krämer, also in late November 1989, 
adopted the same position: “The GDR is currently experiencing its heretofore most 
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severe societal crisis. The necessary process of renewal, which should create the 
preconditions for a humanistic and democratic socialism on German soil, must also 
include the foreign policy and security policy of this state.”114 
 East German experts’ vigorous advocacy for a “renewal of foreign policy” to 
complement and support the ongoing “renewal of socialism” in the GDR was doubtlessly 
motivated in part by considerations of professional self-preservation in the midst of a 
highly unpredictable situation where the East German populace’s rejection of the old 
system and most things associated with it was nearly absolute. However, the internal 
constitution and dynamics within East German foreign policy expertise ultimately played 
a more important role in experts’ attempt to establish East German foreign policy on a 
new footing. Ever since the full “systematization” of East German foreign policy 
expertise in the late 1960s/early 1970s, the expert el ment centered around specialist 
knowledge and professional competency had continually g ined in importance as the 
ideological element that revolved around unsophisticated adherence to unbending 
ideological maxims steadily declined in importance until Marxism-Leninism in the 1980s 
became little more than a façade beneath which sober expert analysis was conducted by 
thoroughly trained specialists. It was namely on the basis of this internal configuration 
that East German experts in the 1980s had engaged in a re-conceptualization of East 
Germany’s foreign relations that produced a body of de-ideologized foreign policy 
thought that bore important similarities to the Soviet New Thinking. The critical tendency 
within East German foreign policy expertise that had elicited this re-conceptualization 
under a party leadership vehemently opposed to reformist thought in foreign policy was 
subsequently allowed to gain full expression once that same leadership had been swept 
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away and thereby provided the key wellspring for East German experts’ attempt, 
however short-lived, to bring about a “renewal of foreign policy” in the GDR. 
 A statement issued by the IIB in fall 1989 powerfully demonstrated that East 
German experts were motivated more by a genuine beli f, stemming from their training 
and the insights they had gained into contemporary international relations as active 
specialists, in the necessity to establish East German foreign policy on completely new 
footing than considerations of professional self-preservation. On 2 November, after Egon 
Krenz had replaced Erich Honecker as head of party and state, but one week before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the Scientific Council of the IIB, chaired by new Director Helmut 
Matthes, who had replaced Gerhard Hahn in May of that year,115 passed a declaration that 
was issued publicly on 6 November, still three days before the unexpected opening of the 
border crossing at Bornholmer Strasse. In its declaration, the IIB’s Scientific Council, 
just as the broader East German populace itself was in the process of doing,116 took the 
concept of turn (Wende), coined by Krenz to indicate a limited, SED-contrlled process 
of reform in the GDR that was intended to placate the restive population, and ran with it. 
The declaration called for a thoroughgoing transformation of political life in the GDR 
and described the role foreign policy expertise would have to play in that transformation:  
We emphatically support the turn (Wende) that has been set in motion and that must lead 
to the fundamental transformation of socialism in our land. As social scientists of the 
GDR, we will advocate for the renewal of socialism in the GDR. The GDR’s 
effectiveness in international relations and its foreign policy, the object of our scientific 
work, depend decisively upon its inner development and stability. At the same time, this 
foreign policy is responsible for creating the most favorable international conditions for 
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the internal process of renewal. The fundamental renewal of our party, our state, our 
entire political system and its capability to function democratically, the reform of our 
economy, the transformation of our intellectual life, the modification of our system of 
information, and a new path of responsible environme tal policies must be 
conceptualized and realized without further delay. For this purpose, we take active part 
with our experiences, our knowledge, our convictions, and our entire intellectual 
capacities in the debates exacted by our people (Volk) and borne by the most varied 
societal forces of our people. In particular we would like to work so that our party 
recovers the strength and trust needed to resolutely lead the process of the fundamental 
renewal of socialism. This is predicated upon the re-organization (Umgestaltung) of intra-
party democracy and reliance upon the intellectual capacities of the entire party.”117 
The declaration of the IIB’s Scientific Council, while expressing the wish that the SED 
take the lead in “the fundamental transformation of socialism” in the GDR, emphasized 
the absolute necessity to democratize both party and state. Foreign policy expertise had a 
key role to play in the process, namely re-conceptualizing East German foreign policy 
both to support and to reflect the broader ongoing re ewal of socialism in the GDR. In 
the crisis conditions of fall 1989, but before the floodgates of change had been 
irrevocably opened, the IIB, one of the GDR’s two leading foreign policy research 
institutes, actively and by its own volition promoted a renewal of foreign policy that 
would subsequently become the predominant concern of East German foreign policy 
expertise in the short period of time between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the point at 
which it became clear that a union of some kind betwe n the two German states was 
inevitable. 
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 Experts’ attempt to establish East German foreign policy on a completely new 
footing, however, was impeded not only by the sever institutional instability and 
uncertainty hanging over their heads but also by the loss of conceptual certainty that 
accompanied the revolutionary developments within and outside East Germany in 
1989/1990. Whereas the GDR’s experts had previously been able to distance themselves 
from a rigid class-based understanding of internatio l relations on the assumption that 
the existence of the Soviet Bloc, even if moving in the direction of non-dogmatic 
socialism, was a permanent feature of international life and that, however international 
relations developments might unfold in the future, th  GDR was a viable, legitimate state, 
the opposite situation had now set in—the advance of d mocratization in Central and 
Eastern Europe had decisively undermined the basic features that had provided the 
political framework in which East German experts had itherto carried out their work, 
depriving them of a solid foundation on which to base the envisaged renewal of foreign 
policy. How, after all, were the foreign policy interests of a state to be defined that was in 
the throes of an identity crisis from which it would never recover and where events had 
shown the certainties of the old order to be obsolete and out of touch with reality? 
 East German foreign policy experts were cognizant of this problem even before 
revolutionary developments in the GDR had reached tir highpoint. On 9 November 
1989, mere hours before the Berlin Wall was breached for the first time, Manfred Müller, 
the head of the IIB’s Fundamental Questions Division with clear reformist proclivities, 
led a discussion round at the IIB dedicated to the topic of the foreign policy interests of 
the GDR in the 1990s. Müller described how the current “existential crisis” facing the 
GDR raised critical questions regarding the legitimacy and identity of the GDR. Müller’s 
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treatment of the issue foreshadowed the centrality it would possess in the following 
months for East German foreign policy expertise: “From this emerges a question that 
demands clarification: What is the identity of the GDR? Is it a national problematic or a 
social problematic? Is the identity of the GDR bound to socialism or to other questions? 
At the moment, the answers to these questions are fully unclear. For the institute, the key 
issue is exploring which contribution foreign policy an make to this clarification of 
identity.”118 Despite the proclaimed desire of the GDR’s foreign policy experts to bring 
about a renewal of East German foreign policy, the GDR’s identity crisis and the ensuing 
conceptual uncertainty engendered by the dramatically altered situation in the GDR as 
well as in the (rapidly dissolving) Soviet Bloc repsented insurmountable obstacles to 
doing so. Bold, cohesive visions of what an alternate socialist foreign policy might look 
like such as the one presented by IIB graduate and employee André Brie119 were the 
exception to the rule. In early 1990, as the likelihood of the continued existence of an 
independent, socialist GDR approached the zero point, expertise produced by the IIB and 
IPW displayed an ever more guarded, descriptive chara ter, providing competent 
coverage of topics relevant to the future foreign policy of a re-unified Germany like the 
European Common Market, the foreign policy of the US, Eastern Europe and the German 
question, and the CSCE process while largely avoiding scussion of any broader 
strategic or conceptual issues.120 
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  The political events that had first engendered th GDR’s post-November identity 
crisis and the resulting conceptual uncertainty among East German foreign policy 
experts, however, ultimately proved decisive for the final outcome of experts’ attempt to 
bring about a renewal of East German foreign policy—b  putting an end to East German 
foreign policy expertise altogether. But this did not occur before a series of institutional 
reforms had been undertaken in a preemptive attempt to ensure that some elements of the 
East German expert infrastructure might be taken over in a Germany re-unified along the 
model of the FRG. On 2 February 1990, the Council of Ministers, led by Prime Minister 
Hans Modrow, passed a resolution that transformed th  ASR, of which the IIB made up a 
component, if largely autonomous, part, into a College for Law and Administration 
(Hochschule für Recht and Verwaltung).121 Raimund Krämer, a 1977 graduate of the IIB 
who had spent 1985-1989 working and researching in Nicaragua and Cuba, was elected 
director of the newly created Section for Political Science/International Relations of the 
college. Krämer’s replacement of Helmut Matthes, who had only taken over the 
directorship of the IIB in May 1989, was supposed to facilitate the overhaul of the 
institute under a new, younger leadership team in accord with the drastically changed 
situation within the GDR.122 The effort, however, ultimately failed owing to the 
resistance of the government of Brandenburg, which d ssolved the college in December 
of that year.123 The IPW was also dissolved in the course of 1990.124 The decision of 
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Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s foreign ministry to refuse employment to any and all foreign 
policy personnel from the GDR meant that East Germany’s numerous foreign policy 
professionals, whether working primarily in the operative realm or in research and 
training, were left out in the cold in reunified Germany, an outcome over which many, 
unsurprisingly, have expressed disappointment.125 In a world where the Cold War and its 
key characteristic of ideologically inspired systemic antagonism between East and West 
had been overcome, all sense of a distinct East German foreign policy expertise had been 
lost. 
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The development of a body of non-dogmatic foreign policy thought among East German 
experts and their break with a strict class-based approach to international relations—quite 
astonishing at first glance given the deserved reputation of the GDR, or at least the SED 
leadership, for strict ideological orthodoxy—appear l ss extraordinary when one takes 
into account the development of East German foreign policy expertise in its entirety. East 
German experts’ formulation in the 1980s of a conception of international relations that 
mirrored the Soviet New Thinking in important ways was propelled by a drive that 
stemmed from the very raison d’être of foreign policy expertise in the GDR and that 
represented one of its two essential characteristics—the imperative to produce sound 
analysis of international relations based upon specialist knowledge. This imperative 
existed alongside the imperative to uphold a “firm Marxist-Leninist perspective” and the 
two objectives taken together comprised the dual mission of East German foreign policy 
experts. This dual mission in turn derived from the defining feature of East German 
foreign policy expertise—subordination to the practical needs and political-ideological 
requirements of the SED leadership. The tension between intellectual autonomy and 
intellectual subordination produced by these two contrasting, if not fully contradictory, 
objectives became a permanent feature of foreign policy expertise in the GDR, where 
neither tendency would (or could) gain complete supremacy over the other, but where the 
center of gravity could shift in either direction. Specialist knowledge and professional 
competence steadily gained in importance over simplistic adherence to crude Marxist-
Leninist schema as the GDR’s system of foreign policy expertise became increasingly 
rationalized and professionalized until, in the 1980s, the preponderance of expert over the 
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ideological element became overwhelming. On this backdrop, consideration of the 
serious foreign policy challenges facing the GDR and the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s 
prompted East German foreign policy experts to recognize that sound assessment of 
international relations was not best served by application of rigid Marxist-Leninist 
categories. Instead of viewing international relations as expression of the inexorable class 
struggle, they prioritized the realpolitical interests of the GDR. 
 The institutional beginnings of East German foreign policy expertise were 
extremely modest as a system of expertise, like nearly verything else in the SOZ and the 
young GDR, had to be built up essentially from scratch. From the creation of the SED in 
1946 until the late 1950s/early 1960s, foreign policy in general and the institutional 
development of foreign policy expertise in particular possessed comparatively little 
importance for an SED preoccupied with the tasks of establishing itself as a Stalinist 
cadre party “of the new type,” cementing its exclusive control over East German politics 
and society, and moving ahead with “the construction of the foundations of socialism” in 
the GDR. The GDR’s near complete dependency on the Soviet Union in foreign policy 
paired with the diplomatic isolation imposed by West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine in 
the context of the Cold War conflict between socialist East and capitalist West further 
reinforced the SED’s relative neglect of foreign policy matters in the period. Under these 
conditions, the construction of a foreign policy app ratus and corresponding expert 
institutions proceeded in fits and starts and not according to a cohesive, long-term plan, 
but rather haphazardly in response to the shifting needs and priorities of the SED. The 
state and party organs created in the period were oriented toward satisfying the party’s 
immediate needs in the realm of international relations, consisting principally in 
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supplying essential information to provide basic foreign policy orientation, production of 
propaganda for domestic and foreign consumption, the creation of the “socialist foreign 
policy cadres” desired by the party leadership to staff its nascent foreign policy apparatus, 
and managing the still-limited foreign relations of party and state. While an array of 
institutions was created to carry out these tasks, a state of marked institutional 
underdevelopment prevailed in the GDR’s foreign policy apparatus throughout the 1950s, 
the main features of which were ineffectual leadership and deficient coordination 
between different bodies, unclear delineation of responsibilities, extreme ideologization 
and politicization, a shortage of material resources, and an acute lack of qualified 
personnel. The end result of the East German foreign policy apparatus’s institutional 
underdevelopment and the SED’s enduring cadre problem was a system of foreign policy 
expertise marked by grave deficiencies. 
 The quality of expertise produced in the course of the 1950s was consistent with 
this state of institutional (under)development, typically possessing little analytical value 
and generally being characterized by a combination of shrill ideological overstatement, 
unfounded wishful thinking, and a shortage of information that went much beyond basic 
facts. Most significant was the absence among experts of a comprehensive conception of 
the place of the GDR in the international arena that clearly delineated the GDR’s specific 
foreign policy interests. Although the 1950s saw the crystallization of the basic foreign 
policy facts that determined the geo-strategic situation facing the GDR—national 
division, diplomatic isolation, acute dependency on the Soviet Union, pronounced 
reliance on the Soviet Bloc—the prevailing institutional and cadre-related 
underdevelopment of the East German foreign policy apparatus prevented the full 
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enunciation and consistent expression of a comprehensive GDR-specific understanding 
of international relations among East German experts. 
 It was only in the course of the 1960s that the institutional and personnel 
prerequisites were fulfilled that would allow this deficit to be overcome. Starting already 
in the late 1950s, after Walter Ulbricht had cemented his position as unquestioned leader 
in East Germany, and in intensified manner after August 1961 behind the security and 
stability provided by the Berlin Wall, the SED leadrship directed its attention to the 
construction and coordination of foreign policy exprtise in a much more focused and 
systematic manner. The rationalization of the work of both operative institutions like the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the International Relations Division of the Central 
Committee and research and teaching institutions like the Institute for International 
Relations, the German Economic Institute, and the German Institute for Contemporary 
History went hand in hand with their full subordination to the practical needs and 
political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership. The process of rationalization 
in service of subordination was intended to bring about the complete “joining of theory 
with practice” (i.e. complete politicization and ideologization), where operative 
institutions and expert institutions would stand in a symbiotic relationship with one 
another and where the functional differentiation existing between these diverse 
institutions would be subsumed under the unity of purpose provided by unambiguous 
subordination to advancing the GDR’s centrally dictated foreign policy goals. By the end 
of the 1960s, this process had brought about the transformation of the hastily created 
patchwork of institutions arbitrarily reacting to mo entary exigencies and lacking 
thoroughgoing coordination inherited from the 1950s into a well-organized, increasingly 
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professional, and efficiently functioning system of f reign policy expertise where “the 
joining of theory with practice” had indeed largely been realized. 
 This institutional basis would in turn give rise to the enunciation of a 
comprehensive, GDR-specific conception of international relations among East German 
experts that fused identification of the GDR’s concrete geo-strategic interests with 
ideological precepts drawn from the Marxist-Leninist canon. Thus, the “clash of systems” 
(Systemauseinandersetzung) between socialism and capitalism represented the efining 
characteristic of international relations, foreign policy was a direct reflection of social 
system and accordingly a form of the class struggle (Außenpolitik als Klassenpolitik), all 
international relations developments possessed significance only insofar as they related to 
and impacted the so-called international constellation of forces (das internationale 
Kräfteverhältnis), which moved inexorably in favor of socialism, and the developing 
world correspondingly was viewed as “objectively anti-imperialist.” Further, the foreign 
policy interests of the GDR were understood as one and the same with the interests of an 
abstractly understood “international socialism,” which was embodied in concrete form by 
the Soviet Bloc. Owing to the peculiar foreign policy conditions facing East Germany 
into the first half of the 1970s—national division, diplomatic isolation, acute dependency 
on the Soviet Union, pronounced reliance on the Soviet Bloc—the GDR’s concrete 
foreign policy interests were uniquely compatible with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, 
to a degree unmatched in other Soviet satellite stas. East German experts’ GDR-specific 
understanding of international relations rested on strong objective foundations. 
 The process of rationalization that had established subordination to the practical 
needs and political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership as the defining feature 
 580
of East German foreign policy expertise and that had created the institutional framework 
necessary for experts’ enunciation of a GDR-specific Marxist-Leninist understanding of 
international relations, however, contained a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, East 
German experts were required to demonstrate compliance with the party line at all times 
and to apply Marxism-Leninism as the theoretical foundation of their work; on the other 
hand, they were expected to conduct their analysis on the basis of specialist knowledge 
and professional expertise in order to provide the party leadership with valuable 
information that could fruitfully be used in the formulation of foreign policy. The result 
of these contrasting objectives was a persistent tension between intellectual subordination 
and autonomy that lent foreign policy expertise in the GDR its own distinct 
developmental dynamic and decisively shaped its functio ing and output. Since this 
tension—not an absolute dichotomy—between the imperativ  to maintain a “firm 
Marxist-Leninist perspective” and the imperative to pr duce factual analysis of 
international relations based on specialist knowledge erived from the very raison d’être 
of East German foreign policy expertise, it became a p rmanent, unavoidable feature of 
foreign policy expertise. As long as the GDR remained largely excluded from the 
international order and its engagement with the outside world severely restricted, the 
preponderance of the ideological element over the exp rt element in East German foreign 
policy expertise was favored and the tension between th  two largely remained latent as 
diplomatic isolation facilitated and reinforced ideological dogmatism and intellectual 
insularity. 
 The effects of foreign policy normalization in the first half of the 1970s, however, 
upset this equation. The GDR’s establishment of diplomatic relations with the majority of 
 581
the world’s states after two decades of Hallstein Doctrine-imposed diplomatic isolation 
represented East Germany’s greatest foreign policy triumph, even if it issued much less 
from its own efforts than the broader shift to détente in East-West relations in the 1970s, 
and gained for the GDR the recognition of the non-scialist world it had so long sought in 
order to demonstrate its legitimacy to its own population and vis-à-vis its West German 
rival. East Germany no longer appeared as an artificial construct of the Cold War but 
rather as a “status quo” actor on the international stage theoretically equal to any other 
sovereign state. What this meant for East German foreign policy expertise was that the 
previously strong correlation between the objective conditions in which the GDR had to 
conduct foreign policy—national division, diplomatic isolation, acute dependency on the 
USSR, pronounced reliance on the Soviet Bloc—and a strict, dichotomous approach to 
international relations began to dissolve. The GDR was rid, for good or ill, of its previous 
insularity and was now fully exposed to the vagaries of international relations and the 
transition from imposed insularity to expansive foreign policy engagement would make 
impossible the high level of ideologization that thrived in the 1950s and 1960s by 
attenuating the strong correlation between the GDR’s specific interests and the 
dichotomous Marxist-Leninist conception of international relations that viewed socialism 
and capitalism as monolithic, contradictory blocs fighting out the inexorable class 
struggle on the international stage. 
 Along with the GDR’s integration into the international order came another key 
development that militated against ideological dogmatism in East German foreign policy 
expertise—greater exposure to and contact with the capitalist West. Starting in the 1970s 
and continuing into the 1980s, the Institute for Inter ational Relations and the Institute 
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for International Politics and Economics, the GDR’s two leading foreign policy research 
institutes, took up and maintained contact with scholars from analogous institutions in the 
capitalist West and thereby became integrated into a transnational network of foreign 
policy experts. Such contacts were intended to serve the dual goal of gaining valuable 
information from the West in order to produce a more accurate, refined picture of the 
complexities of contemporary international relations, of which the SED leadership could 
make use in its formulation of foreign policy, and offensively representing and 
substantiating the East German position on outstanding international relations issues in 
order to facilitate the successful implementation of GDR foreign policy by increasing 
acceptance for it abroad and thus became another element in the broader 
Spannungsverhältnis between the expert and the ideological in East German foreign 
policy expertise. While in the view of the SED leadrship such contacts were supposed to 
function exclusively as a one-way conduit of influenc  from East to West, the essential 
politicization, to which these contacts were unmistakably subjected, was ultimately 
incapable of producing this outcome since the very purpose of such contacts entailed 
learning from and about the West, where a realistic assessment of the situation clashed 
with a strict ideological approach. The simple act of engaging in a dialog with Western 
partners perforce led to a broadening of perspectiv that otherwise could not have taken 
place. As East German experts engaged in a dialog with their numerous and diverse 
Western partners, the bonds of the rigid, dogmatic understanding of international 
relations as the unfolding of the class struggle on the international stage that had been 
inherited from the pre-normalization era necessarily slackened as East German experts 
recognized that the complexities of contemporary international relations, of which they 
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were now gaining first-hand, often intimate knowledg , were a poor fit for a rigid class-
based approach to foreign affairs—integration into a ransnational network of foreign 
policy specialists facilitated a crucial “convergenc  with reality” among East German 
experts. 
 Concurrent with foreign policy normalization, a final push for the 
“systematization” of East German foreign policy exprtise took place and cemented 
subordination to the practical needs and political-ideological requirements of the 
leadership of the SED as the defining characteristic of East German foreign policy 
expertise, which would remain in place for the remainder of the GDR’s existence. Yet the 
successful “systematization” of East German foreign policy expertise, similar to the 
process of rationalization in service of subordination before it, brought with it an even 
greater emphasis on professionalization and specialization. In foreign policy research and 
training, the focus was placed on attaining ever higher levels of skill and qualification in 
order to maximizing their utility for foreign policy practice and in order to keep pace with 
the changing international relations challenges faced by the GDR, which following 
foreign policy normalization became incomparably more varied and complex than those 
accompanying the single-minded focus on diplomatic recognition of the pre-
normalization period. Marxism-Leninism lost none of its centrality as the ostensible 
theoretical foundation and practical template for foreign policy, yet it now was becoming 
the static, even stagnant, element in the equation while specialization and professionalism 
gained in dynamism and importance. The distance between the general Marxist-Leninist 
framework of foreign policy expertise and the concrete substance of specialized foreign 
policy analysis was growing greater and greater. And the gradual but unmistakable shift 
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of the center of gravity toward the expert element in foreign policy expertise was only 
reinforced by expansive international engagement as the new set of complex challenges 
facing the GDR demanded the skills and knowledge possessed only by foreign policy 
specialists. 
 However, the international relations developments of the détente era, extremely 
favorable for both the GDR and the broader Soviet Bloc, postponed East German experts’ 
recognition of the growing distance between the reality of the foreign relations they were 
charged with analyzing and the Marxist-Leninist postulates they were expected to apply. 
The two most important factors shaping the analytical output of experts had always been 
the institutional framework in which expertise was formulated and the state of the GDR’s 
foreign relations at any given moment in time. Up until foreign policy normalization, the 
internal constitution of expertise in the GDR had exercised a greater influence on expert 
output as the scope of GDR’s foreign relations remained highly circumscribed, which in 
turn restricted the potential scope of expert output—the tendency within East German 
expertise toward ideological dogmatism was only promoted and reinforced by diplomatic 
isolation. Foreign policy normalization brought about East Germany’s integration into the 
international order and thereby dramatically broadene  the scope and depth of its foreign 
relations. With the institutional framework of East German foreign policy expertise 
essentially fixed and its key characteristics firmly in place following the final 
“systematization” of expertise, all further changes within East German expertise itself 
would be in degree, not in kind. The GDR’s newly normalized international relations 
now became the more important element in the mix of factors affecting the output of East 
German foreign policy experts—expert output would henceforth shift in response 
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principally to the international relations developments East German experts were charged 
with analyzing. 
 This is why in the 1970s, despite the GDR’s integration into the international 
order as a more or less “status quo” international actor and despite the fact that the expert 
had already begun to overtake the ideological element within the GDR’s system of 
foreign policy expertise, East German experts’ GDR-specific conception of international 
relations that fused identification of the GDR’s con rete geo-strategic interests with 
ideological precepts drawn from the Marxist-Leninist canon experienced the highpoint of 
its development. The manner in which the GDR realizd its most ardently pursued 
foreign policy objective, where the attainment of nrmalization was inseparable from the 
détente-era achievements of the GDR’s superpower patron nd the entire Soviet Bloc, 
appeared to confirm rather than challenge East German experts’ ideologically inspired 
dichotomous understanding of international relations as defined by the 
Systemauseinandersetzung between socialist East and capitalist West. The acievement 
of foreign policy normalization as part of the broader gains made by “international 
socialism” in the period perpetuated the notion that e GDR’s interests were one and the 
same with the cause of international socialism and reinforced experts’ ideologized 
understanding of international relations since the entire process appeared to play out in 
conformity with the defining feature of that same understanding, namely, the fusion of 
the GDR’s realpolitical interests with the Marxist-Leninist notion of foreign policy as a 
form of the class struggle. Thus the perception of fundamental agreement between the 
GDR’s strategic interests and the foreign policy precepts of Marxism-Leninism reached 
its apogee among East German experts just as the strat gic situation in which the no 
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longer-isolated GDR found itself began to correspond less and less to a strict black-and-
white, ideological understanding of international relations and just as the expert began to 
outweigh the ideological element within East German foreign policy expertise.  
 Yet with the GDR irrevocably integrated into the international order and divested, 
for good or ill, of its previous insularity, East German experts were compelled to analyze 
and illuminate the GDR’s increasingly complex foreign relations without being able to 
retreat to ideological dogmatism. The foreign policy fortunes of the GDR were now 
subject to the vacillations of international relations as never before and, just as highly 
favorable foreign policy developments had reinforced the prevailing conceptual paradigm 
among experts in the 1970s, adverse developments could and almost necessarily had to 
elicit critical re-consideration of that same understanding, which claimed to explain not 
only individual events but also international relations in their entirety. 
 And this was exactly what occurred in the 1980s. Domestic stagnation paired with 
the capitalist West’s frontal challenge to the inter ational position of the Soviet Bloc in 
the form of the “second Cold War” provoked a critical re-assessment of the prevailing 
foreign policy paradigm among East German experts, who now became acutely aware of 
the growing distance between the reality of the forign relations they were charged with 
analyzing and the Marxist-Leninist postulates they w re expected to apply. In the first 
half of the 1980s, on some of the most central questions facing the GDR—the peace 
problematic, the strength and strategy of the capitalist West, economic development and 
political cohesion in the Soviet Bloc, relations with the developing world—experts often 
dispensed with application of ideologically derived axioms and instead adopted a 
pragmatic approach focused on the concrete realpolitical interests of the GDR. In the 
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context of this greater analytical refinement and differentiation, the basic Marxist-
Leninist categories were maintained, but they provided above all the general framework 
or façade, beneath the surface of which expertise became single-mindedly focused on 
how best to advance East German interests. As Marxism-Leninism’s value as an 
analytical tool appeared to decrease, the currency of the hallowed Marxist-Leninist 
principles of the prevailing understanding of interational relations fell as well. It was 
conceded that perhaps not all international relations events fit into the Marxist-Leninist 
framework, where the “clash of systems” between socialism and capitalism represented 
the defining characteristic of international relations. Issues like the preservation of peace, 
cooperation with non-communist states and parties, and economic development and the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts in the developing world, it was acknowledged, could 
transcend ostensible class interests and class boundaries and could correspondingly 
possess value in and of themselves, not only insofar as they related to and impacted the 
“international constellation of forces.” Yet the process of critical re-evaluation of the 
conceptual foundations of East German experts’ understanding of international relations 
proceeded piecemeal and unevenly in the first half of the 1980s—the existing paradigm 
was neither completely rejected nor was a comprehensiv  alternative to it fully 
enunciated. Rather, as the Marxist-Leninist façade remained in place, the results of expert 
analysis in individual areas tacitly yet with increasing clarity pointed to a mounting 
discrepancy between the reality of international relations and how Marxism-Leninism 
claimed that reality should look. 
 In the second half of the 1980s, the two key elements that had fostered the critical 
re-assessment of the first half of the decade were still in place—the preponderance of the 
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expert over the ideological within East German foreign policy expertise and the gravity 
of the unresolved foreign and domestic policy challenges facing the GDR and the entire 
Soviet Bloc—but Gorbachev’s accession to power in the Soviet Union added a new 
element to the mix. Although the SED leadership’s opposition to it somewhat dampened 
its impact in the GDR, the Gorbachev’s promulgation and adoption of the “New 
Thinking” in the Soviet Union, the “motherland of socialism” and the leader of the 
Eastern Bloc, nevertheless catalyzed East German experts’ questioning of the Marxist-
Leninist paradigm in foreign policy thought both by providing a favorable environment 
for its continued and intensified development and by offering an alternative conceptual 
model on the example of which previously disunified critical tendencies could be bound 
together into a cohesive whole. One this backdrop, as the results of empirical studies on 
individual topics repeatedly and unambiguously pointed to the incongruence of the 
existing interpretive framework with the existing state of international relations and the 
GDR’s place therein, the hallowed principles propping up the GDR-specific conception 
of foreign policy that fused the clearly delineated r alpolitical interests of the GDR with a 
class-based understanding of international relations were overturned one by one. 
Although East German experts’ critical re-evaluation of the conceptual foundations of the 
prevailing understanding of international relations largely lacked the comprehensive, 
cohesive character and the conscious rejection of iher ted foreign policy postulates 
characteristic of Soviet New Thinking, it by and large realized its essential thrust, the 
rejection of ideological dogmatism in foreign policy thought in favor of prioritization of 
realpolitical considerations. 
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 One must note, however, that the East German foreign policy experts who 
espoused a non-dogmatic understanding of foreign policy in the 1980s in no way rejected 
the GDR or socialism itself. On the contrary, they r mained completely loyal to “real-
existing socialism”1 as general worldview and the GDR as state.2 They acted in full 
accord with the training they had received and with the imperatives of the system they 
inhabited—providing specialist analysis of international relations in order to advance the 
specific foreign policy interests of the GDR. Their break with a rigid class-based 
conception of international relations was the natural result of bringing their accumulated 
expert knowledge to bear on the adverse foreign policy developments facing the GDR 
and the Soviet Bloc. As Marxism-Leninism proved less and less capable of offering true 
insight into the problems they were responsible for analyzing, East German experts 
distanced themselves from its dogmatic tenets and adopted a more flexible understanding 
in order to fulfill their designated charge of safeguarding and advancing the interests of 
the GDR in an international environment that was changing dramatically. While the 
outlook of East German foreign policy experts remained “ideological” in the broadest 
sense of the term, a rather generally defined “socialist” GDR operating within specific 
constraints and possessing certain interests superseded the narrow, Marxist-Leninist, 
class-based conception of international relations as the orientation point for expertise. 
Ingrid Muth has highlighted how this development was intimately connected with both 
professionalization and internationalization: “The ‘party functionary on diplomatic 
                                                 
1 The term “real-existing socialism” is instructive h re because it highlights how the state itself and its 
“real-existing” interests had supplanted adherence to Marxist-Leninist dogma as the locus of identificat on 
and orientation for East German foreign policy experts. 
2 The results of a survey of former East German Außenpolitiker after re-unification are revealing on this 
point as they clearly demonstrate that identification with a generally defined “socialist” East German state 
and its concrete interests far outweighed identification with abstract Marxist-Leninist dogma. Raimund 
Krämer and Wolfram Wallraf, “Diplomat oder Parteiarbeiter? Zum Selbstbild einer Funktionselite in der 
DDR,” Deutschland-Archiv 26 (1993): 326-334. 
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parquet,’ particularly after international recognition of the GDR in the mid-1970s, 
increasingly became a professional diplomat who out of conviction served his state and 
party to the best of his abilities. Until the end of the GDR, the overwhelming majority of 
employees in the foreign service felt themselves to be loyal representatives of their state 
who held doubts about many decisions of the SED leadership and on individual 
manifestations of the socialist model of society, yet hardly doubted the basic notion of 
socialism as an alternative, just vision for the future.”3 
 At the same time, however, it would clearly be an overstatement to declare, as 
some former employees of the East German foreign policy apparatus have,4 that 
perestroika and glasnost’ could have become known by their German names under 
different circumstances. Reformist currents among East German foreign policy experts 
never went as far (and could not got as far) as among their Soviet colleagues since both 
institutional and conceptual barriers existed in the GDR that limited, first, the 
crystallization of a full-fledged “East German New Thinking” that matched the 
comprehensiveness and thoroughgoingness of the Sovit original and, second, the 
adoption and implementation of a re-conceptualized foreign policy paradigm in practice. 
And just like East German experts’ break with a strict class-based approach to 
international relations itself, the existing institu onal and conceptual barriers were 
connected above all with specific East German conditions and concerns. 
 In terms of conceptual barriers, the basic geo-strategic situation faced by the GDR 
served as a key brake on the formulation of an “East German New Thinking.” No matter 
                                                 
3 Ingrid Muth, Die DDR-Außenpolitik 1949-1972. Inhalte, Strukturen, Mechanismen (Berlin: Ch. Links, 
2001), 194. 
4 Manfred Uschner, for instance, argues that this could have been the case had individuals like Werner 
Lamberz and Paul Markowski taken the reins of power in the GDR. Manfred Uschner, Die zweite Etage. 
Funktionsweise eines Machtapparates (Berlin: Dietz, 1993), 35. 
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how much latitude the GDR could obtain in the formulation of its foreign policy and no 
matter how much the characteristic Cold War feature of persistent, systemic antagonism 
might abate, East Germany was at no time fully freeof its dependency on the bloc leader, 
the Soviet Union, and close cooperation with other Soviet Bloc states. These elements 
after all comprised the existential foundations of the GDR that in turn provided the basic 
orientation for East Germany’s foreign relations, which stood at the center of East 
German experts’ analysis. The fact that the GDR comprised one half of the divided 
German nation and was located at the very forefront of the clash between socialist East 
and capitalist West only lent the situation additional volatility and created a tendency to 
resort to simplified ideological positions that simply did not exist to the same extent in 
other Soviet Bloc states, which were free of the problem of national division. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the Soviet Union, which as bloc leader was confronted with a 
hugely diverse set of foreign policy challenges andupon which the onus of finding 
innovate solutions lay, the GDR was a subordinate bloc member and the range of its 
foreign policy concerns was correspondingly much narrower. The formulation of bold 
new approaches to bloc-wide or cross-system problems was therefore much likelier to 
come from the superpower Soviet Union than the restricted GDR, which was in fact 
exactly what occurred in the 1980s. 
 As significant as these factors were, the single most important barrier to the 
development of a full-fledged East German New Thinking was the internal constitution 
of East German foreign policy expertise itself. While the dual mission of maintaining a 
“firm Marxist-Leninist perspective” and producing sound, specialist analysis of 
international relations—itself the result of the complete subordination of expertise to the 
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practical needs and political-ideological requirements of the SED leadership—led to the 
eventual preponderance of the expert over the ideological element in East German 
foreign policy expertise (which in turn propelled exp rts’ rejection of a strict class-based 
approach to international relations in the 1980s), the basic fact of subordination 
ultimately proved decisive in keeping this critical tendency within bounds. In the East 
German dictatorship, the sine qua non of employment in the East German foreign policy 
apparatus, irrespective of whether in a more operativ - or research-oriented position, was 
adherence to the given party line and submission to its will in practice. This led the 
GDR’s foreign policy experts to exercise a form of self-censorship of their actions and 
views so as not come into conflict with the prevailing position of the party leadership or 
to challenge its authority (a classic case of “Schere im Kopf”).5 In contrast to the situation 
in the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev enthusiastically t pped the critical potential 
accumulated within the Soviet system of foreign policy expertise and actively promoted 
its implementation in foreign policy practice, an East German version of Gorbachev was 
sorely lacking—the “dynamic, innovative leadership” indispensable for the actualization 
of the New Thinking in the USSR was absent in the GDR.6 Erich Honecker and the top 
leadership of the SED viewed maintenance of the ideologically inspired fundamental 
antagonism between East and West as imperative and resolutely opposed dilution of the 
strict Abgrenzung (demarcation) separating the two blocs from one another and East 
                                                 
5 Numerous former East German Außenpolitiker have personally attested to this. Joachim Krüger, interview 
by author, Berlin, Germany, 23 April 2008; Erhard Crome, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, 14 May 
2008; Jochen Franzke, interview by author, Potsdam, Germany, 16 July 2008; Hans-Georg Schleicher, 
interview by author, Berlin, Germany, 16 December 2009; Siegfried Bock, interview by author, Berlin, 
Germany, 21 July 2009. 
6 Robert English has highlighted how “crisis” in the 1980s created an opportunity for reform in the USSR 
but was not sufficient in and of itself to guarantee r form—for that, a willing leadership was required. 
Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of the Cold War 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 3. 
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Germany from West Germany. It thus should not have come as a surprise, when they 
placed themselves in strict opposition to the New Thinking and Gorbachev’s other 
reformist initiatives shortly after they were annouced. The catalyzing effect 
Gorbachev’s promulgation of the New Thinking had on the critical tendency within East 
German foreign policy expertise was thereby partially counterbalanced as explicit support 
for the application of New Thinking principles to East German foreign policy then came 
to entail opposition to the party line.  
 The story of East German foreign policy expertise hus also tallies with Catherine 
Epstein’s explication of East German history through a biographical approach to the SED 
leadership. The GDR, she describes, was decisively shaped by the Stalinist old guard 
which held power for the duration of the state’s existence and which, on the basis of their 
particular life experiences, could only view the world in the Marxist-Leninist categories 
of class struggle.7 This generation’s monopoly on power in the GDR stunted the 
development of an “East German New Thinking” among reform-oriented foreign policy 
experts, who had internalized the image of the “statu  quo” GDR and who in their vast 
majority (though not exclusively) belonged to the younger generation, and effectively 
precluded its translation into policy. As Max Schmidt, director of the Institute for 
International Politics and Economics (IPW) 1973-1990, put it before the Bundestag’s 
Enquete-Kommission: “By all means, there was an alternative thinking (alternatives 
Denken) [in our work]…. What was ultimately missing was implementation.”8 
                                                 
7 Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and their Century (Cambridge, MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
8 “Zeitzeugen: ‘Strategie und Taktik der SED in den in erdeutschen Beziehungen,’” in Materialien der 
Enquete-Kommission “Aufarbeitung von Geschichte und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland” vol. 5: 
Deutschlandpolitik (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1995), pt. 1, p. 897. 
 594
 In light of the significant conceptual and institutions barriers to the development 
of a full-fledged “East Germany New Thinking” that existed, it was that much more 
remarkable that East German foreign policy experts in he 1980s enunciated in the place 
of the Marxist-Leninist class-based approach a body of non-dogmatic foreign policy 
thought that displayed key parallels to the Soviet N w Thinking. 
 With that said, the story of East German foreign policy experts is not without its 
share of irony as those experts who broke with the Marxist-Leninist paradigm were not 
cognizant of the fact that thoroughgoing implementation of such principles in practice 
would likely lead to the end of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe9 and, in light of 
flagging domestic support, would result in the incorporation of the GDR into the FRG—
the exact fate East German leaders had unswervingly struggled to prevent for the 
previous four decades. The experts in this respect essentially moved beyond the Cold 
War in their thinking, failing to realize that, despite its domestic and international 
achievements, the GDR remained a creation of the Cold War: the rump of the artificially 
divided German nation that was existentially dependent on the support of the Soviet 
Union and reliant on the Soviet Bloc’s unity of action. And it was only in such conditions 
that the GDR could survive. As a “normal” foreign policy actor, East Germany was not a 
viable state—as soon as the Cold War ended, so too did the existence of the GDR. 
                                                 
9 Brown’s account of the Soviet New Thinking reveals  parallel situation when he attributes to Gorbachev 
a “misplaced confidence in the reformability of theSoviet system which enabled him to embrace new ideas 
far more boldly than any previous general secretary.” Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 96. 
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